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ABSTRACT
State-Corporate Social Development in South Africa:
The Role of the State in Advancing Corporate Social
Engagement
The contemporary South African state seeks to ensure economic growth and global 
competitiveness whilst simultaneously redressing apartheid legacies. These are its twin 
imperatives to effect social and economic transformation.
This thesis advances the framework of State-Corporate Social Development (SCSD) to 
describe and explain policies developed by the post-apartheid government to regulate 
the social and economic practices of business, and policies adopted by businesses in 
response. The thesis explores state-market dynamics as these relate to policies 
promoting black economic empowerment (BEE) in South Africa. Against this broad 
policy rubric, the research explores, within a wider nexus of stakeholder relationships, 
the interactions between business and government with reference to two sectors: 
investment companies and tourism.
Extensive legislative and institutional mechanisms have been established to ensure a 
business environment conducive to government’s political agenda. A key driver is the 
imperative to accelerate the integration of black South Africans into the economic 
mainstream through BEE policies. The state uses multiple levers to offer incentive or 
apply sanction. It is shown that the state, as a major consumer of goods and services, is 
itself a primary agent in transforming socio-economic patterns along market principles. 
SCSD also includes the response of business to evolving policy and environmental 
conditions. These responses vary according to the business size, nature, sector and value 
placed on various stakeholding relationships.
The thesis employs stakeholder and social contract theory, and qualitative methods, 
including 135 interviews, to develop and explain SCSD as it pertains to BEE. Using 
formal and informal social contracts, it is shown how BEE policy shifted from 
emphasising equity ownership to a broader-based strategy. The strategy relies on multi­
stakeholder relationships and drivers offering economic market-based incentives. The 
thesis draws conclusions regarding the centrality of the state in providing incentives for
corporate social development policy in South Africa. It also suggests broader policy 
lessons relevant to state-corporate relations and the viability of the SCSD approach.
Ill
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CSI Corporate social investment
CSP Corporate social policy
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CSSR Corporate social and sustainability reporting
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa
DE AT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DFI Development Finance Institution
DLA Department of Land Affairs
DoL Department of Labour
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
FAWU Federated Allied Workers’ Union
FDI foreign direct investment
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GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNU Government of National Unity
hdi historically disadvantaged individuals
HDSA historically disadvantaged South Africans
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Icasa Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
ICT information, communications and technology
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange
ERA Labour Relations Act
MIC Mineworkers Investment Company
MICE Meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions
MIT Mineworkers Investment Trust
MLC Millennium Labour Council
MNC Multinational Corporations
MRI Medical Research Institute
NAFCOC National African Federated Chambers of Commerce
NALEDI National Labour and Economic Development Initiative
NAIL New Africa Investments Limited
NBI National Business Initiative
NEC National Empowerment Consortium
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEF National Empowerment Fund
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NPB National Parks Board
NSA National Skills Authority
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
Numsa National Union of Metal Workers
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
pdi previously disadvantaged individuals
PFI Public Finance Institution
PHC Protea Hospitality Corporation
PPP Public Private Partnerships
PPT Pro-poor tourism
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
RETOSA Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa
RIF Rural Investment Fund
SAA South African Airways
Saccawa South African Commercial and Allied Workers’ Union
SACOB South African Chamber of Business
SACP South African Communist Party
Sactwu South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SANP South African National Parks
SARB South African Reserve Bank
Sarhwu South African Railway and Harbour Workers’ Union
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SARS^ South Africa Revenue Service
SCSD state-corporate social development
SDI Spatial Development Initiative
SEAR Social and ethical auditing and reporting
SEE Risk Social, ethical and environmental risk
SEED Social Economic and Environmental Development Unit
SETA Sector Education and Training Authority
SMEs Small and medium enterprises
SMMEs Small, medium and micro enterprises
SOE State owned enterprises
SPY Special Purpose Vehicles
SRI Socially Responsible Investment
STD Sexually Transmitted Disease
TAG Treatment Action Campaign
TBCSA Tourism Business Council of South Africa
TBL Triple bottom line
TEP Tourism Enterprise Programme
THETA Tourism and Hospitality Education and Training Authority
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRM Total Responsibility Management
TUIC trade union investment company
UAH Union Alliance Holdings
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO World Tourism Organisation
WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council
LIST OF LEGISLATION
Nedlac Act 35 of 1994
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
National Gambling Act 33 of 1996
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Act 108 of 1996
Development Bank of Southern Africa Act 13 of 1997
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
Skills Development Act 97 of 1998
National Empowerment Fund Act 105 of 1998
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999
Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999
World Heritage Convention Act 49 of 1999
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000
Minerals and Petroleum Development Act 28 of 2002
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The concern in this thesis is the specific and dynamic relationship between the state 
and the market in extending social and economic goods, as well as opportunities in 
contemporary society. Using the social development perspective, I have posited a 
refined and particular framework to describe and explain the drivers established by 
government and responses of corporations to a given social and economic milieu. I 
have called this framework state-corporate social development (SCSD). In 
highlighting the institutional relationships extant between the state and the market, I 
seek to understand what occurs when corporate social engagement is viewed through 
a social development lens. The thesis also seeks to theorise the state-market dynamic 
in a context of shifting expectations regarding the state - locally and globally - and 
the state’s obligations to manage social need and ensure social well-being. The 
argument for the state-corporate social development (SCSD) framework is premised 
on the purposeful and proactive engagement of multiple institutions - specifically the 
state and market - in promoting economic outcomes that are socially responsible and 
which seek to promote social justice.^
This focus is relevant to social policy in the early twenty-first century on several 
counts. First, the role of the state has changed; this is not only true of advanced 
capitalist countries but also of developing countries (Esping-Andersen 1996). The 
partial retrenchment of the state and its role as a coordinator rather than provider of 
services have meant decentralisation and sharing of traditional functions, including 
the promotion of welfare (Batley 1996, 1996a; Davey 1993; Le Grand, Propper, and 
Robinson 1992; Taylor-Gooby 1998). An extensive literature reflects how advanced 
capitalist states (which provide models of social welfare) have grappled in recent 
years with the evolving role of the state. Increasingly, distribution of social resources 
has relied on a dynamic interrelationship between the private and the public sectors.
’ Whilst environmental responsibility is a critical issue in social development, it is consciously 
excluded from the concerns of this thesis. In addition, multinational corporations (MNCs) and their 
impact on social and economic well-being across the globe, fair-trade issues and the issue of global 
supply chains are also excluded.
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The literature concerned with social policy still gives credence to the near-ubiquitous 
conception of the state as the natural and primary social policy institution for the 
provision of social well-being. However, this is being challenged in practice and 
nowhere more clearly than in South Africa through policies promoting black 
economic empowerment (BEE) and corporate social development, which form the 
empirical focus of the present research.
Structure of the chapter
This chapter is structured in two parts. The first part introduces the core research 
framework, state-corporate social development (SCSD). Before advancing the 
framework, the thesis establishes its intellectual and ideological context. The 
framework extends a social development perspective and focuses specifically on the 
interventionist and institutional aspects in the state-market relationship in promoting 
social well-being. State-corporate social development offers a coherent framework 
for the interrogation of the state-market dyad, as well as existing conceptions of the 
social engagement of business. The chapter proceeds with an investigation of the 
social role of business, placing corporate social engagement in relation to attendant 
concepts such as corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship. In so 
doing, it utilises but goes beyond the extensive literature on business-societal 
relations. Continuing the focus on corporations, it is suggested that this literature 
prompts discussion of the ideological basis of arguments around the social 
engagement of business. It also discusses corporate motivations for the same. The 
first part concludes with a discussion of the relationship between social development 
and social justice with business acting as intermediary. The second part of the 
chapter presents the study itself and outlines the methodology in detail. After stating 
the research questions, the thesis briefly situates the research in the political context 
of South Africa. Finally, the chapter concludes by suggesting the anticipated 
contributions and limitations of the research.
Part One: Towards an appropriate social policy
Social policy, as a set of interventions and an academic discipline, is concerned with 
the range of intentions and activities which create mechanisms to manage social 
need. Social policy involves the delivery of goods and services for social well-being
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(Baldock et al. 1999; Huby 1998, p.3; Manning 1998).^ Whilst the state remains the 
fulcrum for such delivery, contemporary social policy has sought to extend the array 
of institutional actors involved in social delivery to include the market and society, 
alongside the state (Batley 1996; Davey 1993; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996; Le 
Grand and Estrin 1989; Le Grand 2000).
Without entering into a lengthy discussion of the typologies of social policy or its 
evolution,^ it is nonetheless useful to highlight three pertinent issues. First, key 
debates informing contemporary social policy relate to the interface between the state 
and non-state actors and their administrative or organisational mechanisms for the 
delivery of welfare benefits.^ Another issue is the integration of the norms and values 
of state and non-state institutions as to what socially desirable objectives might be, 
and what interventions are likely to achieve these ends. This last point suggests an 
accord or compact regarding envisioned societal outcomes and the relationship 
between multiple institutions. It also points to the notion that interventions reflect the 
dominant political ideas about social responsibility. Finally, an underlying value of 
social policy is that of social justice: this being the question of who gets what and by 
what means (Taylor-Gooby 1998, p.39).
Social policy has historically been socially ameliorative or remedial, whether 
targeted at specific groups or universal in nature (Midgley 200Id, p.28; Hardiman 
and Midgley 1982). Some have argued that because of the intertwining of social 
policy with political economy^ and the ideological nature of the project, social policy 
may fail to achieve social justice (Squires 1990). In this criticism, the state is at best 
paternalistic; markets, as a device for social well-being, are inequitable. Social policy
 ^ Social Policy usually encompasses the ‘big five’ areas of social security benefits or pensions, 
housing, education, health and social services (Huby 1998, p.2; Midgley 1997, p.7). In developing 
countries, social benefits may also include access to clean water and sanitation, as well as nutritional 
assistance as part of social delivery (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2002a).
 ^Most texts on social policy trace the development of the welfare state, as well as its extant forms 
globally. Among others see (Alcock, Erskine, and May 1998; Baldock et al. 1999; Esping-Andersen 
1996, 1990; Midgley 1995, 1997; O'Brien and Penna 1998; Pierson 1998; Hall and Midgley 2004 
forthcoming).
Examples of narket provision of welfare include private pensions, public-private partnerships and 
market socialism (Le Grand and Estrin 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990). Quasi-market provisions such 
as social security and provident programmes are based on employee contributions but are not 
universal (Midgley and Tracey 1996).
5 Political economy is understood here as the political aspects of economic policy-making both at a 
national and international level.
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may simply reflect historical priorities and attitudes (Hall and Midgley 2004 
forthcoming). Importantly for this thesis, James Midgley points out that social policy 
has been criticised for failing to address the necessary economic questions associated 
with social welfare. He sees social policy as subsidiary to and dependent on the 
economy for funding (Midgley 1995, p.63) and critiques the idea that social policy 
and the economy are wholly discrete and not mutually reinforcing. Midgley argues 
for a more developmental approach which ‘dynamically and purposefully 
harmonise(s) economic and social objectives within a wider development process’ 
(Midgley 1995, p.l). Midgley’s most recent work is explicitly concerned with the 
interface of social policy and development, especially with regard to addressing 
poverty and social exclusion in developing country contexts (Hall and Midgley 2004 
forthcoming).^ Linked to development, social policy (re)emphasises the role of the 
state (and other institutions) in ensuring secure incomes and livelihood.
Social development: marrying social and economic development
While social policy might be a point of departure, social development constitutes the 
core perspective from which to develop my own framework of SCSD. I have used 
Midgley’s work on social development extensively in this discussion and have 
precised his thesis here.
Midgley defines social development as ‘a process of planned social change designed 
to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a 
dynamic process of economic development’ (Midgley 1995, p.25). This dual focus 
on the economic and the social is the most critical element of the social development 
perspective. He defines welfare as the condition of human well-being which is 
ensured when social problems are managed, human needs are met and social 
opportunities are maximised (Midgley 1997, p.4-6). The integration or harmonisation 
of social and economic interventions is critical to social development’s goal of 
promoting social well-being.
 ^ Social policy has evolved in developing country contexts to refer to ‘questions of sources and 
stability of employment, support institutions, processes and structures that determine people’s well­
being as well as broader natural and political factors which encourage and constrain human 
development’ (Hall and Midgley 2004 forthcoming, p.9 manuscript).
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Below, I present six features of social development which must necessarily be made 
explicit before I can utilise this perspective as a springboard for a new framework. 
First, social development is a developmental approach to promoting social well-being 
(Midgley 1997, p. 180). As such, it is cognisant of the wider social and economic 
realities in which policies are developed. The key attribute of its developmental 
character is that social and economic aspects are viewed as ‘two sides of the same 
coin’ (Midgley 1995, p.21). Second, social development is a planned intervention. 
The state, although not necessarily acting alone, plays a leading role in proactively 
directing social and economic strategies for the promotion of social well-being. Until 
relatively recently, advocating state intervention contradicted global economic 
philosophy - promoted by the World Bank and global investment capital - which held 
state intervention as antithetical to economic growth, and efficient and effective 
government (Midgley 2001a, p.241; Propper 1998; Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs 1997, 
p .ll;  Deacon 1998; See World Bank 1997 for reinsertion of the state). By contrast, 
the social development framework
[R]ejects the idea that social improvements occur naturally as a result of
the workings of the economic market .... Instead, organised efforts are
needed to bring about improvements in social welfare (Midgley 1995,
p.26).
In advancing a unified socio-economic planning model which seeks to promote 
redistribution with growth and ensuring basic needs, social development ‘rest(s) on 
the assumption that governments should be responsible for promoting social 
development’ (Midgley 1995, p.60). Indeed, governments are perceived to have a 
critically important role in creating the enabling conditions - at minimum an enabling 
institutional infrastructure and developing human capacity - for the strategic 
implementation of economic and social development (Stiglitz 2001, p.346). 
Additional interventions include economic policies that enhance social well-being, 
the creation of aligned institutions that promote socio-economic integration, and the 
implementation of strategies that mobilise human and social capital (and investment 
therein) such that they contribute positively to economic growth (Midgley 1995; 
Moser 1998; Karger and Midgley 1994, p. 276-286; Sen 1985). Rather than direct 
redistribution, social investment (primarily by the state) in human capital seeks to 
diminish citizens’ reliance on the state (Esping-Andersen 2001). Rather than a
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retrenchment of welfare, social investment expenditures contribute to economic 
development (Midgley and Tan 2001, p.246).
Third, social development represents an institutional perspective. In seeking to 
harness economic development with social goals, it seeks to mobilise major 
institutions - the state, market and society - to ensure these ends. The successful 
promotion of social development sees the state playing a leading role in integrating 
economic and social objectives. Utilising the market, community and public sector, 
the state’s ‘activist role’ is described as managed pluralism (Midgley 1995, p. 10, 
p.l39; Miah and Tracey 2001, p.61). The notion that the state manages or 
coordinates a plurality of strategies and interests (or multiple competing stakeholder 
interests) is a sustained theme in this thesis.
Fourth, in mobilising institutions, social development may be corporatist in 
character. Governments may seek to create compacts between various social partners 
and institutions (such as organised labour and business) to ameliorate conflict, effect 
economic planning and promote social well-being. Moreover, such arrangements are 
driven by agreements and compacts aimed at promoting the interests of all parties 
(Midgley 1995, p. 148).
Fifth, social development generally promotes universalistic or inclusive policies 
rather than targeted social welfare (Midgley 1995; Midgley and Tan 2001; Midgley 
1997, p. 182). However, social development policies are context-sensitive; some 
social development perspectives use positive discrimination in redistribution. 
Governments may use economic, fiscal or social policies to redirect resources to 
particular people (Midgley 1995, p. 156). Indeed, social development lends itself to 
contexts requiring the removal of institutionalised obstacles to people’s economic 
participation and to providing targeted social investment, such as the case of 
affirmative action (Midgley and Tan 2001, p.250; Midgley 200le, pp. 165-166)
Lastly, the theoretical underpinning of social development is a political economy 
approach (Midgley 1995, p.34). The fi-amework is thus anchored in normative values 
which have ideological roots and the redistribution of resources is invariably a basic 
requirement of social development (Midgley 1995, p.l25; 200le, p.l58; 2001c).
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Those critical of planned or state intervention on one side of the spectrum, as well as 
those opposed to the mobilisation of the market for redistributive purposes on the 
other, are ambivalent about social development’s normative stance. Nonetheless, 
social development cannot be divorced from thinking about contemporary political 
economy, or from the contexts in which social and economic needs and opportunities 
are managed. Indeed, a political economy approach raises anticipated ideological 
criticism from neo-liberals. Social development has been criticised as ‘controversial’, 
‘utopian’, ‘too wide-ranging to be meaningftil’ and theoretically undeveloped, and 
possibly open to right-wing manipulation, especially given the emphasis placed on 
labour market participation (Rainford 2001, p.55).^ Nevertheless, as a framework for 
policy analysis it is useful and often appropriate for real world policy interventions. 
It is in this context that is harnessed here in relation to state-corporate social 
development in South Africa.
State-corporate social development
Of particular relevance in formulating the SCSD framework, are interventionist and 
institutionalist aspects of social development. I define state-corporate social 
development as a framework for planned and strategic change for social well-being, 
in which economic development and social development are integrated and mutually 
supportive in a context-specific environment, and where the state is the chief driver 
and the market its primary co-partner in achieving social goals. The state’s role is 
critical in driving social investment and ensuring an environment in which obstacles 
are removed and opportunities enhanced for economic participation. Here, social and 
economic strategies are used in concert to promote social well-being. In reinforcing 
the state’s relationship with another institution, namely the market, SCSD explicitly 
addresses the state-market dyad. In elevating the market and privileging the dynamic
’ Social development has not been systematically adopted globally but has acquired currency in 
mainstream institutions. The agenda has been driven in recent years by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) agencies (Midgley 1995, p.lO, p.67; 
2001c; Hall and Midgley 2004 forthcoming; Tang and Midgley 2002), These institutions have 
promoted integrative economic (even ‘market-friendly’) planning usually with community 
participation to enhance social welfare (Midgley 2001a, p.245; Midgley and Tan 2001). The World 
Bank uses a social development framework in promoting socio-economic well-being (Hardiman and 
Midgley 1982; Midgley 1997, p.185-187; 1995, p.l06; Violett 2003). The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopt 
rights-based, social protection policies which emphasise security of employment and social protection 
for vulnerable groups (Tang and Midgley 2002).
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relationship between the state and market, the framework does not devalue the state’s 
relationship with other institutions such as the community (civil society including 
international development agencies) for the achievement of social goals.* Its gaze is 
simply narrowed to the key institutional actors.
Central to the notion of SCSD’s conception of the market is a broad definition of 
what constitutes business enterprises. As is argued in the following chapter, these 
market institutions lie along the spectrum with many ‘businesses’ having both public 
and private characteristics. Businesses may be described as being simultaneously 
‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions. SCSD argues a conception of business 
activity in both traditionally private and public spheres. In the first instance, 
commercial enterprises are expected to deliver a return on investment in the form of 
dividends and capital growth. These are conventional for-profit enterprises. In the 
second, such as in the case of public institutions like state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
which operate along business-like principles, the institution follows an economic 
model in which the enterprise is engaged in the capital market but as a sustainability 
measure. Here, the imperative is for cost recovery rather than capital accumulation.
The above definition of SCSD identifies the key characteristics of the perspective. In 
addition, this conception of SCSD can be distinguished from definitions of social 
development in three ways. First, its interest centres on the state’s multiple strategies 
and social and economic policies, and how corporate entities, in turn, respond to 
these. This conception of social development is not primarily concerned with the 
delivery of the ‘big five’ social goods, whether by the state or by intermediaries. The 
SCSD framework assumes a state which is responsive to citizens’ social needs and 
the protection of vulnerable groups through social goods and services. Instead, within 
the context of a resource- or capacity-poor state, the framework seeks to extend the 
purview of institutions that have social responsibility in a social contract. The 
framework concentrates on the mutual obligations of social partners. These 
institutions, in concert, are concerned with removing obstacles, creating
* The participation of communities in social change is a core tenet of current development agendas, 
and of social development in particular (Midgley 1986; Hall and Midgley 1988; Midgley 2001c, 
p.48). In this framing of state-corporate social development, community participation is somewhat 
peripheral to the specific relational dynamic of state and market. It does, however, play a significant 
role in the creation of social cohesion and social compacts (Midgley 2001e, p.162-163).
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opportunities and mobilising social and economic assets productively for social well­
being.
Second, the state’s role is central in directing or driving markets in respect of social 
objectives. At an abstract level, the market is a coherent though heterogeneous 
institution although its economic actors and end-beneficiaries are often individuals. 
State-corporate social development is both an institutionalist and individualist 
approach in respect of the fact that the state-market dyad creates a set of particular 
conditions conducive to the emergence of enterprise, and the fact that individuals 
have to mobilise their own resources and efforts in response.^ Stoesz advances a 
radical view of such an enterprise approach: ‘bootstrap capitalism’ argues that 
poverty will be eliminated and upward mobility secured if social policy ensures the 
economic participation of individuals (Stoesz 2000).'° Aligned to the enterprise 
approach to social development, a ‘productivist’ approach places emphasis on more 
efficient social investment to produce ‘positive rates of return’ not only to the 
beneficiary individuals but to the economy and society as a whole (Midgley and Tan 
2001; Midgley 200le, p. 162; 1997, p. 196; Tang and Midgley 2002). Again, whilst 
the market and entrepreneurship are critical to the SCSD framework, a laissez-faire 
market position which abrogates state intervention is not advocated.
Lastly, whilst it is assumed that social development requires redistributive social and 
economic policies, SCSD redirects resources using the market as a redistributive 
mechanism. As an instrument for advancing development, the market has the 
capacity to deliver extensive benefits whether economic, social and environmental. 
What is highly significant is the potential that economic patterns are positively 
altered, with attendant social consequences. Consequent shifts in economic and 
social distribution are defined by the context in which they occur.
 ^ This is not to say that individuals are alone responsible for their welfare or that poverty or 
deprivation are a result of the inadequacies or maladjustment of individuals (Hardiman and Midgley 
1982). Rather, given enabling conditions, the approach to social development relies on the labour, 
increased economic participation and entrepreneurial assets of individuals.
In the United States, these policies have found expression in ‘welfare-to-work’ programmes.
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A question of ideology
State-market relations inevitably raise the issue of ideology in contemporary political 
economy. Social development, particularly when advanced with a strong market and 
entrepreneurial orientation, has its philosophical roots in left liberalism and social 
democratic ideology (Miah and Tracey 2001, p.58; Rainford 2001, p.51)." 
Importantly, SCSD does not interrogate the legitimacy of state intervention or 
regulation, but rather questions how this is done, in whose interest and to what end. 
There are two levels at which this issue needs to be explored, the first being at the 
level of the state and the second at the level of the corporation.
In a social development model, the primacy of the state is underscored and, in the 
SCSD ft-amework the state is similarly ‘interventionist’ or ‘directive’. Both the 
radical left and right oppose social planning though for different reasons (Hardiman 
and Midgley 1982, p.27-28; Midgley 1997, p. 199). For the right, an inviolable 
laissez-faire state is seen to protect the market from political intrusion and ensure 
economic development (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 14; Midgley and Tan 2001, 
p.244). For the left, class and social divisions may be further entrenched (Pierson 
1998, p.23, p.53). Neither of these radical positions finds resonance in this thesis. 
Rather, the state has to be strong enough to provide effective steering for the 
promotion of social development as well as social justice (Giddens 2001, p.6).
Linked to the role of the state, the second level of ideological interrogation relates to 
the market. The balance of state and market in economic policy which is socially 
responsible raises the question of how the corporation is seen, to whom it is seen to 
be accountable, by what mandate, for what purpose and in whose interest. Many 
large corporations are extremely powerful entities. Their power is pronounced in 
the context of capitalist ascendancy, the free-flow of people and capital, increased
“ The underlying political and ideological debates of state-corporate social development relate to 
liberalism and are discussed further in Chapter Two.
Oft cited global statistics pointing to the influence of companies are illuminating. Of the 100 largest 
economies in the world, 51 are corporations. Wal-Mart, for example, is only 42"** on the overall list, 
yet has revenues larger than the GDP of 161 countries. Ford is larger than South Afnca’s economy 
(http://www.united-church.ca/tsj/pdf/10.pdf).
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technological advancement and the internationalisation of capital (Korten 1995; 
Punch 1996; Hutton 1997)/^
Whilst I argue the increasing acceptability of - even pressure for - corporate 
engagement, the business'environment is oftentimes ideologically hostile to the 
proposition of corporate social engagement. There are three general objections to the 
proposition of corporate social engagement. First, classical liberals see the state and 
market as divergent and exclusive. The (amoral) market self-corrects and regulates 
society through patterns of supply and demand. The corporation in this schema is 
autonomous, and has a fiduciary responsibility only to its shareowners or 
shareholders (Longstreth and Rosenbloom 1973). Classical liberals argue that the 
market must remain autonomous and free of normative values inherent in social 
engagement. Should value imposition occur, social engagement ‘violates the basic 
tenets of inquiry and action that are essential to creating wealth’ (Walsh 1999).
A second objection, which considers the role of the state quite differently, suggests 
that it is unfair to demand social engagement by corporations. Responsibility for 
social development lies solely with the state, which is the only legitimate instrument 
for redistribution and social remedy (Longstreth and Rosenbloom 1973).
The third objection cites economic reasons. Proponents argue that successful 
business equals functioning in a highly competitive environment. The business gears 
resources to signals interpreted from that environment. The fundamental concerns of 
management are centred on corporate survival, continuity, power, reputation and 
profits (Meyer and Zucker, 1967, in Punch 1996). Economic imperatives alone drive 
this conception of business. Contemporary commerce is characterised by an 
increasingly heavy accent on efficiency and functionality: ‘corporations cannot act 
other than in the corporate interest. Altruism or philanthropy are concepts that do not 
exist in an entrepreneur’s vocabulary’ (Wempe 1998). This competitive position
In the case of many developing countries, weak states may not be strong enough to revoke the 
privileges of malfeasant companies in the face of such disproportionate power.
In traditional terms, business is defined as economic activity with the purpose of maximising profits 
on investment, competitiveness through efficiency and investment to ensure the sustainability of the 
enterprise. This is a narrow interpretation of business, and one that is broadly reflected in any business 
or management text.
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requires an intense focus on efficiency and profit; any moral choices, it is argued, 
increase costs and may affect the growth and survival of the corporation (Wempe 
1998). The economic argument against corporate social responsibility (CSR) is that it 
consumes resources, compromises directorial duty and may put socially irresponsible 
competitors at an advantage.
Contextual sympathy: swinging the pendulum
Positions antagonistic to social engagement by business are becoming less politically 
acceptable as contemporary society makes more urgent demands on the corporation. 
The nature of the capitalist political economy and its social milieu has altered (Sethi 
1974; Waddock, Bodwell, and Graves 2002). In a context of globalised capital, 
corporations are recognised as potentially powerful social actors because of the 
wealth generated and also their impact on economies - locally, nationally, regionally 
and transnationally (Held 2001). Social costs are essentially unaltered even though 
economies appear more ‘fluid and volatile than ever’ (Held 2001, p.395). However, 
the demand is now for a more equitable allocation of these costs among all 
institutions, most notably the market (Sethi and Swanson 1981; Taylor-Gooby 2000).
Whilst the demands for corporate social, environmental and ethical responsibility are 
more strident, the exact quality and extent of this responsibility remains unclear. In 
both developed and developing countries, large corporations claim responsible 
citizenship and social engagement as core values and standard practice. Globally, 
relatively few companies validate these claims through external audits. This is 
despite the emergence of a number of voluntary codes and standards, and a plethora 
of reporting guidelines such as the Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, 
AAIOOO, ISO 14000 and the SA8000 which monitors labour standards (Zadek 2001; 
McIntosh et al. 2003; Hamann 2003). The motivations for engagement are various. 
These are discussed in detail below but what is clear is that engagement is uneven 
and context-driven. Values determining social engagement may well be embedded in 
business practice and at the core of business rationale, or they may well be platitudes 
aimed at public relations and reputation management.
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Hence, the definition of SCSD is flexible to the idea that social policy circumstances 
and contexts are continually changing: social needs and appropriate interventions 
change over time and between places. Who determines policy and how these are 
implemented through strategies is by no means a simple and uncontested matter. In 
this context of skewed institutional power, SCSD emerges an important aspect of 
overall social well-being and socio-economic development but not necessarily a 
sufficient one.
In this thesis, the question is not whether corporations engage in social development 
in concert with the state, or whether corporate engagement is compatible with the 
market, but what form it takes. This requires further discussion that will address the 
motivations for companies’ social engagement, and the ways in which it is 
implemented. Using the SCSD framework, the thesis asks a number of related 
questions. How does the state create incentives - negative and positive - to ensure the 
market operates in accord with its social and economic agenda? What are the 
multifarious pressures that obtain which determine the context in which the state and 
business interact, and which determine the business environment in which business 
occurs? What drives business to engage in the social arena? Why do companies 
respond to pressures to engage in a socially responsible manner, to what ends, at 
whose initiative or in the face of what kinds of external pressure -  and with what 
effect? How do these corporate behaviours relate to the economic, political and 
social context in which corporations operate? With whom do corporate entities 
engage and to what end? How does this behaviour relate to the roles, expectations 
and responses of other stakeholders in the social development model? What, if any, 
are the contractual obligations and rights between stakeholders? And finally, what 
are the policy implications that must be considered in light of the SCSD framework?
Understanding the state-market relationship and corporate social engagement
As outlined, SCSD describes the engagement of the private sector, partially at the 
prompting of the state, in pursing social and economic goals. It encompasses the 
policies and strategies of the state with regard to the role and conduct of businesses 
in advancing a social agenda, as well as the responses by corporate actors to these 
given environmental conditions. The framework I advance is new. However, there is
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an extensive literature on its composite elements, whether the state-market 
relationship, social development, or business-society relations.
In this section, I turn my attention to business and its responsibility for the promotion 
of social and economic well-being. What drives a corporation to behave in a socially 
responsible manner? To whom is the corporation responsible, and for what? What 
shifts the recognition by businesses that they are social as well as economic 
institutions? Once recognised, how is the responsibility for social well-being 
balanced between market actors and the state? These questions relate to the political 
economy, and are normative in nature.
Whether in the disciplines of management, governance, development, sociology and 
even - to a more limited extent - social policy, most of the research and commentary 
on business-society relations was found in the literature of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (See among others, Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998; Harvey, 
Smith, and Wilkinson 1984; Jackson 1972; Post 1978; Preston 1980; Sethi 1974; 
Sethi and Swanson 1981). CSR is the dominant term, among many, relating to the 
subject of corporate-societal relations in its broadest parameters. Other terms include 
corporate citizenship, business ethics, accountability, corporate governance, business 
sustainability, corporate social investment (CSl), socially responsible investment 
(SRI), triple bottom line (TBL), corporate social and sustainability reporting (CSSR), 
social, ethical and environmental risk (SEAR), social, ethical auditing and reporting 
(SEAR), total responsibility management (TRM) and responsible business practice. 
However, whilst a plethora of terms exist, there is no universally accepted single 
term to define corporate engagement in the social realm.
CSR has been used by various critics to mean such a wide range of policies and 
activities that it has taken on the qualities of a ‘Rorschach test’, meaning all things to 
all people depending on their particular agenda. Frustratingly, a fundamental 
weakness in the field of business and society scholarship has been the absence of 
shared definitions and frameworks for the systematic understanding of the concepts 
and how these manifest in society (Clarkson 1995, p.92). Indeed, definitions of the 
corporation’s responsibility are wide-ranging: from the narrowest (the imperative of 
maximising profit for shareowners) to the very broad (managing the social needs of
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diverse stakeholders for sustainable ends). Despite its importance to contemporary 
business environments, there is little agreement on what social responsibility is and 
how to discharge it. This thesis holds that there is a growing acceptance of these 
ideas, the crux of which being the place and purpose of private institutions in public 
arenas in so far as these impact on society.
Business has the power to direct considerable human and other resources on behalf 
of society, particularly in developing countries. CSR argues this power should be 
used responsibly. Society bears the costs involved in creating corporate wealth yet 
there are circumstances where it is often left to the corporation to decide both on the 
allocation of these costs and on the distribution of wealth (Medawar 1978). SCSD 
considers alternative arrangements for distributing the allocation of social costs more 
broadly among social institutions. In transferring benefits, SCSD is a policy 
framework that obliges businesses to respond to the specific social environment in 
which they operate. In coupling businesses’ licence to operate with concomitant 
responsibilities, corporate social development marries public policy and corporate 
strategy.
At the very least, corporate engagement (most commonly in a CSR orientation) 
reflects the changing nature of society. In the modem political economy, society 
expects of business that it be conducted with greater sensitivity to societal needs. 
Corporations are currently subjected to well-publicised pressure to play an 
increasingly active role in society and to account publicly for the same. Within the 
CSR literature, some argue that the corporation is to be regarded as an explicit actor 
in the welfare of society, a neat congruence with the institutionalist perspective of 
social development (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998). The role extends beyond 
social welfare so that CSR is defined as the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary 
demands society places on business (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998). For others, 
CSR refers to outcomes of organisational activities. Epstein (1987) sees CSR as the 
'discernment of issues, expectations and claims on business organisations regarding 
the consequences of policies and behaviour on internal and external stakeholders’ 
(Epstein cited in Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.IOI).
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For yet others, CSR is an obligation. Heiman argues that corporations have clear 
obligations beyond maximising shareholder interests. By defining CSR as a 
corporate obligation, Heiman articulates a position informed by theories of 
stakeholding and the social contract. Here, operating a corporation is deemed a 
privilege, and not a right, a privilege that might be revoked should the company fail 
to serve the public interest (Heiman 1997). This notion of the rights and 
responsibilities of the corporation and accounting for these is at the core of corporate 
citizenship.
Indeed, corporate citizenship coincides with a notion of corporate social engagement 
which is premised on the principle that in a democracy, decision-makers should 
account for their use of power. Moreover, they should take responsibility for the 
consequences, both intentional and unintentional, of their decisions. Corporate 
citizenship advances this notion of rights with responsibilities and has in recent years 
regenerated the CSR debate.*^ Corporate citizenship is defined as ‘business taking 
greater account of its social and environmental - as well as its financial - footprints’ 
(Zadek 2001). The corporation must account for its behaviour to all those affected by 
any part of its operation.
Good corporate citizenship is not a naturally occurring phenomenon: rather, good 
corporate citizenship seeks to ‘identify and enhance the drivers of corporations’ more 
progressive engagement in the vision of sustainable development’ (Zadek 2001). 
While poor corporate citizens - whether polluters of the environment or poor 
employers - might be profitable, it is also true that companies with greater 
accountability are considered more sustainable. Zadek notes that ‘demonstrably good 
corporate citizenship offers outcome (i.e. with predictive value) measures for the 
financial markets to identify companies with good management’ (Zadek 2001). In 
other words, it is assumed that the greater the disclosure of financial and non- 
financial performance by the company, the more socially responsible and the more
15 An extensive literature reflects the exponential growth of the concept in the corporate sector. I have 
located this literature within the rubric of corporate social engagement with the recognition that it 
offers multiple insights into a framework for state-corporate social development (Among others, see 
Elkington 1998; McIntosh et al. 2003; Zadek 2001, 2001b; Morrison 2003; Fombrun, Gardberg, and 
Barnett 2000; Waddock, Bodwell, and Graves 2002; Waddock 2000; Altman and Vidaver-Cohen 
2000).
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sophisticated the management and company governance is deemed to be, and the 
greater the likelihood for future corporate growth, profitability and sustainability.
In a context of increasing scrutiny of corporate behaviour, corporate citizenship 
builds reputation thereby mitigating corporate risks from malcontent stakeholders - 
whether rogue employees or disaffected customers, investors, partners, regulators, 
social activists, communities or the media (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett 2000; 
Waddock 2000). Corporate citizenship diifts corporate engagement from ‘bolt-on’ 
corporate philanthropy to seeing engagement as a long-term corporate strategy. In 
ensuring the goals of business sustainability, corporate citizenship æeks to embed 
value-based practices and accounting into business operation. It also seeks to create 
multi-institutional alliances (often in the allocation of public goods) in the interests 
of social goals (Zadek 2001b). Like CSR, corporate citizenship forms a constitutive 
element for the understanding of contemporary corporate responses in a model of 
SCSD.
Responses by corporations, whether captured in terms of CSR, corporate citizenship 
or good governance, are important outcomes of SCSD. Globally, corporate 
engagement strategies constitute an extensive and diverse ‘shopping list’ of corporate 
activities, some explicitly social, others not. The literature on business-societal 
relations (primarily under the rubrics of CSR and corporate citizenship) includes 
such diverse areas as corporate accountability, social and ethical auditing, grants and 
philanthropy, grant-matching, employee volunteering, in-kind corporate involvement 
in social issues, advertising integrity, product responsibility and environmental 
issues. CSR also covers the areas of corporate practice. These include corporate 
governance standards and codes of practice, compliance with international labour 
standards, employee conditions, affirmative action and anti-discrimination 
protection, corruption and misconduct, political responsiveness to human rights and 
employee protection, the conduct of multinationals (especially in developing 
countries), responses to poverty and social exclusion, and ethical and socially 
responsible investment. The focus of corporate social development policies and 
practices might be ‘internal’, focussed primarily on the corporation and internal 
stakeholders, or ‘external’ in which case the focus would be on stakeholders’
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external to the corporation. This distinction is only schematically useful as many 
socially responsible ideas straddle both realms.
Significantly, engagement by corporations in social development is largely 
determined by the context in which it occurs. The form and character of the social 
engagement seems to arise from the particular intersection and congruence of the 
political, economic and cultural systems that obtain (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 
1998). In the first place, the economic and political conditions (the political 
economy) create the conditions for such practices. As represented in Figure 1.1 
below, the political economy might be viewed as a ‘superstructure’, the overarching 
environment for corporate engagement in social development. In the second place 
are the various social and economic conditions that exert pressure on business in 
general and individual firms in particular. These are value-based, specific to any 
given context, often industry specific, and are likely to change with societal 
dynamics and over time. More importantly, with regard to context, corporate social 
development for businesses operating in western welfare economies will mean 
something different from those operating in developing and transitional economies 
such as South Africa. Political, cultural and economic conditions will not be equal. 
Corporate activity in developing countries is more likely to encounter greater 
hostility given the typically uneven patterns of income distribution of income - and 
attendant institutional power - which obtain.
The matrix in Figure 1.1 suggests how SCSD might be defined schematically by 
context and system relationships.
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G l o b a l  C o n g r u e n c e
•Global capital 
•International instruments
Superstructure
Political E con om y
State and market relationship
Political/ideological pressure
Corporation
•Policy instruments 
•Social policy - welfare 
•Institutional and legislative 
framework
Internal
drivers
Policy instruments 
Sectoral dynamics 
Values
External
drivers
Local Conditions 
and imperatives
C o r p o r a t e  p o l i c y / c i t i z e n s h i p
Relationships/reputation 
Accountability 
Rights and obligations
I
External  ^ Internal 
StakeholdersStakeholders Shareholder
value
Figure 1.1: Matrix: Corporation’s web of relationships and influence
The m atrix situates the state and corporations in a dynam ic relationship in which 
social interventions by corporations are com patible w ith broader econom ic and social 
developm ent objectives. Specifically, corporate engagem ent in a SCSD perspective 
occurs within a w ide network o f  stakeholding relationships: a web o f  relationships 
and influence. This idea is pursued further in C hapter Three but holds that the 
corporation, as a value-based institution, is responsible to stakeholders who can 
influence the business and/or are directly affected by its activities. The m atrix also 
applies a w ider vision: the corporation is m ore that an econom ic institution and thus 
has obligations and responsibilities extending beyond its owners, the shareholders.
Contextual dilemmas: The art of balancing disparate pressures
In recent times, business has suffered a crisis o f  credibility fuelled by instances o f
high profile corporate m alfeasance, failure o f  governance, environm ental dam age,
the relentless pursuit o f  profit, human rights transgressions, as well as the
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concentration of power among a small number of large corporations (Korten 1995; 
Punch 1996). A failure of trust is not good for business. Business requires trust, 
integrity and confidence in order to function: to attract investors, to placate 
stakeholders, to meet external controls and -  for neo-liberals -  to avoid additional 
state intervention. It also requires some measure o f consensus and coordination even 
in an aggressively competitive context, to avoid a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ 
(Punch 1996).
Managing disparate stakeholder claims, as well as the competing pressures of profit- 
making and social responsibility are critical to the corporate project. The 
corporation’s operational context is marked by a constant and negotiated tension that 
characterises the complex nexus of relationships in which the corporation is located. 
The tension arises from the contesting interests of various stakeholders. A primary 
tension presents a challenge to the corporation to harmonise the objective of 
maximising profit on behalf of shareholders, and serving the general interest of non­
shareholding stakeholders who might be affected by the corporation’s operations 
(Votaw and Sethi 1973). For example, whilst shareholders might profit from limited 
government intervention, other stakeholders might gain from greater regulation and 
control of corporate activities. Further interests have to be managed between the 
corporation and its internal stakeholders, mostly its management and employees. 
Thus, there is constant managed tension between corporate interests and responsible 
functioning with respect to the corporation’s stakeholders (Wempe 1998).
The corporation is faced with a dilemma (Votaw and Sethi 1973; Sethi and Swanson 
1981). A range of externalities is present which, I have argued, require careful and 
sensitive management. How are the claims of individual and collective shareholders 
to be reconciled against the claims of collective stakeholders? What are the 
boundaries for demands that can be placed on the corporation? What can reasonably 
be expected of corporation in terms of social development?
Stakeholder theory argues that managing these tensions requires that the corporation 
conceptualises itself as a focal point within a network or a web of contractual 
relationships. Stakeholding has been elevated from a heuristic devise to a theory of 
corporate and institutional management. Stakeholding is not only an instrumental but
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also a normative or quasi-ethical framework (Gibson 2000; Harrington 1996; 
Wijnberg 2000; Argandona 1998; Donaldson and Preston 1995). Despite the 
difficulty of the task, identifying stakeholders is critical; whether they are primary or 
secondary, owners or non-owners, actors or those acted upon (Mitchell, Agle, and 
Wood 1997). Corporate citizenship holds stakeholder theory to be of central 
importance to the business environment. Indeed, the issue of building and 
maintaining stakeholder relationships is a key policy issue, important not only for 
corporations but equally so for the state and the third sector in balancing competing 
interests such as meeting social needs and ensuring economic growth (Punch 1996). 
Stakeholder theory is pursued in greater detail in Chapter Three.
The motivations for corporate social engagement
Why do corporations engage in socially responsible behaviour that goes beyond 
narrow financial concerns? What drives corporate engagement in social development 
issues? Are negative drivers (or sanctions) more or less effective than those creating 
incentive? Most commentators writing on the subject of business-societal relations 
are likely to explain corporate engagement within three categories: corporations are 
socially responsible because they are (i) defensive in their response to external or 
internal pressure, (ii) expedient and (iii) proactive about engaging with social 
development issues.
In the defensive or reactive position, corporations are likely to respond to pressure, 
whether from stakeholders internal to the firm, or those located outside the firm. To 
defend their credibility or counter low trust, corporate officers will merely respond to 
criticism or contextual pressures. The fillip for corporate engagement might be 
legislative. This is often indicative of external ideological pressures and the broader 
political economy. A defensive position follows the ideological stance that supports a 
clear separation between the state and market, and the minimal requirements made of 
corporations with regard to their stakeholders.
Cf. Julian Le Grand’s work on the personal motivation of policy-makers, whether they be self- 
interested ‘knaves’ or altruistic ‘knights’ (Le Grand 2000).
31
In the expedient position, corporate social engagement points to the emergence of 
‘enlightened self-interest’ (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998)/^ Arguing the 
‘business case’ of corporate social engagement, benefits include enhanced corporate 
image and public relations, external and internal legitimacy including improved 
workplace morale and improved financial performance. Benefits may accrue to 
corporations who engage minimally - yet strategically - in socially responsible 
policies and practices. CSR, for example, is understood to have a commercial 
rationale (Harvey, Smith, and Wilkinson 1984; Ifemann and Acutt 2003; Marsden 
2000; Waddock, Bodwell, and Graves 2002). Reputation gained from an enlightened 
social position is an economic asset to attract resources, enhance performance and 
build competitive advantage (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett 2000). A focus on 
business efficiency and diminished transaction costs, Wempe points out, means that 
corporate strategies avoid the risk of complicated legal procedures. Expedient 
corporations are more likely to accept a level of self-regulation on its activities 
(Wempe 1998). The rationale for an expedient position is further enhanced by 
arguments suggesting increased value as a consequence. Although not conclusive, 
empirical research points to a positive correlation between CSR and firm’s past 
economic performance in Parert and Eibert (1975), Ullmann (1985) and Roberts 
(1992) (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998). This suggests that firms with a high 
economic performance are more willing to absorb costs associated with social 
development strategies. Similarly, those corporations with a strong past economic 
performance appear more likely to exhibit high levels of accountability, disclosing 
more fully the social impact of their activities (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998). 
Because it is in a financial position to be able to do so, an expedient corporation 
might therefore engage in socially responsible behaviour to gain greater legitimacy 
over competing companies.
The proactive corporation formulates frameworks and strategies for responding 
proactively to societal demands (Sethi and Swanson 1981; Votaw and Sethi 1973). 
Proactive corporations have indeed begun to recognise that it is no longer possible to 
defend narrow corporate interests in the face of stakeholder pressure: they must 
reframe their role in terms of the notion of public good, social justice and broader
Corporate critics argue that the emphasis on self-interest encourages scepticism; social engagement 
operates as would a public relations function (Preston and Post 1975, p.52).
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social development goals. These themes are revisited in the next chapter with 
reference to the ideas of liberal economics put forth by John Rawls and John 
Kenneth Galbraith.
Proactive corporations engage in value-based business practice. They recognise the 
need for trust and confidence for sustained relationships and positive socio-economic 
engagement. Particularly in value-based businesses (such as financial services, 
private pensions and health care) corporations may, in fact, trade in trust and 
integrity. Any loss of integrity would theoretically be damaging to the corporation’s 
interests. The proactive corporation’s value orientation is embedded in business 
operations. In such enterprises, organisational culture reflects proactive social 
engagement. Wempe calls this the ‘organisational redprint’: a semiotic tool pointing 
to the specific meanings, symbols, values, norms, presumptions and convictions, 
recognisable habits, customs and loyalties and identities enjoyed by the corporation 
(Wempe 1998). The issue here is perhaps whether better performing companies are 
able to engage with and advance social development as part of their business 
operations.
The multiple motivations for corporations engaging in responsible behaviours 
suggest that corporations are unevenly responsive to their environments. Acting 
outside of the profit motive towards social ends might be seen as aberrant and 
irrational (as it would on the right) or normative and desirable (a position held by 
those on the left). For others, the issue is a strategic one. Among the motivations for 
corporate social policy is the idea that corporate engagement makes ‘business sense’ 
despite the lack of conclusive research supporting the claim. At the core of this 
essentially normative idea is that socially engaged companies are more likely to 
prosper, now and in the future. Importantly, the argument moves from a normative to 
a strategic one.
Business, social development and social justice
SCSD focuses sharply on the market as a means of ensuring social, as well as 
economic, goals. This does not mean the state may abdicate responsibility for the 
welfare of its citizens to the market. Rather, positive policy interventions may
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broaden the social role of corporations in ways that are also compatible with profit 
maximisation. In the context of multi-sectoral policy fi-ameworks, the converse is 
also true: the social role of corporations might be limited or impeded by a negative 
policy environment depending on how the state (and other stakeholders) views the 
social role of corporations. Whatever the policy environment, the state-market 
emphasis in SCSD presupposes that the functioning of the market is compatible with 
social justice.
Corporations are no longer seen as purely private economic institutions but as social 
institutions (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998; Gray, Owen, and Maunders 1987). 
State-corporate social development positions the corporation along side the state in 
meeting social needs. Corporate social engagement provides (some) private solutions 
to public issues (Harvey, Smith, and Wilkinson 1984). Like all social institutions, 
corporations must be considered in their social complexity: social institutions and 
economic institutions need to be managed through policy interventions.
Corporate social engagement through a social development lens intersects multiple 
realms: primarily the social and economic, but also the political and environmental. 
Both private and public institutions require careful policy formulation for 
institutional vigour. For example, in the social arena, corporate policies may dovetail 
with social development strategies by providing social benefits such as education and 
training, capacity development, investment in human capital, pensions, employment 
equity policies and socially oriented work-place policies beyond those legislated. At 
times corporate policies straddle corporate accountability or compliance with codes 
and standards which pertain to political, legal and social spheres. In the economic 
realm, social development imperatives might be met by changed employment 
patterns and changed patterns of equity ownership as has been the case in South 
Afi'ica and elsewhere. Environmentally, corporate responsibility policies might be 
expressed as strategies for sustainable development and commitment to 
environmental accounting, as well as the implementation of technical environmental 
protections.
This section has focussed on the corporate cohort in the SCSD framework. Most 
literature on corporate engagement with society is concerned primarily with CSR, as
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is the case with other associated frameworks such as corporate citizenship. In 
outlining the multiple drivers for social engagement, I have identified diverse 
pressures exerted on corporations arguing that these need to be managed. A balance 
is necessary between government intervention and regulation on the one hand, and 
corporate autonomy to pursue profit maximisation in a responsible manner on the 
other. A plurality of interests is managed through a web of stakeholder relationships: 
the corporation has responsibilities and obligations to interests which extend beyond 
its shareholders. Corporate engagement in social development issues is both 
normative and strategic. Moreover, in looking at corporate engagement though a 
social development prism, socially responsible business is arguably a critical social 
and economic partner in ensuring social well-being.
Part Two: The study and situating the research
South Africa is the focus of the study. The country experienced massive political, 
economic and social transformation after the demise of apartheid. A key challenge 
still facing the country is how to redress years of entrenched institutional inequality 
and meet the development needs of its citizens, whilst stimulating economic growth 
and global competitiveness. There is an immediate need for redistributive policies 
and strategies to address past imbalances. Black economic empowerment (BEE), 
which is the subject of later discussion, is the government’s political and economic 
strategy to ensure economic equity, enacted by a comprehensive legislative and 
institutional framework. This imperative to redress the past is not only political, but 
also economic and social. Like other developing and middle-income countries. South 
Africa is also under unrelenting pressure to become globally competitive.
In social policy terms, the historical legacy of apartheid has created enormous 
challenges for South African development. South Africa offers a unique opportunity 
to gain insight into processes of social, political and economic transition. A full 
exploration of these myriad challenges and opportunities is conducted in Chapter 
Four on the South Africa context.
In brief. South Africa’s social and economic patterns present a picture of inequality. 
The legacies of apartheid are apparent with deep-rooted social and economic
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problems, the patterns of which correlate roughly with race. Whilst a culture of 
political consensus exists, tensions that emerge from disparate economic interests 
require careful management by the state. Among these are a socialist focussed trade 
union federation and anti-capitalist movement hostile to the market. The state has 
sought appropriate economic policies which deliver both growth and redistribution, 
and promote social well-being. With an economy still largely dominated by white 
people, the state has embarked on a political and economic project to transform the 
racial complexion of economic power. Black economic empowerment (BEE) is 
advanced through legislation and policies which aim to include black people into the 
economic mainstream. The state has been both purposeful and directive in these 
economic policies which have pronounced social outcomes. In targeting black 
participation in the economy, the state’s chief focus for the delivery of economic 
equity is the market, bringing the state’s relationship with the market into sharp 
relief. This context makes South Africa a very specific research case.
The relationship between the state and business is of core research interest here. On 
the one hand, the state plays multiple roles which include primary transformation 
actor, regulator, stakeholder and as a purchaser of goods and services. On the other 
hand, the private sector is institutionally developed, racially skewed and operating in 
a developing economy characterised by massive inequality. With a specific 
‘transformation agenda’ aimed at redressing apartheid, the state has attempted to 
effect transformation,*^ both of its own institutions and in its relations with civil 
society. It has used mechanisms such as legislation, economic sanction and incentive 
creation. But transformation is a highly political endeavour and a process that is 
contested and non-linear. As regulator, the state has structured a value-driven market 
which creates specific, ‘non-negotiable’ conditions for the licence to operate by 
business.
The South African market is notable for its affirmative business opportunities, 
notably in BEE policies. These opportunities structure the market, and are the 
consequence of state design and intervention, as well as historical and political
‘Transformation’ is widely used but rarely defined even in official discourse, whether by 
government, civil society or other actors. It cuts across the heart of the purposeful changes instigated 
in South Africa whether political, social, economic, gendered or racial. Transformation is most 
commonly used with reference to the changes racial composition of institutions.
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imperatives. The state has created the market through regulation, intangible 
normative pressures and significantly, economic incentive. These market 
externalities affect opportunities for corporate social engagement, and SCSD more 
broadly. As a stakeholder, the state has an interest in the growth of business as a 
partner in redistribution, growth and stability. There have existed clear tensions 
between the state and business over BEE. BEE is seen by the latter as state intrusion 
in the economy, as distorting the market, and being injurious to South African global 
competitiveness. Indeed, laying such a premium on the conditions of business may 
be seen as rent-seeking activity. From the perspective of the state it is redistributing 
resources towards an historically disadvantaged racial group and creating a black 
middle class it deems essential both to economic and social development goals.
Aims of the research
The thesis aims to interrogate the specific and dynamic relationship between the state 
and the market in extending social and economic benefits and opportunities in 
contemporary South Africa. In theorising the state-market dynamic in a context of 
shifting expectations regarding the state and its obligations to manage social need, I 
advance a SCSD framework. The primary objective of the thesis involves using a 
social development perspective to learn more about the state-market relationship, in 
general, and the social role of corporations, in particular, in promoting social well­
being. Related to this, the thesis interrogates the appropriateness of SCSD as a 
conceptual framework to describe the state-market dyad.
In addition to the analytical exercise of applying a new conceptual framework, the 
thesis seeks to describe the economic and social drivers established by government in 
South Africa to transform the business environment, and the responses of 
corporations to a given social and economic milieu. Pursing the question of corporate 
responses, the thesis questions the reach and relevance of traditional forms of 
corporate social engagement such as CSR. In arguing that the purview of CSR is 
limited, the thesis asks whether state-directed policies aimed at changing economic 
patterns are more apposite and explores the contextual drivers that apply.
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The thesis also questions the relevance of traditional forms of social engagement 
such as CSR in managing (in a sustainable way) social and economic inequality 
especially in respect of SCSD which, drawing on a corporate citizenship framework, 
seeks to embed social principles in corporate operations.
Within a liberal paradigm, the research aims to establish the relevance of two 
theoretical frameworks, social contract theory and stakeholder theory, in the 
formulation of a SCSD framework. With reference to a social development 
framework, social contract theory informs why these questions are asked in the first 
place and stakeholder theory informs what questions are asked.
In addition, the thesis engages a number of more specific research questions. Using 
case study material, these include interrogating the extent to which current policies in 
South Africa, such as BEE, promote economic outcomes that are socially responsible 
and the extent to which these promote social justice. Linked with this question is the 
development trajectory of BEE policies and how these have evolved since 1994.
Research agenda and focus
The empirical research comprised a qualitative investigation into the context of 
business operation in South Africa. Empirical data were collected and were explored 
with reference to two sectoral case studies: investment and tourism companies. 
Sectoral case studies comprised in turn constitutive business cases as operational 
examples within each industry.
Qualitative methods were most appropriate for meeting the stated aims of the 
research which were sought to explain rather than enumerate phenomena. The study 
lent itself to a detailed and thorough exploratory investigation. This approach 
allowed critical insight into a unique situation at a given moment. It also permitted 
investigation of the relational dynamics extant between given phenomena, events, 
roles and situations (Bless and Higson-Smith 1995, p.42; Robson 1993, p. 147).
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Research strategy: the case study
I elected to use the case study mode of enquiry as lend itself to the opportunities and 
constraints of doctoral research and involves ‘an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence’ (Robson 1993, p.5). The sector study essentially substituted for 
the conventional business case study method which details an individual company. It 
also permitted an opportunity for exploration of the relationship between these 
sectors within the broader context. Yin argues that the case study is the method of 
choice when the phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its 
context (Yin 2003, p.4).
Using sectoral case studies allowed for a multi-layered and nuanced picture of 
sectoral dynamics and corporate activity within two sectors. Whilst the research 
parameters for each case were the same, there was limited ‘functional equivalence’ 
which may be the case with comparative case studies (Hantrais 1996). Two diverse 
sectors elucidated the differences inherent, particularly those relating to the nature of 
the business and relative importance of stakeholder relationships.
Following Lincoln and Cuba (1985), Colin Robson describes case studies as 
‘naturalistic enquiry’ for a number of reasons. ‘Naturalistic enquiry’ is characterised 
by the fact that the research takes place in a natural setting or context. In it, people 
are the data-gathering instruments. Corporate managers, employees, customers, 
suppliers, as well as people in government and others affected by the corporation’s 
activities are these instruments. Naturalistic enquiry relies on the use of tacit intuitive 
knowledge as an adjunct to other knowledge bases. By using qualitative methods, 
naturalistic enquiry increases in scope the range of data. Its analytic methods are 
inductive and can be dialogic in that the interaction between researcher and 
respondent produces outcomes and meanings that are negotiated. Particulars are 
interpreted by the researcher without asserting dogmatic generalisations. The 
research parameters are determined by the research focus. Finally, unlike ‘scientific’ 
research, special criteria exist for evaluating the trustworthiness of the research. 
These criteria are equivalent to reliability, validity and objectivity, and appropriate to 
the form of the enquiry (Robson 1993, p.60-61).
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Robson’s summary of naturalistic enquiry is related here because it provided sound 
rationale for using a case study strategy. In terms of the needs of this research 
project, the case study strategy was highly appropriate. First, it was flexible, 
adaptable and opportunistic. Second, the output was both critical and discursive. 
Third, I was able to consciously ground the theoretical frameworks under discussion 
in the data I collected. Finally, the strategy of using a case study method allowed for 
tentative but broad observations, whilst the use of multiple case studies permitted yet 
broader analytic generalisations.
Multiple methods
The empirical field research used a number of qualitative methods. A total of 135 
semi-structured interviews were conducted. The first five constituted a pilot study to 
assess the research instrument and the information it elicited. Given the diversity of 
informants, I invariably altered any interview schedule where necessary. The 
interview schedule is included in Appendix One. Later interviews used the interview 
template only as a touchstone as the schedule format became constraining. 
Interviews became increasingly unstructured as I engaged in an active interviewing 
process - sometimes in dialogue with the respondent - as a way of eliciting 
information (Holstein and Gubrium 2002; Schrijvers 1991). In dialogue, although I 
ultimately asserted interpretive power, interviewees were seen as social actors, such 
that the objects of the research also became subjects (Schrijvers 1991). Such dialogue 
either elicited very particular information or a response with greater breadth or 
context, both still closely linked to my research questions. The unstructured 
interview was found to be the most appropriate method of eliciting information and 
perspectives, and triangulating divergent responses.
In addition to interviews, I conducted textual analyses of secondary sources such as 
books and journal articles, and of primary sources such as corporate literature, 
including annual reports, social and ethical reports, pamphlets, as well as sectoral 
journals. I reviewed other primary documents in the public domain, including 
government publications, legislation, bills, policy position papers, and Green and 
White papers. In addition, I collected data relating to the South African and business
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sector contexts, as well as to specific areas of interest making extensive use of 
electronic sources such as the Internet and press clippings.
Yin argues that the richness inherent in the inclusion of context as a major part of the 
study means that one cannot rely on a single data collection method but rather 
multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2003, p.4). Multiple methods and multiple sources 
of data permitted triangulation. Different research methods addressed different issues 
and the complementary use of multiple methods allowed for a fuller picture of 
qualitative data. The triangulation of data attempted to cohere an in-depth 
understanding of the research area. But lather than objectively validating the data, 
triangulation by multi-method research allowed for manipulation of information from 
different sources to test its reliability. This strategy permitted additional rigour, 
breadth and depth (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). Both congruencies and discrepancies 
were noted and were explored as nodes of interest in the research findings (Robson 
1993,p.290, p.383, p.404).
Identifying informants
Prior to embarking on field research, I conducted a stakeholder analysis. The list of 
interviewees included elite representatives of corporations, such as CEOs, directors, 
senior managers and board members. In addition, I included other stakeholders with 
both an interest in corporations and the way in which they operate, and those 
stakeholders with some leverage to determine the same. To this end I added 
shareholders and government representatives (as regulator and customer). I also 
included other stakeholders such as informants from non-government organisations, 
trade unions, organised business associations, public finance institutions, statutory 
bodies, universities, think tanks and the media. I also paid specific attention to 
stakeholders in both my sectoral case studies, as well as a significant number of 
people involved in black economic empowerment initiatives, both at a corporate and 
government level.
I interviewed a non-random purposive sample. Most interviewees were identified 
either because of their natural positions as leaders within industries or institutions. 
The vast majority of interviewees were approached cold. An additional number were
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identified through a ‘snowballing’ process; access was facilitated via the assistance 
of personal and professional networks of those already interviewed. These networks 
proved invaluable in gaining access to the most senior echelons of both the business 
world and government.
Methodological sensitivities to sectoral differences
The case study research sought to examine the responses of corporations in different 
sectors to the social development challenges around them, and to the drivers 
established by government policy. Employing similar research approaches both the 
investment and tourism sector cases looked at the effects of state-structured and 
driven transformation on the corporation, at a sectoral, institutional and operational 
level. Both studies were located in the broader political, economic and social arena 
and each tracked the relationship between the corporation and its stakeholders, 
looking at the interrelationship between business imperatives and the structuring of 
stakeholder values. The evolution of BEE as a SCSD outcome is also illustrated in 
each sector. In selecting the chosen sectors, I anticipated some substantive 
differences between the sectors. This assumption was reflected methodologically.
Investment Sector
The investment company sector was divided into three types of investment 
enterprises: black economic empowerment (BEE) companies, trade union investment 
companies and development finance institutions.
The first are black economic empowerment (BEE) companies. BEE companies were 
investment companies established by black entrepreneurs to invest in established 
business (historically white-owned and managed) to take advantage of affirmative 
opportunities, in particular, those provided by government. Most BEE activity occurs 
in this company type. Here, the research focussed on how companies have positioned 
themselves to access affirmative business opportunities which seek to advance black
White owned and managed companies function almost as an analytic benchmark in the sectoral 
study. Many operated within given business parameters prior to 1994 and have had to adapt to a 
profoundly new business environment. New legislation and other social and political pressures have 
compelled organisational transformation at all levels of the institution (whether proactive or obligated 
by law). BEE policy has required shifts in corporate philosophy and operational practice.
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empowerment. Measurement of a company’s BEE credentials or empowerment 
profile shifted from measuring ownership by historically disadvantaged people to 
broader indicators. In this regard, the case study asked similar questions to those 
associated with social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting, of which there 
is a growing body of technical and critical literature (Ernst & Young et al. 1999; 
Gray, Owen, and Maunders 1987; Haufler 2001; McIntosh et al. 2003; Medawar 
1978; Peirce 1999; Zadek, Pruzan, and Evans 1997; Zadek 2001). Social audit 
techniques use indicators pertinent to institutional transformation that would, for 
example, include such issues as race and gender diversity. Indicators, are typically 
means by which thresholds or benchmarks are translated into measurable terms, 
pointing to a process being carried out or the effect of a given policy (Barrow 1997, 
p.301). Audit questions also interrogate the values, stakeholder relationships, 
governance and social engagement by the corporation.
The second type of investment company was trade union investment companies. 
Like other BEE enterprises these companies have emerged in the period of business 
activity since 1994. The establishment of these companies was highly controversial 
and their ideological position as trade union enterprises invites discussion. The third 
type was development finance institutions (DFls), of which government is the sole 
shareowner. The focus here was on organisational philosophy, government driven 
policies and strategies, and the realignment of the institutions with social 
development imperatives. DFls are public sector institutions explicitly aligned with 
government’s socio-economic development policies. These three types of investment 
companies permit a comparison between the relative success and failure of the 
drivers that compel and create incentives for racial and economic transformation in 
the sector. The core methodological question in this sectoral study relates to changes 
in institutional and economic power, as well as shifts in corporate philosophy and 
operation as a consequence of the current policy environment.
Tourism Sector
Given the diversity of enterprises within the tourism sector, substantive differences 
were assumed to obtain. These were reflected methodologically with a clear focus on 
commercial drivers that encourage enterprises to embrace social development
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strategies. Tourism enterprises need the support of a wide range of stakeholders in 
order to operate. The creation of a safe, crime-free and enabling environment for 
tourists is critical. In addition to other stakeholders, tourism enterprises have to 
manage a unique relationship with the state to secure this environment and the 
necessary infrastructure for the operation of the enterprises. Thus, the focus in this 
case study was externally oriented towards stakeholder relationships and the 
management of tourism resources, whether human, wildlife, cultural or 
environm ental.The case study on tourism is, in turn, divided into three smaller 
business case studies: the government-driven tourism investment initiative, the 
Greater St Lucia Wetland Park; a private ecotourism company, CCAfrica; and three 
hotel chains which have responded to social development challenges in disparate 
ways.
The Research Process
Following from and in parallel with textual analysis of documents, a total of 135 
face-to-face semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted. In the 
instances where multiple interviews were conducted with the same interviewee, the 
interview number assigned relates to the last of the interviews but the analysis 
includes the content of previous discussions. To protect the anonymity of 
respondents, there is no correlation between the assigned number of each interview 
and the full list of disclosed interviewees provided (Appendix Two).
The ordering o f primary data
The full transcriptions of all 135 interviews are enormously rich and complex. After 
an initial attempt to analyse the data manually it became clear that the sheer volume 
of collected data had to be managed in a more systematic way. To this end, I elected 
to use the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), Atlas/Ti.
To a minor extent, this case study borrowed gauging concepts from the literature on environmental 
and social impact assessments (Rossi and Gilmartin 1980; Finsterbusch, Llewellyn et al. 1983; 
0stergaard 1992; Moser 1993; Barrow 1997). Impact assessment techniques, and indicator measures 
in particular, guided the research enquiry only. The techniques could not be employed conventionally 
given that the present research necessarily provided a non-continuous ‘snap-shot’ of the drivers and 
the corporate responses at a given moment.
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Atlas/Ti, allowed me to manage and analyse large bodies of textual ‘soft’ data with 
rigour and consistency (Muhr 1997; Spencer, Ritchie, and O'Conner 2003). The 
programme made it possible to analyse, structure, extract, exclude and compare units 
of data relatively easily. The programme has extensive capabilities, particularly as a 
tool for developing theoretical models (Grounded Theory). However, I did not 
exploit the full potential of the Atlas/Ti; instead, using it simply as an indispensable 
data management tool.
Coding o f Data
In analysing the data, I first organised and then interpreted the data, identifying 
themes emerging fi-om the data by segmenting and categorising these. In so doing, I 
engaged in a simultaneous process of understanding the significance of emergent 
themes to the research questions. I developed a short list of key codes prior to my 
data analysis. These related directly to my research questions. In due course, I 
developed a number of other codes which captured a multiplicity of data trends, both 
anticipated and unanticipated. Given the diversity of perspectives contained in my 
sample still further codes were needed to register the range of views and topics 
elicited during interviews. Consistency and rigour in the coding exercise ensured that 
the material prepared for analysis was internally cogent and applied in a consistent 
manner.
Textual and documentary analysis
I analysed primary and secondary documentation in two ways. The first was to 
situate the research within a dynamic historical context. The second was to augment, 
reinforce and consolidate the findings of the interview process. As mentioned above, 
a wide range of documentary sources were consulted. I paid attention to the source of 
the publication in question, whether a public relations document or an internal 
company memo, whether from government or the private sector as these reflected a 
particular perspective.
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Limitations of the research
The research methodology and focus of the research suggest a number of possible 
limitations. Some of these were anticipated prior to my embarking on the research 
process and I sought ways to mitigate their impact on the research outcome.
Subjective interpretation
Qualitative research of this kind is necessarily interpretative. Findings will be 
influenced by the context and the researcher’s perspective in both the gathering and 
interpretation of the data. In such research, ‘values necessarily intrude’ (Robson 
1993, p.60). Indeed, these values are brought into play at every stage in the research. 
Even field data collection in the first instance ‘is dependent on one person’s 
perception of the field situation at a given point in time, [and] that perception is 
biased both by personality and by the nature of the interaction with the researched, 
and that this makes the researcher his or her own ‘research instrument’ (Punch 1998). 
Objectivity was clearly a concern when relying on a single individual especially in 
the case of interviews with individual representatives of corporations (whose role of 
spokespeople might not permit a contribution beyond gloss and mission statements) 
and given the nature of the research aims and focus. Whilst subjective interpretation 
is unavoidable, this might be mitigated in four ways: (i) with the researcher’s explicit 
recognition and disclosure of her interpretive position and agenda; (ii) in proceeding 
with a consciousness regarding bias and a strong research ethic; (iii) through rigorous 
data collection and analytic consistency, and (iv) through the use of multi-method 
research which offers some opportunity, although limited, for triangulation.
The limitations o f  the case study method
Qualitative case studies are hermeneutic; this suggests a limitation associated with 
the case study method, namely, generalisability. Case studies generally allow for a 
broad yet detailed analysis of multiple cases. Indeed, findings may be relevant to a 
single case and may not be useful in other contexts. Case studies may be too unique 
to allow for more generalised insights. However, they might be comparable to other 
similar situations and circumstances (Schofield 1993). I have attempted to mitigate
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the problem of generalisability by focussing on a sectoral case study which 
comprises a number of corporate cases. In so doing, while acknowledging that my 
findings are only suggestive when applied more broadly, I have identified broad 
sectoral or industry-wide trends. In addition, the sectoral case studies also allow for 
inter-sectoral comparisons. Similarly, where it comes to identifying the policy 
implications stemming from any particular case study, I am less tentative about 
asserting the applicability of these to other sectors given these exist within the same 
social and legal context. Many of the same drivers obtain for any sector operating in 
a transforming South African economy. However, a strong cautionary note must be 
sounded. All policy implications are not equally relevant to all sectors as each sector 
has unique challenges and must necessarily manages its stakeholder interests 
differently.
Limitations on resources
Field work was conducted in a nine-month period in 2000-2001. Limited time and 
financial resources also limitecj the scope of the research. For instance, apart from 
some interviews conducted around the tourism sector in Durban (Kwa-Zulu Natal), I 
was unable to interview stakeholders in other centres apart from Johannesburg and 
Pretoria. The short time frame circumscribed the research possibilities. I was unable 
to conduct evaluative research which would have required a longitudinal study. 
Instead, the research presents a time- and space-bound investigation of a particular 
moment in South Africa’s transition to a liberal social democracy.
Ethical considerations
Interviews were confidential. Assurances of confidentiality meant that informants 
were more likely to respond with frankness and transparency. Quotes are not 
ascribed to specific interviewees although a speaker’s broad descriptors are provided. 
For instance, I describe respondents by their race, gender, position, as well as the 
kind of stakeholder institution with which they are associated.
The research depended to a large extent on the disclosure of information and opinion 
by interviewees. Indeed, it was quite common for respondents to ask that views or
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information be kept off the record. At this point, I switched off the recording device 
until the interview progressed to another topic under discussion. It was quite possible 
that given specific conditions, private discourse would merely mirror that which was 
articulated publicly, whether in person or by a given institution. However, the 
assurance of confidentially meant that respondents were more likely to disclose more 
contentious viewpoints, often in contradiction with their own or their institution’s 
public narratives.
A short note on the use of race as a category in this research is appropriate: rather 
than perpetuating the injurious divisions advanced in apartheid categories, it was 
important to recognise that race remained the chief descriptive category in South 
African socio-political discourse. A decade after the demise of apartheid, it remains 
highly determinant of an individual’s experience in South Africa, whether it is access 
to opportunities in education, health care or employment. In this thesis, I have 
recognised that race worked at a number of important levels. First, and most crucially 
for the purposes of this research, race defined the criteria for inclusion and exclusion 
with regard to empowerment legislation and state-initiated policies aimed at 
redressing historical imbalances. Race was privileged in state social and economic 
policy, and this was reflected in legislation aimed at redressing the past. Second, it 
suggested (but did not determine) the political and ideological position of the 
speaker. This pointed to a tension highlighted in the thesis: where race and ideology 
cut across one another in the case of emerging black elites. For example, in the past 
business has been seen as ‘the domain of whites’ yet there is an emerging number of 
black business people which invalidates this crude assumption. Thirdly, in a racially 
divided society, the question of race equity (and concomitantly, social justice) 
required a bald recognition of the race tensions that obtain. At the beginning of this 
research project, I had anticipated including gender as a key analytic criterion. 
However, it was apparent that race (whether the fact of the category itself or a 
difficulty managing the implications thereof) is the primary issue underpinning the 
majority of stakeholder tensions which are described in this thesis.
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Access to informants
Whilst I interviewed a broad range of stakeholders, most interviews were with elite 
representatives of these groups. As can be anticipated, gaining access to and the 
cooperation of such elites was difficult. Had I failed to access significant elites in any 
or all of the stakeholder groups this would have constituted a severe obstacle to the 
research. Whilst a small number of the informants I had identified remained 
unavailable, I was very fortunate in both the number and quality of interviews I 
secured. I was able to interview members of the highest echelons of some of the 
largest corporations in South Africa, as well as high-level government officials and 
key informants. I believe that my access was facilitated by a number of reasons: my 
own tenacity is securing interviews, the fact that I mobilised other interviewees to 
assist me in accessing their well-placed cohorts and networks, and the fact that I was 
perceived to have the backing of a prestigious academic institution (Punch 1998). My 
own identity as a white, middle class South African woman may well have facilitated 
elite access, as well as more controversial disclosures by some, particularly white, 
interviewees. Despite my obvious accent and disclosure to the contrary, some 
interviewees (mostly black) assumed I was British since I was affiliated to an 
institution in the United Kingdom. Access to labour movement elites (who were 
African or Indian) may have been made more difficult as a consequence of my race, 
gender and nationality.
Interpretive limitations
Within the South African political environment, it is often difficult to criticise 
government or current policy without being regarded as reactionary or racist. This 
operated as a highly effective sanction with the result that many views articulated by 
interviewees - many of which are not necessarily reactionary or racist - were self­
censored. I was also sensitive to the elisions and inconsistencies between public and 
private pronouncements, as well as inconsistencies which emerged in the course of 
interviews themselves.
This sanction against criticism also had important implications for the writing of this 
thesis. In analysing and presenting my research, some of which critiques current
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policy, I have attempted to maintain my intellectual integrity. I have recognised that 
this meant interpreting the data in ways that may be unpopular in some instances. A 
final limitation emerged from the research itself. In the field, I discovered that 
important terms for the research which I had assumed to have global currency were 
not used in the same way in the South African context. For instance, CSR which is 
seen positively in South Africa is seen as a pejorative description of patronising 
activities by corporations. Instead, corporate social investment (CSI) was the 
politically more acceptable term though when asked few people could differentiate 
substantively between CSR and CSI. For others, CSI was easily confused with 
socially responsible investment. Moreover, the latter term was arguably confusing 
given there was no clear ‘financial investment’ return. Corporate citizenship also had 
very limited (though growing) application although interviewees often described it 
attributively. The lack of commonly used terms and a common understanding of 
many of the key issues was initially constraining. Consequently, I have subsumed 
these broadly notions under the rubric of corporate social engagement.
Contributions of the research
This thesis contributes to academic research in a number of ways as follows:
(i) SCSD is defined as a framework for planned and strategic change for social well­
being, in which economic and social development are integrated and mutually 
supportive in a context-specific environment. The state is the primary driver and the 
market its primary co-partner in achieving these social goals. State-corporate social 
development presents a framework which theorises the state-market relationship and 
advances an explicit engagement by corporations in the promotion of social well­
being. In developing a new conceptual framework and testing its appropriateness 
against empirical data, the research demonstrates intellectual agility.
(ii) Consistent with its location in the multidisciplinary endeavour of social policy, 
the thesis also draws together insights from sociology, politics, development studies 
and business management. It borrows liberally from the literatures of these 
disciplines, as well as the literature of political philosophy, political economy, ethics.
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governance and even law. In situating kseif thus, the research offers a particular and 
integrative view of the phenomena and situations under investigation.
(iii) Corporate engagement in social issues has largely been concerned with the 
notion of CSR. In a developing country context like that of South Africa, 
philanthropy and grant-making are important yet very limited contributors to overall 
social welfare. This thesis critiques the uncritical application of CSR on this basis 
and proposes a corporate social development perspective which embeds social 
concerns in the operation of business. Influencing this conception of corporate 
engagement, the notion of corporate citizenship advocates value-driven business, 
ensuring that business is accountable for its impact on society (and the environment). 
SCSD takes this conception further by moving corporate social engagement from the 
normative to the strategic level. State-corporate social development claims that 
whilst normative arguments are correct in asserting that corporate social engagement 
is moral, ethical and the right thing to do, business’ interests are motivated by value 
creation. If contextually appropriate, developmental and harmonised with the 
economy, these SCSD policies promote social well-being by extending benefits and 
opportunities. This thesis goes some distance in demonstrating that the potential 
outcome of SCSD is economic engagement by business that is socially responsible.
(iv) In line with the accord paid to context, the SCSD framework is tested in the case 
of South Africa, and found to be appropriate. Post-apartheid South African society is 
characterised by dramatic economic and social inequalities requiring both a 
purposeful, interventionist state and proactive market institutions. The thesis 
demonstrates that government policy has targeted the market as an intermediary to 
extend economic and social opportunities though BEE policies. The research 
supports the central thesis that the government creates the conditions, drivers and 
environment for businesses’ licence to operate using sanctions and positive 
incentives. Corporations respond to these according to their normative and strategic 
imperatives.
(v) Applying SCSD to the sectoral cases of investment and tourism companies 
explores new empirical terrain.
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(vi) Using empirical data, the advancement of the theoretical rubrics of social 
contract theory and stakeholder management establishes their compatibility with the 
SCSD conceptual and operational framework. They offer critical insights into the 
management of contesting interests, showing how despite political, economic and 
social division, social cohesion is ensured.
(vii) There exists to date a paucity of scholarly academic treatment of BEE. BEE is a 
significant project, driven by the state and enacted by the state and the market. The 
thesis’ treatment of BEE represents a significant contribution to the literature. It 
theorises BEE within a social development and left liberal theoretical framework 
employing stakeholder theory and the highly abstracted concept of the social 
contract. Moreover, the thesis traces the evolution of BEE from a narrow strategy 
focussing on business equity to a broad-based strategy aimed at meeting the social 
need of a greater number of citizens.
(vii) The research offers an additional contribution in that it presents a cogent picture 
of South Africa at a particular time in history. It benchmarks the perceptions of 
stakeholders from diverse spheres at a particular time of transition. The research 
establishes a baseline for further research in these areas, without being confined to 
these sectoral areas.
Structure of the thesis
This chapter has introduced the thesis’ main concerns and the objectives of the 
research. As an appropriate conceptual and operational framework offering an 
alternative to social policy, I have advanced a framework of SCSD. Based on and 
extending a social development orientation, its salient characteristics include an 
interventionist and directive state, the harmonisation of economic and social policies, 
the mobilisation of the institution of the market to redirect resources and a 
compatibility with targeted or affirmative redistribution. The chapter explored how 
SCSD is embedded in the political economy and is reflective of the context in which 
it obtains. In looking at the role of corporations, the chapter introduced the notion of 
corporate social engagement. It explored associated concepts such as CSR, as well as 
the ideological basis and motivations for these. In the latter part of the chapter, the
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study outline was presented in detail. The research questions were presented and the 
methodology discussed. The chapter concluded with a recognition of the limitations 
of the research as well as claims regarding its contribution.
Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework of the research. The first part of the 
chapter critically revisits themes introduced in the first chapter. It examines further 
the relationship between the state and the market. The second part locates the issues 
of corporate social engagement in the broader debates around political economy. 
Corporate social engagement issues are then considered in detail. Throughout, the 
debates and issues are located in a review of the literature on political economy, 
CSR, corporate citizenship and business-societal relations. The third chapter of the 
thesis then presents the theoretical framework of the research, reviewing 
stakeholding and social contract theory as concepts that are foundational for social 
policy research.
The fourth chapter sets the context and background for the empirical chapters that 
follow by reviewing the literature on South Afi’ica. In doing so, the chapter links the 
issues of the preceding chapters, namely political economy, corporate social 
engagement and the theoretical frameworks employed with the social, political and 
economic context in South Africa. This lays the foundation for the empirical chapters 
that follow.
Chapters Five and Six detail the empirical findings fi’om the two sectoral case 
studies. Chapter Five considers investment companies and BEE, while Chapter Six 
focuses on the tourism sector. The final chapter of the thesis is divided into two parts. 
The first presents an analysis of the research findings. The second presents the 
conclusions of the thesis and suggests areas for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
CORPORATE SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT
This chapter develops the conceptual framework of the thesis, and expands themes 
introduced in Chapter One. Throughout, these concepts and debates are explored 
with close reference to the literature. The ehapter has two parts. The first addresses 
the state-market dynamic within various liberal conceptions of political economy. 
Left liberalism in particular is useful for deepening an understanding of state- 
corporate social development (SCSD) as it envisions a greater role for the state in 
concert with the market to manage social needs and promote justice. The second part 
locates the issues of corporate social engagement as these are articulated in CSR and 
corporate citizenship in the broader debates around political economy. The issue of 
corporate responsibility is then considered in detail.
The argument presented in this chapter holds that there are vastly different ways of 
regarding state-market relationships. The chapter explores various liberal 
coneeptions of the state-market dyad with regard to the management of social needs 
and social justice. Liberalism is a broad church. Given the spectrum of liberal 
political philosophy, not all liberal paradigms accommodate the SCSD framework. 
Centre, and particularly left liberalism would be more appropriate for the parallel 
institutional responses of state intervention and corporate social engagement. These 
liberalisms could accommodate a position which argues that the market - in concert 
with the state - is a legitimate mechanism for social development and the equitable 
redistribution of social and economic goods.
Part One: Liberalism, the state and the market
This section of the chapter explores different conceptions of the state and market 
relationship. Liberalism, in its various shapes, provides a touchstone for 
understanding the relationship between the market and the state. Liberalism and 
capitalism are interdependent: capitalism is critical to the stability of liberal 
democracies. Liberalism privileges equality of opportunity and is naturally and 
necessarily aligned with the notion of the market. Moreover, liberalism is committed 
to pluralism which is a critical element of SCSD. The chapter refers in particular to
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key liberal commentators from the right to the left of the liberal ideological 
spectrum: namely, Friedman, Hayek, Rawls, Galbraith and Walzer.
This thesis reflects only minimally the large corpus of Marxist social policy. In doing 
so, the thesis does not seek to justify the market but rather seeks to understand how 
the market can be used as a mechanism for redistribution. As such, state intervention 
(and market institutions) is central to the notion of SCSD. Marxist social policy 
typically sees the welfare state as reformist, acting to legitimize capitalism. For 
socialist and left critics such as Ramesh Mishra, such reforms fail to change the 
market economy or the class structure in any radical way (Mishra 1984, p.8, p.67).^' 
Resources are not redistributed vertically but horizontally involving intra-class rather 
then inter-class transfers (Mishra 1984, p.23, p.67). Marxists would interpret any 
corporate social intervention sceptically as ensuring the economic status quo. 
Capitalist institutions are perceived as class enemies and corporate social 
engagement dismissed as reformist. For obvious reasons, Marxist analysis of 
corporate social engagement is of limited application in this thesis. Liberalism as a 
political and economic fi-amework, on the other hand, is most appropriate to the issue 
of corporate social engagement and more specifically SCSD. However, this 
statement is not equally true of all liberal positions, as explained.
Political economy: capitalism ascendant
Political economy locates economic activity in a political context. With the failure of 
socialist states, the capitalist and socialist dichotomy is no longer a particularly 
useful analytic tool in current political economy. As an economic system, capitalism 
is ascendant: most political economies, in both developed and developing countries 
are characterised by private ownership and a market economy, and it is unlikely that 
this situation will change. As Will Hutton asserts: ‘Private capital and private 
corporations have never before so influenced the world economy. Capitalism as a 
system has no competitors’ (Hutton 1996, p.56).
Mishra’s more recent work written after the collapse of communism reflects a somewhat different 
position. Here, he argues that globalisation has restrained social policy options, and advances the 
notion of a global social standard to replace the principles of social rights (Mishra 1998).
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Rather than asserting capitalism’s inherent superiority, Hutton argues that ‘one form 
of capitalism or another is now the only game in town’ (Hutton 1997, p.2). This is a 
view shared by John Kenneth Galbraith who maintains that ‘[t]he age of presumed 
choice between alternative economic systems is over’ (Galbraith 1998, p. 17; 1996). 
Commentators argue that in the absence of any ready ideological alternative, the 
debate is over (Friedman 2000, p. 104; Fukuyama 2002, p.l4; Hutton 1996; Giddens 
2000; Elkington 1998). The binary antagonism that has characterised much of the 
past century -  that of collectivism and socialism on the one hand and capitalism and 
individualism on the other -  has largely been replaced by a diversity of capitalist 
political economies (Friedman 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Giddens 2000; Hutton 1996). 
Hutton’s view is that:
Capitalism comes in diverse forms. The simple proposition that the 
alternative to capitalism is socialism is an inadequate and misleading way 
of looking at the choices available. There are a multiplicity of 
capitalisms, figured by their institutional structures and the way the 
economic, social and political connect. Hence there are truly democratic 
choices available within capitalist society (Hutton 1997 p.2).
Giddens asserts that the twinning of the liberal state with a capitalist economic 
system is what remains in the face of failed communism, fascism and military rule 
(Giddens 1994, p. 104). Similarly, Donaldson and Dunfee describe the dominant 
position as ‘the coming of age’ of capitalism after the fall of communism:
Today with the corpses of Soviet and Chinese Communism in full public 
view, it had become more acceptable to back away from the extremes of 
championing capitalism as a flawless idea or casting it out as a demon.
With the clear record of Communism’s broken promise obvious to all, 
capitalism is rightly viewed as superior to Communism, even as it is 
acknowledged to be less than a panacea for all society’s ills (Donaldson 
and Dunfee 1997, p.xv).
That the capitalist political economy can ameliorate societal malaise is contested, and 
requires further scrutiny. There are criticisms of this position from both the left and 
right of the ideological spectrum. This is the subject of a later discussion but it is 
useful to outline the bald positions here: For conservatives, capitalism’s raison d ’être 
is the profit motive. Entrepreneurs are agents of wealth creation, and their motives 
are rationally self-interested. For neoliberals who construe a narrow view of the role 
of markets, a competitive market maximises economic efficiency. They hold that
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markets are guarantors of individual freedom as well as social solidarity and 
cohesion. The pursuit of individual interests automatically contributes to the 
maximisation of social interests through ‘the invisible hand’. Social interests are only 
served as a consequence of capitalist activity (Novak 1997). Finally, left and centre 
critics argue for the need to situate capitalism more progressively in relation to 
societal needs. Clark and Dear argue that capitalism is both an economic system, and 
a political system whose legal entitlements and liabilities define, equally as the 
market system of commodity exchange, the social relations of capitalism 
(Martinussen 1997, p.224-225, citing Dear and Clark). Capitalist arrangements 
determine the character, not only of economic institutions, but also political and 
social institutions. This balances the relative importance of state structures with non­
state social and economic structures in the capitalist political economy. Neuberger, 
pointing to the left’s core criticism of the free-market philosophy, suggests that 
economic efficiency is not the paramount goal but that an important possible 
alternative aim may be the pursuit of social goals such as equality or equity 
(Neuberger 1987, p. 103).
The state’s responsibility for the well-being of its citizens is typically achieved 
through welfare. Giddens notes, however, that the global spread of the capitalist 
economy has a tendency to polarize income, both in and between countries (Giddens 
1994, p.87-88). This is particularly acute for developing counties who lack 
ameliorative welfare provisions and whose internal stability may be further stressed 
by increasing economic inequality. In the case of the welfare state in affluent 
countries, welfare systems are able to successfully hold off this tendency, though not 
without the associated costs of social and fiscal strain (Giddens 1994, p.88). But as 
highlighted already, globally increasingly there is a shift in public policy away from 
state welfare. The shift is characterised by a move away from a focus on the 
distribution of wealth, to the promotion of wealth creation, with increased 
opportunity, personal responsibility and the mobilization of citizens and communities 
in progressive civil society (Giddens 2000, p.2-3). Such a conception is wholly 
consistent with a social development perspective that combines social and economic 
development.
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Hutton describes a confluence of elements that define the political economy of 
capitalist society, a society he terms ‘real world capitalism’. These elements, which 
characterise the organisation of economic life, as well as the society’s private and 
social institutions, include varying combinations of the principles of commitment and 
flexibility, co-operative trust and competitive rigour (Hutton 1997, p.2). Hutton’s 
‘real-world capitalism’ is closely aligned with the social democratic view 
encapsulated in Giddens’ ‘third way’ (Giddens 1994, 2000, 2001). In defending the 
good of the market, Giddens argues that the left has to become more comfortable - 
and less sceptical - about the market. It has had to recognise the role of business in 
the creation of wealth, and importantly here, that private capital is essential for social 
investment (Giddens 2000, p.34).
Hutton’s ‘real world capitalism’ and Giddens’ ‘third way’ require both (greater) state 
intervention and stakeholding. Hutton argues that ‘[c]o-operative, successful forms 
of capitalism do not arise spontaneously, but are the product of conscious design’ 
(Giddens 1994, p. 151-173; Hutton 1997, p. 10). Such conscious arrangements require 
systematic reforms, the legitimacy of which requires that government itself be 
legitimate, proportional and open. He asserts that stakeholding offers an alternative 
to ‘winner-takes-all triumphalism’. With appropriate state intervention, trade unions, 
corporations and other private interests regard regulation more positively than being 
just the impositions of the partisan state (Hutton 1997, p. 10). Giddens asserts that 
more government is needed, not less, in the face of globalization (Giddens 2000, 
p.83). He also endorses the notion of stakeholding albeit less enthusiastically than 
Hutton (Giddens 2000, p. 151-153). Indeed, stakeholding is central feature of 
contemporary social democratic politics. Giddens’ notion of reflexive ‘generative 
politics’, which involves the conscious engagement of multiple social spheres, 
suggests a stakeholder approach in all but name.
Globalised capital
The issue of ‘globalisation’ can all too quickly dominate current debates on political 
economy. For this reason, I take only a sidelong glance at the phenomenon, at once 
asserting its importance for the thesis but at the same time situating it at the periphery 
of investigative concerns. The global political economy, and its expression as the
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phenomenon of globalisation is, - for better or worse - propelled by a singular 
economic principle: market capitalism. Of course, as I have argued, there is more to 
market economies than simply free markets. The balance of market and state is a 
sustained concern of this thesis. In the global political economy, market forces are 
increasingly powerful with the effect that for some - in theory at least - the more 
countries open their economies to free trade, the more efficient and successfiil they 
become (Friedman 2000, p.9). Conversely, the phenomenon of globalisation is seen 
by others as a harbinger of even greater global inequality and social injustice (Korten 
1995; Pettifor 2003). The challenge is rather one of aligning institutions and markets 
to promote economic, social and environmental sustainability (Elkington 1998).
South Africa, like other developing economies is located in a global political 
economy. Globalisation is multi-dimensional and is characterised by increased 
capital hyper-mobility, increased global trade, diminished aid, the increased 
economic and political influence of multi-national corporations (MNCs), increased 
technology, faster and broader communication and human mobility (Friedman 2000; 
Held 2001; Mills 2000; Haufler 2001). This global business environment throws up 
critical economic issues for countries like South Africa which seek to compete 
globally.
Increasingly, because of the far-reaching dynamic of global economic forces, the 
global political economy mediates the local. Global economic competition constrains 
domestic options (Deacon, Hulse, and Stubbs 1997; Mishra 1998). Evans also argues 
that the connection between the accomplishment of local states and the external 
global context is intimate and direct, depending often on the increasing international 
division of labour (Evans 1995, p.6-10). Changing technology and broader access to 
information regarding emerging economies, their performance and their governance, 
as well as the ease with which capital can be invested and disinvested, can expose 
emerging markets to the vagaries of unstable investment by both other governments 
and institutional investors. Globalisation potentially yields great rewards, risks and 
burdens for developing countries, requiring that governments manage these 
processes prudently and sensitively. Indeed, rather than leading to the retrenchment 
of states, globalisation stimulates a wider range of government and governance 
strategies, and sometimes a more activist state (Held 2001, p.395). The question of
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governance strategies of non-state actors places the question of self-regulation by 
corporations - particularly MNCs in the context of global inequality - on the agenda 
(Haufler 2001)?^
Political economy is a central concept of this thesis and directly informs the mutual 
dependency or embeddedness of the state and the market in contemporary political 
economy. To this end I explore the liberalisms of Smith, Hayek, Friedman, Rawls, 
Galbraith and Walzer. In particular, I examine different conceptions of liberalism 
with reference to social development, and a SCSD perspective.
Adam Smith: Early progressive traditions
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, o f which by fa r  the 
greater part o f  the numbers are poor and miserable. (Adam Smith, 1776, 
quoted in Todaro 2000, p. 151)
In Wealth o f  Nations, the father of political economy Adam Smith described the 
political economy as having two objectives. These were, first, to ‘provide a plentiful 
revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide a 
revenue or subsistence for themselves’ and second, to ‘supply the state or 
commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services’ (Emerton 1881, 
p. 163, citing Adam Smith). In this tract. Smith described the critical role of the 
market mechanism which, if successfiil, would result in the flow of goods to society 
through the workings of the ‘invisible hand’. The market system, as a level playing 
field on which individuals and firms fi’eely pursue their private self-interests, ensures 
that production in society occurs in the best interests of all. The operation of the 
‘invisible hand’ results in direct positive outcomes for firms and individuals in the 
form of profits and accumulation. In the pursuit of self-interest, the ‘invisible hand’ 
promotes, rather than inhibits the interest of society as a whole (Lubasz 1995, p.46- 
47; Friedman and Friedman 1996). The concept of the ‘invisible hand’ has been 
central to debates around the state and market, and about the distribution of social
“  As already outlined, the scope of this thesis purposefully excludes an in-depth interrogation of these 
debates and the extensive literature on the impact of MNCs. However, some of the choices which lead 
MNC to self-regulate are also apparent in national contexts (Haufler 2001; Hopkins 1999; Morrison 
2003).
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and economic goods. Self interest signals the incentive which drives market 
behaviour and its rationale:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages (Adam Smith, 
p.l 19 cited in Wolff 1996)
Smith identified a second important role of the market: the market as a source of 
growth. Smith anticipated that population growth and colonial expansion would 
result in increased demand, market expansion, market specialisation and higher 
resultant productivity (Martinussen 1997, p. 19). Of course, increased accumulation 
assured by the first role of the market, was a precondition for such growth. Parker 
suggests that a Smithian interpretation of the development of nations would be that 
such achievement is catalysed by selfishness and self-interest (Parker 1995, p.48).
There are multiple interpretations of Adam Smith’s work. For the purpose of this 
thesis, particularly in light of the discussion of liberal theorists that follow, three 
crucial points are highlighted. The first stems from Smith’s economic writing. Whilst 
Smith saw the market as flawed he, nonetheless, pursued his justification of market 
capitalism asserting its superiority - by which he meant it efficiency - over any other 
competing economic system. Second, he defended the role of the active state, albeit 
it the capacity of delivering such public goods as security and education. Finally, 
writing as an ethicist. Smith argued that market capitalism resulted in the greatest 
good. Hardly an egalitarian. Smith asserted the moral effect of markets was the 
increased economic welfare of the poor, as well as, though not equally in proportion 
to, the wealthy. The work of Adam Smith has largely been championed by classical, 
neo-classical and libertarian theorists. Two classical theorists, both Noble Prize- 
winning economists, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, are the subject of our 
ensuing discussion.
Liberal conceptions of the state
Liberal theory is concerned with creating a set of rules - impartial rules - under which 
every individual can best secure the most freedom to pursue personal good in any 
way as long as it does not infringe on the freedom of others. In a liberal state,
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government defines these rules that seek to accord individuals with equal respect 
without imposing any particular conception on individuals of what is good. Plant 
notes that neutrality is a core value in liberalism:
[F]or its project to be coherent it has to show that the rules which define a 
liberal society can be derived from a position of neutrality in relation to 
differing conceptions of the good (Plant 1991, p.77).
The economy in liberalism is determined by the same negative freedom. Economic 
liberalism holds that economic life should be as unhindered as possible by 
constitutional, legal and administrative constraints as appropriate to a stable society 
and market (Colclough 1995, p.l).
Neo-classical theory, liberalism and libertarianism: Hayek and Friedman
Neo-classical economic theory is advanced by Hayek and Friedman. For Friedrich 
Hayek, the liberal state is an amoral state characterised by unplanned and 
unregulated order. The market unfolds similarly, in a manner that is neutral, 
unintended and without design. Importantly, the state provides a framework of rules 
within which people pursue their individual purposes and for whom the common 
good is ensured by the rule of law. Hayek states:
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from 
those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the 
former of the great principles known as Rule o f Law (Hayek 1997, p.54).
For liberals, the law is neutral, abstract and impartial, based on universality and 
consistency.^^ It cannot, therefore, be engineered to serve particular purposes, such as 
welfare. Rather, these laws are designed to secure and protect the principle of 
‘freedom’: in the first instance, maximum freedom enjoyed by the individual from 
coercion, and in the second, a free market unconstrained by distributive principles of 
social justice (Plant 1991, p.86).
^  Feminist scholarship and critical theory have demonstrated that in reality, the rule of law is not 
necessarily neutral but reflects the values of its architects (Cornell 1991; Fraser 1989),
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Hayek and social distribution
Hayek's notion of justice is based on an abstract framework of rules that enable the 
largest amount of freedom to individuals to pursue their own purposes. Similarly, 
justice also involves such a space for individual pursuit that is free from interference 
or coercion from others. As a liberal, Hayek’s conception of justice is linked to a 
negative conception of freedom. Injustice occurs only when an individual’s freedom 
is restrained. It is important to note that injustice is not linked to outcomes: Hayek 
does not believe justice to be tied to the distribution of goods or resources.
State intervention, for Hayek, harms the social system since it is amoral and requires 
coercion. A Hayekian resists attempts by governments to plan the economy and 
provide social welfare. While well intentioned, the use of government power results 
in the consequent diminution of liberty for individuals and the beginning of a process 
that leads ultimately to serfdom.
Social justice, Hayek believes, is ‘atavistic’ and ‘irreconcilable with the open 
society’ (Hayek 1978, p.268), and any state that seeks to attain social justice is 
illegitimate. Unacceptably to Hayek, the pursuit o f social justice requires the 
imposition on society of the view of ends and purposes based on needs and merit. In 
such cases, there are no objective ways of determining criteria for making 
judgements regarding social justice. Need and merit are notions he considers 
politically untenable as this accords the state authority to determine and reward 
moral desert. Moreover, they create opportunities for competing interests to sway the 
neutral and amoral state (Plant 1991, p.88). For Hayek, the primacy of the market has 
to be asserted against government regulation and the politicisation of economic life 
which results from the pursuit of the ‘mirage of social justice’ (Plant 1991, p.82).
A liberal society based on neutral and impartial laws, cannot be concerned with 
issues of social justice which are typically articulated in the patterns of distribution of 
social goods to individuals. Hayek asserts that, ‘[Tjhere can be no distributive justice 
where no one distributes’ (Hayek 1978, p.58). In a free market, there is no 
overarching distributor. In a liberal society, there can be no ‘intended’ distribution of 
income and wealth, as well as goods and services, as there exists no such intentional
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distribution in the market. Social outcomes are wholly unintended and arise 
spontaneously. Unequal income and wealth, for example, are not unjust since they 
are neither intended nor foreseen. Hayek argues that income rewards are linked to 
just outcomes in the free market, ‘informing people where they will find their most 
effective place in the overall pattern of activities - the place where they are likely to 
make their greatest contribution to aggregate output’ (Hayek 1978, p.63).
Whilst Hayek is not concerned with distributional justice. Plant notes that he does 
direct his attention to the legitimacy of the market in relation to those who are most 
disadvantaged in society. Hayek argues a ‘trickle down’ theory of economic growth. 
Economic benefits and goods will be enjoyed by lower social echelons at a later 
stage as a consequence of the patterns of consumption and innovation set by more 
advantaged members of society. Despite inequality, the market system, Hayek 
argues, is still more desirable to the poor than any other system:
The fact that the opportunities open to the poor in a competitive society 
are much more restricted than those open to the rich does not make it less 
true than in such a society the poor are more free than a person 
commanding much greater material wealth comfort in a different type of 
society (Hayek 1997, p.77).
He argues further that the free market is advantageous for all in the long run because 
it encourages innovation and growth, and ‘elicits the highest contributions to 
productivity’ (Hayek 1978, p.65). However, Plant criticises Hayek’s argument 
concerning the entry of disadvantaged groups into the market, where the outcomes 
are not favourable and these groups remain the least well off in society. Hayek 
argues that this situation is simply not unjust as these outcomes are not ‘intended’ by 
the market. Since there is no intention to redistribute, there is consequently no 
injustice when this fails to materialise. But, while this position might be tenable with 
regard to individuals, it fails to take responsibility in the case of groups for what 
would in reality be reasonably anticipated consequences of such a system (Plant 
1991,p.91-93).
Hayek and corporate social engagement
In classical and neo-classical economic theory to which Hayek’s liberalism is closely 
aligned, the corporation is a juristic creation, answerable only to law. The
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corporation’s mandate consists of permission to individuals to carry on certain 
enterprises to maximise and advance their own interests, and more especially the 
corporation’s owners, with risk being limited to the amount invested (Newton 1992,
p. 110).
Like the liberal society, the corporation and the market in which it operates, are 
amoral. Hayek draws a distinction between society and an organisation. Whilst 
society has evolved from a diversity of purposes, an organisation exists to secure 
particular purposes. Within an organisation particular rules are devised to help the 
members secure their common purposes (Plant 1991, p.80). Corporations are 
organisations that operate merely as instruments of an efficient (amoral) market. If 
corporations pursue autonomous moral objectives such as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), the freedom of society would be undermined. Pursuing social 
goals is inappropriate. Corporate social engagement transgresses the corporation’s 
bounds; it is behaviour that might in fact create a justification for intervention by the 
state (Wempe 1998, p. 103).
Friedman: The business of business is business
Like Hayek, Milton Friedman also embraces the classic thinking of Adam Smith. 
However, whilst Smith’s notion of freedom is originally rooted in political and 
intellectual freedom, Friedman, a libertarian, makes economic freedom primary. 
Friedman elevates economic freedom to a position of guardianship over other 
primary freedoms (Heilbroner 1970, p. 13). Freedom and the free market are 
inextricably bound. For Friedman, the successful functioning of society depends of 
the role specialisation of its institutions. Corporations are economic institutions, and 
thus their concern is in the economic sphere. Indeed, they are obligated to limit their 
sphere of activity to this realm. Distribution occurs through market corrections.
Milton Friedman argues that the role of the state is to ensure freedom and efficiency 
only in so far as maintaining law and order and ensuring also the market operates 
without monopolistic restriction (Friedman and Friedman 1996). Friedman argues 
that the limited state should also provide care on a limited basis for those who cannot
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meet their own welfare needs through the market. However, intervention beyond 
these bounds diminishes freedom and harms economic growth (Midgley 1995, p.84).
Friedman and corporate social engagement
Like Hayek, Friedman views the corporation as amoral. A neo-classic view of 
corporations says that that a corporation is morally no better or worse than the 
society within which it functions. Corporations merely reflect the norms and values 
of society (Wempe 1998, p. 106). Classical and neo-classical commentators regard 
ethical questions regarding corporate functioning as largely inappropriate and hold 
deep antagonism to the ideas of corporate social engagement (usually in the form of 
CSR).
Friedman is perhaps the most notable and consistently quoted opponent of corporate 
engagement in the social sphere. He argues that CSR undermines the basic tenets of 
capitalism and free society. Arguing against CSR, Friedman asserts that the sole 
purpose of corporations is to maximise the interest of their owners. As corporate 
agents, the fiduciary duty of corporate decision-makers is to ensure that 
shareholder’s profits are maximised. According to Friedman, CSR is a politically 
subversive idea that threatens a free society. He argues that:
... the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ taken seriously would extend 
the scope of the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not 
differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It 
differs only by professing that collectivist ends can be attained without 
collectivist means. That is why, in my book Capitalism and Freedom, I 
have called it a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, 
and have said in such a society, “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business -  to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game, which is to say, engages in a open and free competition without 
deception or fraud (Friedman 1988, p.223).
In such a view, there is no justification for using corporate resources for activity 
other than that which advances the profit-motive in the interests of the shareowners. 
In a free society, this is business’ only social responsibility. The corporation is at 
most an ‘artificial person’, a legal construct incapable of making value decisions 
(Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.26; Wempe 1998, p. 105).
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While the corporation is amoral, corporate managers are not. As corporate agents, 
Friedman argues, executives are employed by the shareholders to lead the company 
on their behalf and in their interests. Friedman is clear that the corporate officer’s 
primary responsibility is to the corporate shareholders. The executive is a corporate 
instrument and must fulfil his explicit and implicit contractual obligations to the 
corporate shareholders by maximising their profits. This is a moral obligation: it 
might be argued that according to Friedman, the moral duty of a corporate director is 
the duty to act amorally (Wempe 1998, p. 105). Whilst in their personal capacities, 
corporate executives might be impelled to behave in a socially responsible way, this 
is a personal matter and not one that concerns business (Friedman 1988, p.218). 
However, in behaving in a ‘socially responsible’ way by using the corporation’s 
resources for non-profit purposes, Friedman would ‘disdain such tactics as 
approaching fraud’ (Friedman 1988 p.222). He would see the corporate decision­
maker as undermining economic efficiency and ‘levying “an illegal tax’” on the 
organisation (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.26).
Hayek and Friedman’s positions are critiqued later by way of presenting alternative 
liberal views. A few specific points can, nonetheless, usefully be made. First, in the 
classical and neo-classical economics view held by both these writers, asserting an 
amoral state - in which an amoral market operates - fails to fully explain the moral 
and ethical character of society and social interaction, of which business is clearly a 
part. A value-based society can not be simple discarded because it threatens liberal 
shibboleths of political neutrality. Second, the ‘invisible hand of the market’ has not 
operated as suggested, nor has the economic sphere been able to remain specialised 
and immune from the influences of the state and civil society. In this regard, global 
capitalism is not a level playing field and is unequally skewed towards developed 
economies. Indeed, most liberal economists today would argue that the free market is 
not free and that there is a role for at least a regulating, co-ordinating state (Toye 
1993; Colclough 1995, p.8-10; Todaro 2000, p.457-460). A regulating state is of 
particular relevance in developing countries, although certainly each situation will 
require a set of different responses, policies and instruments. Third, in asserting that 
the corporation is merely an artificial legal persona, it is not clear why the 
corporation as a ‘person’ can and should not be held responsible. Ethics do not relate 
only to natural persons. Fourth, Hayek argues that the political danger of corporate
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social engagement lies in the corporation operating out of its legal boundaries 
thereby inviting government intervention. However, the converse might easily be 
asserted. It can be argued that corporations can best avoid intervention by the state by 
accepting the need for corporate social responsibility. Finally, a corporation - even as 
an artificial legal entity - is defined by articles and memorandums of association that 
define the corporation’s values, as well as its parameters of activity. Balabanis et a l 
argue that these are broad enough to allow departures from this narrow, purely 
economic path (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998). Thus, there is greater freedom 
for the corporation to accept moral and social responsibility.
John Rawls: Social justice and liberalism
John Rawls would agree with Hayek that a liberal society requires a framework - a 
rule of law - to maximise the individual’s freedom from coercion. However, the key 
point of departure of these two thinkers is the question of social justice.
Although the work of Rawls is discussed in greater depth in the next chapter 
addressing social contract theory, it is usefully presented here as a counterpoint to 
Hayek and Friedman on the issue of social justice. In his Theory o f Justice (1971) 
Rawls argues for the primacy of the principle of justice in his critique of 
utilitarianism which fails to mitigate against possible unfairness in the distribution of 
costs and benefits. Justice, he argues, has to be the overarching principle informing 
public policy. His theory of ‘justice as fairness’ invokes what he terms the ‘original 
position’: the society that self-interested and rational people would contract to create 
if they were ignorant of their status relative to others. Rawls calls this the ‘veil of 
ignorance’. Like other liberal theories, Rawls’ abstract society is neutral. However, 
unlike Hayek, Rawls posits a theory of primary goods which are distributed in 
society, and which include rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and 
wealth and a sense of one’s own worth (Plant 1991, p.99).
Rawls articulates a principle for ensuring equality with which Hayek would not 
agree. Rawls’ difference principle says that social and economic inequalities are just 
only if they are to the advantage of the least advantaged members of society. His 
notion of justice as fairness offers a theory on distribution that is based on 
permissible inequality. The difference principle is arguably radical and may require
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substantial distribution of resources (Pierson 1998, p. 191). Rawls recognises that 
sometimes in order to maximise general welfare, some people are of necessity, made 
worse off for the sake of the general good. The benefits for the whole group, and 
particularly the least advantaged who should bear no additional burden, legitimate 
the unequal treatment of people in society. Importantly, the principle of ‘justice as 
fairness’ allows for positive discrimination and the unequal treatment of certain 
groups of people. The difference principle is discussed further in Chapter Three with 
reference to the social contract.
Corporate social engagement is congruent with Rawlsian liberalism. The market is 
the vehicle for maximising interests, and is also an instrument of redistribution 
(Rawls 1967). In addition, within the corporate social contract (working analogously 
with the social contract), corporate engagement would be an expression of the 
corporation’s adherence to its social, ethical and legal responsibilities. Again, these 
ideas are pursued further in Chapter Three. Corporate social policies are just if they 
are directed towards ensuring human actualisation, including effecting positive steps 
to ensure that all members of the society, including those most disadvantaged, enjoy 
social and economic good necessary for full liberty. Finally, Rawls considers people 
to be moral personalities, and this is a ‘sufficient condition for equal justice’ as might 
be expressed in corporate social engagement and CSR (Plant 1991, p. 106)
Rawls attempts to create a neutral theory for the distribution of goods. Consequently, 
it is important for state action to secure the centrality of social justice and that this be 
pursued ‘without infringing the purpose-independent nature of legislation in a liberal 
society’ (Plant 1991, p.79-80). Rawls, like Hayek, rejects desert as a criterion for 
distributive justice as arbitrary, given family circumstances and the natural 
endowments that individuals enjoy.
One reason for which Rawls is criticised is that his analysis operates at a high level 
of abstraction. While he is credited with developing an ideal theory of justice, this is 
not necessarily easily applied to a non-ideal world (De George 1987, p.207). 
Particular questions arise such as those regarding corporate social engagement and 
corporate morality which require a practical and context-sensitive analysis. The 
original position is also critiqued for its hypothetical abstraction. This is a central
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element in Rawls’ theory of distribution. However, in reality one cannot truly ensure 
that the ‘veil of ignorance’ operates and that those making social decisions will really 
be neutrally securing the interests of those least well off. Moreover, the original 
position operates at no higher level of abstraction than Smith’s ‘invisible hand’.
John Kenneth Galbraith: Left liberalism
We, the socially concerned, do not seek equality in income distribution. 
People differ in ability and aspiration in the pursuit o f  both financial 
reward and gain. There is also the role o f  initiative, luck and avarice.
This must be accepted. There can be no retreat, however from  the goal o f  
a socially defensible distribution o f income. This, to repeat, the tax 
system must continue to address. We must expect, and we need not 
respond to, screams o f anguish from the very rich. Our mission reflects 
the old Pulitzer purpose - to comfort the ajflicted and afflict the 
comfortable. John Kenneth Galbraith (Galbraith 1998, p.25)
John Kenneth Galbraith is located on the left of the liberal spectrum, arguing for 
greater interdependence between the two spheres of the state and the market. 
Galbraith is credited with developing Keynesian and post-Keynesian economics and 
an aligned conception of the corporation. He argues that humane and comprehensive 
social welfare saved capitalism by creating a ‘modem, more socially functional, 
more compassionate society’ (Galbraith 1998, p.27). In his conception of the good 
society, Galbraith argues that a pivotal step is to ensure a more equitable 
redistribution of income than the market system provides. The good society takes 
care of the needs of its citizenry: where the market fails, the state is obliged to 
provide these primary needs (Galbraith 1996). He agues that ‘a reasonably equitable 
distribution of income is not only socially good but also economically functional’ 
(Galbraith 1996, p.330). These basic material needs are a necessary condition for the 
liberty of the citizen. Like other liberal theorists, Galbraith sees liberty at the core of 
the social project. Economic priorities such as a reliably growing economy, are the 
beginning, rather than the end, of a social agenda (Galbraith 1998, p.24).
Diverging from liberal commentators like Hayek and Friedman, Galbraith argues for 
a strongly interventionist state. He argues that social policy should be aligned to the 
public purpose that is determined by the social and political environment that obtains 
(Galbraith 1998, p.31). He also argues that ‘the question of the private versus the 
public role should not be decided on abstract, theoretical grounds; the decision
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depends rather on the merits of the particular case’ (Galbraith 1998, p.20). Such 
assessments require strong public intervention. These ideas also point to Galbraith’s 
pragmatism. Heilbroner notes that this pragmatism was one source of criticism from 
classical economics: Galbraith described the operation of the economic system in 
terms closer to reality than the orthodoxy of classical economics (Heilbroner 1970,
p.228).
In Galbraith’s view the state has a distributive function. This serves as a radical 
counterfoil to Hayek. The state has a redistributive role because of the failure of the 
‘invisible hand of the market’. Inequality - and notably inequality of income - is an 
injustice. He argues: ‘There is another very specific flaw in the market system 
against which we must rally political strength and action. The market system 
distributes income in a highly unequal fashion’ (Galbraith 1998, p.24).
Galbraith and the corporation
Galbraith’s views on the corporation accord with those of Hayek and Friedman in 
that they endorse a neo-classical conception of the corporation. In this common view, 
neither the corporation nor certain stakeholders who create the corporation are 
responsible for social justice. But Galbraith’s views on the corporation diverge from 
those of Hayek and Friedman not in the way the corporation is conceived, but rather 
in the way it is valued. Hayek and Friedman prize the amoral character of the 
corporation, holding it as the guarantor of a free society. By contrast, Galbraith sees 
the amoral idea as obfuscating the actual immorality of corporate functioning. 
Galbraith takes aim at the corporation’s obsessive accumulation and private 
affluence, and its failure to provide social goods in conditions where squalor exists 
side by side with affluence and prosperity (Harvey, Smith, and Wilkinson 1984, p.4; 
Midgley 1995, p. 143). Consequently, Galbraith argues for government intervention 
in the public interest. The locus of power in the corporation is the ‘anonymous 
technostructure’: the linked structure of professionals, specialists, technical experts, 
among others, who collectively guide the corporation. In order for the general 
interest to defeat the interests of the ‘anonymous technostructure’, Galbraith asserts 
that ‘the only answer is a strong framework that aligns the exercise of corporate 
power with the public purpose’ (Galbraith 1977, p.277). The pursuit of non-
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economic goals by a ‘mature corporation’ is thus entirely congruent with the 
concomitant pursuit of economic and technological goals (Sklar 1976, p.77).
For Galbraith, power begets responsibility. The technostructure of the modem 
corporation is hence where corporate power and responsibility lies. Galbraith asserts 
that the modem corporation is not driven by the mythological capitalist figure of the 
single entrepreneur. Rather, it is a committee system which ensures the goals of the 
corporation marked by a combination of impersonality, specialisation and 
bureaucratic procedure (Heilbroner 1970, p.230). Among these goals, Heilbroner 
notes, the classical and neo-classical rationale of ‘maximising of profits’ is notably 
absent (Heilbroner 1970, p.231).
How Galbraith sees the corporation has implications for corporate legitimacy. 
Legitimacy is achieved because the corporation is subject to the market with its self­
correction and ‘comprehensive discipline’ that keeps the private purposes of 
corporations aligned with public interest. Galbraith describes a myth in which the 
corporation serves the public good - the public best - through markets to which it is 
entirely subordinate. The corporation is an expression of public legitimacy: the 
market is an expression of public preference and desire to which the firm responds. It 
is, in its service to the customer, wholly under public control, without any significant 
power of its own (Galbraith 1977, p.257). In reality, Galbraith agues that the 
corporation has power and influence in a wide range of institutional spheres; it 
manages values in the market, shapes tastes and influences consumption through 
advertising as well as exercising influence in and by way of govemment (Galbraith 
1977, p.258).
The site of responsibility in Galbraith’s theory is complex. Galbraith regards the 
corporation as having an autonomous personality, a ‘synthetic personality’ (Galbraith 
1962, p.62). The interaction between corporate participants in the course of the 
impersonal exercise of power creates the personality of the corporation (French 
1984, p.42). Like individuals, the corporation is only effective if it enjoys the liberty 
to pursue its own personality’ (Galbraith 1962, p.69). Corporate autonomy - free 
from the external interference of govemment and its agencies - constitutes the 
prerequisite liberty. He states:
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The intrusion of politics and patronage into the public corporation is 
deeply subversive of the subtle relationships on which an effective 
development of this synthetic personality depends. But so also will be the 
intrusions of civil service procedures and routines. The latter may be 
admirably designed to ensure equality of treatment for all employees. But 
the effect can be to destroy the easy interpersonal adjustments and the 
automatic co-ordination on which effective operation depends. The world 
is full of unhappy choices, and in modem industrialism one of them is 
between perfectly just rules and reasonably satisfactory standards 
(Galbraith 1962, p.72-74).
Galbraith argues that outside authority must be circumscribed in what it asks of the 
corporation if corporate autonomy is to be protected from outside intrusion. The 
corporation’s set goals must be clear and utterly explicit (Galbraith 1962, p.72).
But what of corporate social engagement and corporate responsibility in the 
Galbraithian vision? The corporation comprises individuals in the technostructure. 
Corporations can only be responsible in that that there are individuals who can be 
held morally responsible. In this, Galbraith confirms an amoral vision of the 
corporation. Its technocratic structure, driven by the ‘imperatives of technology’ 
rather than any deliberate engineering, reinforces this idea. For example, the board 
avoids interfering with management decisions but ensures that the corporation is 
aligned with public laws and in this, public purpose. In addition, the autonomous 
corporation operates within a normative moral framework that is determined by the 
market and which inhibits ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-normative’ moral demands on 
corporations (Wempe 1998, p. 108). However, Galbraith argues that, ‘Autonomy 
does not mean less public accountability. On the contrary, it means more. But it is 
accountability not for method, procedure, or individual action but for result’ 
(Galbraith 1962, p.74).
Michael Walzer: Social democracy, egalitarianism and liberalism
Michael Walzer’s liberalism^"  ^ is set in his commitment to egalitarianism and 
pluralism, distributive justice, the diversity of social goods in society and the relative
^  Whilst pluralism keeps Walzer in the liberal camp, he is also a communitarian and radical social 
democrat. His liberalism lies in that he argues for a plurality of ways of being in the world and 
multiple visions of the good life (communitarians tend to hold a single vision). Moreover, as a liberal,
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neutral value of these goods. The competing ideals of freedom and equality underpin 
the core tenets of all far left liberal thinking. In his work Spheres o f  Justice, Michael 
Walzer attempts to accommodate these two competing master ideals through the 
notion of autonomously self-regulating spheres of human activity and distribution.
Walzer’s descriptive project can be summed up as follows. Human society is made 
up of an array of discrete and autonomous spheres of human activity (Walzer 1983, 
p. 10). In each autonomous sphere of activity, human beings pursue the acquisition of 
particular goods whether it is sporting accolade, grandmaster points in chess, 
university degrees or access to medical resources for illnesses. Each sphere is 
autonomous and guided by its own set of rules and boundaries (Katz 1989, 
p. 179).Within each sphere, goods are - or ought to be - distributed according to 
criteria intrinsic to the activity in which people engage. That is, the socially 
determined meaning and goals of the activity should dictate the distribution of the 
available goods. Thus, grandmaster points in chess should be distributed according to 
one’s ability to win games against the best players; medical resources should be 
distributed according to the requirements of the illness and the social resources 
available. Were life simple and resources unlimited, distribution of particular goods 
in their specific realms would not be a problem. However, life is not simple. First, 
resources are not unlimited. Second, individual participants in various activities may 
attempt to secure a monopoly on the distribution of goods in a given sphere. In, this 
attempt at monopoly should not be a problem - so long as the monopoly power 
remains within a given sphere of activity. However, monopoly power regarding the 
distribution of resources rarely remains within a given autonomous realm of social 
activity. That monopoly or significant accrual of goods and power in one sphere, 
particularly the market sphere, invariably leads to inappropriate distributions of 
goods in other spheres. This leads to the third problem: domination. Domination, in 
short, is the use of goods or power accrued in one discrete domain of social activity 
to secure the distribution of goods in another sphere of human activity. Examples are
Walzer insists that various forms of power - monopoly power over a sector of the economy - do not 
influence the goods distributed in other non-economic areas of life. Most importantly, he would not 
have power in other spheres of life influence the choices citizens make as equals in the political 
arena. Perhaps the contusion lies in his radical way of looking at nonmarket driven distributions of 
goods and the conditions of equality needed for meaningful engagement as citizens..
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easy. Money should enable one to buy things - some things - but it should not enable 
one to purchase political office, ecclesiastical positions or access to educational 
opportunities. Beauty should be fair game in love; but it should not influence the 
distribution of jobs or academic marks or money. The ‘tyrannical’ use of social 
goods is the use of a monopoly on social power in one sphere to exploit and to distort 
the distribution of goods in other spheres.
The market is the primary - but hardly the only - offender when is comes to 
domination or ‘tyranny’ (Katz 1989). Walzer’s conception of the state is very much 
interventionist when it comes to the market: its necessary and primary function is to 
constrain the misuse of monopoly power wherever it occurs (Walzer 1983, p. 15). 
Regarding the constraining state, Walzer is both cautious and consistent. The state, 
rather than merely breaking up tyrannical monopolies or repressing new forms of 
dominance, becomes the site of competition. Power to constrain is itself a social 
good and groups will seek to monopolise it in order to protect other monopolies. 
Walzer argues that the need arises to constrain the agents of constraint by 
establishing constitutional checks and balances (Walzer 1983, p. 14). Thus, for 
Walzer, social life, the market and the state all operate similarly, in that they are 
determined by their particular context, given meanings and the social resources they 
distribute.
For Walzer, ‘distributive justice is the art of differentiation’ (Walzer 1983, p.xv). 
Social goods have particular social meanings and distributive justice occurs through 
a realisation of particular interpretations of the meanings ascribed to social goods. 
Each sphere of human engagement has its own principles and meanings attached to 
the social goods that obtain (Walzer 1983, p. 19). What goods are distributed, in 
whose interest, with what ascribed meaning, by which authority and for what reasons 
are important questions to be considered. It follows that all distributions can be seen 
to be just or unjust relative to social meanings of a particular sphere, and the social 
goods in question. Walzer sees all resources with which distributive justice is 
concerned as social goods (Walzer 1983, p.7). Still, it must be remembered, these 
social goods are highly particularised, having different meaning in different societies 
and over time. Thus, Walzer’s complex conception might be encapsulated as:
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The principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different 
social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance 
with different procedures, by different agents; that all these differences 
derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves the 
inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism (Walzer 1983,
p.6).
In the Walzerian view, human society is essentially, though not exclusively, a 
distributive community (Walzer 1992). This has implications for how he sees society 
operating, as well as how key institutions - the state and market - behave. An 
extensive welfare state must meet the needs of its community, distribute goods in 
proportion to need and ensure that ‘membership’ or inclusion in ensured (Katz 1989). 
In society, people associate to share, divide and exchange. People also associate to 
make that which is to be shared, divided and exchanged, and even the work of 
making of the goods is characterised by a distribution of labour (Walzer 1983, p.3).
Walzer is unambiguous about what he sees as the role of the market. He asserts:
Throughout history, the market has been one of the most important 
mechanisms for the distribution of social goods; but it has never been, it 
nowhere is today, a complete distributive system (Walzer 1983, p.4).
The idea of corporate social engagement is entirely congruent with Walzer’s position 
on the distribution of social goods generally. Nothing in the market’s socially 
determined meanings and values precludes corporate social engagement. Indeed, 
responsible corporate activities would act as inhibitor on the use of monopoly power 
to exploit the distribution of goods in other spheres of activity. A commitment to a 
more egalitarian and non-tyrannical distribution of social goods makes Walzer’s 
vision and corporate social engagement compatible vehicles for attaining comparable 
goals.
Hayek, Friedman, Rawls, Galbraith and Walzer all write in the liberal tradition but 
hold very different positions about the principles of social justice and distribution. 
This has obvious implications for the relationship between the market and the state, 
and to what extent these spheres interact. A limitation of liberalism - certainly one 
offered by communitarians - is that in defending individual rights it dislocates people 
from personal identities which are rooted in community identities, and which refer to 
individuals in their social, historical and cultural contexts (Avineri and de-Shalit
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1996). The debate between liberalism and communitarianism is not pursued further 
here. It is, nevertheless, an alive and interesting debate that might well yield 
interesting insights into an interrogation of SCSD.
State and market: a negotiated marriage?
The relationship between the state and the market is neither static nor given. It is 
most often informed by its political and social context. The dominant ideas of the 
state and market relationship are most often presented within a spectrum of (ideal) 
interaction: an interventionist state and a mixed economy on the one hand, or a non­
interventionist state and an unbridled free market, on the other. The notion of the 
state and market relationship operating on a spectrum challenges the neo-classical 
dichotomy of state and market being shorthand for public and private. Neo-classical 
economic theory advocates the case for limited state intervention, arguing instead for 
competitive market mechanisms on the basis of efficiency. However, given that both 
the market and the state are complex institutions, defined by concrete specialisations, 
it is often the important, and negotiated task of policy makers to determine the best 
division of (institutionalised) labour. Richard Batley contends that the case for state 
intervention rests on the argument that there are circumstances where markets fail to 
perform efficiently. Most significantly, however, it is predominantly the character of 
particular goods and services, although these will vary to some extent depending on 
local market conditions, institutional arrangements and technologies, that determine 
the appropriateness of state intervention (Batley 1996, p.726). Whether economic 
performance is improved through introducing market reforms, or whether the size of 
the state is reduced, the important point Martinussen makes is that the absolute size 
of the public sector and the quantity of state interventions are less important than the 
way in which the state acts and the kinds of relationships it establishes with the 
private sector (Martinussen 1997, p.266).
This core issue is more complex than just choosing between the state and the market. 
Martinussen points to two imperatives around which such choices must be 
negotiated, namely economic and political feasibility. He argues that from the point 
of view o f economic feasibility, the central task is to establish a working relationship 
between the state and the private sector. From the perspective of political feasibility,
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the key task is to find out whether sufficient support can be mobilised for the 
proposed policy (Martinussen 1997, p.266). Most importantly, it is a question of 
what is both politically and economically feasible at the same time, and this requires 
that the relationship between the state and market be flexible, continuously adapting, 
particularly to meet the challenges of extracting maximum benefits from a globalised 
market (Martinussen 1997, p.266).
It is common to represent the market and state in a dichotomy. In reality the 
spectrum is more fluid. Many institutions do not fit neatly into the state or market 
divide. Rather, they may have a mixture of both public and private characteristics, 
‘private-like’ and ‘public-like’ institutions. Elinor Ostrom makes this point. She also 
argues that a competitive market is a public good. She asserts that whilst the market 
is the epitome of a private institution, no market can exist for any significant time 
without the existence of underlying public institutions to support it. In reality, public 
and private institutions are often interdependent and interwoven (Ostrom 1994, p. 15; 
Giddens 2001).
Part Two: Corporate Social Engagement
The second part of this chapter situates the Bsues of corporate social engagement, 
introduced in the first chapter, in the broader debates around liberal political 
economy. The issue of corporate social engagement is then considered through a 
detailed discussion of the literature^^ and with reference to the core perspective of 
SCSD. As SCSD argues for an economic outcome that is socially responsible, this 
section revisits the nature of the state-market relationship viz. corporate engagement, 
the locus and nature of responsibility and corporate ethics. The chapter concludes by 
returning full circle to political economy, the state-market theme and the issue of 
regulation in corporate social engagement.
In search of the Holy Grail
A critical point needs to be established at the outset. State-corporate social 
development seeks to shift the traditionally normative perspectives of corporate
“  The literature concerned with corporate social engagement is dominated by CSR, and most 
originates from a North American or European perspective.
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social engagement, including CSR and corporate citizenship from the normative 
towards the strategic realm. However, the strategic rationale for social engagement 
by business raises the spectre of a Holy Grail sought by academics and practitioners 
alike. Indeed, the relationship is ‘enshrined in corporate rhetoric’ (Post, Preston, and 
Sachs 2002, p.27). Creating a business case for corporate social engagement aims to 
show that these activities contribute to improved financial performance. The 
argument follows that if such a link were established, companies (and shareholders) 
would benefit from adopting policies and practices which benefit a wide range of 
societal stakeholders. Whilst multiple case studies assert the correlation between 
business ethics, corporate engagement and profitability, finding a conclusive positive 
relationship is difficult^^. In seeking such evidence, Margolis and Walsh analysed 95 
studies conducted between 1972 and 2000 of the relationship between corporate 
social performance and financial performance (Margolis and Walsh 2001). The 
majority of these studies indicated a positive relationship although methodological 
questions lead the researchers to proceed with caution (Margolis and Walsh 2001, 
p. 13). Indeed, despite the presence of a growing high-profile global CSR movement, 
and sizeable scholarship on the issue, a consistent causal link between CSR and 
increased profits remains elusive (Clarkson 1995; Hamann 2003; Margolis and 
Walsh 2001; Marsden 2000; Preston and Post 1975). The discursive tools related to 
corporate social engagement thus remain essentially normative. The argument on 
which corporate social engagement is premised sees no inherent contradiction 
between profitability and remaining responsible to society (and the environment) 
(Zadek 2001). However, moral imperatives are commendable and desirable but these 
do not convert the sceptical to the value of social engagement. Speaking to the 
interests of business is more likely to convince the sceptical, as does addressing the 
longer-view issue of business sustainability. Arguably, appealing to the business case 
or ‘enlightened self-interest’ of corporations is a more compelling argument that a 
vague moral code. But the absence of clear causation (and well as compelling
“  Numerous books and articles demonstrate that corporate social engagement reduces volatility and 
risks, and increases returns and profitability (Recent examples include Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 
1998; Cowe 2004; Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) UK 2003; Donaldson and Preston 1995; 
Margolis and Walsh 2001; Riahi-Belkaoui 1999; Willard 2002; Zadek 2001). The countless business 
cases are also available on the Internet from CSR, corporate citizenship and business sustainability 
sites which argue the positive associations. (Most notable amongst recent research are Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) UK and Future 2003; Collinson 2001; Kemp 2001. See also Sustainability's 
Buried Treasure, Business Case Matrix at http://www.sustainability.com/business-case/contents.asp).
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scholarly evidence to substantiate the same) probably means less social engagement 
on the part of corporations than is now the case.
Thus, the discussion of corporate social engagement proceeds with two assumptions 
in mind. One, corporate engagement is both a normative and a strategic response by 
business. Two, whilst no conclusive link between financial and non-financial 
performance is asserted, corporate social engagement, nevertheless, accrues multiple 
positive gains to the corporation in its relationships with other stakeholders and in the 
course of conducting its business. These gains are consistent with business 
sustainability, and are suggestive of positive financial performance (Zadek 2001, 
p.171).
Locating corporate social engagement in the state and market debate
Before looking at the issue of corporate social engagement in depth, it is important to 
look at various responses regarding corporate social engagement within the state and 
market debate. These have usefully been summarised by Gray, Owen and Maunders, 
and are reproduced schematically here (Gray, Owen, and Maunders 1987, p. 10-12)
Gray, Owen and Maunders suggest five main responses to corporate social 
engagement, formulated as CSR in their treatment. The first is the argument of the 
‘pristine capitalist’, which can be understood to refer to neo-classical, liberal 
economic theorists such as Hayek and Friedman. The pristine capitalists deny any 
responsibility beyond efficient response to the market. This position, which has been 
described earlier, asserts that corporate social responsibility is an inappropriate 
activity for a corporation whose main responsibility is profit making. This position 
might be described thus:
There is no reason to think that shareholders are willing to tolerate an 
amount of corporate non-profit activity which appreciably reduces either 
dividends or the market performance of stock (Gray, Owen, and 
Maunders 1987, p. 10, citing Hetherington 1973).
The second response is that of ‘the expedients’. The expedients believe that 
economic welfare and stability can be achieved by the acceptance by the corporation 
of some (minimal) wider social responsibility. The stimulus to social engagement
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might be internal but is usually external. Corporate social responsibility is seen as a 
trade-off for some other benefit accrued to the corporation. This position involves 
accommodating different and often conflicting values. Corporations, particularly 
larger entities are likely to invest in longer-term relationships in the interest of their 
own institutional and business sustainability. Consequently, in their self-interest, they 
will allocate resources to long-term strategies and to stability, including corporate 
social engagement.
The third response identified by Gray et a l  is of the proponents of the social contract 
who believe that companies exist at society’s mandate. They are therefore beholden 
to society’s wishes. Any social institution - among which business can be numbered - 
operates in society via a social contract whether expressed or implied. The corporate 
social contractarian would argue that:
[E]very large corporation should be thought of as a social enterprise; that 
is as an entity whose existence and decisions can be justified in so far as 
they serve public or social purposes (Gray, Owen, and Maunders 1987, 
citing R. Dahl, 1972).
The compact is particularly important when the institution’s survival and growth are 
based on social deliverables and the distribution of economic, social or political 
benefits to groups from which it derives its power. This position might be articulated 
thus:
In dynamic society, neither the sources of institutional power nor the 
need for its services are permanent. Therefore an institution must 
constantly meet the twin sets of legitimacy and relevance by 
demonstrating that society requires its services and that the groups
benefiting from its rewards have society’s approval (Gray, Owen, and
Maunders 1987, p .ll, citing Shocker and Sethi, 1973).
The fourth response is that of social ecologists who are concerned with the
environment in the broadest sense. Social ecologists argue that corporations are often
influential in creating, and are potentially equally successful at resolving very 
serious social and environmental problems.
The fifth group are the ‘socialists’, who wish to see the end of economic and political 
dominance by capitalism in favour of economic as well as political socialism (Gray,
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Owen, and Maunders 1987, p.l 1). This position enjoys little support. An ameliorated 
version, one that supports the market as a means of distribution, now has greater 
currency than an unaltered Marxist response.
Normative versus strategic imperatives
I wish to underline the strategic imperatives of corporate engagement in a conception 
of SCSD. The concept of CSR often falls short of highlighting this on its own. 
Indeed, the philosophical notion of responsibility is largely seen as normative in 
character and this necessarily leads to some exploration of the normative issues of 
corporate morality. The chapter concludes with discussion regarding the nature of 
responsibility and ethics and ends with an inquiry into the role and nature of 
regulation. In asserting the necessity of regulation with regard to the market (though 
not necessarily the regulation of corporate social engagement) I reinsert the state and 
its regulatory institutions into the debate. I argue that if the business’ ‘licence to 
operate’ and its sustainability are in the balance, then corporate social engagement 
within this environment takes the character of a strategic rather than a moral 
imperative.
Individual versus collective responsibility
The question of where responsibility lies for meeting social need in the SCSD 
ft-amework raises the issue of CSR with regard to business-societal relations. 
Giddens argues that positive values of human sustainability, such as those associated 
with human rights, and care of present and future generations imply the ethics of 
both individual and collective responsibility. As value claims, these are able to trump 
particular divisions of interest. Giddens argues that as responsibility is not a duty, it 
may therefore lack the imperative power of the call to duty. But, while duty suggests 
blind allegiance, responsibility implies a self-conscious rationalisation which is 
compelling given that ‘commitments freely undertaken often have a greater binding 
force than those which are simply traditionally taken’ (Giddens 1994, p. 20-21). 
Whether located at the level of the individual or collective, responsibility suggests 
voluntary and non-coerced accession to a moral position.
8 2
In Market and Morality, Johan Wempe offers a useful consideration of business 
ethics. In his thesis, he identifies a key conceptual problematic with regards to moral 
responsibility and corporate social responsibility. In what Wempe calls the ‘many - 
and dirty - hands dilemma’, it is difficult to ascribe moral responsibility to 
corporations as these are entities defined by a complex division of labour. 
Importantly for this thesis, Wempe uses the social contract with specific reference to 
business ethics along with models of morality to address this dilemma. His project 
can be summarised as follows: whilst few people would argue the difficulty in 
ascribing morality and responsibility to an individual, according the corporation with 
the same moral characteristics as one does a natural person requires an intellectual 
leap. Individuals are autonomous, morally conscious and free to choose their actions. 
But, to what extent is this true of corporations, who are in the very least, co-operative 
entities? How can atomistic notions adequately conceptualise a morality for an entity 
that is essentially collective? Wempe argues that collective responsibility does not 
diminish individual responsibility. Rather, by seeing the corporation as a ‘multi-party 
contract’, a new type of responsibility - one that is collective and broad - is 
developed (Wempe 1998, p. 19).
Wempe identifies three models for the functioning of moral responsibility in 
corporations: the moral, functional and autonomy models. Presented below, these 
summaries are based on Wempe’s own description (Wempe 1998, p .l57). The first 
model, the amoral model of corporate responsibility places no special moral 
responsibilities on the corporation or on its individual representatives who engage in 
its functioning. The amoral model, moreover, ignores the context in which the 
corporation operates, asserting that the corporation is viewed as a social phenomenon 
that is determined by market forces. The congruence of this model with the neo­
classical liberal position is clear. It fits relatively seamlessly with classical economic 
theory. Wempe suggests a variation of the amoral model of corporate responsibility 
that traces corporate responsibility to personal responsibility. Individual moral 
conscience can not simply be suppressed when individuals operate within the bounds 
of corporate activity. It is characteristic of the amoral model of corporate 
responsibility that moral issues are seen as independent of the corporate. However, I 
argue that given that corporate responsibility must be seen as contextually 
determined. This model fails in situations in which corporate environments require
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corporations to be socially responsible but where legislation and govemment 
regulation is insufficient to compel corporations to take responsibility for their 
(potentially or existing) injurious behaviour.
The second model, the functional model permits the conception of the corporate 
context as a source of moral obligation. It reduces all moral questions involving the 
corporation to the responsibilities of natural persons. Moral concerns in the corporate 
context are problems for functionaries as corporation representatives, and all 
responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. It is always an individual who gives 
shape to the function. Moral problems which occur in the corporate context can 
therefore be reduced to individual moral problems. However, as Wempe notes, by 
reducing all moral problematics to the level of the individual, in real-life corporate 
situations, the model obfuscates moral implications for the corporate entity. This is 
especially true for situations in which the responsibilities are beyond the individual 
functionary. The model fails to adequately apportion responsibility where it lies with 
a corporate entity, where it is spread over several people, or in complex situations 
over a period of time (Wempe 1998, p. 157).
Wempe’s final model, the autonomy model, acknowledges the relevance of the 
corporate context. In addition, it deals with the moral problems connected with the 
corporation as a separate problem category with its own characteristics (Wempe 
1998, p .l57-159; French 1984). In this conception, the corporation is also seen as a 
moral subject. In legal terms, the corporation is a juristic person. However, the 
recognition of corporate responsibility does not suggest that individual responsibility 
is reduced. Wempe’s project is ultimately an ethical one. His major concerns are with 
philosophical ethics and the problems of morality, integrity, malfeasance and virtue 
in business. What Wempe very usefully achieves is a concord between stakeholding 
and the social contract. But given the absolute value and abstraction of his moral 
precepts, Wempe fails to fully recognise the importance of context to moral 
dilemmas.
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Ethics and business
Ethical business is often referred to as ‘good business’ and ‘good for business’. The 
precept that ethical behaviour contributes to long-term value has led to a growing 
number of large corporations positioning themselves as good corporate citizens. 
‘Ethical business’ may be signified by commitment to good governance, explicit 
value statements, development of ethical supply chains, public commitments to 
ethical labour, environmental and social codes and standards and disclosures of non- 
financial performance in social audits. Ethical codes inform business issues and 
dilemmas related to the moral actions and decisions of corporations while audits 
account for financial and non-financial impacts (Bendell 2000; Donaldson and 
Dunfee 1994; Elkington 1998; McIntosh et al. 2003; Sethi 1973; Zadek 2001). 
Commitment to ethical business practice is central to the notion of corporate social 
engagement, particularly as expressed as corporate citizenship. For some businesses, 
such commitments seek to mitigate damage as a consequence of deviant behaviour 
by the corporation, or its individual functionaries. For some critics, debates regarding 
ethics are inherently limited. Capitalist society and competition provide 
opportunities, motivations and rationalisations for business deviance (Punch 1996, 
p. 10, p.45, citing Coleman 1989, and Clarke, 1990). Korten argues that capitalism is 
a continual trade-off between profits and principles (Korten 1995). Similarly, Punch 
sees the occurrence of business deviance as inseparable from the legitimate conduct 
of business. He argues that business is about the exercise and abuse of power: 
business is essentially about the quest of (legitimate) self-interest in a context 
proscribed by rules to necessarily protect the various interests of all stakeholders 
(Punch 1996, p.45). In contrast, this thesis holds that corporate social engagement 
issues require a particular ethical stance on matters of concern to the corporation, 
although circumstances that inform these positions are themselves changeable.
Without incentives or regulatory pressures, few businesses make significant social 
investments. Business ethics and the ability to account for corporate behaviour 
whether financial, social or environmental is critical to building trust, gaining 
legitimacy among stakeholders, ensuring social investment, promoting business 
sustainability, and may even be positively associated with greater profitability.
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Rhetoric versus reality: Accounting for the social and ethical performance of 
corporations
Having ethical governance standards is one thing, implementing and monitoring 
these another. A growing phenomenon related to the ethics in corporate social 
responsibility is corporate social accounting. Gray et al. argue that once 
responsibility has been determined, the corporation must account for the extent to 
which it has been met (Gray, Owen, and Maunders 1987, p. 12). Social and ethical 
accounting, auditing and reporting is, in various forms, being increasingly integrated 
into corporate governance practices (McIntosh et al. 2003; Elkington 1998). While 
the practice remains largely marginal, there is a growing corpus of literature, as well 
as practical advancements made by some business enterprises, business think tanks, 
management consultants, institutional investors, and academics, who are devoting 
considerable effort to techniques to measure and evaluate the social impact of 
business activities.
Corporate accountability requires rigorous auditing practices. However, unlike 
financial auditing which measures the fiscal performance of a corporation, social and 
ethical performance are relatively difficult to measure. Thus, it is important to be 
explicit about the responsibilities of a corporation in order to measure, evaluate and 
report on its achievement or failure. One can not measure that which has not been 
defined, and one can not evaluate that which has not been measured. Significantly, 
good governance requires such disclosure about social and ethical performance 
because these point to company investment in value-based stakeholding 
relationships:
Relationships matter in seeking business success, and such values as 
trust, integrity and commitment are integral to long-term relationships 
that work (Zadek, Pruzan, and Evans 1997, p. 12).
In reality, whatever glossy social reports claim, as Balabanis et al. contend, the 
higher the level of financial performance, the higher the level of corporate social
Corporate citizenship debates have progressed corporate social accounting significantly. (See, 
among others, Bowen 1953; Elkington 1998; Ernst & Young et al. 1999; Gray, Owen, and Maunders 
1987; Heiman 1997; Longstreth and Rosenbloom 1973, p.24; McIntosh et al. 2003; Medawar 1978; 
Peirce 1999; Sethi 1973; Sethi 1974; Sethi and Swanson 1981; The Sigma Project 1999; Zadek, 
Pruzan, and Evans 1997; Zadek 2001).
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engagement, and the higher the level of corporate social disclosure. Indeed, a healthy 
and critical scepticism must arguably operate with reference to corporate 
pronouncements. There is an obvious and important difference between what 
companies do and what they say they do (or did) (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 
1998, p.32-33). Post, Preston and Sachs argue a redefinition or re-evaluation of the 
corporation in this light as resting on the maxim ‘corporations ARE what they DO’ 
(Post, Preston, and Sachs 2002, p.2, p.63-64).
Regulating corporate social engagement
As argued above, the market requires the intervention of the state for the creation of 
‘predictable, effective and cost-efficient regulation’ (Elkington 1998, p.247). A 
SCSD framework, which argues for an interventionist and directive state, will also 
necessarily be sympathetic to the idea of reasonable and necessary regulation. 
However, the regulation of corporate behaviour has long provoked debates between 
stakeholder groups. Whilst regulation is certainly necessary, corporations argue that 
voluntary compliance (whether around social or environmental goals) best serves 
both the state and business by reducing transaction costs. Critics argue that voluntary 
compliance is at best minimal compliance, that it relies on the integrity and direction 
of corporate leadership and that without external verification may well be unreliable. 
In addition, while environmental performance, labour standards and tax 
environments might lend themselves to regulation where political will exists, broader 
social engagement by corporations may not. Extensive regulation on the other hand 
leads critics to argue that such states engage in rent-seeking and extractive activities 
or to inefficient bureaucracies (Evans 1995, p.24; Murray 2003; Weaver 1981)
As discussed earlier, the motivation for a corporation’s engagement in the social 
sphere might lie internally or externally. Once a policy of corporate social 
engagement has been adopted -  whether voluntary or obligatory - its regulation too 
might emanate from various sources. These regulatory mechanisms might be external 
(through legislation or industry standards) or internal (company ethical codes or 
value statements). Social and ethical auditing are examples of internal voluntary 
regulation mechanism. Internal self-regulation might work to protect corporations 
and their representatives where they can be held liable for damages. Self-imposed
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internal limits on behaviour might protect the corporation from litigation, from 
greater govemment intrusion in business, as well as enhance the corporate reputation. 
Intemally-set parameters for corporate social engagement, particularly in the case of 
larger companies, are increasingly more likely to be negotiated by internal 
stakeholder groups (Elkington 1998). This démocratisation in decision-making 
comes with attendant responsibilities. Responsibilities are more dispersed to the 
lower levels in the corporate hierarchy pointing to the need for sustained leadership 
commitment to these areas of corporate engagement.
External regulation can take various forms: public opinion, govemment and 
legislation, or, codes and standards. Corporations may be compelled by negative 
public opinion to examine their social and ethical performance. Stakeholders located 
outside the corporation may organize around issue-based concems be they consumer 
related, social or environmental.
The chief regulatory mechanism, however, remains intervention by govemment. It 
has already been established that the nature of the intervention will be contextually 
determined. Govemment regulation of corporate activity, even corporate social 
responsibility, requires political will and acceptability. At its least regulatory, the 
state is the guardian of the market, intervening minimally only to assure the fair 
balance of competing interests in society. To evoke a trope used by Punch, 
govemment is ostensibly a neutral referee that ensures that the game is followed 
according to the rules. He asserts that govemment ensures the playing field is level, 
that the goal-posts are not moved, and that no one has ‘thrown’ the game (Punch 
1996, p.251). Where the game has been thrown, as in the case of corporate crime, for 
example, ‘government plays a pivotal role in setting ground rules, in interfering in 
specific cases, and in determining outcomes in relation to tackling business deviance’ 
(Punch 1996, p.252).
Of course, any govemment’s ability to regulate corporate activity is also constrained 
by multi-national corporate activity. Whilst the regulation of MNCs is not a central 
concem of this thesis, such regulation raises important questions about the impact of 
globalisation on corporate responsibility nationally, and the limits of regulation in a 
global business environment. Held argues that such regulation must be enacted in the
context of democratising capitalism. Where stringent regulatory mechanisms are 
consistently present, companies might regard this regulation as intrusive, and likely 
to ‘throw the rules of the game’. Companies may object to the possible handicap they 
might suffer from the loss of competitive advantage viz. those not subject to these 
regulations. They may resist intervention or move their activities to less regulated 
environments. Held asserts:
Accordingly, the rules of the game have, in principle, to be altered tout 
court, at regional and global levels, if capitalism is to democratised and 
entrenched in a set of mechanisms and procedures that allow different 
kinds of market to flourish within the constraints of democratic 
processes. A democratic political economy can be envisaged as part of a 
‘democratic alternative’ to both state socialism and liberal democratic 
capitalist economies (Held 1997, p.259).
Legislation and other govemment regulation may be thwarted by the mobility of 
capital, and the lack of shared frameworks for regulation between regions and 
countries.
The legal framework by which business is regulated reflects dominant political 
interests within the political economy. However, as both Wempe and Punch argue, 
legislation takes years to enact, often running behind actuality so that the question of 
moral responsibility may not always suggest a legal response (Wempe 1998, p.5; 
Punch 1996, p.253). What is not regulated cannot be proscribed, adjudicated or 
prosecuted. Whilst a regulatory legal framework may exist, there might be 
difficulties in implementing its substance. Difficulties might arise from structural 
weaknesses of governmental and other agencies: they might possess feeble sanctions, 
be toothless, collusive, understaffed, poorly qualified, unwilling to prosecute or 
overly deferential to the companies in their jurisdiction (Punch 1996, p.254).
Law, codes and standards may also be incentives for the award of business, measures 
for enhanced reputation and tmst, or indicators o f good governance practice and 
sound investment value. These regulatory instruments (voluntary or mandatory) may 
also encourage, enforce or drive the social engagement of corporations. These 
instruments are themselves products of political determination, as has already been 
asserted. They are an ‘extortion to do good’, a ‘steady reminder’ and an ‘enforcer of 
desirable values’ (Arrow 1973, p.309). However, to be meaningful. Arrow argues,
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obligations must be embodied in a social institution, a legal code constituting such an 
institution (Arrow 1973, p.309-310). Legal codes are important for a number of 
reasons. While they might be vague and abstract, the legal compulsion to at least 
minimally comply provides some assurance to any one firm that the firms with which 
it is in competition will also accept the same responsibility (Arrow 1973). This is an 
important rejoinder to companies that claim that the cost of corporate social 
engagement puts them at a competitive disadvantage. In addition, having a value- 
based standard, which has wide stakeholder recognition and approval, applies 
pressure to non-compliant businesses particularly in an information age (Haufler 
2001). Finally, the existence of legal codes can raise general consciousness about 
ethical business practice and the social impact of corporation activity.
Legal frameworks and codes are not, however, without problems. Punch argues that 
we are unavoidably reliant on internal control mechanisms (Punch 1996, p.69). 
These rely on corporate accountability and disclosure. However, there are countless 
examples of corporate malfeasance, social and labour standard transgressions, the 
violation of human rights and environmental exploitation that warn of the limitations 
of self-regulation and the over-reliance on voluntary codes (Haufler 2001). In an 
ideal situation, focus should be on voluntary business-led standard setting and 
compliance as suggested by the term ‘responsibility’ (Murray 2003). But Ihe ideal 
position begs the question whether corporations can be persuaded to comply with 
voluntary codes and standards, and in circumstances in which they must subjugate 
immediate corporate interests to the general good? If the state were not to introduce 
binding social and environment regulation, what mechanism would best promote the 
encouragement of corporate engagement?
Regulation for neo-classical liberals is a highly undesirable phenomenon. The 
intervention of the state in the market in any way runs counter to their philosophical 
conceptions of freedom and liberty. The explicit presence of the state (primarily as a 
regulatory agent) for left liberals points to the state operating as arbitrator of the 
plural contesting interests at play, of which the state itself, is one. Midgley’s notion 
of managed pluralism, important to SCSD, is well placed in this understanding.
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In the next chapter, liberalism and corporate social engagement, the two key ideas of 
this current chapter are explored further in relation to social contract theory and 
stakeholding theory. These theoretical frameworks, which are demonstrated to be 
mutually reinforcing, offer greater insight into the relationship between state and 
market.
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CHAPTER THREE: STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for subsequent empirical chapters. 
Here, stakeholder theory - in conjunction with social contract theory - is used to 
provide greater insight into the motivations for, and manifestations of, corporate 
social engagement.
This chapter is structured in three parts. The first introduces stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory is primarily used here for understanding the locus of corporations 
within a nexus of societal relationships. The second part of the chapter examines 
social contract theory. Social contract theory is often used implicitly or explicitly to 
explain and justify the multiple relationships, as well as rights and obligations, within 
stakeholder theory. Moreover, social contract theory also provides analytic 
justification for social redistribution discussed in the previous chapters. In the third 
part, these theoretical frameworks - stakeholder theory and social contract theory -  
that operate at different levels of abstraction are examined in relation to the notion of 
state-corporate social development (SCSD) developed in this thesis.
Part One: Stakeholder Theory and the Corporation
Chapter two examined the context of business and its operation in the liberal 
economy. Some additional and perhaps reiterative insights regarding modem 
capitalism may be useful here to frame the discussion on stakeholding as a 
theoretical paradigm for understanding corporate social engagement. With use - 
whether by politicians, economists, management consultants or lobby groups - the 
stakeholder concept appears to have become more elastic. The application of 
stakeholding to fundamentally different settings, whether the state, civil society, 
social programmes, political engagement generally or business practice, has meant 
that the concept often confuses rather than clarifies. Consequently, this thesis focuses 
primarily on a narrow application of stakeholder theory; its application in the context 
of corporations and their operations. This narrowed field of inquiry is very rich and 
the debates nuanced. Stakeholding was until relatively recently still considered a 
controversial approach to conventional views of market capitalism. The concept now
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enjoys greater currency and there is a growing body of stakeholder literature both 
scholarly and practice-driven (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.69; Sethi and Swanson 
1981).
The institutional structures of capitalism are diverse, as are the ways in which the 
social, economic and political spheres interconnect. The stakeholder economist. Will 
Hutton, argues that the market system is more than a sum of its parts; all markets are 
political and social, as well as economic. ‘Real world’ capitalism - constructed by 
real people, located in real culture and made operational by real institutions - is 
characterised by different syntheses of the principles of commitment and flexibility, 
co-operative trust and competitive rigour, in the arrangement of economic life, in the 
organisation of states, private institutions and society at large (Hutton 1997, p.2; 
1999, p.89). Stakeholding capitalism is one choice of institutional arrangements: one 
that potentially strikes the balance between social and economic imperatives which 
drive the concerns of social development.
In a broader context and, given the symbiosis of social and economic development in 
the political realm, stakeholding capitalism depends on a strong stakeholding society. 
Stakeholding strongly suggests interrelated systems: a stakeholder economy and 
society which, in turn, is reflected in a stakeholder polity (Hutton 1999, p.75). Such a 
society would reflect the desires of common citizenship and prevent the 
fragmentation of social fabric. It also defines values in more pluralist and inclusive 
ways (Allen 2001). David Goodhart calls stakeholding capitalism ‘civic spirited 
capitalism’ (Goodhart 1994, p.77). Many of the insights from stakeholding in the 
political realm can be applied to a stakeholder conception of the corporation.
Defining a stakeholder theory of the corporation
Whilst Freeman, the originator of stakeholder management describes stakeholding as 
a ‘framework’, Donaldson and Preston (among other scholars) elevate stakeholding 
as a theory intended to explain and to guide the structure and operation of the 
corporate entity (Clarkson 1998; Donaldson and Dunfee 1997; Donaldson and 
Preston 1995; Freeman 1984; Jones 1995; Morrison 2003). Detractors of stakeholder 
theory see it as ‘unsubstantive’, ‘unworkable’ and merely a ‘new orthodoxy’
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(Sternberg 1997, p.70). Whilst stakeholder theory may be general and 
comprehensive, Donaldson and Preston assert that it is neither lacking in rigour nor 
substance (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.70). One challenge in making a sweep of 
the literature is that much of what passes for stakeholder theory is implicit rather than 
explicit. Debate around the theoretical integrity of stakeholder theory continues with 
scholars proposing additional theories - institutional theory and organisational justice 
theory - to augment what is seen as a weak theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; 
Husted 1998).^* This thesis recognises stakeholder theory as a legitimate theory but 
also pairs it with social contract theory for additional rigour, as well as to advance 
the notion of SCSD theoretically.
Stakeholder theory represents a controversial approach to conventional views of 
market capitalism (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.69). The stakeholder concept 
describes the relevant actors in a business environment, whilst stakeholder 
management is the premise that businesses have to manage a plurality of interests in 
the achievement of business goals (Freeman and Gilbert 1987, p.397). Stakeholding 
is controversial for similar ideological reasons that corporate social engagement is 
seen to be a subversive practice by neo-liberal economists and many business 
practitioners. They hold that business is for the benefit of all but only made manifest 
through the ‘invisible hand’ of an efficient market, and with corporations being 
accountable only to their owners, the shareholders. Blair calls this position ‘finance 
and market myopia’ in that shareholder’s interests are pursued in the maximisation of 
share price (Blair 1995, p.47). A stakeholder conception of the corporation literally 
inverts these assumptions. The benefits flowing from corporations need to be shared 
collectively and corporations are accountable to multiple stakeholders, one of whom 
are shareholders (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.26). Husted takes the idea of 
corporate allocation further in arguing that stakeholding inheres distributive 
decisions: stakeholding reifies the relationship between legitimacy, allocative 
fairness and business sustainability (Husted 1998, p. 646-5).
^  An alternative theoretical framework to social contract theory through which to ground 
stakeholding is institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2003; 
Hoffinan and Ventresca 2002). A e th e r in the dsciplines of sociology or management, institutional 
theory is useful for understanding both exogenous and endogenous factors driving the business 
enterprising, social structure and organisations, as well as the codification of power in society which 
frames political process. However, 1 have elected not to pursue institutional theory as a theoretical 
perspective in this thesis as social contract theory is more apposite to ideas relating to the state- 
corporate social development framework.
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From shareholders to stakeholders
In this inversion, the key shift in accountability flows from a broadened and more 
inclusive conception of who has a ‘stake’ in the corporation. In traditional terms - as 
codified in corporate statutes and practice - the corporate constituency comprises 
shareholders. The shareholder model of the corporation emphasises the fiduciary 
obligation of corporations to their owners. In this model, managers, are solely 
obliged to further the interests of the corporation’s owners. The shift from rights in a 
shareholder model (apparent in neo-liberal frameworks) to a model of rights and 
responsibilities in stakeholding (characteristic of left liberal and communitarian 
perspectives) is highly significant. This move which also underscores the notion of 
obligations that attend rights is reflected in an analogy between corporate and 
individual citizenship in corporate citizenship concerns (Morrison 2003).
Allen argues that stakeholding is an essential part of the knowledge economy, with 
its rapid change of pace, demands for innovation and the generation of the need for 
different forms of business relations. These new business relations, he argues, protect 
and enhance human resources and conspicuously cultivate trust, co-operation and an 
element of mutual gain in pursing innovation without engendering instability (Allen 
2001, p.285). It has become crucial for corporate management to recognise new 
mutual obligations and an increased constituency base including groups not 
previously considered as part of its accountability (Sethi and Swanson 1981, p.xii). 
In contemporary ‘real world’ capitalism, equity ceases to be the sole claim on the 
corporation. But dice corporations’ acknowledge a broader constituency, the next 
crucial step in the chain of logic is to interrogate the composition of the stakeholder 
group.
Defining stakeholders: who stakes a claim?
The key challenge to stakeholder theory regards the identification of stakeholders. 
Clearly, ‘stakeholder’ encompasses both individuals and groups and explicitly 
recognises their influence on the corporation and (managerial) decision making 
(Jones 1995, p.407; Scott and Lane 2000, p.44). But, who are the corporation’s 
stakeholders? Do all stakeholders have a legitimate claim on the corporation? Do all
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stakeholders have an equal stake? Can some stakeholder interests be privileged over 
other interests? Who decides how such a hierarchy of interests is to be arranged? 
How do corporate managers, themselves a stakeholding constituency, manage the 
competing interests of different stakeholders?
Defining who is a stakeholder is itself contested terrain. Within the stakeholding 
literature - academic and managerial - the differences in conceptions of who 
constitutes stakeholders are often subtle yet important, although tracking these can be 
a somewhat pedantic exercise. For example, Clarkson attempts to limit the number of 
claimants on the corporation by creating a boundary between Social and stakeholder 
issues (Clarkson 1995, 104-5). But such a boundary is often artificial and takes the 
corporation out of the real context in which it operates.
Stakeholders were originally identified as those individuals or groups on whom the 
survival of the business depended. This definition is currently much expanded to 
include all those who hold a stake in the corporation:
Stakeholders are persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, 
or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future.
Such claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions with, or 
actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual 
or collective (Clarkson 1995, p. 106).
Similarly, Donaldson and Preston argue that stakeholders are ‘all persons or groups 
with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise’ or ‘persons or groups with 
legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity’ 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.67-68; Wempe 1998, p.23). They argue that 
stakeholders participate in order to obtain benefits, and that ‘there is no prima facie 
priority of one set of interests and benefits over another’ (Donaldson and Preston 
1995, p.68). Moreover, the corporation’s stakeholders are identified by their interest 
in the benefits accrued by the association with the corporation rather than the 
corporation’s interest in them. Goodpaster citing Freeman (1984) defines 
stakeholders as ‘a group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (Goodpaster 1991, p.54; Sternberg 
1997, p.70; This definition is reasserted in Freeman and Gilbert 1987). In other
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words, they present a definition of stakeholders that is at once broad, thoroughly 
inclusive and non-hierarchical.
Herein rests the first major criticism of stakeholder theory. When the term 
stakeholder is understood so broadly and inclusively, the number of potential groups 
who might stake a claim in the corporation is, in Sternberg’s criticism, unlimited. 
Sternberg argues that by extending stakeholding to encompass all those affected by 
the corporation’s activities, ‘the popular modem characterisation excludes all criteria 
of materiality, immediacy and legitimacy’ (Sternberg 1997, p.70). The field of 
influence can indeed become very wide. In opening the definition of stakeholders to 
multiple actors who have no specific stake in the corporation and who have no 
interest in its success may be undermining the more legitimate claims of those actors 
whose immediate interests are involved. An unlimited relationship of responsibility 
is intractable, and indeed may undermine the strength of a rights and responsibilities 
model. Post, Preston and Sachs particularise stakeholding to include those engaged in 
wealth creation capacities and activities, these interest groups being the potential 
beneficiaries and risk bearers of corporate activity (Post, Preston, and Sachs 2002, 
p. 19). Does this refinement adequately achieve balance between various stakeholders 
that at once includes all legitimate stakeholders?
Another perspective Donaldson and Preston offer - but do not pursue to conclusion - 
borrows fi-om social contract theory. Stakeholders are identified by the existence of a 
contract, expressed or implied, between them and the corporation (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p.85). Once presented, Donaldson and Preston dismiss this definition, 
however, on the grounds that it is too loose, and that many relationships that obtain 
between the corporation and whomever might be considered stakeholders are ‘so 
vague as to pass beyond even the broadest conception of ‘contract’ (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p.85). Instead, the definition of legitimate stakeholders - for these 
commentators - rests on a risk-principle: the actual or potential harms and benefits 
that stakeholders’ experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of the 
corporation’s activities. They argue that an important function of management 
involves the appraisal of the legitimacy of stakeholder interests, the management of 
risks and rewards flowing fi-om the firm’s actions, often in collaboration with these 
same stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.85).
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Risk and benefit following from rights and responsibilities may be one organising 
principle but determining inclusion in any group requires some disaggregation of the 
term ‘stakeholder’. Disaggregation can happen in three ways, which are compatible 
with each other: by separating stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders, 
by distinguishing between internal and external stakeholders, and by looking at 
implicit or explicit claims on the corporation.
Clarkson (1995) and Hopkins (1999) distinguish two classes of stakeholders. In the 
first instance, primary stakeholders are those on whom corporations’ survival 
depends. These typically include shareholders, investors, employees, customers, 
suppliers together with what is defined as the public stakeholder groups: 
governments and communities that provide infrastructure, markets, laws and 
regulations. There is a high level of interdependence between the primary 
stakeholder and the corporation: the disapprobation of customers, for example, can 
damage the corporation’s sustainability. In the second instance, secondary 
stakeholders are those who infiuence or affect the corporation but are not engaged in 
transactions with the corporation. This potentially involves a significant number of 
interest groups that are not considered essential for the corporation’s survival, and 
include the media and a wide range of special-interest groups (Clarkson 1995, p. 105- 
108; Hopkins 1999, p.l2).”
In another typology, stakeholders are disaggregated into internal stakeholders and 
external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include employees, management and 
creditors. These individuals and groups are active in the corporation’s business, and 
like ‘primary’ stakeholders they are responsible for the continued existence of the 
corporation. External stakeholders, are those located outside the corporation, and 
include consumers, suppliers, government, the community in which the corporation 
is located, as well as particular interest groups. External stakeholders influence the 
corporation in the course of realising their own objectives but are also important for 
the firm’s sustained existence (Wempe 1998, p.23-24).
While Clarkson would number competitors among in this class of stakeholder, Post, Preston and 
Sachs explicitly exclude competitors from among stakeholder groups to whom the corporation is 
accountable (Clarkson 1995,1998; Post, Preston, and Sachs 2002, p.23).
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Finally, Balabanis et al. suggest the idea of stakeholders as explicit and implicit 
contractors. They argue that the value of a firm is related to the cost of both implicit 
and explicit claims. Explicit claimants include the shareholders in the first instance, 
as well as government, investors, creditors and employees. Implicit claimants are 
individuals or groups who have implicit contracts based on agreements such as those 
suggested by the firm’s value statement, CSR programme or commitments to codes 
and standards. However, if these contracts are not honoured, the parties to these 
contracts may attempt to change them from implicit to explicit agreements. This is 
more costly to firms, not least of all because it involves loss of credibility, increased 
direct costs through litigation and greater transactional costs (Jones 1995, p.409). 
Corporations must manage stakeholders’ claims in such a way as to ensure fewer, 
high-cost explicit claims (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.28).
All three disaggregating strategies make an important distinction: between 
stakeholders and influencers. The latter group exert influence but do not significantly 
determine the activities or impact upon the survival of the corporation (Donaldson 
and Preston 1995, p.86). Freeman and Gilbert call this group ‘kibitzers’: neither 
having an equity nor market stake in the business but nonetheless having an interest 
or being affected by what the firm does (Freeman and Gilbert 1987, p. 403).^° The 
implication of this distinction is that stakeholders - in the broadest sense of the 
definition that would include all groups with an interest in the corporation - do not 
enjoy equal legitimacy or power. While a corporation can be held to account for its 
activities and decisions, it might not be appropriate for the corporation to be held to 
account equally to each stakeholder group. Being affected or influenced by a group, 
even needing to be instrumentai^ responsive to a group, is quite different from being 
held to account by that group (Sternberg 1997, p.79). Corporations may be 
differently accountable to these influencers.
Stakeholding necessitates that managers are skilled at balancing interests in such a 
way that parties continue to invest trust in a long-term relationship. Herein lie two
The anti-globalisation movement are an increasingly powerful and vocal ‘kibitzer’ group, as 
attested by highly publicised protests in Genoa, Seattle and Davos in recent years, and even the anti­
privatisation lobby at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002.
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further criticisms of stakeholder theory. First, stakeholding is a normative theory of 
corporate functioning which pivots on the notion of accountability. However, the 
corporation is not equally accountable to all stakeholders (including influencers); just 
as all stakeholders are not equally engaged in the processes of, and decision-making 
by, the corporation. Second, the corporation relies on the tacit agreement - and often 
the willing cooperation and active patronage - of society but to what extent does this 
give society the right to hold corporations to account? Even if the answer to this 
question was inclusively affirmative, should the corporation break compact, 
individuals and groups might withdraw their support and cooperation but they would 
have no general authority to hold the corporation to account.
With regard to the first criticism, Sternberg argues that stakeholder management is 
unworkable because the number of potential interests that must be balanced is almost 
infinite. Similarly, Novak argues that such a conception of stakeholders is bound to 
be ‘like a nest of open-mouthed chicks’ (Novak 1997, p.44). For a balance to be 
struck, the number of stakeholders must be limited (Sternberg 1997, p.72; Novak 
1997, p.43-44). But, stakeholder theory does not provide guidance as to how such a 
balance might be struck. It does not determine how divergent stakeholder claims 
might be reconciled against each other. If stakeholder interests are unequal, how are 
they to be ranked and how are the interests of stakeholders who straddle multiple 
interest groups to be managed (Alcock 1996; Sternberg 1997, p.73-74)?
Of course, one way to manage stakeholder interests is to acknowledge (and 
prioritise) needs, obligations and rights. Where managers subordinate other 
stakeholder concerns to those of shareholders, they rely on the assumption that 
market and legal forces will secure the interests of those of whom corporate strategic 
considerations might discount (Goodpaster 1991, p.57). In daily corporate practice, 
Scott and Lane argue, managers do attend to the needs of certain stakeholders more 
then others, sometimes for philosophical and strategic reasons, but most times 
because of time and cognitive constraints. Managers are also more likely to prioritise 
the needs of those stakeholders whom they consider legitimate, whose demands are 
urgent and who appear to have the power or ability to impose their will on the 
organisation (Scott and Lane 2000, p.54). This balancing dilemma may mean that 
substantive commitment to stakeholder involvement might translate into trading off
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some (economic) advantages or benefits of one group against another (Goodpaster 
1991, p.61).
In stakeholder synthesis - which moves stakeholder analysis (identification) to 
practical response or resolution - Goodpaster points to a ‘stakeholder paradox’. The 
‘stakeholder paradox’ exists, he claims, because business ethics seems both to forbid 
and demand a strategic, profit-maximising mind-set. He argues that managers who 
pursue a multi-fiduciary stakeholder orientation for their companies must face 
resistance from those who believe that a strategic orientation is the only legitimate 
one for business to adopt given the economic mission and legal constitution of the 
modem corporation. The tension stems from the corporation’s fiduciary and non- 
fiduciary obligations. Whilst managers are legally obliged to maximise shareholder 
profits, stakeholder management may mean that under particular circumstances, 
certain other non-economic benefits might be privileged over profit. This 
contradiction underplays well-defined corporate codes regarding accountability to 
the corporation’s owners. In this narrow view of accountability, stakeholder 
management would represent a betrayal of shareholder trust. Goodpaster argues that 
if corporations treat stakeholders as they do shareholders, in a fiduciary relationship, 
stakeholder management effectively turns all stakeholders into quasi-shareholders. 
He argues that these multi-fiduciary stakeholder relationships convert the private 
corporation into a public institution and raises the need for a corresponding 
restructuring of corporate governance (Goodpaster 1991, p.63-66).
Employing stakeholder theory in the management of the corporation
Donaldson and Preston argue that stakeholder theory is managerial in the broad sense 
of the term. It goes beyond simply describing extant situations or predicting cause- 
effect relationships. Stakeholder management recommends attitudes, structures and 
practices by the corporation. The corporation’s policy and practice is required to pay 
attention to the legitimate interests of stakeholders, as well as both the immediate 
case-by-case decisions, context, organisational structures and operational practices of 
the corporation. Donaldson and Preston also assert that the requirement of 
simultaneous attention to multi-stakeholder interests does not itself resolve the 
problem of stakeholder identification, or the problem of evaluating which ‘stakes’
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are most legitimate (Donaldson and Preston 1995, p.67). Despite the persistent 
problem of stakeholder identification, Donaldson and Preston advance a stakeholder 
theory of the corporation on the basis of its normative validity, descriptive accuracy 
and instrumental rationale. Although these models have different implications, they 
are, nonetheless, mutually supportive and often used in concert (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p.65).
Turning first to the normative basis of stakeholding, this model argues certain 
individuals or groups - not only shareholders - with legitimate interests in the 
procedural or substantive aspects of corporate activity. As a normative theory, 
stakeholder theory interprets the function and the operation of the corporation on the 
basis of moral and philosophical principles. Importantly, rather than being identified 
and valued by corporations’ functional interest in them, stakeholders are identified 
by their interest or stake in the enterprise. Preston and Sapienza suggests that 
traditional corporate performance measures, such as high return on investment, 
profitability and growth, appear to correlate with stakeholder satisfaction. There is 
clear evidence, despite conventional mythology, that major stakeholders typically 
gain or lose collectively rather than at each other’s expense (Preston and Sapienza 
1990, p.372-3). Co-joined interests are better advanced through efficient contracting, 
mutual trust and co-operation by diminishing transaction costs (Jones 1995, p.421-2). 
All this suggests that although based on normative and ethical principles, stakeholder 
management is the optimal strategic model for maximising corporate performance 
and that it accords with even narrow economic objectives.
As a descriptive theory, stakeholding asks how the modem corporation behaves in 
relationship to its stakeholders. It describes ‘the corporation as a constellation of 
cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic value’ (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p.66, p.71), and serves an instrumental providing an empirical 
framework with which to test competing claims. As an instrumental or strategic 
theory, stakeholding focuses on interrogating the connections, if any, between 
stakeholder management and traditional corporate performance objectives. In this 
application, managers engage in stakeholding in order to further their desired 
objectives such as profitability and growth. The normative and strategic basis of 
stakeholder theory is congruent with contractarian arguments for a corporate social
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contract which, in turn, supports arguments for corporate social engagement in a 
SCSD framework.
Part Two: Social Contract Theory
Social contract theory is proposed as a key theory functioning at a high level of 
abstraction. The social contract - in tandem with stakeholding - is particularly 
appropriate to the SCSD framework advanced in this thesis. Together they explain 
the overarching state-market relationship, most especially in advancing an 
understanding of redistribution. I also argue that they provide some analytic 
justification for corporations engaging social issues beyond the profit principle. The 
modem social contract may be a useful theoretical tool to develop an understanding 
of the management of multiple stakeholder interests, particularly as these obtain in a 
contemporary business environment. Linked to both liberal pluralism and the social 
development’s managed pluralism which underscores the SCSD framework, the 
social contract can be used to theorise the state-business relationship, globally, 
nationally and locally. In addition, both theories in concert provide a theoretical 
framework for analysing and understanding contemporary South African policy.
It is necessary from the outset, however, to outline how the social contract is to be 
used in this analysis. Whilst this analysis will later briefly discuss some theoretical 
positions associated with key classical contractarian thinkers, it uses the concept of 
the social contract analogously. In classical political theory, classical contractarians - 
the triad of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau - developed theories of the social contract 
in order to understand the genesis and operation of government. Government was 
established via the relationships of individuals with other individuals or between 
individuals (as citizens) and the state. The social contract linked rights and 
responsibilities vertically between individuals and the state and horizontally between 
individuals. Similarly, in contemporary social contract theory, which uses a 
citizenship framework with attendant rights and responsibilities, the state provision 
of social rights (such as is in the case of both social policy and social development) 
requires the adumbration of accompanying responsibilities (Giddens 2001, p.8). 
Indeed, these rights and responsibilities discussed in the previous chapter, apply to
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both individuals and institutions.^' By comparison, in this thesis the social contract is 
a heuristic device used to understand the relationship between oftentimes powerful 
market institutions, their relationship with the state and the society in which they are 
embedded.
Defining the social contract
The social contract is used in arguments to explain the nature of political obligation 
and to provide an account of organised society (Audi 1995; Lessnoff 1986). More 
commonly associated with political philosophy, the application of social contract 
theory to issues such as contemporary corporate social engagement requires caution. 
However, before exploring a contemporary view of the social contract such as that 
advocated by Rawls, classical social contract theory is examined with reference to 
how it might usefully be applied to the relationships between corporations and 
society.
Classical social contract theory gives an account of the development and operation of 
government, and the social and political relationships that flow fi-om particular 
arrangements. In other words, social contract theory defines and justifies the limits to 
political authority and the concomitant ‘contractual’ obligations that result. Thus, as 
a political theory, social contract theory provides an analysis of political obligation as 
contractual obligation (Lessnoff 1986, p.2).
The social contract sees morality as founded on the uniform social compacts that 
serve the best interests of those making agreements. The social contract occurs 
between two or more parties with rights and obligations on both sides. The contract 
is reciprocal and conditional. It is also voluntary and consensual. The contract might 
be expressly stated, or it might be tacit or implied. It is an agreement that allows and 
sustains communal existence, and one that evolves in time and place, i.e. it is 
contextually driven (Loewy 1993, p.30).
As Morrison argues, companies as entities are analogous to individual citizens. Large, economically 
powerful companies may also enjoy a position analogous to governments (Morrison 2003).
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Importantly, modem social contract theory uses the social contract as a metaphor or 
analogy. The social contract as analogy borrows from the idea of a contract as a legal 
term. The legal connotations are undeniable though the social contract is clearly not 
the product of any formal, express or litigable agreement. The use of analogy frames 
social or political contract obligation in similar terms as those of a legal obligation 
determined by legal contract. Indeed, as analogy, the social contract has weaknesses 
and indeed, the social contract as metaphor might become undone. Lessnoff stresses, 
however, that used analogously, the social contract is not an obligation (Lessnoff 
1986, p.2). The social contract does not formally exist and it is not legally 
enforceable. As it is most often implicit, exacting compliance legally may not be 
appropriate although other means of contractual enforcement may be. How then is 
obligation - whether legal, political or social - enforced when the contract governing 
its prescription operates at the level of a metaphoric analogy? As metaphor, the 
theory assumes that the mutual relationship of citizens is sufficiently analogous to 
contractual relationships bound by justiciable process to justify the use of the 
language of compact.
Gough attempts to address this dilemma in his analysis of the state which can be 
broadened to include other institutions, including corporations, in developing a social 
contract theory of the corporation. He argues that rights and duties are reciprocal and 
the recognition of this reciprocity constitutes a relationship which by analogy is 
contractual (Gough 1963, p.245). Indeed, the social contract employs legalistic 
language in the terminology ‘agreement’, ‘compact’, ‘covenant’ or ‘contract’. 
Whether the contract describes relationships between the state and citizens, the 
relationship between citizens or between stakeholders and corporations, the legal 
analogy is still appropriate. Hence, the contract is explicitly understood by modem 
contractarians in a qualified sense, at a heuristic and abstract level, but one which 
seeks to explain and orient itself in reality.
Classical social contract theory
In classical social contract theories, the social contract (or original contract) 
encompasses two different kinds of contract. The first, which is also the theory of the 
origin of the state, is the social contract proper. This social contract assumes a
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number of individuals living in a ‘state of nature’ who agree together to form an 
organised society; ‘civil society’ as contemporary social and political theorists call it. 
This theory is also commonly associated with the doctrine of ‘natural rights’, the 
surrendering of certain rights to ensure that others are guaranteed. The second is the 
‘original contract’, the contract of government or the contract of submission. It 
purports to define how an already extant state is to be governed especially in relation 
to the contractual agreement that exists between citizens who promise a sovereign 
entity - whether king, ruler or government - obedience and loyalty in return for 
protection and good governance. In the event of misgovemment, the compact is 
rendered void and the allegiance broken. In a contemporary reality, the relation of 
citizens to ruler is no longer one of a contract. Rather, government is the expression 
and execution of sovereign popular will (Gough 1963, p.2-7).
The following section briefly traces the different conceptions of the social contract in 
the work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The section culminates in a discussion of 
John Rawls who advances a contemporary conception of the social contract.
Thomas Hobbes: The reductionist project
Within the taxonomy of the social contract, Hobbes, a natural philosopher, can be 
seen as a descriptive - as opposed to a normative - social contract theorist. Hobbes’ 
great project was essentially a reductionist one; a project attempting to reduce all 
perceivable phenomena in the (natural and political) world to a set of simple, general 
propositions. In the Age of Enlightenment, it was not unusual to attempt to reduce all 
of human and political reality to a set of descriptive principles.
In Leviathan, Hobbes amalgamates in a single theory of the social contract, the 
theory of obligation and right, a theory of power, and a theory of the equal natural 
rights of man (Macpherson 1985, p.9). Hobbes describes the relationship between 
individuals in the genesis of a state. He begins by evoking natural systems and 
principles, such as Galileo’s law of inertia. Hobbes applied this theory of motion to 
the systematic motions of men relative to each other in society, and the kind of 
government that would best be able to sustain and maximise their motion 
(Macpherson 1985, p. 19). His description is systematic and amoral.
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Hobbesian contract theory’s basic unit in political society is the individual human 
being. In his reasoning, humans are considered to be intrinsically driven by emotion 
which expresses itself in appetites or desires, or appetites and aversions (Hobbes 
1985, Chap. VI, Of Man, pp. 118-120). As a consequence, humans are naturally self- 
seeking and egoistical. In achieving the objects of desire from which pleasure flows, 
or avoiding that which causes aversion, man self-interestedly pursues power: ‘The 
Power of a Man, (to take it Universally) is his present means, to obtain some future 
apparent Good’ (Hobbes 1985, Chap. X, Of Man, p. 150). Hobbes also regards power 
as a means of securing the assistance and services of others, to increases existing 
power, and to gain others’ regard (Hobbes 1985, Chap. X, Of Man, p.I50-151). He 
asserts that, ‘The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is 
to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power’ (Hobbes 1985, Chap. X, 
Of Man, p. 151-152). That men are both self-seeking and power-hungry suggests that 
social and political relationships are characterised by competition. The natural state 
in which men exist is naturally at war with one another (Hobbes 1985, Chap. XIII, 
Of Man, p. 185). Indeed, the Hobbesian state of nature, which is a state of war and 
which exists prior to civic organisation is famously described:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man 
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men 
live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own 
invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place 
for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no 
Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
maybe imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of 
moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge 
of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no 
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent 
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short 
(Hobbes 1985, Chap. XIII, Of Man, p. 186).
Man’s unbridled egoism in the state of nature is intrinsically human. The judgement 
Hobbes makes is amoral: men are self-seeking, acquisitive and selfish. In order to 
survive one’s own and others’ self-seeking egoism, men enter into a social contact: 
the original social contract. In this contract, men surrender certain powers - or 
interests - in return for the guarantee of others by the Sovereign. The Hobbesian 
contract establishes political authority directly, prior to, and as a source of civil law
107
(Lessnoff 1986, p.49). Hobbesian contractarianism essentially reflects the behaviour 
of rational self-seekers.
The Hobbesian social contract and corporate social engagement
Such a thought experiment requires that one thinks of the Hobbesian political entity 
analogously as the modem corporate entity. Indeed, it may even be more 
theoretically appropriate of the corporate entity than the individual given that as a 
construct, the corporation’s purpose is often defined as rationally self-seeking and 
self-promoting. A Hobbesian analysis of the modem corporation might be teased out 
in a number of ways with divergent political implications. A Hobbesian way of 
thinking though is unpredictable: egoism on the part o f corporate entities may result 
in either narrow economic pursuits or socially responsible behaviour or both.
Hobbesian social contract theory might be usefully employed to explain 
unconstrained self-seeking behaviour. Such an understanding of the social contract 
when applied to an exploration of stakeholder theory would account for free-market 
capitalism - and at its extreme - unfettered libertarianism. Corporations will operate 
rationally in Iheir own self-interest as egoists: self-seeking behaviour is then what 
makes the corporation part of civil society. However, such a Hobbesian 
understanding of the operations of the modem corporation results in short-termism. 
In its extreme formulation, the life of the corporation and the competitive 
relationships in which it is embedded will be characterised as ‘nasty, bmtish and 
short’.
On the other hand, egoism might express itself in the opposite manner. Corporate 
self-interest might result in socially responsible engagement by corporations. 
Enterprises would be motivated to act accordingly for normative and instrumental 
reasons: whatever response ensured the long-term sustainability of the enterprise 
within a particular milieu. Such behaviour is often congruent with ensuring survival 
(a key Hobbesian notion), as well as longer-term corporate sustainability and 
profitability. In this sense too, corporations may be seen as egoistical and as self- 
seeking entities whilst simultaneously pursuing what appears to be the altmistic ends 
of corporate responsibility. Once society holds companies to social ideals, there is a
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changed response to the market. The problem with this line of argument is that it 
hinges on the decisions of managers as corporate agents, and their willingness to 
surrender short-term profits in the interest of long-term sustainability. Managers are 
themselves egoists in the company of other egoists, such that they may demonstrate 
their own self-seeking behaviour by refusing to surrender profit and kudos in the 
corporation’s long-term interests, or to the generation of managerial executives 
which follow them.
Lockean social contract theory
Meta-theoretically, Hobbes might be represented as a descriptive egoist. In 
contradistinction to Hobbesian amoralism, Locke’s formulation is one of ethical 
egoism. He asserts that it is good and desirable - indeed, it is moral - to pursue self- 
interest. Libertarianism is grounded in Lockean contractarianism.
While Hobbes’ entity is driven by intrinsic desires and passions that he regards 
amorally, Locke’s individual unit is more complex. In Lockean social contract 
theory, the most important values are those of freedom and autonomy. Society’s aim 
is to furnish the individual with opportunities to pursue that which they value, 
whatever their individual life project and ends. Individuals are ends in themselves. 
The state has been founded upon the values of liberty and autonomy so as to 
guarantee these for individuals. Thus, individuals are the repository of value in the 
Lockean social contract.
In the Lockean social contract, individuals are free to pursue their own ends as long 
as they desist from interfering with the good of others as represented by the 
community. The social contract in liberal contractarianism is justified in the pursuit 
of the values of freedom, dignity, life, liberty and property. As a liberal, Locke has a 
particular understanding of the boundaries and ends of freedom; freedom is 
intrinsically tied to property. Concomitantly, ‘harm’ is also defined in relation to 
property. A Lockean analysis of corporate social engagement then would be set by 
the conditions of harm. The corporation would assess its interests only in relation to 
the harm or risk principle such that corporate rationality would caricature itself in a 
display of self-interested and self-aggrandising behaviour.
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In the case of using the social contract theories of both Hobbes and Locke regarding 
corporate social engagement, the dominant question remains one of interests. What 
are the best interests of the corporation? If the corporation’s best interest is posited as 
its sustained role in society, does this imperative trump other competing interests 
even if it affects the corporation’s bottom line in the short-term?
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau represents the culmination of the classical phase of social contract theory. 
Offering an ideal contract, Rousseau is concerned with the origin of government. He 
is, however, more concerned with the normative issues of how governments ought to 
be established rather than describing how they actually are. Rousseau’s social 
contract, which displays strong libertarian trends, asserts that individual freedom is 
represented by the freedom to pursue one’s life end. More than in the case of either 
the social contract projects of Locke and Hobbes, Rousseau is concerned with what 
makes the surrender of liberties to the State a legitimate relinquishment. For 
Rousseau, people entering into civil society from a radical state of nature in which 
they enjoy anarchical freedom (the absence of moral, legal and governmental rules, 
as well as the personal independence from others) exchange personal freedom for 
unhappy social bondage (Medina 1990, p.47-9). Ultimately, his theory of popular 
sovereignty means that Rousseau believes people should govern themselves 
according to the general will.
Communitarianism themes are evident in the work of Rousseau. The social contract 
is understood to be the social responsibility that exists between individuals and the 
community. The relationship between the individual and society is necessarily 
interdependent. One cannot exist apart from the other. In addition, Rousseau’s 
conception of property is that it must serve a social function by promoting the well­
being of the community. Political justice necessarily involves economic justice; the 
obverse is also true for Rousseau with economic justice bolstering political justice 
(Medina 1990, p.51).
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Rousseau’s social contract is both political and social in nature. It essentially marries 
both spheres, and privileges the notions of political and economic justice. Rousseau 
saw economic inequality resulting in political inequality because those with access to 
political power enjoyed greater freedom. The social contract becomes a moral and 
political instrument that transforms society from an unjust society into a just political 
order. The function of law is to protect and promote the common good. Should the 
law fail to do so, it bses legitimacy and the social contract will be void. Political 
obligation, in Rousseau’s social contract, is grounded on the principle of consent. 
Citizens are politically obliged to obey the law (an enactment of the general will) as 
long as the terms of the contract are honoured. However, as Medina points out, 
Rousseau’s social contract relies on hypothetical consent which is no consent at all 
(Medina 1990, p.61).
Understanding corporate social engagement via Rousseau’s conception of the social 
contract provides three useful insights. The first, that of consent - albeit it 
hypothetical - suggests that the relationship between the corporate entity and society 
ought to be consensual and mutual. The second is that the social contract protects 
property rights but simultaneously asserts that political and social freedom requires 
some economic equality; what might later be called a theory of distributive justice. 
The third is concerned with normative values in a shared community. These values 
are reflected in laws that protect and promote the common good, and which through 
the notion of consent, require a degree of self-prescribed norms in the social contract.
John Rawls: The modern social contract
The work of John Rawls was visited earlier in Chapter Two in relation to developing 
a taxonomy of liberal theories of distributive justice. Rawlsian theory is a Gordian 
knot of abstraction and complexity and I do not claim to cut it here. Rather, I have 
attempted to present and develop a number of notions which can be usefully applied 
to the broader analytic schema of the thesis. Arguably, such a treatment will be 
circumscribed. However, whilst selective, the theoretical insights drawn from Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice are adequate for the purposes and aims of this analytic project.
I l l
As a modem contractarian, Rawls’ conceptual lineage is deeply rooted in the 
philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau (and also Kant) (Rawls 1999, p. 10). Rawls 
places his principles of justice within a more general conception of justice which he 
articulates as follows:
All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
social bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s 
advantage (Rawls 1999, p.54).
This outlines the central idea of Rawls’ theory. Rawls is concerned with the idea of 
justice as having an equal share of social goods. But, treating people equally is not 
about removing inequalities per se but about removing inequalities which 
disadvantage those worst off in society (Kymlicka 2002). Inequality is, therefore, 
permissible if this situation benefits everyone. Kymlicka explains that the theory 
‘gives the less well off a kind of veto over inequalities which sacrifice, rather than 
promote, their interests’ (Kymlicka 2002, p.55).
Rawls uses the social contract theory tradition loosely and variably for his own ends 
towards a conception of justice. Justice, at its simplest conception, is ‘maximising 
the good’ (Rawls 1967, p.58). Rawls does not employ the social contract to explain 
or describe historical events but as a hypothetical situation - a thought experiment as 
it were - one which, when applied to moral theories, suggests the content of the given 
agreement (Rawls 1999, p. 14). Rawls asserts that the guiding idea is that the 
principles of justice that he proposes for ‘the basic structure of society are the object 
of the original agreement’ (Rawls 1999, p. 10). Essentially, the hypothetical situation 
of the free, rational and self-seeking individual in a social contract is a device for 
talking about the basic arrangement of society and social conditions.
Rawls’ imagined situation is that of the social contract made in the hypothetical 
original position (as corollary to the state of nature encountered in different classical 
theories) which he argues to ‘justify the adoption of egalitarian and non-perfectionist 
principles of justice’ (Medina 1990, p.83). Rawls asks: what would free and rational 
agents agree upon as basic rules of organisation in society? Rawls attempts to define 
these rules; rules by which the value of other rules will be measured. These rules - 
principles that regulate all further agreements - outline the kinds of social
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cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government than can be 
established. Rawls argues that justice in the social contract is ‘justice as fairness’. 
The two principles - lexically ordered - that are essential to the just social contract 
are:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1999, p.53).
Rawls’ principles of justice offer a set of principles that would be accepted by 
rational and self-seeking people in an initial position of equality (Rawls 1999, pp.l5- 
19). The ‘original position’ which approximates to ‘the state of nature’ is a 
hypothetical social state. A ‘veil of ignorance’ which obfuscates people’s natural and 
social advantages allows for a fair agreement or bargain since everyone appears to be 
similarly situated. The ‘veil of ignorance’ is an intuitive test of fairness in the way in 
which people contract with others. Thus, Rawls’ situation requires that individuals 
take the position o f ‘an ideal impartial contractor’ in order to choose the principles of 
justice which ought to be applied (Rawls 1999, p.83). As Lessnoff argues, this is 
individualism but not egoism (as would be the case in Hobbes) because it promises 
in the social contract equal protection to the (possibly conflicting) interest of all 
individuals (Lessnoff 1986, p. 159). Using the social contract, Rawls develops a 
moral philosophy which gives a standard way by which the fairness of institutions 
can be judged. The advantaged concede that the possession or use of their advantages 
is contingent on an egalitarian society, one which will persuade the less advantaged 
that inequalities are to their advantage (Bloom 1990, p.319). Here a contract exists, 
based on the principles of justice, which as Rawls would have it played out means 
the existence of a society of mutual advantage founded on radical equality.
The difference principle
Particular attention is drawn to Rawls’ difference principle. As stated, injustice 
occurs when inequalities are not to the benefit of all. Conversely, inequality is 
justifiable if it exists to the benefit of all. Thus, Rawls asserts that if certain
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inequalities would make everyone better off than the hypothetical starting situation, 
then they accord with the general conception of justice.
A chief concern of this thesis is the employment of social and affirmative economic 
policies such as those which may be advanced in SCSD to promote certain groups 
that might not enjoy equality (such as would be defined in an original position) or 
equal access to ‘positions and offices’. Assuming equality of opportunity, this is 
generally understood to mean a justification of differentials in income if this is to 
advantage of everyone in society (Kymlicka 2002, p.57). Under the difference 
principle already mentioned in Chapter Two, people may legitimately defend a 
greater claim on resources if this can be demonstrated to be in the interest of those 
with lesser shares. Rawls is critical of the ‘equality of opportunity’ position which 
ensures people’s fate is determined by their choices, their merit and success, rather 
than their circumstances. Rawls opposed this idea by arguing that no greater share of 
resources should accrue to anyone on the basis of arbitrary inequalities, such as 
talent, able-bodiedness, intelligence, social status or beauty. If these are indeed 
results of a ‘natural lottery’, these benefits might be justifiably enjoyed by those 
whose hold the advantage if, and only if, they are part of a scheme which improves 
the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1999).
But what if extant inequalities were structural and reflective of unjust political 
processes and biases? What if social and economic inequalities are not arranged to 
everyone’s advantage (or to the advantage of the least well off), or if positions are 
not open to all? Left liberals would argue for the remedy of this by affirmative action 
or equal opportunity policies adopted in relation to women, the disabled, racial and 
ethnic minorities, and so on. How might the Rawlsian difference principle be 
interpreted here? In the case of South Africa, such policies primarily advance black 
economic empowerment (BEE). These issues are explored in the next chapter and are 
detailed in the two empirical chapters which follow. For now, a detailed discussion 
of these policies is held in abeyance. However, in order to engage these 
particularities, some of the empirical issues of this thesis are prefigured here for the 
purposes of critiquing Rawls’ difference principle as it might be applied in a real 
context. Suffice to say here that BEE policies are affirmative policies which justify 
unequal social and economic arrangements (in the direct material benefits to black
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people and in terms of creating affirmative opportunities) in order to render the 
system ‘just’ for the benefit of all.
In the previous chapter, the thesis sought to primarily advance the idea of the market 
as a redistributive instrument. As a liberal, Rawls does not argue the instrumentality 
of the market: rather, the market is a fact of reason and an expression of the idea of 
rights. Rawls’ notion of distributive justice requires that:
... government regulates a free economy in a certain way. More fully, if 
law and government act effectively to keep markets competitive, 
resources hilly employed, property and wealth widely distributed over 
time, and to maintain the appropriate social minimum, then if there is 
equality of opportunity underwritten by education for all, the resulting 
distribution will be just (Rawls 1967, p.69).
For Rawls, the state plays numerous roles, all associated with keeping markets 
efficient and competitive whilst preventing unreasonable market power. Thus, the 
state has a redistributive role to justify competitive markets (Rawls 1967). However, 
are further constraints on efficient market-based behaviour acceptable through value- 
driven policies like BEE? Would such constraints on competitive markets such as 
affirmative policies be compatible with social justice? Given that some people will 
be worse off in light of BEE policies, is BEE as a set of political, social and 
economic strategies fair and just? How usefully can liberalism and Rawls’ theory of 
justice in particular advance an understanding of BEE?
Rawls’ two principles for justice were described above (Rawls 1999, p.52). The two 
principles are reiterated here and must be satisfied to be true in lexical order. The 
first principle of justice is that every person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties. Indeed, the new South African Constitution 
(South Africa 1996) guarantees equality: the law prevents all reference to colour as a 
basis of discrimination. At a formal level, the first test for justice has been fulfilled 
and it would follow that all South Africans arguable enjoy this basic schema of rights 
necessary for their self-respect and autonomy (both given precedence in a Rawlsian 
conception). Yet, even though formal (constitutional, political and legislative) 
equality is secured, as this thesis has argued forcefully, the existence of massive 
social and economic inequality attests to a different reality.
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Right-liberal theorists would oppose state intervention such as BEE on the grounds 
of an efficiency justification or on the basis of rights. Such a position would hold that 
differences in real opportunity for people of different race groups are justified with 
reference to gains in efficiency. Stated differently, given right-liberals’ commitment 
to an unrestrained market which they believe is most efficient in creating wealth, 
imposing BEE policies on the market diminishes market efficiencyIndeed, there 
are many additional transaction costs for the state as a consequence of further state 
regulation. Moreover, such policies lay an artificial premium on doing business and 
also increase transaction costs for businesses. Are these justifiable? How does this 
focus on efficiency fit in Rawls’ difference principle? With regard to the lexical 
order in which the principles of justice must be satisfied, is BEE a question of basic 
rights (first principle) or is it a question of distribution with regard to economic 
capabilities ‘attached to positions and offices’ (second principle)?
Indeed, for left liberals, there exists empirical justification for state intervention in 
the market to address the inequalities that obtain. The argument regarding efficiency 
would be eclipsed by the argument that state intervention in the form of BEE might 
increase the Rawlsian efficiency standard employed to support the least well-off in 
society. Should the state terminate its pursuit of BEE policies, the short-term effects 
might certainly be an increase in market efficiency. But, this would not be to the 
greatest benefit of all, unless the state compensated those who might otherwise 
benefit from BEE policies through greater redistributive taxation, for example. 
Indeed, as Rawls concedes, optimal or efficient distributions are not necessarily the 
best distributions (Rawls 1967, p.64).
Are BEE policies licensed by Rawls’ second principle? The second principle - in two 
parts - states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged reasonably so 
that they are to everyone’s advantage, and also attached to positions and offices open 
to all (Rawls 1999, p.53). This places an onus on the state to create an efficiency 
surplus to meet the social and economic needs of citizens in the first instance. In the 
second, it holds that equal access attached to offices and positions - an idea that
As outlined by Kymlicka, within Rawls’ lexical order, justice is prior to efficiency and to 
maximising the sum of advantages. Fair opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle 
(Rawls 1999, p,56; Kymlicka 2002). It should be notes that efficiency is not a liberal argument in its 
own right but a beneficial spin-off of markets.
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extends beyond equality of opportunity - must be ensured. Given the lexical order 
above efficiency, it is therefore legitimate and appropriate to treat people differently 
as is entailed in the promotion of BEE in order that they may enjoy equality of 
opportunity and capability. These ideas provide an important justification of policies 
advanced in social development and SCSD in particular.
Defending the Rawlsian social contract
Rawls warns that justice as fairness is limited in scope and not a complete contract 
theory given that it does not embrace all moral (and natural) relationships in a 
systematic way. He does, nevertheless, recognise that the contractarian idea can be 
extended to the choice of ethical system in play. Rawls defends his use of the 
contract in five ways. First, he argues that the contract terminology conveys the 
notion that principles of justice may be thought of as principles that rational people 
could use, and this would allow for such a conception of justice to be explained and 
justified. Second, principles of justice deal with competing claims and thus can be 
applied to relations between people or groups. Third, the term ‘contract’ connotes 
both plurality and the condition that where distribution occurs - as it must and does -  
it is under appropriate principles acceptable to all parties. Fourth, the contract is 
public; publicity suggests that if these principles are the outcome of an agreement, 
citizens have an understanding of the principles that follow. Last, in line with the 
normative character of the social contract theory tradition, the contract terminology 
helps crystallise ideas whilst invoking a ‘natural piety’ (Rawls 1999, p. 14-15).
Rawls is criticised for a number of reasons. A chief criticism obviously lies in the 
imperative to distribute economic resources, fairly and based on the difference 
principle addressed above. Other criticisms points to an apparent internal 
inconsistency and contradiction in his thesis (Kymlicka 2002; Plant, Lesser, and 
Taylor-Gooby 1980). On the one hand, what free, rational and self-seeking 
individual would choose to organise society on the basis of the social contract? Does 
ignorance of one’s personal talents and position in society provide sufficient grounds 
for choosing the principles of justice Rawls offers? In order to make it run, Rawls 
reduces it to rational prudence. But this reduction is still not wholly convincing as 
once conditions are chosen, people who can maximise their benefits would abandon
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the attendant burden or responsibility associated the compact. Rawlsian social 
contract theory appears to be missing a component that essentially explains why an 
individual (who is not in the original position) would engage the social contract at 
all, and more especially, why he wouldn’t abandon the compact once he becomes 
aware of his position relative to others. If ignorance is a guarantee of impartiality and 
ultimately justice, what happens when people are cognisant of their relative benefits 
and burdens in society?
In addition, Rawls’ social contract is a hypothetical contract. His theory is an abstract 
theory. While in the abstract, people might find themselves in the original position, 
in reality, this is not the case. The principles of justice might be a rational choice in 
the hypothetical instance but they are not necessarily so in reality. A hypothetical 
contract is just that: any obligations that follow from this agreement are hypothetical 
and unenforceable: a ‘hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual 
contract; it is no contract at all’ (Dworkin 1989, p. 18). Another criticism is levelled 
at Rawls’ rejection of the notion of equality of opportunity. Indeed, even if the 
difference principle were to address differences in natural and social circumstances, 
the difference principle may not also mitigate the effects of different choices and 
preferences, as well as effort and determination. Finally, Rawlsian principles would 
be principles to organise a just society but these original principles in a pluralistic 
society are one way to arrange society.
The Rawlsian social contract and corporate social engagement
Corporate social engagement, in a Rawlsian analysis, abides by Rawls’ two 
principles of justice. In this thesis the second principle is particularly useful when 
applied to social development, in a developing context. However, there are questions 
about whether Rawls’ overall framework holds good under such examinations. For 
example, if markets are known entities - which they are - how then can Rawlsian 
contractarianism, which is premised on the notion of the veil of ignorance, be 
usefully employed in further understanding corporate social engagement? Indeed, the 
raison d ’être of the modem corporation is the market, a known market of the 
distribution of resources. What is true of individuals in the social contract is also true 
of corporations. What would sustain this arrangement once people become aware of
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the true distribution? What keeps corporate decision-makers who no longer live with 
the veil of ignorance bound to the pact? It might be argued that if one assumes that 
individuals are rational then once they emerge from the original position, they would 
abandon the project of the social contract.
The concept of obligation (which is also key to ‘justice as fairness’) might suggest an 
ideational bridge to a Rawlsian perspective of corporate social engagement. 
Obligation as part of a schema of rights and responsibilities may also be helpfiil to 
develop these ideas in relation to corporate social engagement (particularly CSR). 
Justice as fairness itself requires two conditions (Rawls 1969). The first is that the 
institution is just or fair (it meets the principles of justice). The second condition is 
that the individual (corporate manager) has voluntarily accepted the arrangement or 
accepted the benefits of such an arrangement to further his interests, or the fiduciary 
interests he represents. The critical ideal of fairness is that when engaged in mutually 
advantageous cooperative ventures, no one gains from the labours of others without 
contributing his fair share. Thus, the requirements outlined by the principle of 
fairness involve obligations that presuppose just institutions. Critically, obligations 
are not mere moral requirements. Rather, they tend to be institutionally defined and 
arise as a result of voluntary acts (such as express or tacit undertakings or even 
accepting benefits arising from a given situation) (Rawls 1999, p.97). Thus 
obligations, political or social, are necessarily self-assumed moral responsibilities 
assumed in a social contract in the community of others who also have the same 
mutual obligations. Thus, a parallel can be drawn with the corporation and its 
stakeholders, particularly where the ‘responsible’ corporation’s stated objectives are 
seen as just and engaged to the benefit of a wide range of interest holders.
Problems of the social contract: moving to metaphor
Most social contract theorists use the social contract as a heuristic devise to explore 
the nature of (political) authority and social arrangements as well as the nature of 
obligation and responsibility. It has been suggested here that the social contract is an 
implicit agreement between parties, usually between the state and its citizens, but 
also between corporations and their stakeholders. Social contract theory, and 
specifically a social contract theory of the corporation, operates as a metaphor.
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Indeed, as has already been iterated any argument in defence of the social contract 
must acknowledge that only hypothetical obligations can flow from a hypothetical 
construct in a hypothetical situation. The hypothetical contract is not an actual 
litigable contract, nor an express agreement between parties.
Critiques of corporate social contract theory
The metaphor of the social contract is an important analytic tool when examining a 
stakeholder theory of the corporation. The corporate social contract is a complex 
notion, conceived in the abstract but intended to serve practical demands. Of course, 
there are innumerable objections to the concept on ideological grounds; these have 
been adequately covered. However, the social contract model might be criticised for 
oversimplifying the nature of corporate power in society.
In the first instance, corporate entities can be extremely powerful entities. In such a 
context, contractual partners do not enjoy equal leverage. Stakeholders in this model 
do not operate on a level playing field; some stakeholders enjoy more power and 
exert greater influence than others. The nature of the contract is itself compromised 
in that while members of society can withdraw their cooperation, they have no 
general authority to force organisations to honour contracts that are neither legal nor 
formal.
Second, social contracts require levels of trust between contracting partners and 
some disclosure regarding activities. Corporations in a social contract have to 
account for their social and economic impacts. However, the issue of accountability 
might become obscured when conceived so broadly. The stakeholder system rejects a 
single centre of authority in favour of broad accountability. But Sternberg lobbies her 
first criticism of stakeholder accountability when she argues that such diffuse 
accountability is effectively non-existent, and that ‘an organisation that is 
accountable to everyone, is actually accountable to no one* (Sternberg 1997, p.75). A 
possible rejoinder would ague that within the stakeholder corporation, not all 
relationships of accountability are necessarily equal or non-hierarchical. Sternberg 
takes aim again at stakeholder accountability arguing that corporations are generally
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only answerable to interest groups if they are formally obliged to do so, in terms of 
legislation or specific contractual arrangements (Sternberg 1997, p.79-80).
Third, not all ‘contracts’ are the same. As already described, some contracts are 
formal and specific whilst other contracts are implicit and relatively vague. It is 
useful to differentiate between an on-going continuous contractual relationship such 
as exists between the shareholders and management, or between management and 
employees on the one hand, and intermittent contracts between occasional vendors or 
customers on the other (Jones 1995, p.409). Having asserted this, however, whilst the 
specifics of the contract might alter as immediate social and circumstantial 
conditions change, in general this contract remains the basis of the legitimacy for 
corporate social engagement (Balabanis, Phillips, and Lyall 1998, p.26).
Fourth, as described the social contract is a hypothetical construct. As such, the 
contract is not legally enforceable as is the case with formal legal contracts 
(Donaldson and Dunfee 1994). Enforcing the social contract requires a moral 
environment intolerant of contract-breaking, a cohesive stakeholder community to 
exert sanctions, and where appropriate, regulation to protect parties to the contract.
Finally, the categories ‘corporations’ and ‘society’ are, in addition, not monolithic 
and comprise multiple interest groups. Moreover, the relationships of power that 
exist between large corporations and other stakeholder groups may not be equal and 
might not easily be reduced to simple contractual exchanges.
Nonetheless, the thesis holds that the metaphor is a useful and appropriate one, not 
least of all because it suggests a normative basis in which a framework of rights and 
obligations are exercised. Moreover, these relationship of rights and obligations have 
a particular character in the case of South Africa where democracy has been 
established on a negotiated social contract and where the legacies of apartheid 
necessitate a different set of contractual arrangements between the state and business 
as key economic actors as exemplified by BEE.
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Part Three: The social contract, stakeholder and state-corporate social 
development
As argued, the social contract is a hypothetical agreement between business and 
society. Its basic supposition is normative in character. However, this thesis posits 
that the social contract might appropriately be considered within a strategic 
framework for the operation of business in society. As Wempe asserts:
A contract tries, after all, to do justice to the claims of the partners and at 
the same time makes it possible to pursue the corporation’s own interest 
(Wempe 1998, p.51).
Moreover, the compact between corporations and stakeholders reins in the excesses 
of the market working in the long-term interests of business ‘otherwise driven by the 
imperative of short-term profit-maximisation’ (Allen 2001, p.285). In other words, 
business’ long-term self-interests are served by the push-me-pull-you nature of 
competing stakeholder interests in a social compact.
Some key commentators on the corporate social contract, including Hopkins, 
Donaldson, Dunfee, Freeman, Preston, Wempe, Jones and Balabanis et al, argue that 
the corporation is defined in terms of its relationships with stakeholders. Jones argues 
that the corporation can be recast as a ‘nexus of contracts between its top 
management and its stakeholders’ (Jones 1995, p.407; Similarly in Morrison 2003). 
Evans and Freeman offer that the firm is a ‘set of multilateral contracts over time’ 
and the purpose of the firm is to serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder 
interests (Evan and Freeman 1993, 82).
Corporate stakeholding theory dovetails with the reasoning that business operates 
because society allows it to. Using the social contract argument, organisations - in 
particular, business corporations - exist because they enjoy the mandate not only of 
their shareholders, but also of a broader stakeholding community. This mandate is, 
for the large part, mostly tacit. Business enjoys a ‘license to operate’ from a range of 
shareholders beyond the market. Using some of the classic stakeholder categories of 
interest groups, a business can not survive - let alone function - without the 
participation of people, as capital investors, employees, suppliers and consumers.
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Thus, stakeholders influence the ability of corporations to operate regardless of 
market conditions.
As Hopkins asserts, CSR (or corporate social engagement more broadly) is another 
face of stakeholder theory; both are interested in the social engagement of 
corporations and analyse the meaning of socially responsible behaviour by splitting 
stakeholders into their constituencies. Hopkins describes stakeholder theory in term 
of a compact or agreement, operating on a global level which he calls ‘the planetary 
bargain’ (Hopkins 1999, p. 17; A similar project is advanced by Gragg 2000). The 
bargain or contract - whether local or global - interfaces stakeholder theory on the 
one hand, and corporate social engagement on the other
Corporate social contract theory maintains that corporations are accountable to all 
their stakeholders because as suggested above, corporations wield power, resources 
and influence that affect the broader society. An implicit contract follows that in 
exchange for exploiting society’s resources, stakeholders may make a claim on the 
corporation. What constitutes this claim is a more difficult question. Corporations 
also enjoy special privileges and protections (legislative) from society, the character 
of which might be formally authorised or tacit. In exchange, it is argued, 
organisations need to be accountable for the privileged position of power accorded 
them. Accountability between parties in the social contract is key as ‘stakes in each 
are reciprocal since each can affect the other in terms of harms and benefits as well 
as rights and duties’ (Evan and Freeman 1993, p.79). These rights and 
responsibilities are indicative of the consensual nature of the relationship between 
business and society.
Corporate stakeholding and the corporate social contract are premised on 
relationships of trust, and are closely linked to corporate social engagement (Hopkins
This raises the instance of the Global Compact, instigated by Koffi Annan, General Secretary of the 
United Nations (UN) in 1999, is a global corporate citizenship initiative (Annan 1999). Globally, 
companies are urged to sign the compact which is based on nine human rights, labour and 
environment principles. Over 1000 companies are reportedly committed to the Global Compact which 
champions social and environment causes (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.aspl. 
Importantly, there is no verification process for the Compact or any mechanisms for enforcing or 
legally binding commitments. Critics argue the lofty principles are undermined by lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms. A number of corporate offenders are numbered among the compact’s 
partners giving rise to criticism of UN co-option in public relations exercises.
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1999, p. 17-18). An accepted system of mutual rights and obligations creates social 
cohesion, maximises trust, minimises uncertainty, cuts transaction costs and 
opportunism and stabilises corporate governance (Fukuyama 1995, p.27-8; Goodhart 
1994, p. 18, p.68-69; Ostrom 1994, p.38-41 for related ideas). These characteristics 
are clearly relevant to the long-term relationships necessary for long-term investment 
decisions: high trust is necessary for high-commitment relationships, and 
consequently for the long-term sustainability of the corporation. It is in the 
corporation’s strategic interest to generate trust which is an ‘elusive and 
economically valuable commodity’ (Allen 2001. p.286).
But sceptics of corporate social engagement - whether formulated as CSR or 
corporate citizenship - argue that there is little form over substance. Firms, they 
would argue, can merely enhance their reputations by successful advertising, 
occasional high-profile altruism, and public relations management. The application 
of the citizenship trope to corporate entities is limited in this view because corporate 
accountability and transparency simply mitigate against risk. Any substantive social 
contract is undermined by short-term profit maximisation. Indeed, deconstructing 
corporate rhetoric is a critical endeavour for multiple groups who might scrutinise 
corporate performance, whether academics, environmentalist, government regulators 
or investors. Public relations can only stand up to interrogation for so long. Trust in 
corporate pronouncements and convincing evidence of corporate integrity are 
necessary for sustaining and enhancing the wealth-creation capacity of the 
corporation. As Jones argues, trust and a reputation for trustworthiness signal to 
potential partners the desirability of a particular firm. He argues that firm morality is 
substantive, tested over time and is difficult to simulate.Corporations signal their 
trustworthiness by avoiding opportunism so that a firm that usually honours its 
contracts will earn trust (Jones 1995, p.420-421).
At a macro-level (and coming full circle to the state-market dyad of SCSD), the 
corporate social contract is critical for the conditions necessary to wealth creation in 
a given society. Hutton argues that wealth is created when new economic
The potential for CSR and corporate citizenship stances to be seen as mere public relations is high. 
Proponents of multi-dimensional auditing and reporting arguing these mechanism are intended to 
demonstrate the integrity of corporations’ social commitments and the embeddedness of these values 
in corporate operations,
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institutions, systems and values that allow co-operative relationships to flourish are 
embedded within capitalism (Hutton 1999, p.83).
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn together the threads of a stakeholder approach to corporate 
social responsibility. Whether stakeholder theory is used normatively, descriptively 
or instrumentally, (or a combination of these models), it posits an obligation of 
responsibility and accountability that goes far beyond a purely fiduciary relationship 
between corporations and shareholders. Indeed, the relationship is one that 
necessarily balances multiple, and often contesting, stakeholder interests. A theory of 
the social contract lies at the centre of stakeholder theory and corporate social 
engagement. The corporate social contract situates the corporation’s obligations in 
relation to society in parallel with the state-society relationship in classic social 
contract theory. The social contract is used metaphorically as a heuristic device to 
describe the relationships of rights and obligations, as well as the values adopted by 
institutions. It is hypothetical but nonetheless creates a normative foundation for the 
operation of the corporation in society. It also provides a strategic rationale for 
corporate social engagement. More specifically, the social contract is a useful 
theoretical tool to explain social and institutional arrangements, as well as provide a 
justification for social distribution.
The following chapter focuses on South Africa and lays out the social and political 
context that informs the empirical research of this thesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTEXT OF STATE- 
CORPORATE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH
AFRICA
Introduction
Ten years into democracy South Africa faces enormous challenges, many of which 
are developmental in nature. Despite the arguments about South African 
exceptionalism, South Africa is like many other middle-income developing 
countries (Simon 2000, p.l). Its development is uneven, simultaneously displaying 
the contours of both a developed and developing economy. South Africa needs to 
become globally competitive. At the same time, there are pressing local challenges. 
These challenges - political, social and economic - are exacerbated by the enduring 
structural inequalities left by apartheid (as well as colonial and union policies). 
South Africa remains among the most unequal and divided countries (May 2000). 
This is the broad historical and contemporary context in which the thesis located 
state-corporate social development (SCSD).
The chapter comprises six sections of uneven length. In the first part, I locate South 
Africa in a global and regional political economy. In the second, I focus on South 
Africa’s political economy and its transition from apartheid to a liberal social 
democracy. The third and fourth sections consider the social and legislative 
environments respectively. In looking at the social environment, I concentrate 
specifically on race, poverty, the AIDS pandemic and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), and the issues raised by the last regarding social justice and the 
role of business. The section on the legislative environment maps ‘transformation’ 
or empowerment legislation enacted since 1994, and business’ reception of the 
same. In the fifth part, I examine the history of South African corporate social 
engagement and current business involvement. Linking the previous chapter, the 
sixth and final parts address current manifestations of the social contract and 
stakeholding in South Africa’s liberal social democracy.
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P art One: Globalisation and South Africa
As stated, in the global political economy, market forces are increasingly powerful. 
Capital and capitalists retain enormous power simply because of their importance to 
economies (Seekings and Nattrass 2002, p.2). Of course, there is more to market 
economies than free markets. Since the late 1990s even advocates of markets have 
recognised the necessity of state coordination - if not regulation - in order for 
markets to work effectively (World Bank 1997). Alongside global trade, 
globalisation is characterised by capital hypermobility, the economic and political 
influence of multinational corporations (MNCs), technology, faster and broader 
communication and human mobility and diminished aid in favour of trade (Mills 
2000; Friedman 2000). Everywhere the global political economy increasingly 
mediates the local. More specifically, changing technology and broader access to 
information regarding emerging economies, their performance and their governance, 
expose emerging markets to the vagaries of investment by other governments and 
institutional investors. Globalisation raises critical economic issues for developing 
countries including South Africa. Carmody argues that the South African political 
economy has been ‘rescaled’ to the global market (Carmody 2002).
South Africa in the region
During apartheid. South Africa was a pariah state isolated from the rest of Africa. 
Nevertheless and somewhat ironically, trade between South Africa and the rest of 
independent Africa never ceased, even at the height of South Africa’s foreign policy 
of destabilisation and with international trade and political sanctions against South 
Africa (Simon 2000, p.7; 1998, p.249). Today, South Africa’s economic links with 
the southern African region and the continent are seen as critical to mutual 
development despite some evidence that regional planning elsewhere has enjoyed 
limited success (Simon 1990, p.4). Stressing the value of regional links. Mills 
contends:
It is broadly acknowledged today that the development of economies 
cannot occur in isolation. It is also accepted that the route to global 
integration and competitiveness runs through regional consolidation and 
harnessing of regional economies of scale (Mills 2000, p.73).
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Within Africa, South Africa dominates both politically and economically.^^ At an 
institutional level too South Africa is a dominant partner in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) in the sub-Saharan 
region and through New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). However, 
this regional dominance operates equivocally for South Africa. On the one hand. 
South Africa has power to leverage social, political and economic change to ensure 
stability in a region itself characterised by widespread inequality. For example, 
poorer frontline states remain dependent on South Africa for remittances in an 
inherited regional political economy (Fine and Stoneman 1996, p.7; Wilson 2001). 
There is also increased competition in the region for South African investment, as 
well as for investment from abroad (Simon 1998, p.249; Heese 2000). On the other, 
the identification of South Africa with its neighbours does have severe implications 
for inward foreign direct investment (FDI).^^ For example. South Africa’s irresolute 
policy towards undemocratic and corrupt regimes like Zimbabwe taints its own 
reputation for accountable governance. As one interviewee put it:
They look at Zimbabwe. And they think Zimbabwe and South Africa are 
joined at the hip, as Siamese twins. They taint us with the same brush.
So those are the issues of perception that we need to be looking at. In 
conclusion, I think the state has a huge role to create a just environment 
(Interviewee 21, African, male, business/parastatals).
Hence, Southern African problems are South African problems. Instability and poor 
governance by neighbouring governments have a knock-on effect for South Africa. 
Events and conditions on the continent and in the sub-region - such as poverty, war, 
corruption, failure of governance, collapsing infrastructure and HIV/AIDS - 
undermine African development or seriously erode development gains. South Africa 
now considers these strategic issues. South African ‘national interest’ is expressed 
on the continent including the imperative to improve political and economic 
governance aimed at development (Gelb 2002).
South Africa accounts for 45% of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP (The Economist 2004; See also 
Simon 2000).
^  Pervasive crime and labour market flexibility are other reasons cited to explain South Africa’s 
failure to attract more foreign direct investment (Boyd, Spicer, and Keeton 2001, p.84; Shaw 2002, 
p.155).
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With the launch of the AU in July 2002, African leaders committed themselves to 
NEPAD as an instrument for changing Africa’s currently bleak outlook (See Gelb 
2002a for a detailed treatment). With good political and economic governance and 
transparency as its cornerstone, NEPAD urges the commitment and cooperation of 
stakeholders to achieve African transformation. Good governance and development 
commitments are not limited to nation states with NEPAD arguing a critical role for 
business.
NEPAD is too new an initiative to make any judgement regarding its success in 
achieving its stated goals regarding the role of business. However, two issues are 
worth highlighting. First, NEPAD sees business explicitly as a driver and a partner 
in African reconstruction and development. Second, South Africa’s own role is 
dominant and needs to be carefully balanced by the state both in terms of its 
reputation as governance leader and role model for the region (The Namibian 2002; 
Mills 1998; Gelb 2002a). South Africa’s influence in the region - whether political, 
military, economic or in terms of human capital - although often resented by the rest 
of Africa, is the likely driver for an apparently elusive African Renaissance.
Part Two: An Overview of the Political Economy of South Africa
Apartheid entrenched ‘separateness’, and South Africa was regulated to this end 
with ‘grotesque fastidiousness’ (Marais 2001, p.7). It was morally reprehensible, 
politically deluded, economically unsustainable and ideologically aberrant. The 
impact of apartheid policy on people’s lives was, and remains, very real.
In the period prior to - and during - South Africa’s negotiated transition 
apprehension abounded. Many feared civil war, retaliatory racial killing, the collapse 
of rule of law, and the fundamental restructuring of the political system. With a 
liberation movement committed to socialism, the establishment also feared a
Reuel Khoza, chairman of the NEPAD Business Group asserted: ‘It is recognised that business 
needs a stable and predictable institutional and regulatory environment, and should work with all 
stakeholders in achieving this goal’ (NEPAD 2003). NEPAD’s strategy involves the adoption by 
member countries of economic management codes ‘to promote market efficiency’ (South Africa: 
Department of Foreign Affairs 2003, p.l2),
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fundamental restructuring of the economic system. It is clear that political settlement 
alone has limits. South African prosperity rests as much on economic and social 
justice.
Past imperfect: Capitalism and apartheid
From the 1970s, a long-standing ideological debate emerged regarding the 
relationship between capitalism and apartheid. At the core of this debate lay the 
question: Was apartheid’s suppression of black labour instrumental to capitalist 
development or did it retard growth (Nattrass 1994, p.517)? Today the question has 
shifted: Are the current levels of South African inequality an inevitable consequence 
of capitalist development or a result of apartheid’s discriminatory laws and customs? 
At the time of the transition from apartheid. Le Roux argued that:
The historic evidence seems to be conclusive: there is no doubt that 
unbridled capitalism, even if it is successful in terms of a high rate of 
economic growth for a generation or two, worsens the economic 
conditions of a significant proportion of the populace. Discriminatory 
legislation, however, ensured in the case of South Africa, the group 
excluded from the benefits of economic growth was much larger than 
would have been the case in the absence of apartheid legislation (Le 
Roux 1992, p. 15-16).
Indeed, the development and consolidation of capitalism and the roots of racial 
inequality were well established by colonialism. The discovery of gold and 
diamonds shifted South Africa both strategically and economically, and these 
resources remain critical to the South African economy. The radical interpretation of 
the relationship between apartheid and capitalism - racial capitalism - is well- 
rehearsed elsewhere (Bond 1991; Lipton 1985; Nattrass 1991; Wolpe 1988). It, 
nonetheless, requires a brief discussion based on Hein Marais’ treatment of it.
South Africa’s initial entry into the world economy at the end of the nineteenth 
century was as a source of primary commodities and as a destination for investment 
capital. Capital accumulation relied on the exploitation of wage labour and on an 
expendable pool of African labour (Bond 1991). The 1913 Land Act created ‘native 
reserves’ (7.3% of South African land area) and then Bantustans which reproduced
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the system at minimal cost to capital. From the outset, these areas were overcrowded 
and poverty-stricken. Legislation such as the notorious pass laws regulated the flow 
of labour. Racial division of labour was established early although class fractures 
appeared among white society, particularly after the Great Depression of 1929-1932 
which created a class of (mostly) Afrikaner ‘poor whites’ (O'Meara 1983, 1996). 
The rise of an increasingly politicised urban black and white working class in the 
1920s precipitated political alignment along racial lines. Heightened racial wage 
differentials, job reservation for whites and expanded social benefits for whites 
increased race tensions and reinforced race-bound class alliances.
The National Party’s victory in 1948 paved the way for even greater control of 
African labour, greater centralisation of key aspects of the South African economy 
by the state, the facilitation of monopoly capitalism^*, and the augmentation of an 
Afrikaner capitalist class through a programme of concerted affirmative action. 
White ascendancy was achieved through a proactive state and an ongoing 
dependency on cheap African labour. The apartheid state attempted to establish 
optimal conditions for capitalist growth by erecting high tariff protection around 
vulnerable industries, setting up massive parastatals, and expanding 
telecommunication and transport infrastructure. What emerged in this racially 
structured economy were elements of ‘first world’ economies including a 
burgeoning manufacturing sector, a modem working class and pockets of modem 
industrial capitalism through increasingly concentrated pattems of ownership.
Apartheid granted whites access to better-paid jobs and opportunities for capital 
accumulation. The state invested in education, health, cultural, physical and 
recreational infrastructure, and social services for whites (O'Meara 1996; Beall, 
Crankshaw, and Pamell 2002). Apartheid inextricably linked race and class. The 
racialised nature of wealth creation and the distribution of resources were primarily 
ideological and political. The last two decades of apartheid saw deepening 
recessionary conditions and the assertion of Afrikaner ideology over rational 
economics (Marais 2001, p.33; Nattrass 1994). The development and growth of 
South African capitalism cannot be divorced from systematic racial discrimination
The economy is dominated by a small number of conglomerates with high levels of cross-holding.
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and entrenched pattems of privilege and deprivation. Nevertheless, in the 1980s a 
nascent African middle class emerged.
In the early 1990s, South Africa made the transition from apartheid to a liberal 
social democracy.^^ An interim period from 1989-1993 saw low-scale civil war 
(both overt and covert) conducted by a repressive state against a liberation 
movement both inside and outside South Africa. A number of interviewees 
attributed the existence of a culture of pluralistic dialogue in South Africa to lessons 
learned in the process of negotiations. Political stability needed a far-reaching 
political settlement. A negotiated political settlement had universal franchise and a 
liberal pluralist democracy as its point of departure. Later in this chapter, I argue that 
this first social contract was a positive-sum arrangement that cut across race, class, 
ideology, history and interests.
Economic outcomes appeared less certain. The vociferous debates continue in 
contemporary economic discourse as evidenced in my interview data. Capitalist 
interests explicitly demanded a continued and strengthened market economy and 
restrained redistributionist policies. Later, capital also called for the privatisation of 
public assets, fiscal discipline by the state and an abatement of business regulation. 
Left-wing interests were less transparently articulated. The African National 
Congress (ANC) - a broad liberation movement turned govemment-in-waiting - won 
popular support under a nationalist-cum-socialist banner along with its tripartite 
partners the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU). However, the fall of centralised economies in 
eastern block countries did little to support the socialist tendencies within the 
movement. Upon his release, Mandela promised the nationalisation of mines, banks 
and monopoly industries (Marais 2001, p. 122). Dropping its populist rhetoric, the 
ANC’s economic policies arguably matured (Kentridge 1993)."^ ® Its constitutional 
proposals advanced a mixed economy; socialism was relegated from the centre of
South Africa might be described as ‘social democratic development of the liberal tradition’ 
(Christianson 2003). For many, the distinction between (left) liberalism and social democracy is 
blurred (Welsh 2002).
^  The ANC is a more complex, heterogeneous and contradictory organisation than is reflected here 
(See Dubow 2000; Deegan 2001; Ellis and Sechaba 1992; Saul 1999).
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the party’s economic vision. However, its pronouncements during the transitional 
period were akin to ideological acrobatics, and capital interests were uneasy.
The triumph of liberal social democracy
Apart from the most committed of Marxists and the libertarians, an uneasy centrist 
consensus emerged regarding the future of South Africa as a liberal social 
democracy. The residual political and policy questions related to the respective size 
and influence of the state in relation to the market (Nattrass 1994, p.518). This is not 
a new debate, nor is it one exclusive to South Africa (See relevant case studies in 
Simon 1990).
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDF), an ambitious programme 
for social delivery and redistribution, envisaged a strong role for the state. It was 
conceived in concert with the trade union movement and adopted by the ANC as the 
centrepiece of social development policies (Deegan 2001; Midgley 200If). The RDF 
also aimed to unify diverse interests in a ‘social contract’ with transformation as its 
goal. The envisioned end was ‘basic needs provision, economic growth, vigorous 
civil society participation and initiative, and a democratised state geared at servicing 
the needs of all citizens’ (Marais 2001, p.237). The RDF, Midgely argued, drew on a 
conception of development that stressed endogenous growth, the use of regulated 
markets to ensure social goals, the fulfilment of basic needs and popular 
participation in development (Midgley 200If, p.269). While the RDF outlined a 
social programme, it offered little regarding macro-economic policies. Working in 
an environment of raised expectation post-1994, it was also dependent on the 
capacity of an overburdened state to deliver social goods.
The RDF closed its offices in 1996 whereupon the government introduced an 
alternative policy framework of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). 
This marked a move to an economic technocracy in government: GEAR advanced 
conservative economic policies, and was concerned with creating an enabling 
environment for market directed growth. Most notably, GEAR called for fiscal 
austerity by the state. GEAR was a self-imposed structural adjustment policy aiming 
to achieve growth, employment, as well as a sustained link with RDF objectives.
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Whilst GEAR retained the RDP’s focus on redistribution, it sought distributive 
mechanisms through private development such as construction. GEAR thus aimed to 
achieve growth with redistribution by achieving economic growth, the creation of 
new jobs outside the agricultural sector, growth in manufactured exports and in the 
rate of real investment (Deegan 2001, p. 119; South Africa 1996). It holds that 
growth brings improvements to the absolute living standards of the poorest 
(Greenberg 1981, p.678; South Africa 1996). With a focus on fiscal austerity, 
privatisation and investment^ % GEAR appeared to yield to the interests of capital as 
well as the influence of African nationalism within the ANC. These in turn led to the 
facilitation of a black middle-class whose interests were not aligned with those of 
the black working class or the poor (Friedman 2002). The ANC’s partners, the 
SACP and COSATU were vituperative. Capital - both local and international - was 
approving.
One of South Africa’s key economic concerns is employment creation. 
Unemployment is a major determinant of poverty and inequality (Seekings and 
Nattrass 2002; Mokate 2000, p.57). GEAR supports ‘a competitive and more labour- 
intensive growth path through wage moderation and increasing employment 
flexibility’: Unemployment (using an expanded definition) lies at 36.2% and 
represents a national crisis (NALEDI 2000). May argues that while more formal 
jobs might be created these will be low quality and unstable (May et al. 1988, p.9). 
Low growth rates have not relieved high unemployment, and the economy is simply 
not generating employment at the necessary rate to absorb new entrants into the 
labour market (Bhorat 2001; Joffe 2003; Wray 2001, p. 9). Insecure low-income 
informal jobs are replacing better paid, more secure jobs in the formal sector 
(NALEDI 2000). This has implications for the state’s tax base. Africans and women, 
particularly in rural areas, are most likely to be among the chronically unemployed.
Whilst South Africa’s employment figures are discouraging, the state can claim a 
number of important achievements following democratic transition. Significant
The opening of the economy also saw the listings of a number of large South African companies on 
the London Stock Exchange, including Anglo-American, BHP Billiton, Didata, Investec, Old Mutual 
and SABMiller. These listing effectively de-link company share prices from the South Africa market 
(Carmody 2002, p.264). Friedman argues that off-shore listing places additional pressures for 
accountability on tiie corporation (Friedman 2002, p.48)
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transformation has taken place. Four and a half million have gained access to 
potable water and 600 000 now have access to inexpensive housing (UNDP 2003). 
Other successes include an extensive public works programme, the deracialisation of 
the school system including free and compulsory ten years of primary schooling, 
free medical care of pregnant women and young children, and expanded social 
services providing a universal state pension, water and electricity to previously 
inadequately serviced areas and most recently the provision of anti-retrovirals to 
HIV-positive patients.
Significantly, a black middle class has become entrenched because of social and 
economic opportunities instigated by a new political dispensation."^^ This suggests a 
significant (though partial) delinking of race and class. Increasingly, black people 
are represented in the elite and middle-classes, and there is increasing economic 
differentiation among blacks (Beall, Crankshaw, and Pamell 2002, p.39-40; Gumede 
2002; Nattrass and Seekings 2001; Seekings and Nattrass 2002; Terreblanche 2002, 
2003). Terreblanche demonstrates that a dramatic distributional shift has taken place 
over the past 30 years, transforming South Africa from a race- into a class-stratified 
society. Among indicators of increased differentials within race was a 40% increase 
of income of the top quintile of blacks from 1975 to 1994 and by a further 30% 
since 1994. The income of the poorest 45% of blacks declined by almost 50% from 
1974 to 1994, and by a further 10% (approximately) since 1994 (Terreblanche 2003; 
See also Terreblanche 2002).
Inequality has increased in the last decade (Seekings and Nattrass 2002; May et al. 
1998). Seekings and Nattrass also argue that inequality is increasingly intra-racial. 
Inequality persists not only as a consequence of apartheid but also because of the 
political (and economic) pressures on the government (Seekings and Nattrass 2002, 
p.5). They argue fiirther that inequality (inter- and intra-racial) is tolerated because 
of high rates of redistribution through benefits in-kind by the state (Seekings and
As elsewhere in Africa (Simon 1992, p.9), patronage links have played a role in the creation of a 
black middle class and elite (The Economist 2004). Despite this trend. South Africa has not 
deteriorated into a state of corruption: it retains a free press, a vibrant civil society and an independent 
judiciary.
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Nattrass 2002, p. 7-9). The growth of the black middle class in discussed further in 
Chapter Five.
Part Three: South African social drivers to corporate social engagement
This section looks at the social environment within which South African business 
operates. It also outlines some of the specific challenges a state-corporate social 
development (SCSD) framework must accommodate.
‘Business’ as a generic term has been used throughout the thesis and is admittedly 
misleading. Used by convention in South Africa, the collective term belies the 
heterogeneous character of the sector. It must be emphasised that business refers to a 
collection of diverse enterprises. The needs, capacity and interests of large 
corporations differ from those of medium and small enterprises. The capacity of 
businesses to understand, respond and comply with legislation may be determined 
by their size (Boyd, Spicer, and Keeton 2001, p.83). Business is further diversified 
along racial and ethnic lines: people still speak anecdotally of English, Afrikaans 
and Jewish business, and of course, formal discourse makes the distinction between 
black and white business a greater organising principle. The size of the enterprise 
affects its capacity to compete for a relatively small pool of skilled labour. 
Moreover, the sectoral involvement of the business, that is, the kind of business 
activity will be another differentiating factor.
The broader contextual pressures faced by business in South Africa are represented 
graphically in a matrix in the first chapter. I have selected a small number of areas of 
concern for discussion: race and poverty, HIV/AIDS and socio-political justice as 
represented in the case of the TRC."^  ^ Each constitutes a major challenge facing 
South Africa and is a fillip for corporate social engagement. Three other issues 
represent prominent concerns in South Africa and profoundly affect the social 
milieu. The first two, education and skills training, are addressed in the next section
Environmental and ecological sustainability are arguably critical issues but these are not addressed 
in this thesis (For fuller discussion on the issue, see Fig 2000; O'Riordan et al. 2000; O'Riordan 
1998).
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of this chapter with reference to legislation. Crime is considered below as a barrier 
to FDI and in the Chapter Six on tourism.
Race and poverty
Why then are race classifications of apartheid sustained? Whilst non-racialism is 
constitutionally enshrined (South Africa 1996), Posel points out that ‘the juridical 
assertion of sameness cohabits with existential reiterations of racial difference and 
separation’ (Posel 2001, p.50). ‘Race’ and ‘class’ are social constructs. Both are 
political and problematic' '^*’ As asserted above, race categorisation determined not 
only an individual’s access to political franchise but also to education, employment, 
health, housing and recreation. While all societies are materially unequal, race and 
class have closely coincided in South Africa: pattems of privilege and poverty are 
woven into the social fabric in clear (though changing) racial strands.
‘Black’ is an inclusive term for Africans, coloureds and Indians (South Africa 1998). 
However, ‘black’ is neither an uncontested nor a neutrally descriptive term. Inherent 
in the collective term ‘black’, is a politically loaded project. At its bedrock, the 
project allies diverse groups - who have some but not wholly common experiences 
of oppression and deprivation - into a sympathetic collective. For some, it is a 
unifying identifier. For others, it is an imposed label. In official discourse, at least, 
the term succeeds.'*^
South African democracy has delivered political equality but it has yet to deliver its 
economic adjunct. The Gini coefficient in South Africa - the standardised measure 
of income distribution ranging between zero (perfect equality) and one (complete 
inequality) - is among the highest in the world at 0.58 (UNDP 2001; May et al.
^  Ideas of racial distinction are widely held in contemporary South Africa, and are institutionalised in 
current legislation which employs racial categorisation for redress (Mare 2001; Posel 2001; Posel, 
Hyslop, and Nieftagodien 2001)
A further nuance in the race debate is that of ethnicity. For example, among the white population 
historically English and Afrikaans interests were seen as divergent despite being racially aligned, 
while among Africans, Zulus in particular are often mobilised under an ethnic banner,
^  However, there are further class differences within ‘blacks’ between Africans, Indians and 
coloured in terms of the percentages of these populations represented in the top deciles of income 
distribution (Taylor Committee 2002) and this is bound to have political implications.
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1998, p.4; May, Woolard, and Klasen 2000)."^  ^The UNDP pegs South Africa’s rate 
of poverty, measured as an extent of absolute poverty, at 45% rising to above 50% 
in rural areas (UNDP 2001, p. 10) This translates into over 18 million citizens living 
below the poverty line. Poverty is racialised and gendered:
Poverty is dramatically concentrated among Africans; 57.2 percent of 
Africans live below the poverty threshold compared with only 2.1 
percent of whites. The poorest 40% of citizens remain overwhelmingly 
African, female and rural (UNDP 2001).
Presented differently, whites (13% of the population) earn more than half the total 
income whilst Africans make up three-quarters of the population but earn just over a 
third of the total income (Marais 2001, p. 199). Race is also reflected in human 
development indicators such as infant mortality, longevity, educational attainment 
and standard of living (May, Woolard, and Klasen 2000).
For most South Africans, inequality is often reduced to racial inequality with 
significant political and economic policy implications (Seekings and Nattrass 2002, 
p.25)."^ * Such inter-racial disparities would support ‘the two nation’ thesis if it were 
not for the increasing inequality within race groups to which I have already alluded. 
There is a widening gap in economic strata as the middle class becomes increasing 
multi-racial (Seekings and Nattrass 2002; Terreblanche 2003). For example, 88% of 
the total income accrues to 15 million people in the middle-class of which 4 million 
are white and 11 million are black (Terreblanche 2003). In addition, further intra- 
racial inequality is evident between the African poor and the ‘relatively’ privileged 
African urban working class (Nattrass and Seekings 2001, p.47; Seekings and 
Nattrass 2002, p.25; Friedman 2002). Racial redress which is an explicit government 
commitment requires an assertive confrontation of race. However, rather than being 
determined by race inequality in income is now explained primarily by differences
The Gini coefficient is a contested figure. The Taylor Report (2002) uses the 1996 Population 
Census figure of 0.68 (Taylor Committee 2002). The government argues that if social spending is 
included, this measure of inequality is lowered to 0.35 
(http://www.gcis.gov.za/docs/publications/10tab.pdf).
^  Policies aimed at redress such as affirmative employment and BEE initiatives are based on this 
reading of race and economic inequality. Indeed, Mbeki’s two nation thesis - one black and poor, the 
other white and relatively prosperous - supports this interpretation (Nattrass and Seekings 2001, p.45; 
See Mbeki 1995).
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in skill, rural versus urban location, economic sector, and most importability, 
education (Nattrass and Seekings 2001, p,52).
May argues that the perpetuation of extreme inequality will thwart the achievement 
of government growth targets (May 2000, p. 14). In addition, capacity problems are 
an obstacle to the state’s comprehensive anti-poverty policies, many of which have 
related to housing and service delivery (Friedman 2002, p.49; O'Riordan et al. 
2000). The divide between policy and outcome lies in the inefficient coordination of 
three levels of government departments. However, some critics argue that the state 
lack political will to address poverty; its project to establish a black middle class 
undermines its pro-poor agenda (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998; Bond 
2000; Mutume 1997; Seekings and Nattrass 2002, p.5; Terreblanche 2003; The 
Economist 2001, p.l 1).
The business sector also has to confront the issue of race within corporate social 
engagement. Value-based drivers in the business environment mean greater pressure 
to recognise the needs and preferences of a more racially diversified market. 
However, current state-driven social and economic policies use race as a way of 
delivering redress to those previously disadvantaged.
While race is arguably too crude an explanation for social and economic inequality, 
racialism remains as South Africa’s longest and deepest fault line. As well as its 
economic influence, racialism is entrenched in South African custom, tradition, 
historical sensibility and social patterns. Yet by pegging policies to categories like 
race, critics of policies like affirmative action argue that we are continuing the 
pervasive and divisive racialism that has thus far characterised the South Africa 
political landscape? It is important to recognise the injurious legacy of racialism 
even after the dismantling of apartheid.
fflV/AIDS
The issue of HIV/AIDS warrants more attention than is possible here. I focus on the 
specific impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy, on business and on social policy as it 
pertains to corporate social engagement.
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The impact of the pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa has been devastating. In South 
Africa, there have been unprecedented social and economic consequences, with slow 
responses by both the state and the private sectors (Venage 2002; Johnson and 
Dorrington 2001; World Bank 2003). The statistics obscure the unfolding human 
tragedy they record. UNAIDS cites HIV adult prevalence figures at 24.8% in 2001, 
an increase from 0.7% in 1990. Infections are said to be increasing at a rate of 1700 
people each day (iafrica.com 2003). A key development indicator, that of life 
expectancy, has been rolled back by the disease: in the 1950’s, adult life expectancy 
was 44 years, rising to 59 in the early 1990’s and anticipated to fall again to 45 years 
by 2005 (World Health Organisation 2000). South Africa is not alone but it faces the 
pandemic on a larger scale than other countries.
HIV/AIDS largely affects adults in their economic prime or those about to become 
economically productive causing long-term damage to national economies. The 
World Bank suggests that South Africa ‘may face progressive economic collapse 
within several generations unless it combats the pandemic more urgently’ (World 
Bank 2003). Even in the short-term, the disease is expected to shrink the county’s 
GDP by as much as 5.4% by 2010 (Kramer 2003). The deleterious economic effects 
are compounding and the sequelae of the pandemic raise urgent questions for social 
and economic policy."*  ^ Indeed, the complete impact of AIDS on the economy is 
difficult to measure. The full impact will depend on how many people are infected 
and who these people are. As Whiteside and Sunter contend, ‘Economics does not 
value all lives equally. However, everyone is a consumer even if they are not 
producers’ (Whiteside and Sunter 2000, p.83; Whiteside 2002).
Government has been strongly criticised for its management of the crisis. HIV/AIDS 
ranked low in government priorities until 1998 (Marais 2001, p. 192). The state was 
accused of failing to demonstrate the political will to address HIV/AIDS, and
In the absence of adequate policies that pay attention to the wider context, the World Bank (2003) 
warns of the threat of worsening inequality among the next generation (and the families) 
compounding an already unequal society. The World Bank also cautions that South Africa’s tax base 
will erode, further undermining its ability to finance public expenditure aimed at education and health 
services. National finances will be simply incapable of meeting redistributive demands to ensure the 
care of the sick and the orphaned (World Bank 2003).
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consequently for failing to implement comprehensive policies to manage incipient 
social and economic problems (Crewe 2001, p. 10; BBC News 2003). This has been 
attributed to failure of political leadership (Van der Vliet 2001; Schrire 2000; 
Thomson 2003; The Economist 2001). The state’s position became increasingly 
untenable from a moral, political and legal standpoint. A politically resistant 
government only approved the decision to provide anti-retrovirals to HIV-positive 
patients in 2003, with only five hospitals in Gauteng administering the drugs by 
April 2004 (IRIN News 2004).
Like government, the business community has been slow to react to the threat posed 
by HTV/AIDS. Business, most particularly big business, only recently responded to 
this ‘bottom line issue’ (See South African Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS and 
Bureau for Economic Research 2004). One interviewee lamented: ‘It’s coming down 
on us like a freight train’ (Interviewee 24, white, female, business). Although 
business is now responding differently, at the time of interviews only a handful of 
the 110 institutions I canvassed had any HIV/AIDS policy. Ibwer still providing 
employees with antibiotics to manage opportunistic infections, and none provided 
anti-retrovirals (Findings similar to those in KPMG 2001; South African Business 
Coalition on HIV/AIDS and Bureau for Economic Research 2004). One interviewee 
explained:
This is not what your average businessman is thinking. He is not 
thinking that he should give money to the AIDS cause because in five to 
ten years he is worried he will not have enough skilled labour 
(Interviewee 126, coloured, male, NGO).
One interviewee, an AIDS consultant to business, decried the absence of policy 
insisting that ‘even big businesses simply had to have a survival strategy’ 
(Interviewee 61, white, female, business).
Business costs are measured as reduced productivity, increased labour costs, loss of 
customers and a consequent depression of profits. There is an impact on companies’ 
bottom lines in terms of the costs of absenteeism, replacement, recruitment, training, 
increased payouts to medical schemes and employee benefits (Sprague and Segel 
2002, p.43). The impact of HIV/AIDS also differs by sector, training costs, skills
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level and geographic location (South African Business Coalition on H lV /A lD S and 
Bureau for Econom ic Research 2004; W hiteside and Sunter 2000, p. 103; W hiteside 
2002).
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Figure 4.1: Increased Labour Costs Introduced by HIV/AIDS
Source: Adapted from Clem Sunter and Alan Whiteside, AIDS The Challenge for South Africa 
(Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, Pty Ltd. 2000), p. 101. (Cited in Sprague and Segel 2002)
W hatever the direct and indirect costs o f  H1V/A1DS to each business, failure to 
m anage AIDS is more costly (Sprague and Segel 2002, interview with Stephen 
Kram er AID S Research Division at M etropolitan). The private sector has an 
im portant role to play in fighting the disease as a stakeholder whose interests are 
directly and dram atically affected. AIDS is not sim ply a health issue but a m ulti­
system problem (W hiteside 2002). As a business issue, it dem ands a dedicated 
policy agenda.
With governm ent vacillation on the provision o f  antiretroviral drugs, a num ber o f  
(large) com panies initiated drug therapy ahead o f  governm ent policy. The move 
earned them the grudging approbation o f  AIDS activists and the ire o f  governm ent 
resulting in a tem porary stand-off between these com panies and governm ent on the 
issue (Battersby 2002). Bell argues that:
142
Keeping infected people alive and well, especially parents, so they can 
continue to live productive lives and take care of the next generation, is 
not only the compassionate thing to do, but it is also vital for a county’s 
long-term economic future (Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach 2003; Also 
reflected in World Bank 2003).
The Metropolitan AIDS Research Unit argues a business-case for antiretroviral 
provision. Although providing anti-retrovirals involves some risk on the part of the 
company. Metropolitan argues that the business-case simply lies in cost 
effectiveness (Bennett 2002). In larger companies holding such a view, AIDS drugs 
augment the now-standard company HIV/AIDS prevention strategies which might 
include providing condoms, workplace, peer education, counselling, periodic 
presumptive treatment for STDs, and the treatment of opportunistic infections 
(Interviewee 55, white, male, business; Interviewee 61, white, female, business).
Three important points are illustrated in the case of two companies, both mining 
houses, which embarked on comprehensive HIV/AIDS programmes, including anti­
retrovirals, ahead of government. The first is that although the company carries 
additional short-term costs, it ultimately costs the company less:
[I]t is estimated that overall HIV/AIDS costs to the company will peak 
marginally above US$3 per ounce of gold when the epidemic reaches its 
peak in 2010. This is not an incremental cost increase as some of the 
costs, such as medical infrastructure, are already accounted for in the 
cost base. Had Gold Fields not intervened in the proactive management 
of the epidemic at its operations, the cost to the company would have 
peaked at US$9 per ounce (Goldfields Limited 2003).
The second is that the nature of a business will often catalyse particular responses. 
HIV/AIDS has severely affected flie mining sector with over a third of employees 
infected (Interviewee 55, white, male, business). The mining sector is also well 
organised and well resourced to lead on the challenge. Thirdly, this case suggests 
that the crisis was a driver for changes in both corporate strategy and engagement. 
At the time of fieldwork, before the provision of drug regimes to HIV-positive 
workers, one interviewee admitted that ‘at the end of productive life, the worker is 
sent home with condoms but no anti-retrovirals’ (Interviewee 55, white, male, 
business). The announcement to provide antiretroviral drugs by one company, Anglo 
American, seemed to put pressure to bear on its competitors who now also provide
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comprehensive treatment (Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited 
2002; Goldfields Limited 2003; Agence France-Presse 2001; Dispatch Online 2001).
The impetus for immediate and proactive responses by business might well come 
from external drivers such as pressure brought to bear by trade unions or civil 
society, or even the state. The fillip may well also derive from a pervasive sense of 
morality at the devastation wreaked by the disease. However, the most sustainable 
argument for businesses is not a normative supposition but rather a strategic position 
based on business’ interests. Business survival may depend on appropriate responses 
to HIV/AIDS.
Business and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process reflects deep tensions 
running through South African society. The Commission raised the issue of 
concessions and trade-offs, as well as responsibility, redress and justice. I include 
the TRC as an instance of a social contract for reconciliation with broader 
resonance.
The TRC was established by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, No 34 of 1995 to deal with human rights abuses under apartheid (TRC 2003a). 
During 1997, the TRC focussed on the role in apartheid of different institutions.^® 
Like other hearings, the Business and Labour hearings, which examined the 
relationship between the state and business under apartheid were incomplete and 
contested, failing to deliver anticipated ‘real truth’ or ‘reconciliation’ (Mamdani 
1998; Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998). Attended by large corporations, 
organised business groups, corporate executives, as well as civic and trade union 
organisations, the hearings attempted to elicit a full disclosure of facts from the 
business sector regarding its role in sustaining apartheid.^*
“  These included business and labour, the faith and legal community, the health sector, the media and 
prisons.
The Marxist-liberal debate regarding the capitalism-apartheid debate is outlined above.
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The TRC hearings exposed ‘sharp differences’ in perceptions of the role that 
business played during apartheid, ideology and the subsequent issue of 
accountability. If the TRC established that business had profited from apartheid, was 
business then ‘responsible’ for the systematic violation of human rights (narrowly 
defined as killings, torture and severe mistreatment)? How then was it to make 
reparations for complicity in systemic human rights abuses, and to whom?
In the Final Report, the Business and Labour hearings track the history of business 
in South Africa. Implicit in the analysis of the role of business during apartheid is 
‘an underlying conception of what the role of business should be in society’ (TRC 
2003a, 4:2:141). Two contesting positions are reflected. In the first position, which 
was largely articulated by the traditional Left (including NGOs, the SACP and 
COSATU), apartheid was seen as a system of racial capitalism (Lipton 1985; Bond 
2000; Wolpe 1988).^  ^ The interests of business and the apartheid state were 
congruent with those of business: business was partner and collaborator in the 
system, and therefore had to accept a degree of co-responsibility for the system.
The second position, articulated mainly by business, argues that the apartheid 
system increased the costs of doing business in South Africa by limiting markets, 
undermining growth and productivity by obstructing business expansion, and 
eroding the county’s skills base. This position also pointed CSR programmes 
seeking to ameliorate existing social and economic problems and to the fact that 
businesses were responsible for employment creation, wealth generation, improved 
living standards and the creation of an enabling environment for democratic 
transition (TRC 2003a, 4:2:10).
Significantly, business largely denied any symbiotic relationship with the state 
although some recognised a role in sustaining apartheid. Amongst these submissions 
were those of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AH), the Land Bank, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa and Anglo American, all of which recognised 
explicitly that apartheid had facilitated a privileged business environment (Macun
See the section above entitled ‘Past imperfect: Capitalism and apartheid’.
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and Holdt 1998, p.72)/^ The TRC found that business could have done more to 
oppose apartheid and instigate change (TRC 2003b, p. 137-141).
The Report states explicitly that ‘business (not least for reasons of self-interest) is 
coming to recognise that morality is an important ingredient of viable business (TRC 
2003b, 147). Critics did not contest the moral probity of this conclusion. The 
church-led TRC found that the absence of morality resulted in human-rights 
violations, implicating business to some degree. For the TRC, past moral failure 
ought to motivate businesses’ involvement in post-apartheid renewal.
Thus, business critics saw the private sector as being both morally and politically 
passive at best, and complicit at worst. Indeed, the structure of the economy meant 
that whilst business was not monolithic, ‘overwhelming economic power resided in 
a few major business groupings with huge bargaining power vis-à-vis the state’ 
(TRC 2003a, 4:2:49). It appears that apartheid endured despite its alleged economic 
costs to the business community.
Whilst the TRC Findings on Business were criticised as ‘vague, tentative and rather 
superficial’, most of the criticism was levelled at business for its account during the 
hearings (Terreblanche 2000, p.6). Critics of business argued that submissions were 
flawed, full of elisions and even ‘spurious’ (Mail and Guardian 1997). The business 
sector was accused of being defensive and largely failing to address many 
contentious issues. The business sector appeared, with few exceptions, to play down 
its participation in the ‘design’ and maintenance of apartheid, whether intentional or 
unintentional. In addition, critics accused large corporations of using the TRC as a 
public relations exercise (Beresford 1997). Terreblanche argued that the TRC failed 
to unpack the myth-making by large corporations regarding their representation of 
themselves and the reality of their relationship with ‘white supremacy, racial
In their submission, the Anglo American Corporation conceded that segregation policies directly 
affronted the human dignity of its workers and that the company ought to have desegregation earlier: 
‘In a number of other areas, the views and values of the senior management of Anglo .... failed to 
shape workplace realities, which instead reflected the social and political prejudice of the broader 
communities in which these companies existed’ (Anglo American Corporation of South Africa 
Limited 1997, p.5).
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capitalism and apartheid’ (Terreblanche 2000, p.20)/'* Critics dismissed the TRC 
findings as symbolic. However, the severest criticism of business response to the 
TRC findings regarded the question of reparations.
Righting apartheid wrongs? The question of reparations
The TRC findings imputed that:
Business was central to the economy that sustained the South Africa 
state during the apartheid years. Certain businesses, especially the 
mining industry, were involved in helping to design and implement 
apartheid policies.... Most businesses benefited from operating in a 
racially structured context (TRC 2003a, 4:2:161).
All parties agreed that gross human rights violations were not in question, the 
exercise mined very little new information and amnesty had not been sought nor 
awarded. However, reconciliation suggested an opportunity for transformation. How 
then was the TRC process to be made meaningful? How would the business sector 
respond with the burden of culpability being hoist upon it? Moreover, would this 
sense of complicity in an unjust system on its own provide a sustainable rationale for 
business engagement?
Left critics raised the possibility of business reparations as a means of redistribution. 
Indeed, large business had anticipated calls for reparations and responded by paying 
greater attention to CSR programmes. It also established the Business Trust, a high 
profile business-initiated and led development programme working in close 
partnership with government (See Part 6 for a more detailed discussion).A  number 
of senior businessmen admitted this, with one stating:
Although these conversations did start before the TRC they were given 
momentum. So it was candidly, in particular, a pre-emptive strike to 
avoid having to go down that road [of reparations] (Interviewee 108, 
white, male, business).
^  One interviewee described the hearings as ‘artful theatrics’, and described Terreblanche’s 
submission as the script for the basis of the Business and Labour Hearings (Interviewee 109, white, 
female, business foundation).
Another businessman refiited the claim that the Business Trust emerged in anticipation of calls for 
reparations. He argued that the idea germinated at the Presidential Job Summit in October 1998 
(Interviewee 59, African, male, business and ex-union).
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Whatever the catalyst for the Business Trust, certain civil society groups, organised 
black business, the trade union movement, some people in government and within 
the TRC claimed that established white business were morally obliged to pay 
specific reparations. The TRC recommended a ‘once-off wealth tax’ on South 
African businesses and industry^^ in the ‘war against poverty’ (TRC 2003a, 
4:7:727). The ‘wealth tax’ was suggested by economist Sampie Terreblanche as a 
means of redressing South Africa’s unequal distribution of wealth but was later 
dropped from the TRC’s final recommendations (Mail and Guardian 1997; 
Terreblanche 2000; TRC 2003a).
Large corporations were clearly and vocally opposed to a reparative wealth tax 
(Michael 2003). One interviewee countered that business’ response ‘doesn’t help to 
overcome the ideological gap, the hostility that already exists towards the business 
sector’ (Interviewee 124, white, male, business). Another argued that refusing the 
wealth tax was evidence that ‘business has not come to transformation responsibly’ 
(Interviewee 33, African, male, trade union). Significantly, when President Mbeki 
rejected the TRC’s recommendation of a wealth tax, the seething debate between 
government, business, the civic and trade union movement regarding business 
reparations temporarily abated (Sebelebele 2003).^^
However, as one interviewee stated, off the record, the TRC explicitly created 
expectations of reparations (Interviewee 117, white, male, NGO) (TRC 1996). For 
many, reconciliation could not be divorced from immediate material and financial 
reparations, and failure by businesses to commit themselves to such reparations 
amounted to hollow justice (Valji 2003; Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 2000; 
Terreblanche 2000). For others, reconciliation linked with broader transformation. 
Macun and Von Holdt argued that, ‘Reconciliation would clearly have to 
encompass economic and industrial relations practices consistent with the emerging
^  This was a once-ofF market capitalisation tax for JSE-listed companies.
Mbeki also distanced the Soudi African government from a parallel class action against large local 
and multinational businesses by victims of apartheid led by US lawyer Ed Fagan, a process seen as 
both foreign and opportunistic (Bailey 2003). But for some, Mbeki's rejection of the class action was 
perceived as disregarding the needs of victims in favour of the ‘needs of capital’ by mollifying the 
anxiety of international lending institutions (Valji 2003).
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political and social norms of democracy in South Africa’ (Macun and Holdt 1998, p. 
72).
The TRC concluded that ‘business could and should play an enormously creative 
role in the development of new reconstruction and development programmes’ (TRC 
2003a, 4:2:159). Whether the TRC succeeded or failed in delivering truth and 
reconciliation is not for consideration here. However, the Business and Labour 
hearings was a significant moment in the state and business relationship in South 
Africa. Responsibility regarding the delivery of social goods and justice to South 
Africans, seen as a prerequisite for transformation, further sharpened the existing 
ideological debates. At the very least, the TRC hearings were a politically inspired 
and executed process which sought symbolic - if not criminal or economic - justice.
Part Four: Driving Policy: The Legislative Environment
Since 1994, the government has introduced wide-ranging legislation aimed at 
transforming the business environment. This ‘transformative legislation’ aims to 
compel any institution whether public or private that employs workers, and procures 
goods and services to behave according to state sanction. In effect, a directive state 
has created a specific environment in which businesses have the ‘license to operate’. 
There are two issues to highlight. First, government’s commitment to changing the 
economic landscape to achieve the meaningful participation of black people has 
been systematic. The seriousness of this commitment is reflected in state-market 
relationships with the evolution of black economic empowerment (BEE).^^ 
Government’s position in respect of BEE is evidently non-negotiable. The 
environment in which business operates is defined and determinate. The ‘market is 
willing to accept that in the current phase of our transition what would otherwise be 
regarded as inefficiencies are acceptable’ (Interviewee 85, white, male, business 
school).A nother argued that ‘this was a small price to pay’ (Interviewee 95, white.
^  According to Emeritus Professor Nick Segal of the Graduate School of Business, University of 
Cape Town and parastatal Kumba Boardmember, company directors are now recognising, in a way 
that they did not only a few years ago, the seriousness of government’s BEE commitments (Personal 
E-mail communication, 17 February 2004),
^  The interviewee opined that the best examples of this tolerated inefficiency are seen in the complex 
cross-holding of capital structures put in place in order to facilitate black investment. He added that
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male, business), This last point evokes Rawlsian principles of justice discussed in 
the previous chapter in that certain inefficiencies are tolerated if these afford greater 
equality for the least well-off.
The South African Constitution provides the overarching legal and normative 
framework.^^ With a Bill of Rights that protects individual and collective rights, the 
Constitution is considered one of the most progressive in the world (South Africa 
1996). The Constitution itself was negotiated painstakingly with an interim 
document accepted in 1993 when formal negotiations ended, and the final 
Constitution adopted in 1996. A product of broad consensus building with the 
objective of establishing political stability, the Constitution itself reflected major 
political and economic compromises and concessions by all stakeholders. These 
included, for example, private property rights being secured by capital, the 
feasibility of an Afrikaner homeland and the protection of the Zulu monarch and 
traditional leaders by the political Right, and three tiers of government and extended 
worker rights being secured by the Left.
Government has also introduced extensive empowerment related policies and 
legislation. The various pieces of BEE legislation are enacted as ‘a remedial 
strategy’ to address the economic exclusion of blacks (Adam 1997, p.231). Indeed, 
empowerment legislation is the realisation of a political demand; the crux being the 
assimilation of black people into the economic mainstream. The environment is 
dynamic. New legislation, particularly legislation that affects specific sectors, is 
constantly being promulgated.^^ Consequently, I focus on six particular pieces of 
legislation. These are the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the twinned pieces of 
legislation, the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 and the Skills Development 
Levies Act 9 of 1999, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), the Basic
there was recognition among stakeholders that these structures would in due course be dismantled, 
but only once black capital was properly established.
“  An obvious elision becomes apparent. As discussed, black entrepreneurs and black capital do not 
constitute the least well-off in society as in the Rawlsian schema. However, given their small 
numbers, institutionalised prejudice that they might encounter and historical difficulties accessing 
capital, black business people may hold such a status regarding other (white) business people.
Indeed, the limitations clause allows the qualification of certain rights but only if that limitation is 
Justifiable in terms of equality (Stacey 2003).
62 In the next chapter, I also focus briefly on the development of sectoral charters as instruments of 
BEE.
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Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and, finally the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act 5 o f2000.
The Employment Equity Act
Probably the most ‘contentious’ piece of transformation legislation is the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Seen in context as an empowerment 
mechanism, the Employment Equity Act has impact as a social and redistributive 
policy tool. The first principle of the Act recognises that disparities in employment, 
occupation and wealth produced by apartheid ‘create such pronounced 
disadvantages for certain categories of people that they cannot be redressed simply 
by repealing discriminatory laws’ (South Africa 1998). The Act aims to eliminate 
unfair workplace discrimination, and to change the racial profile of the labour force. 
It seeks to implement non-prescribed affirmative action measures to redress 
disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups and to ensure their 
equitable occupational representation. Employers are obliged to prepare an 
employment equity plan in consultation with employees. The plan - which 
companies submit to the Department of Labour - outlines, inter alia, employment 
objectives, affirmative action measures and numerical goals with an implementation 
timetable. The plan must also establish monitoring and evaluating procedures.
The Act is dense, covering all aspects of employment policy and practice. These 
include recruitment procedures, advertising, selection, appointment. Job 
classification and grading, remuneration, employee benefits, terms and conditions of 
employment. Job assignments, working environment and facilities, performance 
evaluation, promotion, transfer, demotion, disciplinary measures and dismissal 
(South Africa 1998). Individual institutions with 50 or more employees set their own 
targets and projections. No external quotas are imposed by the state although some 
argue for the compulsory imposition of these (Black Management Forum 2003). 
Importantly, the award of state procurement contracts for supplies and services also 
explicitly rests on compliance with the Employment Equity Act. Indeed, Section 53 
of the Act is a certificate of compliance for tendering purposes.
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After its promulgation, the Employment Equity Act faced a massive backlash, 
particularly from white business. One executive saw it as ‘a monumental headache 
and a huge cost factor’ (Interviewee 128, white, male, business). Another saw 
employment equity as overly prescriptive, superfluous and as intervening in the 
market interview 125, white, male, business organisation). Another reported that 
white business saw employment equity as ‘lowering standards and as reverse 
discrimination’ (Interviewee 39, Afi-ican, male, business). A standard argument 
against employment equity suggested that ‘forcing empowerment or affirmative 
action before you have competency is a risk to the bottom line’ (Interviewee 25, 
white, male, business).
Some company representatives admitted that rather than complying with legislation, 
their companies elected to pay the given penalties:
It is clear that some companies live up to the letter of the law and some 
will live up to the spirit of the law: of course, the spirit being the greater 
of the two. They will stand out and become employers of choice. But 
there are a lot of companies that are just trying to comply minimally. In 
fact, some are not even submitting a plan. They would rather pay the 
cost of the fine than the cost of implementing which is very short-term 
focused (Interviewee 120, white, male, business).
Minimal and non-compliance with the Act was reported by a number of those 
interviewed to be easier and more cost effective than compliance (Also confirmed in 
Gumede 2002a, p. 204). Compliance was more likely in larger businesses than 
medium and small business. For others, non-compliance was illogical:
1 think that businesses are savvy enough to understand that it is not good 
for their image and it will make it difficult for them to project 
themselves positively to a certain segment of the market should they be 
seem to be totally unresponsive to this legislation (Interviewee 103, 
African, female, business).
An interview with Department of Labour representatives confirmed the non- 
compliance strategy by companies.
As 1 have alluded, the size of the business may affect its capacity to both implement 
the Employment Equity Act and compete for black skills. The legislation appears to
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target big business but makes no distinction regarding the company size other than 
the lower limit of 50 employees. An informant from a large corporation assented:
I think smaller companies are finding it more difficult. I think one of the 
problems with the government is that it tries to solve every problem 
everywhere with the same instruments. I would have left smaller 
companies out of most of the legislation, to be dealt with later on. The 
area government has acted intelligently with this whole thing in that they 
did not tell companies what to do. TTiey asked companies to tell them 
what they were capable of doing -  the company looks within its related 
industry (Interviewee 17, African, male, business).
The Act puts pressure on a small number of highly skilled black workers. As my 
own research holds, companies bemoan the shortage of black candidates, 
particularly at management levels (Mail and Guardian 2003). Businesses ‘vie for 
black managers who are poached and head hunted with remarkable inducements’ 
(Adam 1997, p.231). My own research confirmed this view. One interviewee 
contended:
There is an enormous premium attached to black skill. There is also the 
question of demotivating white and Asian people in the company by 
promoting black people over them at a premium. It causes unbelievable 
strains and tension (Interviewee 89, white, male, business/foundation).
The notion that over-valued black skill creates a false economy in the labour market 
was a common refrain in this research and I explore this further in the next chapter.
A number of those interviewed acknowledged that the Employment Equity 
legislation forced them to engage with the issue of equity in ways they would not 
have considered proactively. One informant offered that the primary function of the 
Act was ‘to change a mindset’ and that companies have ‘no excuse for getting 
nothing done’ (Interviewee 17, African, male, business). One interviewee simply 
acknowledged, ‘We needed a kick up the ass as far as employment equity was 
concerned. It ultimately makes organisations accountable for what goes on in the 
country’ (Interviewee 24, white, female, business).
Indeed, the Employment Equity Act, coupled with the LRA, crowbars open 
opportunities for black people in the formal economy. The Employment Equity Act,
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in particular, forces companies ‘by agreement’ to adopt policies to transform the 
complexion of their workforce at all levels. Failing this, companies will incur 
sanctions in the form of fines for failing to meet their own numeric goals, or suffer 
by not winning government contracts and tenders. Whilst there is no termination 
date on this policy, and regulating the legislation may be a flawed process, the 
Employment Equity Act is, in principle, a very powerful driver for achieving 
workplace equity. Whether transformative legislation like employment equity leads 
to a drive towards increased contracting out to smaller operations and the 
informalisation of labour processes as evidenced in other countries remains to be 
seen. Certainly, that legislation does not discriminate between large and small 
businesses may contribute to outsourcing as a measure to avoid regulation.
Skills development legislation
Two other pieces of empowerment legislation address the paucity of black skills. 
The Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 provides an institutional and financial 
framework for developing labour force skills. It seeks to enhance workers’ 
prospects, as well as their labour mobility, productivity and competitiveness. The 
National Skills Authority (NSA) advised the Minister of Labour on national skills- 
development policy, strategy and implementation while each of the 25 economic 
sectors has a designated Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA). The Act 
ostensibly creates significant opportunities for workers and trade unions to influence 
the type and extent of training provided by employers (Barry and Norton 2000, p.6). 
One interviewee summed it up ‘as an attempt to foster and facilitate a new 
dispensation around skills acquisition’ (Interviewee 103, African, female, business). 
Its legal cohort, the Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999, is concerned with 
financing the Skills Development Act. It compels employers to pay a skills 
development levy: initially a 0.5% levy on remuneration paid by private employers 
to the South African Revenue Service (SAKS), which increased to 1% in 2001/2. 
The funds are then disbursed: 80% of levies to SETAs, and the remaining 20% to 
the National Skills Fund. Employers can recoup a proportion of the levy on 
condition that they provide skills training for their employees. With a somewhat 
elaborate incentive scheme, the Act encourages employers to raise the skills levels 
of their workforce. The Act includes municipalities, as well as statutory bodies
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receiving government funding (South Africa 1999). The Acts expressly attempt to 
equip South Africa with skills to compete and succeed in a global market (National 
Skills Authority 2000, 2.3). They also explicitly target black workers: 85% of those 
proposed to receive training are black (National Skills Authority 2000, 3.6).
Indeed, most informants lamented the paucity of black skills. One director of a large 
financial services company asserted ‘the biggest challenge for us is obvious: it is a 
dearth of [black] skills’ (Interviewee 89, white, male, business). Another interviewee 
acknowledged, ‘we have to look at strategy and corporate policy to accelerate the 
development of black candidates, from basic skills to leadership’ (Interviewee 107, 
African, male, business). While most business people objected to additional 
regulation, the shortage of skills, particularly black skills, appeared to be an 
influential driver for training and development. While some saw the levy as 
additional taxation on businesses, one interviewee argued:
I think if you can’t tax companies more for social investment purposes, 
or put additional pressure on them for that reason, then the obvious 
alternative way would be to concentrate on labour-type issues. This 
might be looked at as a kind of penalty which 1 think would be wrong to 
do. It is in business’ interests to develop skills. But in more ways than 
one, if the people of South Africa are to be beneficiaries of a range of 
steps by government, be it in terms of direct financial assistance, or in 
indirect terms with skills development and future capacity building to 
contribute to the economy, starting with the labour force is a very good 
way of doing it! (Interviewee 90, white, male, NGO)
Whilst the skills legislation boosts social investment in human resource 
development, it also creates both a heavier state bureaucracy in the NSA, and greater 
transaction costs for companies. Most businesses lacked understanding of the 
legislation and of its implications, including how to align skills development plans 
with employment equity objectives. Along with employment equity requirements, 
the Act admittedly imposed a new level of complexity on administrative procedures. 
Critics argue that aside from large enterprises most businesses do not have the 
resources for the production of necessary documentation. Government argues that 
the legislation offers incentives to companies to train their own employees. 
However, given the paucity of black skills, some companies still see training staff as 
a ‘risk’: there is a danger of training employees only to lose them after incurring the
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transaction costs involved. But the argument rebounds on itself. Businesses require 
skills in order to operate and to remain competitive.
The Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) and the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 represent key gains by the labour movement. Prior to 
the Employment Equity legislation, these represented the cornerstone of anti- 
discrimination legislation for the workplace. Many of the demands of the labour 
movement acquire legislative force in these Acts (Marais 2001, p.240). The 
legislation attempts to ensure labour flexibility whilst simultaneously stabilising the 
labour market. It emphasises dialogue between social partners, as well as a more 
structured collective bargaining system. Business people acknowledge that after 
decades of industrial action ‘to be sustainable you need good labour relations’ 
(Interviewee 134, white, female, business).
Different stakeholders interpret the legislation differently. A government informant 
argued that the LRA was essentially a social contract in the national interest 
(Interviewee 19, coloured, male, govemment/ex-union). Unions see the legislation 
as ‘a victory’ and acknowledge that in the balance of interests ‘it is more favourable 
to workers than to business’ (Interviewee 82, Afi-ican, male, trade union). 
Unsurprisingly, these pieces of labour legislation are the subject of criticism, mostly 
fiom business people. In the first place, the legislation is seen as being ‘enormously 
detrimental and prejudicial to anyone who is unemployed given that the minimum 
wage is unsuccessful in allocating resources to the poor’ (Interviewee 135, white, 
male, business). As discussed, new social cleavages are evident in the growing 
tensions between and divergent interests of the employed and the unemployed 
(Seekings 2002a). Most commonly, labour legislation was criticised by various 
informants for being ‘incredibly prescriptive’, ‘incredibly onerous’, ‘overregulated’, 
‘disruptive’, ‘a disincentive to employers’, ‘hampering investment’, ‘undermining 
entrepreneurship’ and ‘punitive to business’. An interviewee contended that ‘the 
legislation is counterproductive and damaging to the South Afiica economy’ 
(Interviewee 52, white, male, business). One informant retorted to business 
discontent by asserting: ‘We have one of the most flexible labour markets in the
156
world. It’s absurd to think in a country like this, having rules determining the 
fairness of dismissal is overregulated’ (Interviewee 96, coloured, male, stakeholder 
organisation). Another argued it was in the interest of business to support labour 
legislation measures since they ensured a certain lifestyle for workers that was 
conducive to productivity (Interviewee 58, African, male, business).
Affirmative Procurement
Finally, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 obliges 
national and provincial departments, municipalities, legislatures, national parliament 
and other ‘organs of state’ to use preferential or affirmative procurement procedures. 
The Act creates tendering opportunities by ‘persons historically disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability’ (South Africa 2000). 
It aims to establish a procedurally fair and transparent point system for the award of 
tenders and concessions. However, being affirmative, BEE imperatives might trump 
procedural fairness. The Constitution permits affirmative procurement policies 
which target ‘the allocation of contracts and the protection, or advancement, of 
persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’ (South 
Africa: Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Works 1997; South Africa 
1996, S 217, 1-3). Whilst tendered price is considered, black equity and other BEE 
scorecard indices were often a determining criterion for awards (Stafford 2003).
Procurement of goods by government, including different state organs, amounts to 
approximately R56 billion annually (South African Reserve Bank 2003; World 
Trade Organisation 1998; South Africa: Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Public Works 1997). The state is the largest purchaser of goods and services in the 
country. Thus, government commands enormous buying power with attendant 
influence to ensure that procurement supports its overall economic objectives. One 
interviewee argued that ‘the government’s ability to buy and sell is possibly one of 
its strongest levers in ensuring its transformation objective’ (Interviewee 12, 
African, male, government). As outlined in the Green Paper on Public Sector 
Procurement Reform in South Africa, affirmative procurement represents a key 
element of the state’s strategy for employment creation and income generation by 
promoting small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) (South Africa: Ministry
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of Finance and the Ministry of Public Works 1997). As such, procurement can be 
used as a lever for effective social redistribution, growth and development. The Act 
has the potential to realize greater empowerment gains further down the value chain: 
the trickle down of economic goods to small and medium contractors who account 
for 60% of all employment and 40% of output (Gomomo 1999). The counterpoint of 
this is that the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act can be an effective 
driver for corporate social engagement.
Affirmative procurement, however, lacks effective monitoring structures (Black 
Economic Empowerment Commission 2001, Chapter 6; Gomomo 1999). This opens 
the system to abuse and raises the necessity of establishing stronger control systems. 
One informant stated that the tender system was ‘almost a patronage system’ with 
frequent awards to well-connected contractors (Interviewee 4, white, female, 
business). Another argued that the state paid a premium of up to 30% on certain 
black companies. She contended that it was ultimately the black consumer who paid 
the premium, which raised the question: ‘who are we really empowering’? 
(Interviewee 14, white, female, NGO). This premium on affirming black businesses
raised the question whether the state in redistributing to black companies is not
i
engaged in rent-seeking activity.
At present, there is no Constitutional or legal obligation on the private sector to 
pursue affirmative procurement. The second King Committee on Corporate 
Governance (2002) recommended that companies support BEE through procurement 
(King Committee on Corporate Governance 2002). The Black Economic 
Empowerment Commission (BEECom) proposed that 30% of private sector 
procurement be awarded to black-owned companies including SMEs (small and 
medium enterprises) (Black Economic Empowerment Commission 2001, p.8). One 
businesswoman in a BEE company contended that while public institutions should 
be compelled to procure affirmatively, ‘private companies can not be expected to 
sacrifice profits’ (Interviewee 29, African, female, business). Although likely 
beneficiaries, a number of black business leaders who were interviewed opposed 
obligatory affirmative procurement as over-regulation, and on the grounds that it 
undermined the market.
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This research was conducted prior to the government’s Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Strategy (BB-BEE) which seeks to encourage more 
widespread affirmative procurement (South Africa 2003a). At the time of 
interviews, businesses (big business and established black businesses) were 
increasingly employing affirmative procurement policies. A small number of those 
interviewed reported they had proactively developed affirmative procurement 
policies. However, as my own research supports, most reported that affirmative 
procurement took place around non-core goods and services though this might differ 
between businesses and sectors (Meth 2001). One informant from a large 
corporation described the ‘huge transaction costs’ in finding the necessary 
affirmative companies to deliver reliably on the scale and to the quality requirements 
of the company. He contended that in such cases, the company proactively engaged 
in joint ventures with affirmative companies in order to develop their capacity 
(Interviewee 7, white, male, business). A number of larger companies also reported 
that they, in turn, insisted that their own contractors sub-contracted affirmatively. 
One interviewee explained, ‘If you are structured right, you get access to my 
business. If you are structured wrong, my sanction is that you won’t get access to 
my business’ (Interviewee 49, Indian, male, business/ex-union).
Part Five: Business as a South African social institution
In this section, I briefly scan the history of corporate social engagement. I also 
define the terms of engagement customarily used in South Africa and explore how 
these have evolved. Finally, I look at current drivers of corporate social engagement 
and business responses.
A history of business-societal relations in South Africa
The history of business’ involvement in the social arena has been well-told 
(Alperson 1995), particularly by long-established corporations who wish to 
legitimate their good-standing. Critics of business tell this history differently. These 
narratives reflect the ideological tension over the relationship between capitalism 
and apartheid discussed in detail above. I do not wish to reengage this debate
159
fiirther. Rather, I shall select instances that illustrate the critical points I wish to 
emphasis.
In 1973, tiie Anglo American Chairman’s Fund, which was established in the early 
part of the last century, merged with the De Beers Chairman’s Funds (Dembo 1991). 
The merger created the largest philanthropic fund for charitable causes in South 
Africa. The funds were ad hoc and disbursed at the Chairman’s discretion. It was not 
until 1976 with the establishment of the Urban Foundation by Anglo American 
Corporation, Barlow Rand and Rembrandt did corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
appear on the South African business landscape. Significantly, the Urban 
Foundation’s purpose was to improve the quality of life for black South Africans, 
and improve community and business relations. It sought to ‘stabilise urban labour 
and defuse protest’ (Simon 1989, p. 199). It must be emphasised that CSR was a 
response to the volatile political and social unrest sweeping through South African 
townships at the time. CSR constituted a response to what was widely seen as a 
threat to the legitimacy of capitalism (Mann 1992, p 250). Significantly, external 
political drivers catalysed business responses to emerging social and economic 
threats. Indeed, most businesses, especially large concerns followed suit and 
established their own CSR projects or foundations.
External drivers including pressure from foreign companies investing in South 
Africa also shifted the landscape. During the 1970s, the international and local anti­
apartheid movements made increasingly strident demands for sanctions and 
divestment by multinational corporations (MNCs) (Malone and Goodin 1997; 
Rodman 1994; Becker 1988). Although almost 500 foreign companies ultimately 
divested, some enterprises sought to defend their continued presence in South Africa 
by adopting a code known as the Sullivan Principles. The, mostly American, 
signatories committed themselves to a range of progressive workplace changes 
including equal employment practices, affirmative action and social investment to 
improve the quality of life for their staff outside work (Mangaliso 1997).^^ In the 
1980s, it was principally the dramatic escalation of civil unrest that contributed to
® The underlying rationale of the Principles were ‘licence to operate’ and the responsibility attending 
the power wielded by business (Post 2002, p. 268).
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the acceleration of CSR programmes. Indeed, CSR had become a growth industry. 
Mann estimated that in 1988, an estimated R800 million was disbursed by CSR 
programmes (most being channelled into education for which there was tax relief) 
(Mann 1992, p.252).
The history of business engagement also highlights three developments associated 
with the terminology used to describe business-society relations. First, ‘CSR’ was 
dropped from use in South Africa and was gradually replaced by the term ‘corporate 
social investment’ (CSI). The grant-making practice of CSI is the same as that of 
CSR. The word responsibility was rejected because it was perceived to carry 
‘negative’, ‘patronising and moralising’ connotations, both for the benefactor and 
beneficiary. Moreover, responsibility carried connotations of ‘a guilt thing’ 
(Interviewee 90, white, male, NGO). Surprisingly few of my informants - even CSR 
practitioners - had really interrogated the change in terms. Most used the two terms 
interchangeably. One cautioned, ‘we don’t really distinguish between CSR and CSI. 
I’d be careful about imputing too much consciousness regarding this on the actors’ 
(Interviewee 130, white, female, NGO). Another assented, ‘It’s interchangeable. We 
have about 15 names for this but it’s all the same activity’ (Interviewee 121, 
African, female, NGO). However, for those who had interrogated the terminology, 
investment was perceived to embrace the idea of ‘businesses truly investing in the 
future of South Africa’ (Interviewee 133, white, male, business). A foundation 
manager argued that philanthropy was a noble activity; corporate social investment 
meant that businesses were engaging socially for a return, albeit non-financial in 
nature (Interviewee 129, coloured, female, business/foundation). Moreover, the 
investment terminology spoke to the long-term strategic interests of business.
Second, the history of CSR (or CSI) in South Africa also suggests the move from 
reactive business engagement for purposes of legitimacy building to a more 
proactive stance to ensure business sustainability. Recent policies have placed 
business in the role of intermediary in the goals of social development (Gumede 
2002a, p. 203). External drivers and pressures are likely to make business engage in 
the social realm given businesses awareness of the conditions in which they operate.
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Third, as South African businesses own understanding of their operational 
environment has become more sophisticated, so has their recognition of the notion 
of ‘licence to operate’. Whilst South African companies have a ‘remarkably 
developed CSR culture’, t h e s e  remain philanthropic and, typically, add-on 
functions. Increasingly, companies are considering the rights and obligations of 
business relative to their stakeholders. Importantly, businesses are increasingly 
embedding this consideration in business philosophy. International benchmarks in 
corporate behaviour discussed in Chapters One and Two such as the triple bottom 
line, social auditing and corporate citizenship as a behavioural paragon are 
becoming more apparent in local business strategy and policy. Notable among these 
are the ideas of good corporate governance, an issue in which South Africa has 
become a leader since the production of the King Report on Corporate Governance 
(King 11).^  ^Acknowledging the ‘licence to operate’ also prioritises the imperatives 
of black empowerment in the South African context.
Part Six: Stakeholding and the social contract in South Africa
In this final section, I interrogate the social contract in South Africa. I look at 
various state and business initiatives which are - either explicitly or implicitly - 
concerned with the creation and strengthening of a social compact. This section 
pursues some of the theoretical ideas introduced in the last chapter.
The social contract operates at two levels of abstraction in this chapter. First, as in 
the previous chapter, the liberal social contract establishes a hypothetical and 
abstract compact between social partners. The social contract seeks to manage - and 
reflect - stakeholder interests in a fair, just and democratic manner. In seeking 
stability, social partners tend to cooperate within a set of negotiated rules, with a 
common interest in fairness and social well-being as a goal. Each seeks to advance 
their immediate and long-term interests.
^  This point is made by Jeremy Baskin, Head of Research at the Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS) which has conducted research global comparisons of CSR (Personal communication, 
London, December 2003).
“  Corporate governance issues are also becoming increasingly important to non-private sector, such 
as SOE’s, as the corporate model is adopted more widely in South Africa and elsewhere (Larbi 1999,
p.20).
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The Rawlsian contract, in particular, provides insights for a South African social 
contract. Political and economic uncertainties may evoke the Rawlsian ‘veil of 
ignorance’. Stakeholders cannot be guaranteed of specific outcomes (Sisk 1995, 
p.257). Moreover, all parties are concerned with creating the necessary conditions 
for just redistribution. The second level of abstraction is at a concrete, substantial 
level where social partners have established real and grounded institutional social 
contracts in order to establish and secure common goals (Friedman 1992; Mokate 
2000).
In achieving political settlement. South Africans proved their ability to negotiate a 
broad political social contract, a ‘démocratisation pact’ (Sisk 1995, p.201) or an 
‘implicit bargain’ (Gelb 1999, p.8). Sisk argues that a post-apartheid social contract 
was necessarily rooted in the historical context, ideological constraints and existing 
power relations. Post-apartheid institutions did not create newfound consensus in a 
society riven by difference and conflict: rather they reflected pre-existing 
relationships (Sisk 1995, p.6). The foundations of a political social contract were 
thus established. Newer economic social contracts have their roots in this existing 
compact. As Sisk asserts:
With a social democratic economic accord - a codetermination 
agreement -buttressing a political agreement, the possibility of a broadly 
inclusive social contract comes into focus. Socioeconomic 
transformation will be an indispensable element of a new social contract 
in South Africa, even if it is more elusive than a political settlement and 
may take many years to evolve as pact making occurs on a sector 
specific basis. Over time, economic codetermination will be necessary 
for the country to alleviate poverty (Sisk 1995, p.282-3).
At a macroeconomic level, GEAR has been described as social contract (May et al. 
1998, p.64; Mokate 2000; Friedman 1992). In common with other economic social 
contracts, GEAR advocated a social compact to facilitate wage moderation, 
accelerate investment and employment and improve service delivery (Friedman 
1992, p.34). In advancing GEAR, the state sought to reify a social agreement in the 
form of an economic instrument that could be used to mitigate the negative effects 
of labour market flexibility and international competitiveness on vulnerable groups.
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A culture of dialogue presupposes such a social contract: the articulation of a social 
contract among economic stakeholders can provide an important means of fostering 
agreement on shared goals and compromise (May et al. 1998. p.9). However, as 
Friedman argues, for an agreement to be feasible, it must be reached by parties who 
are strong enough to ensure that their constituents endorse and abide by it (Friedman 
1992, p.35). Certainly, business was supportive of GEAR although it was 
strategically reticent about this (Interviewee 84, African, male, business). Business 
interests appeared to be mollified in GEAR. However, other stakeholder groups 
were less satisfied. Crucially, the fact that GEAR has not been readily embraced by 
all may undermine its potential as a social contract. Even within government, one 
respondent reported ‘GEAR was a policy owned by Treasury and the Finance 
Department and even within government, people didn’t feel like they were 
stakeholders or that they were centrally involved even though [the Department of] 
Labour and DTI were in limited ways’ (Interviewee 66, white, male, public finance 
institution).
Civil society and the trade union movement in particular, were vexed by GEAR 
(ka'Nkosi 1997). They labelled it ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘part of a conservative agenda’ 
(Wackemagel 1997). GEAR requires that trade unions relinquish their traditional 
bargaining positions by accepting wage restraint and labour market flexibility. 
Government was accused of pushing the policy through with minimal consultation 
(Centre for Enterprise Development 1997; ka'Nkosi 1997). Government apparently 
refused to bring GEAR to National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC) even after an announcement to table it had been made (Interviewee 66, 
white, male, public finance institution). ‘Getting the fundamentals right’ - in essence 
ensuring macro-economic stabilisation - has now been acknowledged by GEAR 
critics: ‘The lesson for us, and the ANC has been that we must take the issue of 
economic stability far more seriously than any of us had ever imagined’ 
(Interviewee 96, coloured, male, stakeholder organisation/ex-union). One 
interviewee argued: ‘Whether GEAR is good or bad for the country is an 
increasingly sterile debate. What is important is that people not get hung-up on 
GEAR but to say there are areas of macroeconomic policy that we can look at, find 
agreement in respect of a way forward .... What is required is understanding,
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visions, shared agreements and shared strategies to engage’ (Interviewee 116, white, 
male, NGO).
Institutionalising the social contract
The past decade, building on a culture of negotiation, saw a number of formal and 
semi-formal institutions established to husband smaller social contracts, which are 
predominantly economic in nature. Whilst these might not explicitly be called social 
contracts, these bilateral pacts are examples of corporate social engagement that 
reflect attempts by stakeholders to grapple with higher-level policy issues.
In the first instance, NEDLAC was created by Parliamentary act (Nedlac Act 35 of 
1994) and launched in 1995.^  ^The institution, which was preceded by the National 
Economic Forum, was established to formalise the role of various social partners or 
stakeholders ‘in the creation and consolidation of a new social and economic order’ 
(NEDLAC 2000).^^ It is a corporatist institution seeking to regulate stakeholder 
bargaining and its key achievements have been in the area of labour market policy. 
NEDLAC comprises four groups: organised business, organised labour, community 
groups and the state. NEDLAC argues that it exists ‘to effectively institutionalise 
social dialogue in a developing country’ (NEDLAC 2000). NEDLAC explicitly 
recognises that South Africa development challenges require ‘trade-offs that that 
will create the conditions for significant and sustainable economic growth and 
development’ and that such trade-offs can only be identified and negotiated if 
constituencies remain committed to ‘the common strategic vision’ (NEDLAC 2000). 
One informant attributed to NEDLAC the success of ‘brokering labour peace’, no 
small achievement given the animosity between stakeholders. However, he also 
criticised the institution for being reactive rather than proactive (Interviewee 48, 
Indian, male, business/ex-union).
“  Some critics would disagree which the characterisation of NEDLAC as an instance of a social 
contract arguing the institution merely frames options at a national level for sectoral and workplace 
negotiations (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998, p. 147).
^  Different sectoral chambers constitute NEDLAC and these have successfully debated numerous 
acts, bills, protocols and policies.
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However, NEDLAC has received wide criticism. Criticism describes the process as 
‘laborious and lengthy’ (Marais 2001, p.270). Corporatism relies on often elusive 
consensus and one which is difficult to implement (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and 
Moodley 1998, p. 140; Baskin 1993). Given that the environment has often been 
highly contested, as well as politically and ideologically charged, old stakes 
emerged (Interviewee 38, white, male, business organisation). One business 
representative said wryly of the enmity, ‘sitting on NEDLAC was not an enriching 
experience’ (Interviewee 85, white, male, business school). Business perceives itself 
as having limited space to articulate its concerns, particularly given the closeness of 
the state-labour interests. The institution is also accused of failing to recognise the 
diversity of business: ‘the interests of a large company bear no resemblance to the 
small comer store’ (Interviewee 78, white, male, business organisation). In addition, 
business perceives government as being institutionally constrained. One informant 
said, ‘I don’t see any action’ (Interviewee 77, African, male, business). Another
executive saw the funding of NEDLAC as problematic arguing ‘you cannot be a
referee and a player in the same game’ (Interviewee 58, African, male, business). He 
also argued the limitation of NEDLAC was that it was established as a political and 
not a social institution.
There exists a dangerous perception of NEDLAC as a declining institution which 
may be reflected in a reluctance of other non-state partners to leverage government 
accountability (Interviewee 66, white, male, public finance institution) (View also 
reflected in Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998). One informant argued:
NEDLAC is an attempt at social engineering. It is a homogenous 
solution .... In many ways, it’s too cute to be true. No one wants to be 
seen to wreck it. But it is an institution that does not have teeth. It is
merely an interface for social dialogue (Interviewee 47, white, male,
business organisation).
While social dialogue in itself is not a social contract, it is certainly a precondition 
for any compact. Other bilateral social dialogue arenas have been established 
between the three axis points of business, labour and the state. These also represent 
current and dynamic instances of corporatism, which seek a working agreement 
between institutional actors. While each of these bilateral fora might be flawed, they
166
represent instances o f  w orking social contracts. Their efficiency and usefulness for 
accelerating decision-m aking seems obvious. ‘C onfrontation does not lend itself to 
building relationships’, one interviewee offered (Interview ee 74, coloured, male, 
NGO). 1 have represented these bilateral relationships graphically below.
STATE
A N C -
C O S A T U
A L L I A N C E
BI G
B U S I N E S S
W O R K I N G
G R O U P
NB I  &
B U S I N E S S  T R U S T
N E D L A C
(4"^ C h a m b e r  = C o m m u n i t y )
LABOUR BUSINESS
M I L L E N I U M
L A B O U R
C O U N C I L
Figure 4.2: Diagram of social contract partners
A historical bilateral relationship obtains on the axis between organised labour and 
the state; between the ANC and COSA TU. The A N C ’s adoption o f  more 
conservative econom ic policies has strained the relationship between these alliance 
partners in recent years.
A second bilateral engagem ent exists between big business and the state. The Big 
Business W orking Group (BBW G ) was established by President M beki as a forum
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for dialogue with large corporate interests.^* Via the BBWG, big business has direct 
contact with Mbeki biannually ‘to discuss the state of the nation and to give input’ 
(Interviewee 97, white, male, business). The BBWG received a mixed response. 
Many seem satisfied with high-level government access that business enjoys and the 
leverage that potentially attends ‘having the ear of the government’ (Interviewee 14, 
white, female, NGO). The BBWG acknowledges that they are not mandated. The 
invited group attend as interested stakeholders seeking a ‘shared appreciation of the 
critical issues facing South Africa’ (The Business Trust 2003). But as one 
interviewee complained, the BBWG includes the same business interests and leaders 
that have access to NEDLAC, despite the argument that growth is powered by 
unrepresented SMBs who are more effective job creators (Interviewee 78, white, 
male, business organisation).
Along the second axis is another bilateral forum for the business-govemment 
relationship: the National Business Initiative (NBI). The NBI’s predecessor, the 
Consultative Business Movement was a liberal business organisation that involves 
business in the facilitation of a political settlement. This achieved, and with the 
closure of the Urban Foundation, the NBI was formed with a new ‘developmental’ 
mandate. That business-govemment relationships were at their lowest ebb 
constituted a significant external driver for the NBFs establishment. The 
govemment-business relationship around 1997 was characterised by distrust and a 
lack of communication. One informant admitted that the NBI served a political 
agenda: ‘Some of us in business said we needed to get closer to government’ 
(Interviewee 108, white, male, business).
The NBI comprises 186 member companies who subscribe to the vision that 
business has a vested interest in assisting government, that stability is necessary for 
business and that socio-economic delivery brings stability (National Business 
Initiative 2000). Although the organisation engages in commercial lobbying, its 
foundation work seeks to position the NBI as ‘a public interest body’ working for 
the long-term benefit of business and the country (Interviewee 125, white, male.
“  Other Presidential consultative fora exist including, for exanple, an international investment group, 
an organised labour group and a black business group.
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business organisation). In a frank account, an informant outlined that 20% of the 
National Business Initiative’s membership were motivated by ‘philanthropy’ and 
‘doing good’. Another 20% were motivated by being ‘seen to do the right thing’ and 
getting on a ‘politically-correct bandwagon’. Indeed, a separate interview with a 
representative of one of these businesses confirmed this:
One has to participate as one does not want to be conspicuous in one’s 
absence: though, those who are absent are companies ‘with balls’. The 
NBI is business doing government’s job (Interviewee 89, white, male, 
business foundation).
The remaining 60% of NBI membership was reported to be ‘genuinely committed to 
the NBI’s development goals’ out of ‘enlightened self-interest’ or ‘as a strategic 
decision’ (Interviewee 125, white, male, business organisation). The NBI 
nonetheless enjoys a broad business mandate to partner government, build public 
sector capacity and provide private sector expertise to deliver development goals in 
line with the state’s agenda.
The NBI’s main project, the Business Trust, which plays on multiple meanings of 
‘trust’, is a collective CSI project. It has to date raised approximately R1 billion 
from member businesses. A conscious compact between business and the state, 
funding is channelled into supporting government-identified development areas, 
including tourism programmes and capacity development programmes (The 
Business Trust 1999, 2000). The Business Trust uses a third stakeholder group, 
NGOs, for project delivery. Among the Business Trust’s trustees are high-level 
representatives from business and government, including as many as five cabinet 
ministers (Interviewee 97, white, male, business). The Business Trust is discussed 
further in Chapter Six concerning its role in tourism development.
Some NGOs informants complained that the Business Trust acted as a gatekeeper, 
essentially channelling corporate money away from NGOs and other community- 
based organisations that might be critical of business (Interviewee 92, white, male, 
business; Interviewee 74, coloured, male, NGO). Another interesting though 
controversial fillip for the formation of the Business Trust was raised earlier in this 
chapter: reparations. Surprisingly, a number of business leaders admitted that the
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Business Trust was a proactive response or ‘a pre-emptive strike’ to the likelihood 
of calls for business reparations from the TRC. One explained: ‘clearly part of the 
Business Trust activities was TRC reparations but it was our absolute conviction that 
[reparations] was the wrong way to go’ (Interviewee 108, white, male, business).
A third axis between business and trade unions exists in form of the Millennium 
Labour Council (MLC).^^ The MLC is an example of a corporatist (more correctly 
neo-corporatist) institution in that its policy outcomes are a consequence of high- 
level negotiations between business and organised labour (Hughes 1993, p.58; 
Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998). The MLC’s objective was to ‘develop 
a shared analysis of the crisis in employment, job loss and the lack of job creation’ 
(Boyd, Spicer, and Keeton 2001, p.96; MLC 2000). One informant remarked, ‘There 
is an emerging social contract between business and labour and the MLC is the 
epitome of this’ (Interviewee 125, white, male, business organisation). One of the 
initiators of the MLC saw its rationale clearly:
My own experience in social dialogue was very revealing and it was 
very encouraging in the sense that the parties had a common objective 
but they had different understandings often about how to realise that 
objective (Interviewee 116, white, male, NGO).
The same informant explained that the Council created an environment and an 
opportunity for leaders ‘to engage each other outside of an issue-based adversarial 
context’ (Interviewee 116, white, male, NGO). A government informant explained:
Some bilateral processes might undermine the NEDLAC process and 
some of them smooth them over. These are often frank, exploratory and 
un-mandated talks. They are useful for thrashing out issues before 
putting them on record. Bilateral consultations mean greater dialogue 
before positions of parties are harder, and the positions are mandated for 
more formal negotiations in NEDLAC (Interviewee 19, coloured, male, 
govemment/ex-union).
Whilst stakeholders respect different ideological perspectives, the Council operates 
by strengthening interpersonal relationships between sector leaders. Trust is critical 
both for successful social dialogue and for a workable social contract. To this end, at
® The Millennium Labour Council enjoys government support at the highest level (See speech by 
President Mbeki in Millennium Labour Council 2000).
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least quarterly, twelve key business leaders meet twelve leaders of the organised 
labour movement to discuss current issues and ameliorate tensions (Interviewee 97, 
white, male, business). Both parties work from the premise that South Africa has to 
become internationally competitive, and the ‘chosen destination for foreign 
investment’ (Interviewee 97, white, male, business). But the MLC has also come 
under criticism, primarily for replicating NEDLAC processes which arguably dilute 
the latter’s efficacy; ‘an indication that NEDLAC is slowly drifting apart 
(Interviewee 96, coloured, male, stakeholder organisation/ex-union). In addition, 
critics also see the MLC as lacking accountability. Some argue that, unmandated, it 
simply facilitates the interaction between business and labour elites (‘elite- 
pacting’)^ ®. Whilst the MLC makes outcomes public, the discussions remain 
confidential. On the one hand, it allows a free-exchange of ideas without sanction, 
whilst on the other, opens the process to charges of secrecy and elitism. Another 
criticism rests on the perception that the MLC is personality-driven, and is therefore 
a vulnerable institution given that people move in and out of positions (Interviewee 
48, Indian, male, business/ex-union). However, it was acknowledged that 
compromises won by business around Sunday payment, amendments to the LRA to 
include arbitration and the stripping of more militant language from trade union 
discourse were a consequence of debates and common understandings derived in the 
MLC (Kindra and Daniels 2001). One informant saw the de-radicalising of unions 
as having negative consequences for the labour movement (Interviewee 99, white, 
male, academic). Indeed, a challenge for the labour leadership is to bring its 
constituency along with it, outside the safety of the boardroom.
Whilst formal and institutionalised economic social contracts are necessary to 
deliver the stability necessary for growth, there is also the matter of non-economic, 
informal social contracts. Customarily, the South African social contract has also
Sustained elite-pacting is also seen as counter-productive to democratic values after a given 
transition period (Good 1997; Herbst 1997-8).
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referred to as nation building^^ or a social accord. The issue is difficult to address 
because it easily shifts one into the often fatuous discourse of unity.^^
The dominant discourse came to orbit around postulated common 
interests and destinies - rather than difference, contradiction and 
antagonism - as the fundamental dynamics at work in society. 
Commonalities (whether authentic or invented) are emphasized and 
amplified in service of a hegemonic project, which for the first time in 
South Africa’s history, seeks to organise society on the basis of inclusion 
(Marais 2001p. 94).
Is this discourse necessarily a bad thing? Is the notion of nation building an adequate 
foundation for an enduring social contract? South Africa is a deeply riven and 
unequal society. Addressing pressing socio-economic needs is likely to ameliorate 
existing divisions. Yet, it is questionable whether deeply held racial and ethnic 
prejudices will simply disappear with rising living standards that may even 
exacerbate other divisions such as class.
Corporate social engagement must strive to establish the necessary conditions for 
addressing social divides, as well as ensuring that social engagement is a continuous 
and self-critical exercise. Any social contract requires high levels of trust. South 
Africa’s own experience suggests that trust is not a static resource to be exploited as 
necessary. One interviewee argued that ‘more than the need for pragmatism is the 
need for intelligent strategic compromises for a new social contract’ (Interviewee 
131, white, male, business school). Employing the social contract in a more 
grounded way means interrogating the extent to which people have common visions 
and goals.
Nation-building is defined as a focus on values, culture, symbolic commitments and transcending 
loyalty derived from common citizenship (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998, p.95). 
However, the social contract cannot be conflated with nationalism or with symbolic politics 
(Friedman 1991; Atkinson 1991).
^  These include symbolic notions of the ‘Rainbow Nation’, Ubuntu (new social ethics) and 
unsuccessful govemment-society compacts such as Masekane (aimed at encouraging payment for 
local services) and Imbizo (aimed at civic communication with government).
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Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of the contextual environment for state-business 
relationships in South Africa at a particular historical juncture. A number of the 
issues raised in this chapter receive more detailed treatment in the empirical chapters 
that follow.
Given the contextual sensitivity of the SCSD framework, the chapter outlines the 
unique environmental challenges for the engagement of business as a social 
development partner, and the dynamic relationship between the state and business in 
promoting social and economic well-being. Social problems such as chronic poverty 
or the HIV/AIDS pandemic raise critical issues of concern to both the state and 
private sector.
In locating South Africa within a broader global and regional context, the chapter 
has identified the overarching (and often opposing) pressures of global 
competitiveness (‘globalisation’) on the one hand, and the internal pressure to 
redress apartheid’s legacies (social democracy) on the other (Carmody 2002, 
p.261). As a dominant regional power. South Africa’s political and economic 
influence is crucial to the region’s stability and development.
South Africa’s political economy has been shaped and determined to a large extent 
by its political history. Capitalism was linked to apartheid, as wealth became 
associated with race. Capitalism suffered a crisis of legitimacy. As in other 
developing economies, the debates around market and state boundaries remain alive 
in South Africa. However, South Africa’s transition has seen the state making firm 
commitments to neo-liberal policies in a market economy. It has simultaneously 
made social development commitments to meet basic needs provision, and create 
opportunities for its citizens. Such commitments increase pressure on South Africa 
to manage unemployment as a means of relieving poverty and inequality.
Whilst inequality remains a pressing issue, it is increasingly intra-racial (under 
apartheid wealth-inequality was predominantly inter-racial). South African society is 
becoming divided by class rather than race as a growing middle class has become
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entrenched by the ‘rewards’ of capitalism. Moreover, political and economic 
policies have been targeted at creating a black middle-class through policies such as 
BEE.
Indeed, at the end of apartheid there existed a well-developed CSR (or CSI) culture, 
particularly among large corporations (Business and Marketing Intelligence 1999, 
2000). However, as a social development strategy, CSR is often ameliorative and 
fails to address the primary political concern of changing ownership of the economy. 
Falling under the rubric of ‘transformation’, the state has pursued a political and 
economic agenda that aims to alter patterns of wealth to enable black participation in 
the economy. Justifiable for normative and strategic reasons, the state has 
accelerated the BEE agenda. Early BEE strategies were criticised for ‘empowering’ 
a limited number of well-placed black beneficiaries (Schlemmer 2003). The 
government has since significantly and appropriately widened the pool of 
beneficiaries beyond that small elite.
Indeed, an important issue explored in this chapter is that government has created 
particular ‘market conditions’ in which business must operate. While multi-lateral 
stakeholder fora aimed at building consensus were established, business leaders 
were at the time of field-research nonetheless still very resistant to state intervention 
in the business environment.^^ Resistant views saw these as rent-seeking by the 
state, laying a premium on business and distorting the market. Certainly, at the level 
of public discourse, large companies as well as empowerment companies and 
‘enlightened’ businesses supported such intervention as appropriate and desirable. 
Large companies managed to better meet the challenges of transformation, and 
exploit the opportunities attached to business awarded by the state.
Flowing from a recent history of divided social interests, social and political stability 
in South Africa appears to be cohered by a broad abstract social contract. The 
contract finds common ground in the rights and obligations of social partners. At a 
secondary level and building on a history and culture of dialogue, dynamic and
^ State intervention in South Africa is not new. As Lipton and Simkins note, the state has historically 
intervened massively to shape economic development (Lipton and Simkins 1993).
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institutionalised contracts (essentially based on corporatist dialogues) between social 
and economic partners have developed. Contrasting with an abstract social contract, 
these grounded contracts attempt to establish and achieve negotiated social goals. 
The existing social contract is, nonetheless, vulnerable to social conflict, as well as a 
lack of trust and tolerance in society. However, democratic institutions must 
necessarily balance competing interests for any sustained social contract.
South Africa is a liberal social democracy. Scholars such as Hudson argue that the 
specific formula employed in the South African social contract ‘exceeds the 
theoretical vocabulary of liberal individualism’ (Hudson 2000, p.93). Whilst this 
might be true in part, liberalism finds expression in the South African context in a 
number of ways, and most significantly in pluralist institutions. I have argued that 
liberalism in a broad church. The admixture of a directive liberal state and market in 
post-apartheid political economy reflects a social contract that seeks to negotiate, 
define and sustain social and economic well-being.
The following empirical chapter draws on the context and rationale of the social and 
legislative environments described above. The chapter examines investment 
companies and explores the articulation of BEE in further detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE: BEE AND INVESTMENT 
COMPANIES
Introduction
This chapter is the first of two sectoral case studies presenting the empirical data. 
The previous chapters provide the conceptual, theoretical and contextual foundations 
for the analytical treatment of the case studies. Chapter Four contextualised the 
operation of businesses South Africa and looked specifically at political, social and 
legislative imperatives for black economic empowerment (BEE). This logically 
leads to an interrogation of the manifestations of BEE including the transformation 
of ownership and control of the South African economy, stakeholder responses to 
BEE as a transformation tool, and more generally of business-societal relations.
In this chapter, I look at BEE and its articulation in both private and public 
investment companies. The first part of this chapter reviews the importance of the 
sector to the South Africa economy and barriers to investment. It then explores the 
genesis, definition and history of BEE, and scrutinises BEE and its evolution in the 
South African business context. "^  ^ Here, I explore the state of BEE and the role of 
government in advancing and leveraging black empowerment. Alongside general 
discussion of BEE, the chapter also offers detailed discussion of trade union 
investment companies (TUICs) and state-owned development finance institutions 
(DFIs). The chapter concludes by examining BEE in relation to the SCSD 
framework advanced in this thesis.
The term ‘investment companies’ refers to the wide spectrum of companies with an 
investment, holding, finance or development finance focus. Whilst the term enjoys 
wide currency, I use it here inclusively to embrace diverse corporate entities 
involved in the allocation of capital. For example, originally, and on an on-going
I have avoided a close market analysis of companies given their recent ephemeral nature and rapid 
evolution. Referring to the number of failed BEE companies, one interviewee quipped: ‘Now you see 
them, now you don’t’ (Interviewee 31, African, male, business). Moreover, I consider a wider range 
of enterprises than permitted by detailed treatment of fewer companies.
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basis, many BEE companies were ‘passive’ investors in other enterprises. BEE 
companies are typically ‘holding companies’, often with a stake (usually a minority 
portion) of established com panies.W ith  the exception of small-scale venture 
capitalism attempts^^, few traditional financiers seek venture capital fi'om these 
holding companies but rather an empowerment profile often to win state tenders. 
Such BEE stakes are wound up in regulatory obligations such as media, 
broadcasting, gambling concessions with the consequence that BEE companies 
cannot sell stakes and reinvest as easily as their conventional counterparts. In 
another example, I include in the rubric financial services companies such as 
commercial banks, finance houses and asset managers that have investment 
activities in their portfolio, as well as public-sector development finance institutions 
(DFIs). I am aware, therefore, that the term ‘investment companies’ includes whose 
activities include some kind of investment but which are not typically considered as 
such. Where I use this term, I do so self-consciously. Company types within the 
rubric are not intended for direct comparison as their business models and mandates 
are too dissimilar.
The rubric ‘investment companies’ permits the examination of a range of disparate 
companies, private and public which act as intermediaries for the allocation of 
capital. The term permits interrogation of cross-sectoral policy measures, multiple 
companies within an investment activity, as well some observations and insights 
regarding the trends in both public and private institutions. Finally, addressing 
diverse investment enterprises in a single case study allows for limited sectoral 
comparison with my other chosen case study, tourism.
Rationale for selecting investment companies as an area of study
Many sectors might have yielded interesting research. Had my research taken place 
just a year later, I would have considered such sectors as the pharmaceutical, 
financial, construction or mining and petroleum industries. Given the newness of
Indeed, BEE company names refer ofien to their type of investment activity, for example Ukhumba 
Investment, Mineworkers Investment Company (MIC), Calulo Investment Holdings, Johnnie 
Holdings, New Africa Investments Limited (NAIL), Kagiso Trust Investment Company, Thebe 
Investment Corporation, NAFCOC Investment Holding Company and Ucingo Investments.
For example by Wipcapital and the union investment company, MIC
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BEE policies and initiatives, their dynamic nature and the speed at which they gain 
momentum, the terrain in which they obtain changes very quickly. In each of these 
industries, sectoral social partners have made significant achievements towards 
transformation in relatively short order.^^ These include legislative achievements in 
the case of the pharmaceutical industry around anti-retroviral drugs, and significant 
stakeholder charters redressing BEE equity and control in the case of the others. 
Importantly, charters also point to emergent social contracts between stakeholders, 
albeit as non-inclusive contracts and with highly selective groups of stakeholder 
interests. However, at the time of my fieldwork in 2001-2002, the most dynamic and 
interesting sectors, and those most explicitly prioritised in both government and 
business discourse were those selected. For instance. President Thabo Mbeki’s State 
of the Nation address in 2001 stressed the importance of both the investment and 
tourism sectors (Mbeki 2001). Both these sectors were considered sectors for 
economic growth and to a degree, this has not changed.
I selected investment enterprises engaged in the allocation of capital. Most BEE 
activity occurs in this sector. The state and business highlighted the importance of 
foreign direct and local investment to kick-start the economy, and advance social 
and economic development. Indeed, GEAR was widely embraced by the business 
sector because it was perceived as investment-friendly, and stressed market directed 
growth and fiscal austerity. In terms of a SCSD framework, the coordination of 
multiple institutions in the state-market dyad towards achieving stated social and 
economic outcomes yields multiple insights (UNRISD 2000). Finally, most of the 
earliest empowerment initiatives are located in the investment sector. Indeed, the 
majority of BEE activity directed towards building black capital still follows these 
passive investment patterns in investment enterprises.
A history of BEE
In a speech given shortly after the first democratic elections Thabo Mbeki asserted:
Let me also point out that noble and correct as they are, reconciliation 
and nation-building, unless they are accompanied by the fundamental
^  Achievements in different sectors might also be attributed to case-specific pressure by different 
government ministers (Karen Heese, BEE economist, personal communication, January 2004).
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transformation of the entire socio-economic fabric of our society would 
remain but unrealisable ideals. For those of us who have been the objects 
and victims of racial oppression, and social and economic deprivation, 
we cannot but conceive of the two processes as two sides of the same 
coin, or two interdependent processes each of which is incapable of 
realisation if its is not accompanied by the other. Reconciliation, must 
therefore, of necessity encompass the transformation of everything else 
in addition to the political accession to power of the representatives of 
the formerly oppressed blacks. It must include the transformation and 
deracialisation of the South African economy (Mbeki 1995).
Since 1994, BEE has been a strong leitmotif in the ANC-led government discourse 
regarding political and economic transformation. BEE describes a range of policy 
and institutional measures employed by the South African government, parastatals, 
businesses and communities to redress the economic inequalities that resulted from 
apartheid .T hese measures are primarily intended to include black South Africans 
in the economic mainstream.Importantly, BEE carefiilly avoids the notion that its 
policies are redistributionist as any such redistributionist discourse typically creates 
anxiety among investors both local and foreign (Rumney 2003; Ludman 2003). 
Instead, BEE policies, whether generated by the state or private sector, strategically 
employs the language of redress. BEE advocates argue that systematic institutional 
and economic redress is necessary to remedy enduring racial inequalities.
With a widespread expectation that BEE will result in redistribution of wealth, it is 
clear that government does not directly intervene in this redistribution but rather 
actively guides the market environment. Government primarily uses its position as 
consumer and regulator to redistribute opportunities towards BEE companies and 
their shareholders. BEE might be interpreted rather than redistribution of wealth but 
as ‘redistribution of opportunity’.*®
^  As already discussed, empowerment is a contested term. I employ it here at face value as it is used 
by the South Africa government, business and other BEE stakeholders,
^  As defined in Chapter Four, ‘black’ refers to South Africans, whether African, coloured or Indian, 
who experienced systematically deprived regarding political rights, and access education, land, skills 
and other opportunities for mainstream wealth creation. In South Africa political discourse, ‘black’ is 
also used synonymously with ‘previously disadvantaged individuals’ (pdi) or ‘historically 
disadvantaged individuals’ (hdi). Earlier definitions of BEE such as in the Preferential Procurement 
Act included white women (South Africa 2000),
Edwin Ritchken, BEE consultant, personal communication. May 2004,
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Black business existed under apartheid, and despite exclusionary legislation and 
onerous business conditions, very occasionally thrived. However, it was not until 
the demise of apartheid that significant numbers of black businesses began to 
emerge. In 1998, the Black Management Forum (BMP) initiated the establishment 
of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEECom) ‘to take control of 
the [BEE] agenda’ (Black Economic Empowerment Commission 1999, p.4). The 
Commission, which represented black individuals, organised black business, 
academics and professional organisations, defined BEE thus:
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is an integrated and coherent 
socio-economic process, located in the context of national 
transformation that is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by 
seeking to substantially and equitably transfer and confer ownership, 
management and control of South Africa’s financial and economic 
resources to the majority of its citizens, with a view to ensuring their 
broader and meaningful participation to achieve sustainable 
development and prosperity (Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission 1999, p.5).
The BEECom has enjoyed implicit government support and has helped shape the 
evolution of state BEE policy. The state itself has been the primary driver of BEE 
although state policy has increasingly tended to emphasise the need for ‘broad 
based’ BEE. By 2000 when I initiated my field research, there already existed over 
24 laws, policy and regulatory provisions pertaining to empowerment (BusinessMap 
SA 2000, p.7). The state and government-owned utilities and enterprises have since 
increasingly used their significant purchasing power to drive an empowerment 
agenda, thus making BEE a critical arena in the national political agenda.
BEE has become an immutable fact of the South African political and economic 
landscape although many remain sceptical about BEE’s inherent value and 
anticipated outcomes. Most big businesses have entered into BEE deals but this 
apparent consensus among big business veils non-conforming private views, as well 
as opposing views among other sizes of business. These oppositional views
Some pioneering black entrepreneurs managed to benefit from the apartheid-era regulations within 
township patronage networks. These include Sam Motsuenyane, Archie Nkonyeni, Richard and 
Marina Maponya, Ephraim Tshabalala, Peter Motale, and Bishop Bamabus Lekganyane (Gqubule 
2004). Others succeeded outside apartheid structures such as Dr N.H Motlana, the Kunene Brothers, 
Herman Mashaba, Habakuk Shikwane and Jabu Mabuza and remain successful entrepreneurs.
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contradict accepted political stances and are mostly privately articulated. They 
hold that BEE has a ‘negative impact on productivity, on the cost of business and, 
therefore, on the competitiveness and productivity of companies’ (South African 
Press Association 2003; Pieter Haasbroek cited in Lourens 2003). Since few 
business leaders are public about their criticism of BEE it is all the more surprising 
when these criticisms come from black business leaders close to the President. 
Moeletsi Mbeki, the President’s younger brother, argued publicly that the current 
model of BEE, with its focus on equity transfer, undermines black entrepreneurship 
and has ‘created a culture of entitlement and dependency in the black middle class’ 
(Mbeki cited in Ludman 2003; Also in Bidoli 2003).
BEE evolving
The short history of BEE can be divided into first and second waves of 
empowerment. The first wave of empowerment accelerated in 1993 when SANLAM 
sold 10% of its stake in Metropolitan Life to an empowerment consortium led by Dr 
Nthato Motlana who renamed the investment holding company. New Africa 
Investments Limited (NAIL). In 1994, NAIL was the first black-owned company to 
be listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Kobokoane 2000).®  ^ This 
development, which brought in thousands of first-time black shareowners,*"  ^became 
the precedent for many other similar investment transactions whereby black 
empowerment consortia bought equity in existing blue-chip companies, creating 
‘black-chip’ listings (Verhoef 2002). Southern Life sold Africa Life to Real Africa 
Investments and the largest BEE entity, Johnnie, was created through a similar deal, 
brokered between the National Empowerment Consortium (NEC), headed by Cyril
^  This debate became public in late 2003 when oil group Sasol described BEE as a risk it its NYSE 
listing requirements.
^ NAIL also developed a ground-breaking empowerment code in late 1999 which argued for broad 
based empowerment
^  In NAIL’S two-tier share structure, N-shares were purchased at a discount and carried no voting 
right attempted to boost black ownership. The scheme failed: 2% of shareowners outvoted the rest 
(Rymore 2002). Thus, NAIL was nominally a BEE company with less than 5% black-owned. 
Significantly, despite being black-controlled. Nail’s empowerment status was questioned and found 
lacking by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa) when the company 
attempted to acquire a significant share Kagiso Media’s assets (BusinessMap Foundation 2002c, 
2002d). Similarly, some years earlier 2001, after restructuring and unbundling, Johnnie struggled to 
retain its empowerment credentials whilst bidding for a second national telecoms licence (Segel and 
Sprague 2001; BusinessMap 2001a),
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Ramaphosa, and Anglo American. Johnnie attempted to broaden the ownership base 
of BEE: 6% of the original 35% stake transferred to the NEC was offered to ‘new’ 
black shareholders in a discounted public offering called the Ikageng Johnnie Share 
Schem e.Johnnie claimed 25 000 new black shareholders who when the scheme 
matured three years later enjoyed a dramatic 400% return on their original 
investment (See Segel and Sprague 2001 for detailed business case).
The first wave of empowerment ended after peaking in 1998 with the fallout of the 
Asian markets in that year. A high incidence of deal-making, which created little 
value, was mostly facilitated through financial engineering by financial institutions. 
Financial engineering was deemed necessary to assist the transfer of ownership to 
black consortia who lacked the necessary capital to purchase business interests 
outright. Financiers played a key role in creating a class of ‘capitalists without 
capital’ (BusinessMap SA 2000, p.7). Critics of BEE and these initiatives in 
particular believed they were vindicated by high failure rates amongst empowerment 
enterprises.
A prominent black businessman confessed that that many new players were naïve 
and unskilled: ‘I will not pretend that we understood those things’ (Interviewee 34, 
African, male, business). Indeed, even those sympathetic to empowerment concede 
some mistakes in the first wave of empowerment trades (BusinessMap SA 1999, 
p.7-8). First, this frenetic deal-making induced a fevered spate of low-value deals 
often made in the spirit of avaricious accumulation. One responded described these 
deals as ‘opportunistic, not entrepreneurial’ (Interviewee 95, white, male, business) 
while another described their motivation as ‘greed and avarice’ (Interviewee 113, 
white, male, academic). The high volume of deals appeared to be more in the 
interest of financiers and venture capitalists than empowerment groups given that 
the former enjoyed greater returns on a higher transaction rate. The second mistake 
related to the financial engineering used to ‘empower’ empowerment groups. 
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) were premised on bullish market growth. However, 
volatility in global markets meant that black empowerment players were ill-
M-Net’s Phatuma Share Scheme provided the model for Ikageng but did not realise the same rate 
of success in unlocking shareholder value (Interviewee 22, white, male, business; Interviewee 6, 
black, female, business; Interviewee 76, white, male, business).
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resourced to meet their financing obligations, resulting in the loss of the shares they 
had acquired through SPVs. New black investors were left highly indebted to their 
financiers. Any value accrued to the financier and not to empowerment vehicles. 
Third, high acquisition patterns ‘effectively discouraged [empowerment] companies 
fi’om paying much attention to any one of their investments’ (BusinessMap SA 
1999, p. 9). Un-strategic acquisitions by opportunistic deal-making failed to develop 
the operational and strategic business skills of black corporate managers, to add any 
sustainable value, or to develop empowerment enterprises strategically. Finally, risk 
is an essential business principle to ensure that investors’ interests are aligned in 
ensuring profit accumulation. However, early BEE deals were devoid of risk to the 
empowerment partners. Risk was essentially supported by financiers. With no 
capital to risk, empowerment entrepreneurs who often manage these assets were 
unconstrained by conventional business practices and responded to incentives to 
enter numerous transactions in the hope that some would entail returns.
One lesson well-learned by empowerment stakeholders was that ownership alone 
was an inadequate indicator of empowerment, nor was it a substitute for operational 
empowerment or capacity. Whilst BEE encountered significant obstacles in this 
period, it was nonetheless groundbreaking. A businessman observed: ‘BEE is not an 
event. It is a process’ (Interviewee 71, African, male, business). BEE was placed 
firmly on the national political and economic agenda. A new cadre of black business 
leaders emerged and BEE became established as a strategic business imperative. At 
their peak in 1998, BEE companies accounted for 7% of the JSE with a market 
capitalisation of R66 billion (BusinessMap Foundation 2003a). First wave 
empowerment both challenged and reinforced traditional thinking about black 
business. Empowerment deals which simply involved equity were welcomed by the 
white establishment since no actual control was transferred. First wave 
empowerment highlighted the structural impediments to successful black business 
performance and the need for ‘real’ transformation that saw genuine distributive 
shifts to black entrepreneurs.
The second wave of empowerment began when BEE deals started to re-escalate 
after the global market recovery. As established, the initial empowerment wave
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advanced shareholding and equity ownership as the chief benchmark but lacked the 
necessary productive capital to ensure effective transfer of equity. The second wave 
represented an attempt at a more coherent and strategic policy although accessing 
the necessary capital remains a ch a llen g e .It employed other means of delivering 
value such as the development of capacity to manage business assets, the 
development of staff capacity and the reframing of Employment Equity legislation 
as a transformative business tool as well as a legal obligation. It stressed affirmative 
procurement measures to facilitate business opportunities and access to markets, 
new business development and to monitor the empowerment commitments of 
suppliers of goods and services to the public sector. Additionally, second wave BEE 
highlighted the restructuring of state owned enterprises (SOEs), the CSR/CSI 
commitments of businesses as social institutions, as well as the governance 
commitments of companies particularly those pertaining to empowerment priorities, 
such as the establish of relevant empowerment committees, the disclosure of the 
enterprise’s empowerment profile and the concomitant transparency of this as a 
powerful measure to reflects company values and stakeholder pressures.
The model of passive ‘holding companies’ described earlier has largely been 
replaced by a different model which require greater ‘commitment’ and engagement 
by the stakeholders. Passive ownership by empowerment groups through pension 
and provident funds, unit trusts growth funds and other collective investment 
schemes is in itself unlikely to result in any sustained economic transformation, or 
any control over investment decisions. Passive share-owning of enterprises is also 
more likely to result in black ‘fronting’ or ‘window-dressing’ (Interviewee 94, 
white, male, business; Interviewee 103, African, female, business). In a fronting 
arrangement, the empowerment company has no actual capacity: non-empowerment 
businesses masquerade as empowerment companies to secure contracts, particularly 
from the state or SOEs. In fronting blacks typically hold non-executive positions.
“  There are numerous examples of deal failure because empowerment partners were unable to raise 
the necessary capital. Just looking at the privatisation of state assets: the initial sale of Aventura 
collapsed because the empowerment bidder lacked capital; SAA has no BEE stake; and the 
privatisation of the Airports Company of South Africa had to be delayed because it lacked a viable 
BEE bidder (Rumney 2004). In 2003, Ucingo held a small stake in Telkom but could not replay its 
debt at let alone realise any gain (Karen Heese, BEE economist, personal communication, October 
2003).
^  This is a global trend. Institutional ownership is often more appropriate that direct ownership.
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whilst whites occupy top executive and management positions. One interviewee 
quipped that fronting companies were ‘coconuts’, ‘black’ companies owned and 
controlled by whites (Interviewee 65, white, male, business). To remedy this 
miasma, and ensure a more committed, active and sustainable role for empowerment 
investors, risk is being reintroduced into the empowerment equation. Financial 
institutions are increasingly arguing that black investors should advance their own 
capital in deals, thereby exposing them to risk and ensuring they consider any 
investment opportunities with care and diligence. Moreover, businesses which have 
operational capacity are considered to be better investments than those that merely 
act as investment holding companies. This is also true of BEE companies with an 
established portfolio of investments, good governance, higher performance rates, an 
envisaged listing or a direct large investor (BusinessMap SA 1999, p.8).
Partnerships - such as alliances and joint-ventures between existing and emerging 
empowerment companies, as well as an increasing number of Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) - are increasingly becoming strategic and important drivers for 
successful black empowerment and mechanisms for broadening the pool of 
economic beneficiaries. These partnerships are important on two accounts: they 
mitigate risk by creating a risk-sharing arrangement and create a corporate entity 
outside of existing business operations. Not including the restructuring of 
established white business, joint ventures with black-controlled companies were 
valued at about RlObillion in 2002 (Rumney 2003b, p.5). Most recent policies, 
which stress the importance of partnerships and joint undertakings, have been 
outlined in the government’s Strategy for Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BB-BEE), and are promoted through an attendant pieces of 
legislation (South Africa 2003,2003a).
As highlighted in Chapter Four, businesses are not homogenous, differing in size, 
sector, listing and institutional arrangements, and their interests might well be 
influenced by these differences. This is true too of the range of BEE enterprises that 
obtain, from JSE-listed ‘black-chip’ companies, to unlisted companies of different 
sizes to emerging businesses and SMEs. Most data on BEE companies pertain to 
larger and listed companies, or interests held via blocs of ownership by black
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investors. There are insufficient financial data concerning small and unlisted black 
companies or individual black shareholding.
Defining BEE Companies
What is a BEE concern? Do BEE companies conduct business in different ways 
from their traditional competitors? How are the empowerment credentials of BEE 
companies measured? Are BEE companies truly empowerment companies if their 
holding companies are still indebted to financial institutions? Can one call an 
empowerment company black-controlled if white advisors and managers make 
decisions?
There has been enduring debate over the definition of BEE companies and regarding 
the meaning of empowerment. Given the potential profitability of qualification as an 
empowerment enterprise and the political importance of having a critical mass of 
empowerment companies, empowerment stakeholders have sought to emphasise and 
develop their empowerment credentials. Empowerment verification became 
especially important when fronting became commonplace. Whether as a means to 
win government contracts and licences, as the basis of an empowerment scorecard 
aligned to a sectoral charter, or as a mechanism for drawing targeted institutional 
support from SOEs, the importance of empowerment credentials for businesses in 
South Africa is considerable.
Empowerment companies have most often been loosely defined as black-owned, 
black-controlled and black-influenced companies. Until recently, these are 
ambiguous classifications and were indicative of the expansion of black business 
particularly prior to 1998. As definitions, they must necessarily be used cautiously 
(BusinessMap 1997). Definitional problems persist. For example, are BEE 
enterprises empowerment companies if, for example, black consortia own a 
substantial but minority stake in the corporation? Can a BEE be considered a black- 
controlled enterprise if its management is dominated by whites? It has become 
strategically important to firm up these definitions. ‘Black-controlled’ enterprises 
are those ‘having a definitive say in the affairs of a company by virtue of their equity 
stake in the ultimate holding company’ despite the common scenario in which
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empowerment holding companies have not fully redeemed debts taken to finance 
their equity stakes (BusinessMap 1997). ‘Black-influenced’ enterprises are those 
with a certain proportion of black shareholders - typically over 5% of a company's 
issued equity. As this would suggest, black shareholders have an influence but no 
control over strategic issues of the company (Segal 1999). BusinessMap, a think 
tank, also distinguishes between active and passive black ownership. The strategic 
thrust has shifted from the importance of passive shareholding to control 
(BusinessMap Foundation 2003, p.4). Elsewhere, BusinessMap uses three criteria to 
include companies on its BusinessMap Foundation BEE Index. Companies are 
included when they are owned 10% or more by black block shareholding, have one 
historically disadvantaged South African (HDSA) as an executive board member, 
and a ratio of 1:5 HDSA non-executive board members (BusinessMap 2003d). 
These relatively loose and inclusive criteria for BEE were necessary to ensure that a 
sufficient number of companies would be included to validate the movements 
suggested by a BEE index.**
In response to ongoing ambiguity, the recent BB-BEE Strategy offered a tightened 
and often-called for ‘official’ definition of a BEE enterprise. BEE companies are 
defined here as those entities at least 50.1% owned by black people, and where 
blacks have substantial management control (South Africa: Department of Trade and 
Industry 2003, Appendix B, 1). New government BEE scorecards still focus their 
weighting on black ownership although its importance has ostensibly been 
diminished by other considerations. In defining an empowerment or black 
enterprise, scorecard assessments weight direct equity ownership and the percentage 
of black executive or board management at 20% and 10% respectively (South 
Africa: Department of Trade and Industry 2003, Appendix A). The emphasis of 
direct ownership of equity has significant implications for the financing of 
empowerment transactions. Rather than using the level of shareholding by 
empowerment interests, a company’s score is determined by the economic stake 
directly held by blacks though not as a consequence of financial engineering.*^ The 
highly complex financial mechanisms advancing BEE are beyond the scope of this
“  Karen Heese, BEE economist, personal communication, January 2004.
^  In such cases, financial engineering would dilute the economic interest held directly by black 
persons and value would accrue to financiers.
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thesis and are usually beyond public scrutiny. However, what critics argue is that the 
determination of ‘empowerment enterprise’ in the scorecard potentially raises the 
same problems around financial engineering and the high levels of gearing which 
debilitated first wave empowerment (BusinessMap 2003b).
The BEE environment is volatile. As direct investments and mergers proliferate, the 
proportion of purely empowerment investors becomes diluted by traditional or 
established investors. What determines a ‘black firm’ requires some interrogation of 
the composition of its institutional ownershÿ, board and senior management. 
Control requires significant representation at all three levels. Over the last decade 
key BEE stakeholders have interpreted and advanced black empowerment in diverse 
ways. As described earlier, initial conceptions of BEE were more limited. The state, 
BEE interest groups and their financiers all placed the strategic focus on passive 
equity ownership. I argue that these later interpretations and implementations were 
more sophisticated, and more appropriate to the SCSD framework advanced in this 
thesis. Recently, BEE stakeholders have looked at a broader range of policies in 
such a way as to produce a more coherent corporate social policy. In so doing, BEE 
policies are more likely to be embedded as issues of operational importance to 
companies, particularly when these are aligned with the strategic interests of those 
companies such as the award of state tenders. Whether by legislative compliance or 
voluntary codes and initiatives, the embedding of BEE in business operations 
transforms and broadens black access to mainstream economic activity, as suppliers 
of goods and services, employees, managers, board members and owners.
The key question which follows, and one to which I shall turn to later in this chapter, 
asks how broad-based this access is given its tendency toward an elite group of 
beneficiaries. In addition, the issue of business access and opportunity has further 
raised questions regarding broad-based access to finance for black entrepreneurs, as 
well as entrenched patronage networks for a few politically well-connected 
beneficiaries. Again, this is a subject for later consideration.
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The state as underwriter in BEE
Critical to my argument is that the state plays an important role in the current 
empowerment environment as director, driver and underwriter of BEE policies and 
strategies. Not only has the state expedited a plethora of empowerment legislation 
described in the previous chapter but it also advanced a slew of licensing and 
regulatory instruments in various key sectors such as fishing, telecommunications, 
broadcasting, mining, gambling and liquor. Whilst sectoral charters aimed at 
empowerment transformation are considered appropriate for designated sectors and 
various of these are currently being negotiated, the state will encourage voluntary 
compliance (Buthelezi 2003). Arguably, although these charter processes are 
reportedly highly conflict-ridden and wearying, the state achieved significant 
subscription from diverse stakeholder interests - from the trade union movement to 
large business - because of a strategy of successful stakeholder engagement.^® 
Recent government policy is the outcome of extensive consultation, particularly 
with the organised business, as well as other key stakeholders such as BEECom, the 
President’s Black Business Working Group, the Big Business Working Group and 
NEDLAC.
The state is a significant underwriter of BEE. As a direct investor, government 
pension funds own about 10% of the JSE, representing the largest share of black 
ownership on the JSE by ordinary black people (Reddy 2003b, p.24). The state has 
also created legislative and regulatory benchmarks to determine what minimally 
constitutes business social responsibility in the South African context. Whilst 
CSR/CSI remain concepts associated with corporate engagement in its grant-making 
and philanthropic capacity, more significant business engagement is increasingly 
linked to a given company’s BEE strategy and performance. In essence, the state has 
taken a lead in determining whether businesses are socially responsible using 
relatively narrow criteria; these may or may not be linked to the critical issue of 
sustainability.
^  Comment by the Minister of Minerals and Energy, Minister Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, on the 
process of developing the Mining Charter at conference entitled ‘Towards South Africa 2004, Ten 
years of Freedom’, 24-26 October 2003, London. The Mining Charter finalised in October 2002 is 
formally known as the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South Africa 
Mining Industry.
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The state’s role as BEE underwriter is also manifest in the number of institutional 
arrangements giving impetus to the empowerment imperative and the redistribution 
of opportunity.^* Not least of these has been the massive transformation of public or 
development finance institutions (DFIs). The key DFIs include Khula Enterprise 
Finance, Ntsika Enterprise Promotion, the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC), the Land Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). 
Three of these, namely the DBSA, Land Bank, and the IDC are discussed below. 
These DFIs make targeted investment available to black groups (or emerging black 
farmers in the case of the Land Bank). In the 2000/2003 financial year, the 
government disbursed through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) a total of 
R2,2billion to fund BEE initiatives through DFIs. The IDC, in particular, financed 
over 690 empowerment deals fi’om 1990 to 2003 valued at R6.6 billion (South 
Africa: Department of Trade and Industry 2003, Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.5).
The state’s role as an underwriter is further evident in the creation of other 
institutional arrangements such as the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) to secure 
capital from the restructuring of SOEs^  ^ for black entrepreneurs, and the proposed 
establishment of a BEE Advisory Council. However, as in the case of other delivery, 
institutional structures are only one element in successful BEE delivery by the state. 
Although the NEF was gazetted in the National Empowerment Fund Act 105 of 
1998, and established in 2001, its poor institutional performance has undermined its 
laudable goal of warehousing state-owned shares from restructured state assets 
before passing them onwards to black investment groups (Business Day 2003; 
Wadula 2003a, 2003b). Twelve previously state-owned enterprises, including 
Telkom, the Airports Company, South African Airways, Adventura and Alexcor 
were targeted, with between 5% and 10% of proceeds being retained by the NEF. In
The idea of BEE as redistributed opportunity was highlighted in a number of interviews with one 
informant defining BEE as a policy which ‘merely gives black people the same opportunities 
afforded other [white] people’ (Interviewee 88, African, male, business).
“  As Larbi notes, SOE, and utilities in particular, tend to be enjoy posses ‘non-competitive market 
power derived from natural monopoly rights’ (Larbi 1999, p.24). Privatisation of these assets may be 
eschewed and ownership remains in state hands as has been the case of a number of South AfHcan 
SOEs such as ESKOM and TRANSNET. In such cases restructuring (in tandem with accountable 
management, state intervention and regulation) may increase performance and efficiency (Kamdar 
2001; Larbi 1999). Whilst not all privatised. South African SOEs have all been restructured to meet 
central fiscal efficiency requirements, and BEE objectives.
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five years, the only transfer to the fund was the government’s 1.5% stake in M-Cell 
despite having over R200 million in available funds (Wadula 2003b; Foundation for 
the Development of Africa 2003). In mid-2003, the state suspended funding to the 
NEF raising questions about its ability to deliver on its mandate. Reportedly, the 
lack of intra-govemment unanimity about the respective roles of the NEF and DFIs, 
under-funding by government and limited capacity constrained the fund (Wadula 
2003a).
In 2003, the state published a comprehensive Strategy For Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BB-BEE) (South Africa: Department of Trade and 
Industry 2003). Using a scorecard approach, ‘broad-based’ empowerment combines 
ownership, management, employment equity, skills development, affirmative 
procurement, CSR, investment and enterprise development in one overarching 
process. Significantly, the addition of ‘broad-based’ to the formal definition of BEE 
is also a significant step in countering one of the salient criticisms levelled at BEE, 
that of elitism and ‘enrichment’. I address this issue later in the chapter. The thrust 
of the Strategy appears to be a more coherent and wide-reaching BEE policy, and a 
concomitant broadening of empowerment beneficiaries. With close echoes of the 
BEECom definition offered above, broad-based black economic empowerment is 
defined as:
... an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly 
contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings 
about significant increases in the numbers of black people who manage, 
own and control the country’s economy, as well as significant decreases 
in income inequalities (South Africa: Department of Trade and Industry 
2003)
Mindful of the successes and failures of BEE to date, the Strategy ‘seeks to balance 
growth, investment and transformation imperatives’ in a manner which is both 
realistic and demonstrates an openness to critical debate (BusinessMap 2003b).
However, the Strategy and accompanying Act (South Africa 2003a) have been 
criticised for being vague, over reliant on Ministerial powers and significantly, 
omitting any reference to women, which explicitly exclude white women
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(BusinessMap 2003c).^^ Like the exclusion of disability, excluding white women 
shifts the focus of the legislation from a concern with the remedying of past 
discrimination to being racially focussed. While better positioned than their black 
counterparts, white women constitute just 12% of total top white management and 
have undoubtedly experienced gender discrimination (Rumney 2003a). Arguably, 
the state is setting a dangerous precedent and possibly introducing divisive race 
politics into arguments around justice and equity. Indeed, the Act’s failure to register 
women and the disabled prejudices black women and the black disabled, and makes 
these instruments vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
The state of BEE
The state of BEE health is primarily seen in equity ownership terms, and this is most 
accurately calibrated in terms of BEE listings on the JSE (Segal 1999; Financial 
Mail 1998). Here, BEE is mainly measured in terms of the size of black holdings in 
blue-chip companies on the Exchange or where BEE enterprises are listed. It should 
be noted that critics of this methodology have argued that the close scrutiny of the 
JSE ignores progress made by unlisted companies (Dispatch Online 2001). Indeed, 
BEE activity outside of the JSE is difficult to define and measure. Conversely, JSE 
measures indicate two important trends. It pegs the growth of BEE corporate 
activity, as well as allowing for a comparative performance of black-listed 
companies (Segal 1999). However, even in times of relative market stability, 
empowerment shares fluctuate dramatically often compromised by a presence in less 
favoured sectors such as IT. The table below illustrates the number of BEE 
companies listed on the JSE, their market capitalisation and the proportional value.
NO FIRMS MARKET 
CAPITALISATION (Rbn)
% of
JSE
Oct-97 17 37 3
Nov-97 26 52 4
Feb-98 27 55 5
Jul-98 28 68 6
”  By contrast, the 2001 Mining Charter includes white women as a previously discriminated group 
suggesting some inconsistency by government (BusinessMap 2003b; Rumney 2003a).
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Sept-98 28 48 4
Nov-98 33 66 7
Jan-99 35 59 6
Apr-99 35 67 6
Aug-99 38 53 4
Nov-99 36 42 3
Feb-00 36 61 4
May-00 32 37 3
Aug-00 33 98 6
Nov-00 34 78 5
Feb-01 22 84 5
Mar-02 26 38 2
Jun-02 26 39 2
Sept-02 22 33 2
Dec-02 22 44 3
Mar-03 21 42 3
Jun-03 21 43 3
Sep-03 21 43 3
Table 5.1: Black controlled^  ^companies on the JSE
Source: BusinessMap Foundation, REF No: 2003\056\BEE\CR (BusinessMap Foundation 
2003a)
The measurement of black ownership in relation to black control might be higher or 
lower depending on whether the measurement includes pension funds and other 
passive ownership assets. The fluctuation of BEE on the JSE appears to be the result 
of the transfer of shares between companies in the absence of real growth. Delisting 
and dilution of management also alters the empowerment status of companies, such 
as Real Africa Investments, until 2002 considered a JSE black-chip but now delisted 
and no longer black-controlled (Reddy 2003a, p.9). BusinessMap calculates BEE 
ownership in six ways illustrating the complexity of using the above classifications. 
Whilst BEE performance has been variable, overall empowerment gains appear to 
have stabilised. In 2002, BusinessMap maintained that black ownership of the JSE 
stands at 15% when this is calculated to include both active and passive ownership
^  Firms where black-control is exercised but which do not necessarily have majority black 
ownership.
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based on both local and foreign owned shares. This figure rises to 22% black 
ownership as a proportion of locally owned shares^^. Overall, by the end of the first 
quarter of 2003, the BEE market capitalisation on the JSE was approximately R40 
billion (Reddy 2003a, p. 9).
While listings prevail in conditions where there is a need to raise capital, 
empowerment groups are recognising that unlisted companies hold the benefit of 
control and greater focus (BusinessMap Foundation 2003, p.4). There is an 
emerging trend among BEE enterprises to delist or revert to original ownership, a 
route elected by large former black-chips Wiphold, Kunene Technology, Moribo, 
African Harvest, Real Africa Investments and NAIL (Gqubule 2003, p.3I; Reddy 
2003a, p. 11). Along with greater control, delisting has protected them from volatile 
market sentiment whilst also permitting allocated dividends to be ploughed back 
into the companies. But, delisting from the chief barometer of BEE reflects a 
diminished number of black-controlled and black-owned companies among top 
South African companies. The largest black-chips, MTN, Johnnie and ARMgold 
remain dominant listed BEE companies. Such is their dominance, the market 
capitalisation of BEE on the JSE was hardly altered by the exit of eight BEE 
companies from the JSE by March 2003 (Reddy 2003a, p.9). If measured only in 
terms of how many blacks own shares in blue-chip companies, BEE has had 
disappointing impact (Gumede 2002a, p.207). Thus, the very index which arguable 
signals BEE health only reflects a narrow band of prosperous listed companies but 
fails to number many others.
Certainly, although other indicators are important, equity ownership is still 
considered the critical benchmark of empowerment and the state’s Strategy employs 
equity transfer through sectoral charters, and is strengthened through balanced 
scorecard methodologies. The latter highlights the obvious issue that in accruing 
value and building black wealth, ownership has a strategic corollary: control. Issued 
shares give the empowerment investor influence and control of board member 
appointments, greater control of strategic decisions by the company, greater control
^  Similarly, Empowerdex, an empowerment rating agency which rates enterprises according to their 
levels of black ownership suggests that that historically disadvantaged groups own almost 10% of the 
equity of all the top 115 JSE-listed firms (Wu, Khoza, and Ngcobo 2002).
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of internal transformation and the opportunities to develop a cadre of black 
managers to reach a critical mass level (Ndlovu 2003; South Africa: Department of 
Trade and Industry 2003, Appendix A, p. 21).
Black control of companies
However, despite some evident gains in terms of equity transfer, there is an under­
representation of black directors among senior management. Indeed, the number of 
black directors, especially in executive positions, is a good indicator of BEE health. 
In late 2002, 260 blacks held some 367 directorships in 387 South African based- 
companies on the JSE securities exchange; the majority of these positions (83%) 
were non-executive directorships (Wu et al. 2003). Gqubule notes that in 2003, there 
were 64 black executive directors of JSE listed companies, of whom only three were 
women (Gqubule 2003). Black directors are generally employed in black-controlled 
companies where black owners are more likely to push the Employment Equity 
agenda more forcefully (Reddy 2003b, p.23). Overall, the influence of these black 
directors is limited given that black-controlled companies represent such a small 
proportion of market capitalisation of the JSE. Instead and unsurprisingly, real 
economic influence still lies with the approximately other 98% of executive 
directors of companies listed on the JSE who are mostly white men (Gqubule 2003 , 
p. 31). In addition, with delistings the numbers of black executive directors and 
managers in South African companies listed the JSE is likely to appear even lower if 
that is to remain a chief measurement of black control among top South African 
companies.
Whilst senior positions in companies remain largely the domain of white males,^^ 
Employment Equity legislation has significantly shifted employment patterns. For 
example, the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) reported that black 
representation at management levels increased by 1% from 11.8% in 2000 to 12.8%
^  As elsewhere, women are under-represented at managerial levels occupying just 12% and men 
88% of top management positions in South Africa. The proportion of women improves at 
professionally qualified levels of empowerment where women hold 38% and men 62% of positions 
(South Africa: Department of Labour 2002, p. 10). BEE companies were more likely to better perform 
in terms of gender equity than their mainstream counterparts (Reddy 2003b), and evidence suggests 
that public and private sector procurement opportunities have had a positive impact in promoting 
procurement opportunities to women (Bhoola 2003).
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in 2001, and at senior management level, black managers increased from 15.4% in 
2000 to 16.4% a year later (South Afnca: Department of Labour 2002, p.44).
The increase in black managers is apparent in the public sector. In 2001, there were 
62,561 African managers in the public sector compared to 19,860 in the private 
sector (Gqubule 2003). Public sector employment equity is especially important 
because the state is the largest employer with over a million people at all levels. In 
addition, for obvious political reasons, the public sector has led on the employment 
of blacks and women, particularly at managerial levels. Citing a report by Thompson 
and Woolard (2002), the CEE revealed that by 2001, 51% of public sector managers 
were African compared to 30% in 1995. In addition, black representation among 
public service managers increased from 40% to 63% in the same period (South 
Africa: Department of Labour 2002, p.41). These figures suggest that at the level of 
redistribution of employment opportunities, BEE has been successful particularly in 
the public sector though less so at higher management levels in the private sector.
Sector charters: stepping up BEE
As discussed earlier, the move towards shareholder-negotiated charters to broaden 
the impact and beneficiaries of BEE is highly illustrative of important shifts in the 
South African business and policy environment. Charters and attendant legislation 
are aimed at transforming whole sectors. Whilst newly developed charters which 
pertain to the minerals and energy, mining and finance sectors^^ did not constitute 
any part of the empirical research, they are, nonetheless, important in terms of 
highlighting key trends on the part of the state, big business and other empowerment 
stakeholders.
Some critical issues are usefully illustrated by the evolution of the charters. The first 
is the role of multi-stakeholder dialogues in negotiating a sustainable outcome 
around BEE. For example, the Energy Charter and the Minerals and Petroleum 
Development Act (South Africa 2002) provided a model for further charters and
^  The Tourism Charter was the first charter to be developed through multi-stakeholder dialogue and 
was initiated by business rather than government. This Charter does not share the same status as 
others and is discussed in the next chapter,
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secured high level of buy-in and consensus, particularly between government and 
large business.Second, charters result in the transfer of significant sectoral assets 
to black groups (as well as targets such as the management and control of industries) 
and involve the private sector in redress efforts aimed at the broader population.^^ 
The increasing focus on broader empowerment is significant since the direct 
beneficiaries of BEE were limited. Twinned with this, broader empowerment 
initiatives have yet to be promoted to deliver empowerment gains both more broadly 
and further along the value chain. However, the transfer of some economic assets 
from whites to blacks has begun. Separate sectoral initiatives, many already 
underway'®^, are likely to pursue industry specific charters and stakeholder- 
negotiated targets to deliver empowerment gains more broadly.
BEE: Black empowerment or black enrichment?
The state’s rethought empowerment agenda highlights the broad-based benefits of 
BEE. Commentators argue that this is in no small part a reaction to the political 
sensitivities around charges of elitism that has historically been linked to the growth 
of the middle class and empowerment to date (Cargill 2003, p.27). For many BEE 
critics, black and white alike, the new black elite is the fault-line running through 
BEE. As one cynical informant asserted: ‘They tell you its empowerment but don’t 
believe them ... its empowerment for whom? For how many?’ (Interviewee 14, 
white, female, NGO). In reality, most BEE deals involved the same handful of 
beneficiaries, many of whom enjoy political connections as a consequence of 
moving out of liberation politics into business (Gumede 2002; Moti and Mabaso 
2001; Ludman 2003).
^  The Energy Charter negotiations included all key players in the fuel energy industry, including 
major oil companies. They agreed to transfer 25% of the industry to blacks within a decade. The 
transfer of assets, currently at 14% but due to reach 25% by 2014, ahead of schedule (Msomi 2002; 
Gumede 2002; Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections 2002)
* For example, the Finance Charter seeks among other aims to redress tfie ‘discriminatory redlining’ 
by banks of townships and inner city neighbourhoods making it impossible for the poor to leverage 
credit to start businesses or pay for tertiary education by using their property as collateral (Gumede 
2002).
At time of writing, charters for the transport, construction and information, communications and 
technology (ICT) industries were being negotiated.
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In 1999, Mbeki called for the creation and the strengthening of a black capitalist 
class and for the formation of a ‘black bourgeoisie’, later adopted aphoristically by 
ex-activist black business people as the ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’. T h e  Marxist 
epithet, now no longer enjoying currency, was a residue of the socialist discourse 
then still employed by the ANC, and a marker of its attempt to reposition itself ‘in 
response to the real world’ (Mbeki 1999). Mbeki articulated what was for many, a 
difficult and politically awkward position:
This is, and must be, an important part of the process of the 
deracialisation of the ownership of productive property in our country.
Ours is a capitalist society. It is therefore inevitable that, in part -and 1 
repeat, in part - we must address this goal of deracialisation within the 
context of the property relations characteristic on a capitalist economy.
As part of the realisation of the aim to eradicate racism in our country, 
we must strive to create and strengthen a black capitalist class. Because 
we come from among the black oppressed, many among us feel 
embarrassed to state this goal as nakedly as we should (Mbeki 1999).
Through BEE policies, the state actively promotes the growth of a black corporate 
class. Affirmative employment legislation ensures the upward mobility of a black 
middle class; deal-brokering and patronage ensures the ascendance of a black elite 
and affirmative procurement creates the institutional support for the development of 
black SMEs. Procurement also aims to achieve broad-based economic 
empowerment, with desired consequences which see value-creation trickling down 
beyond the primary beneficiaries of BEE initiatives. Marais argues that building a 
‘patriotic bourgeoisie’ is hardly an ideological anathema to successful liberation 
movements (Marais 2001). Similarly, Gumede argues that a black middle class 
serves as a bulwark against pressures from mass constituencies and other partners in 
the tripartite alliance such as labour (Gumede 2002). Moeletsi Mbeki criticised BEE 
for its political, rather than economic, imperative arguing that BEE created a black 
elite class that protects white business rather than being a coherent economic 
strategy (Ludman 2003).
For others, this black middle-class is regarded as fundamental to a sustain the 
democratic transformation and create conditions for sustainable growth and
One interviewee described the high proportion of ex-socialists in the new black middle class as 
‘class snuggle’ (Interviewee 99, white, male, academic).
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‘therefore in the interests of all South Africans’ (Foundation for the Development of 
Africa 2003). The rise of an African capitalist class is seen to secure the 
deracialisation of South African society, as well as the sustainability of the capitalist 
system:
This sub-project [BEE] of the ‘national democratic revolution’ is 
expounded on the grounds that transformation within a capitalist system 
will be sold short if the heights of the economy remain exclusively in 
white hands. The rise of African capitalists there is also deemed to 
address a facet of the ‘national question’ (Marais 2001, p.240).
The ideological indeterminacy involved cannot be better illustrated than in the case' 
of trade union investment companies (TUICs), which are explored below. The 
emergence of a black middle class - in particular, a black corporate class - has 
established nearly 10% of blacks as the top fifth of earners in South Africa, 
compared to 2% in 1990 (Gumede 2002). A stinging criticism of the black middle 
class - one often heard in my own research - has been their ostentatious show of 
wealth (Gumede 2002; Haffajee 1998; Koch 1997a). Indeed, BEE has seen massive 
wealth accumulation by a small number of well-positioned indiv idualsw hilst the 
black middle class remains exiguous constituting a mere 4% of the country’s 
economically active population (Gqubule 2003, p.31; Heese 2003). Twinned with 
this is the enduring picture of poverty and unemployment which characterises the 
lives of the majority of South Africans. Through a sceptical prism, it might be 
argued that the robust pursuit of BEE policies by the state and other BEE 
stakeholders has also created patterns of intra-racial economic inequality not 
dissimilar to the general patterns of inter-racial economic equality that obtain. One 
informant argued: BEE is an ideological tool rather than redress of historically 
entrenched inequalities based on race’ (Interviewee 117, white, male, NGO). The 
issue raised by BEE critics and the Left, is that BEE is not about deracialising South 
Africa as claimed by state rhetoric but about deracialising wealth and continuing 
patterns of inequality.
Among the most notable are the new politically well-connected ‘comrades in business’ including 
Tokyo Sexwale, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mathews Phosa, Moss Mgoasheng, Jeff Radebe and Patrice 
Motsepe (See Gumede 2002a for more detail).
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But whilst criticisms about the new elite enriching themselves persist, is it not 
impossible for any successful capitalist society to exist without the concomitant 
accumulation of wealth and the shoring up of value in the form of profit?'®  ^Many of 
the new black elite are ‘unapologetic’ and confident capitalists. Indeed, the Minister 
of Minerals and Energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, defended new black money 
arguing that a black elite was desirable and that people legitimately engaged in 
business to become rich.^°^
Other criticisms of the new elite have concerned corporate governance issues, linked 
to cronyism and political patronage, as well as a failure to engage with CSR/CSI 
issues in a proactive way that is not strategically linked to the award of tenders and 
concessions. This raises the relationship between BEE and CSI: if a company has 
strong BEE credentials, or is simply owned and controlled by black people, does this 
suggest social responsibility? One consultant with a long history in the anti­
apartheid struggle asserted: ‘I have no hesitation in saying they [BEE companies] 
are less socially concerned and engaged’ (Interviewee 95, white, male, business). 
Indeed this was borne out by my own research in which just a clutch of large BEE 
companies had CSI programmes, notably Johnnie, Kagiso, MTN, MIC, Nail and 
J&J. Company size appeared an important factor in CSI programmes. The same 
informant generalised that most black business people saw their business 
contribution as sufficient, raising a question regarding the apparent ‘double 
standards applied to black and white businesses when it comes to social 
engagement’ (Interviewee 95, white, male, business. Another senior manager 
concurred: ‘Where are the black empowerment companies? What have they put 
back? They have done nothing!’ (Interviewee 89, white, male, business). Indeed, 
one black businessman described his company’s CSI programme as ‘making deals 
with other black companies and employing blacks in the business’ (Interviewee 88,
Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley make the point that these patterns of enrichment and 
consumption are not particular to South Africa but are evident in new elites in the former Soviet 
Union and China where ideology prevented private accumulation (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and 
Moodley 1998).
Minister Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka argued this position whilst answering a question regarding the 
appropriateness and desirability of a black elite at the conference entitled ‘Towards South Africa 
2004, Ten years of freedom’, 24-26 October 2003, London.
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African, male, business). Another senior black manager criticised this apparent 
failure and the rationale regarding delayed accumulation:
Many of them don’t even have that welfare thinking. But they can’t get 
away with it. And you can’t say, we will contribute when we have more 
money. You can never make enough money’ (Interviewee 84, African, 
male, business).
Another commentator agreed that black companies were operating on a differed 
standard regarding CSR. He argued that given black businesses were in ‘unhelpful 
funding structures’, they were engaged in ‘primitive capital accumulation’. He 
hoped that once these companies had matured (in terms of capital accumulation), 
they would look beyond their own interests (Interviewee 72, African, male, NGO). 
Another director of a large listed company explained that whilst they had no CSR 
programme, they had simply advanced equity to disadvantaged groups (Interviewee 
29, African, female, business). Like a number of other BEE companies who at the 
time did not have CSI programmes, this company has since created one.
It is unclear whether social responsibility has been put on the agenda because these 
companies have ‘matured in terms of their capitalist accumulation imperatives’, they 
see business as a social institution and CSR a moral responsibility or whether they 
see it as a business imperative given the requirement to complete for government 
contracts and tenders. Indeed, CSI activity by large black entities was reportedly 
significantly increased: large black-owned and black-controlled companies now 
voluntarily contribute to social investment programmes (Wadula 2003d). However, 
voluntary CSI contributions, both for empowerment companies and transitional 
established businesses, may be under pressure as a result of the increase in financial 
and non-financial obligations placed on businesses by sector charters (Wadula 
2 0 0 3 c ) . A t  the very least, the problematic raised significant questions concerning 
the relative importance and relevance of traditional CSI activities in relation to BEE 
in the current South African business environment.
For example, mining houses (many listed in London and now with significant black equity 
ownership as a result of the Mining Charter and attendant legislation) applying for mineral rights are 
now obliged to submit a social plan outlining their CSI activity (BusinessMap Foundation 2002e).
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The black middle-class and the new black elite are entrenched and their ranks are 
growing. For Sisk, this elite coalescence - an indigenous elite more specifically - is a 
precondition to démocratisation and indeed the spread and deepening o f democracy 
(Sisk 1995, p.250). Indeed, this is likely to be the case in the South African context 
as long as capitalism is seen to be successfully embraced by black South Africans, 
and as long as access to BEE benefits continues to accrue in ever-widening circles.
Trade union investment companies
Trade union investment companies (TUICs) have emerged as important BEE 
entities. In recent years, interest in their trade union affiliation and the controversy 
that attended their creation has waned. They have simply melded into the cohort of 
BEE enterprises that survived the vagaries of the market. However, at the time of 
my field research, the issue of TUICs was hotly debated and affected trade union 
identity and the empowerment landscape. Like other BEE companies, they emerged 
in the context of proactive state policies to create and extend a black presence in the 
economic mainstream. Like their non-union cohort, they grabbed the opportunity for 
‘relatively rapid accumulation’ that existed (Dexter 1999, p. 82). Like the plethora of 
other BEE entities emerging under favourable conditions in the latter part of the 
1990’s, TUICs became large institutional investors in JSE-listed companies, their 
primary driver being the broader pressures around capital accumulation, both 
globally and locally and its allocation in a local context.
As I have argued, the state played a pivotal role in the emergence and entrenchment 
of a black corporate class. I have asserted that the state advanced BEE for a range of 
ideological and political reasons to meet its transformation imperatives and stabilise 
the political economy. TUICs, however, differ from their mainstream cohorts in one 
critical regard. As investment companies of the trade union movement, they have 
had to bridge an ideological divide that has generally resulted in conceptual and 
semantic gymnastics in terms of their membership’s political sympathies (ka*Nkosi 
1997a).
Trade union rhetoric remains opposed to ‘capitalist globalisation’ which, consistent 
with Marxist analysis, ‘is riddled with economic and financial crises’ (Madisha
202
2000; Cosatu Central Executive Committee 2000). As late as 2000, the Trade Union 
Investment Council rationalised trade union investments companies as ‘one of the 
instruments to transform the current South African capitalist economy into a 
socialist and worker controlled economy’ (Cosatu Investment Council 2000). Trade 
unions have used other arguments to justify their engagement in market activity such 
as theirs’ was ‘capitalism with a human face’ and that trade union investment 
strategies were a ‘means of ensuring the means of production were owned by the 
workers’ or marked an ‘inevitable period of [socialist] accumulation’ (McKinley 
1999; Dexter 1999; ka'Nkosi 1997a). The rank-and-file discourse of the trade union 
movement per se has remained socialist, or at least highly ambivalent about the 
market, whilst trade union leadership appears to have embraced the market (Koch 
and Day 1997). As entities distinct from their trade unions, these companies allowed 
trade union officials (silk-and-tie socialists) to apparently elide this inherent 
contradiction although their critics raised other questions regarding accountability 
and transparency (Dexter 1999, p.84).
Uys has argued that: ‘The paradox is substantial market-orientation at union official 
level but old fashioned militancy among shop stewards and workers’ (Uys 1997, 
p.273). Indeed, the trade union movement’s hostility to privatisation and its 
continued militancy including the organisation of strike action and sit-ins in 2001 
stands in contradiction to instances where TUICs have been empowerment partners 
in the privatisation of state assets (Randall 2001).*°^ As a consequence, TUICs have 
been expressly forbidden to invest in SOEs as part of Cosatu’s opposition to GEAR 
and macroeconomic liberalisation which saw thousands of worker retrenchments but 
benefited a small group of empowerment players (Heese 2003; Also in Daniels and 
Kindra 2001). These tensions also speak to a greater and enduring disapprobation 
between the trade union movement and the government (partners in an enduring if 
fraught political alliance) around macro-economic policy, and the perception by 
trade union militants that the capitalist ANC was anti-union (Madisha 2000; Vavi 
2000; Xundu 2001).
In 1997, Cosatu's investment company was part of a consortium bidding to buy the tourism 
parastatal, Aventura. They argued that this was not contradictory to their militant anti-privatisation 
stance as Aventura was not ‘an essential service’. Statement found at 
http://gate.cosatu.org.za/pipermail/press/2002-0ctober/000155.html.
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At the height tensions, Cosatu attempted but failed to curtail directors’ fees and 
share participation rights which made a number of ex-activists into millionaires 
(Haffajee 1998). Through the Cosatu Investment Council, it also attempted to 
manage the direction, ethics and shape of TUICs, and end the growing competition 
between investment companies Kopano ke Matla and Union Alliance Holdings 
(which comprises 13 TUICs). The trade union movement was concerned that 
massive accumulation undermined the goals of socialism by benefiting only a 
proportion of blacks and ‘workers would be passing the chance to influence patterns 
of accumulation’ (Dexter 1999, p.82). However, the engagement was steeped in 
ambivalence at best and even as late as 2000, investment companies were considered 
threatening to the trade union movement: ‘the practice of investment companies 
holds many threats to the unions, [and] there is a need to align union investment 
company strategy with union principles’ (Cosatu Investment Council 2000). Trade 
union rhetoric, however, softened in the recent past and TUICs are operating under 
the same conditions as other BEE enterprises, often delivering positive returns to 
shareholders. The debates regarding the legitimacy of union investment have fizzled 
out and the enmity seems to have receded.
Whilst TUICs were vulnerable to the same market fluctuations as their BEE cohort, 
there was probably been greater scrutiny of their performance. Initially, a number of 
TUICs were considered to have questionable corporate governance operating in 
secrecy and opportunistically. A number of trade union companies declined to 
disclose financial information arguing they were private companies; however, 
millions of union members made up their shareowners and were explicitly entitled to 
such disclosure (BusinessMap 2000a, p.60). Moreover, few trade union companies 
have concerned themselves with socially responsible investment (SRI) practices, 
instead ‘adopting the capitalist logic of ruthless exploitation of all opportunities’ 
(Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert, and Moodley 1998, p.3). In addition, unionists were 
concerned about the creation of a trade union ‘bourgeoisie’ instead of concentrating 
on the empowerment of the poor and the commercialisation of the ethics of a labour 
movement underpinned by the ideals of solidarity and collectivism. Indeed, many 
questioned the motivation for TUICs and the identity of their ultimate beneficiaries.
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One success story is the Mineworkers’ Investment Company (MIC), which other 
than from R3million seed money received no funding neither from its parent union, 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), nor from provident or pension funds. 
Charged in 1995 with generating wealth for the Mineworkers Investment Trust 
(MIT), MIC has disbursed R88 million to mineworkers and their families in the 
form of bursaries, rural development funds and SMME development among other 
projects. Many of these ideological issues endure unresolved within the broader 
BEE debate on what has constituted empowerment. A number of dominant players 
emerged, including the South Africa Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union 
(Sarhwu), South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union Investment Group 
(Sactwu), the National Union of Metal Workers’ (Numsa) Investment Trust, Union 
Alliance Holdings, Cosatu’s investment company, Kopano ke Matla, and most 
notably, the Mineworkers’ Investment Company (MIC). A decade on, many of these 
trade union investment players are now mature companies, and like other BEE 
companies face the challenge sustainable empowerment shareholding as well as 
sustained value.
Development Finance Institutions (DFI)
Empowerment has been embraced by public sector investment companies in line 
with government policies. Development finance corporations explicitly reflect the 
government’s proactive stance on empowerment and socio-economic 
transformation. There is significant political pressure on the state-owned enterprise 
to deliver BEE both within its institutional framework and within its strategic 
operations. The Land Bank, the IDC and the DBSA, which are of concern here, are 
classified as DFIs and constitute three of five such public finance enterprises. In 
each, the South African state is the sole shareholder and each has a sectoral remit 
whether agriculture, infrastructure, and industry and small business development. I 
focus on three areas to examine the transformation of DFIs; employment equity, 
affirmative procurement and strategic operations.
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DFIs and Employment equity
Public sector companies set empowerment standards, particularly in the case of 
employment equity. Parastatals like the DBSA, the Land Bank and the IDC have a 
much higher proportion of black directors than in the private sector, leading to the 
assertion that ‘black people run the public sector and parastatals, while white people 
run the private sector, the engine room of the economy’: for example, Africans 
account for 71% of management positions in the public sector and a mere 9.4% in 
the private sector (Gqubule 2003, p.31). Throughout Ihe public service, blacks and 
women are well represented at all levels.
Affirmative procurement
Procurement is a powerful lever and incentive for empowerment and transformation, 
potentially delivering huge opportunities and rewards to companies. Affirmative 
procurement is an example of redistributed opportunity, particularly in the context of 
disappointing BEE performance on the JSE (Gumede 2002a, p.207). As outlined in 
Chapter Four and accented above, the state (and now major sectors through charter 
commitments) leverages policy changes through corporations, whether by the threat 
of legislation or by significant rewards and incentives. Government tenders, licenses 
and concessions are the lifeblood of many industries, and the award of such 
contracts depends on black control or ownership of equity. Moreover, the state is the 
major purchaser of goods and services with its annual R120 billion procurement 
budget (Gumede 2002). Indeed, this makes the state procurement budget a key 
policy tool for leveraging transformation in the economy. SOEs are required to 
procure affirmatively under affirmative procurement the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act of 2000. The Act attempts to develop business-like efficiency 
in the public sector whilst simultaneously advancing empowerment. With 
legislative obligations on the part of SOEs, the implication is the natural 
development of emerging businesses to meet the need for goods and services by
In addition to procurement by the public sector, it should also be noted that affirmative 
procurement is also a concern for the private sector; a policy driven by the BEE scorecard which 
entails a preferential procurement element (South Africa 2003; South Africa: Department of Trade 
and Industry 2003). Affirmative procurement is considered an indirect empowerment score along 
with investment in black-owned or black-controlled businesses (South Africa: Department of Trade 
and Industry 2003).
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government and its institutions. It also means a greater demand for finance to 
bankroll emerging businesses from DFIs such as the DBSA and, in particular, the 
IDC.
However, with enormous resources at stake and some experience, critics argue that a 
leading model of affirmative procurement has failed to emerge (Terblanche 2003, 
p. 102). Indeed, affirmative procurement has matured since its formal adoption a 
decade ago: from its beginnings as the limited outsourcing to black suppliers of 
services, to procurement by CSI/CSR programmes, to its establishment at the heart 
of business operations. But the shortage of black suppliers particularly as a 
consequence of a widespread business-skills deficiency hampers affirmative 
procurement in both the public and private sectors.^^^
Within the public sector, the state’s procurement framework is a complex set of 
guidelines, administered by some 15 000 buyers across all spheres of government 
(Terblanche 2003, p. 104). The regulatory Act (South Africa 2000) details the criteria 
against which suppliers are scored, as well as providing a weighting for preferences 
such as whether the supplier company is black-owned or the product locally 
manufactured. Some 17 ‘aims’ which advance state preferences are adumbrated 
including, among those already mentioned, female ownership, ownership by the 
disabled, regional location, youth empowerment and the use of local labour.
Whilst this sub-section has looked at the significance of affirmative procurement to 
public finance institutions, it is important to reiterate that the state’s Strategy for BB- 
BEE rewards similar private sector leveraging regarding the development of 
emerging SMEs. Partnerships and joint ventures are most often set up between 
established companies and emerging black businesses. These business ‘marriages’ 
ensure that preferences for procurement tenders are more easily met but while skills 
transfer may occur, these arrangements make emerging businesses vulnerable to
'°® While institutional racialism and limited access to finance are enduring problems for emerging 
businesses, most interviewees noted that the key obstacle is a paucity of black skill. Most SMEs fail 
(BusinessMap Foundation 2003a), and the demand for black suppliers exceeds the supply.
Within the private sector, most large companies, such as Sanlam, Sun International, SABMiller 
and most notably, Anglo America’s Zimele have set up procurement funds to develop and ensure 
affirmative suppliers (Terblanche 2003, p. 102-107).
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‘fronting’. However, more forward-thinking private sector companies such as 
Anglo’s Zimele have recognised the need for sustainable black suppliers and, where 
no black company or affirmable business existed to meet the need, the companies 
have simply created them, acting as both business developers and venture capitalists 
to black equity partners. It might be argued that here the private sector is 
championing government policy. Similarly, some private sector companies such as 
Sanlam and Sun International are, in turn, compelling their suppliers to procure 
affirmatively. Indeed, this further raises the demand for reliable and sustainable 
black supply partners. In effect, the ‘carrot-and-stick’ control is reproduced further 
down the value chain this time by private sector partners and buyers themselves: 
compliance being rewarded with continued business and non-compliance with 
sanction and business-withdrawal. Thus affirmative procurement creates the 
conditions for the redistribution of opportunity in both the public and private sectors. 
In line with the BB-BEE Strategy, affirmative procurement policies broaden the 
pool of empowerment beneficiaries and in such a way that the state directs the 
market environment and business’ respond to these structural incentives.
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)
Established in 1983, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) provides 
finance and expertise to enable infrastructural development by provincial and local 
governments, including and especially the former homelands (the TBVC States* *°). 
At a time when the DBSA was extensively bankrolling the Bantustan system, it 
funds came from the South African government or were raised on the country’s 
capital markets (Lewis 1990, p.50). In 1996, under democratic rule and then under a 
new constitutional dispensation, the DBSA was re-enacted via the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa Act, No 13 of 1997. The Bank was identified for targeted 
and accelerated transformation under the leadership of CEO Ian Goldin. Its new 
mandate was transformed to align with RDP, and later also GEAR values: ‘to 
address the social and economic imbalances that obtained, and to improve the 
quality of life for South Africans’ (Development Bank of Southern Africa 2003).
Bantustans included the ‘self-governing and independent States’ of Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, 
Bophathutswana, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, KaNgwane and QwaQwa,
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The DBSA operates explicitly in a very broad, multi-stakeholder environment, 
numbering among its development partners national and provincial government, 
local authorities, district councils, provincial development corporations. Parks 
Boards and tourism entities, statutory institutions, SADC countries^ and finally, 
the private sector. The Bank’s stated mission is ‘to maximise our contribution to 
development by mobilising and providing finance and expertise for infrastructure 
development in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Southern 
Africa’. A manager described the DBSA as a ‘change agent for the socio-economic 
development of Southern Africa’ (Interviewee 118, white, female, DFI). It 
development mandate meant a ‘move from bulk infrastructure to the heart of change 
- social infrastructure - like clinics, schools and community centres’ (Interviewee 13, 
African, male, DFI). Whilst providing infrastructural and development finance to its 
key intermediaries is the Bank’s chief activity, its mandate also covers the financing 
of sustainable development through public private partnerships (PPP). It also acts as 
a catalyst for investment (Development Bank of Southern Africa 2003).
Internal transformation was described by one senior manager as ‘incremental’ 
(Interviewee 13, African, male, DFI). Employment equity was unequivocally 
addressed in the Bank’s empowerment agenda through a transformation committee 
(Interviewee 13, African, male, DFI). A senior manager responsible for this asserted 
that the DBSA had ‘taken more decisive action that whoever did not fit in would be 
retrenched’; she was referring to the problem of ‘dead wood’, ‘white old-guard 
employees’ who were retrenched (Interviewee 64, African, female, DFI).
The Bank, like other DFIs, claims a business ‘market niche’ (Interviewee 13, 
African, male, DFI). The niche is located between government grants and the private 
sector. Indeed, no longer the recipient of government grants, the Bank competes 
with other commercial banks on the capital markets (Interviewee 13, African, male, 
DFI). This has fundamentally altered the Bank’s business orientation. Importantly, 
the Bank’s target group (and those of the Land Bank and the IDC) is not the ‘poorest 
of the poor’ but borrowing institutions (and individuals in the case of the latter two)
" ' A t  the time of research, the DBSA also worked in Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Malagascar, Seychelles and was soon to fund projects in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (Interviewee 13, African, male, DFI).
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who are overall financially sustainable. Its business-orientation means that the Bank 
must manage both risk and cost-recovery. Thus, the Bank awards development 
funding on the basis of any institution’s capacity to meet its ongoing financial and 
public service obligations, as well as its ability to leverage co-financing from other 
agencies, including government and the private sector (Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 2003). However, one critical manager at the DBSA questioned 
whether fundamental values of social justice had not been overridden by an agenda 
directed at wealth creation and growth (Interviewee 79, white, female, DFI). Having 
positioned itself thus, it is interesting to note that the Bank has never engaged in a 
social impact study or social assessment appraisal of its delivery (Interviewee 3, 
African, female, DFI; Interviewee 115, white, female, DFI; Interviewee 114, white, 
female, DFI; Interviewee 79, white, female, DFI).
As a financially self-sustaining institution, the Bank assumed the language, style and 
management systems of an efficient business-like institution. A chief challenge is to 
be both a banking and development institution. Not surprisingly, in the light of its 
business alter-ego, one senior manager lamented: ‘it gets confused with business, yet 
it has this social obligation and development angle’ (Interviewee 13, African, male, 
DFI). This tension was alluded to by a number of the Bank’s senior staff 
(Interviewee 64, African, female, DFI; Interviewee 3, African, female, DFI; 
Interviewee 79, white, female, DFI). Admittedly, as a DFI with development 
imperatives the business model causes tensions (Development Bank of Southern 
Africa 2003). The Bank recognises that whilst it is desirable to maximise private 
sector funding and involvement, it is not in a position to compete with private 
sector: it is essentially expected to support projects with higher levels of risk 
(Development Bank of Southern Africa 2000). This approach, which is often 
developmentally legitimate, may also frustrate the Bank’s twin objective of being a 
self-sustaining financial institution. The Bank also recognised early on, the power of 
affirmative procurement to leverage transformation and promote BEE in its 
operations (Development Bank of Southern Africa 2001b).
BEE was not explicitly articulated in DBSA policy (unlike the IDC, the Bank is not 
perceived as a BEE champion). Instead, as a development institution it saw
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empowerment as a core value within its institutional arrangements and, most 
significantly, at an operational level. Finance is increasingly geared towards 
facilitating access by BEE groups, particularly in the case of PPPs (Loxton 2002), 
but with a focus on financing local government and regional projects. But the key to 
the Bank’s empowerment strategy has been its radical re-invention of itself, from an 
apartheid structure to one which epitomised the new dispensation. Critics argue too, 
that in line with given interpretations of BEE policies, it is the new middle class that 
benefits from this DFI.
The Land Bank
The Land Bank provides financial services for the agricultural sector. The tension 
between servicing the poorest in society and servicing an emerging black middle 
class was demonstrated in a dramatic way in the case of the early years of the Land 
Bank’s transformation.*'^ This conflict between the needs of the poor and creating a 
black middle class is a sustained political theme, and government directed BEE 
policies evoke this enduring tension.
The tensions associated with the ANC’s transition from a broad-based liberation 
movement containing within it socialist ideals, to a political party, to a government 
facilitating the development of a black-middle class, is inherent in the narrative of 
the Land Bank’s painful and rutted transition. Nevertheless, before her departure 
Dolny oversaw significant changes in the Bank, following the recommendations of 
the Strauss Commission, to transform the provision of rural financial services 
(Strauss Commission 1996). The Commission highlighted the role of the state in 
facilitating and co-ordinating the provision of financial services for the rural poor, 
especially women. It also pointed to the role of the state in complementing the
In 1999, the CEO, Helena Dolny resigned following accusations of ‘racism, nepotism and 
corruption’. She was cleared of 11 of 12 allegations by the Katz Commission which assented that she 
had been insensitive to voices on the Land Bank’s Board who resisted her implantation of salary 
increases (Isaacson 2001). However, a more likely cause, and the same one that dogged Derek 
Hanekom, the then Land Affairs Minister of similar political persuasion, relates to the fact that Dolny 
was ‘white leftist’ (Isaacson 2001; Barron 2001; Robertson 1997). Indeed, the internal transformation 
of the Land Bank was often conflict-filled. Dolny’s successor, acting CEO Totsie Memela, was also 
accused of malfeasance and nepotism and was later cleared. Smear campaigns directed at both Dolny 
and Memela were widely covered in the press (Mboyane and Mokoena 2001; Business Day 2001h; 
Mothibeli 2001; Farmer's Weekly 2001; Robertson 1997).
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private sector and improving efficiency by supporting the market (Dolny 2001, 
p.57). In line with these recommendations, the focus of the Land Bank’s operations 
has also shifted in line with national priorities: from a ‘clientele of largely white 
commercial farmers’, the Land Bank began to focus on blacks, women and 
emerging farmers, the previously ‘non-bankable’ (Mahlangu 2001; Strauss 
Commission 1996). True to this mandate, 68% of the banks new ‘step-up’ clients 
were black women (The Land Bank 1999, p. 18). Indeed, the wholesale 
transformation of the Land Bank also meant reducing bureaucracy, a more efficient 
business model and management structure, and addressing the demographics of the 
top management structure (The Land Bank 2000). The most overarching 
transformation involved making the Bank’s business relevant and appropriate to new 
development demands.
The implementation of employment equity was also uneven given the Land Bank 
staff demographics. Until the transformation process was initiated in 1996, the Land 
Bank still served the white farming community as it had since its inception in 1912. 
It actively avoided lending money to black farmers and did not support black 
farmers in freehold areas or the Bantustans, although middle class white farmers in 
these ‘states’ were serviced (The Land Bank 2001a). In 1948, The Bank was served 
‘a specific mandate to serve and support white Afrikaans-speaking farmers’ (The 
Land Bank 2000). Indeed, the Land Bank’s staff reflected its clientele. 
Retrenchments and redeployment followed initial transformation: ‘the affirmative 
action story was an ongoing sore point with white males who for decades had been 
the powerhouse of the Bank’ (Dolny 2001, p. 171). For example, the 1999 Annual 
Report accounts that as an employment equity process was initiated, staff at Head 
Office was reduced by 59% (The Land Bank 1999a, p.25).
The Land Bank reconstituted itself as a development institution (Interviewee 62, 
white, male, DFI). It transformed its governance and management structures, 
implemented aggressive employment equity policies and crucially, realigned its 
business. In realignment Land Bank re-designed its products to establish distribution 
channels which accelerated financing to black and women farmers (The Land Bank 
1999a, p.23). It also provides loans for land reform beneficiaries, first time
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agricultural property purchase, assistance with rescheduling debt for black farmers, 
lower interest rate products for commercial farmers to create incentives for job 
creation as well as land and housing improvement on established farms. The Bank 
established micro-loans schemes for emerging black farmers in primary agriculture. 
It also set up satellite offices to make the Land Bank more accessible to poor black 
rural farmers (The Land Bank 2001; 1999, p.7-11). In tailoring loans for emerging 
black farmers, the Bank flouted conventional banking wisdom which pegged loans 
to collateral, the most common stumbling block experienced by black entrepreneurs; 
instead loans were delinked from the ‘collateral fetish’ and adjusted to track record 
and repayment potential (Dolny 2001, p. 109-111). A number if interviewees from 
the Bank pointed to this key tension between profit and responsibility, and cost 
recovery and development (Interviewee 49, African, male, DFI; Interviewee 50, 
white, male, DFI; Interviewee 54, coloured, male, business; Interviewee 89, African, 
male, DFI)
Whilst the poor were not yet part of the Bank’s existing c l i e n t e l e t h e  Bank is 
actively training and grooming emerging farmers from disadvantaged communities 
to become full-fledged clients (Interviewee 54, coloured, male, business; 
Interviewee 49, African, male, DFI). In the interim, the Land Bank instituted its 
CSI-type programmes, awarding non-repayable grants rather than loans to small 
farmers to facilitate business skills development, training, capacity development and 
alternative farming methods (Raboroko 2001; Meintjies 2001). Percentage profit 
from the Bank’s development finance model accrues towards this CSR activity. An 
interviewee acknowledged that these grants were seen by commercial clients as a 
subsidy for black farmers but he argued: ‘The Land Bank’s commercial imperative 
is linked with its development imperative’ (Interviewee 54, coloured, male, 
business).
At the time of field research, unlike the DBSA, the Land Bank (which was not 
subject to the Procurement Act) had hardly begun to look at the empowerment 
potential of affirmative procurement (Interviewee 50, white, male, DFI). Given the
Emerging black farmers account for just 2% of the Bank’s business (Interviewee 49, African, 
male, DFI).
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emphasis on affirmative procurement just a few years later, the Land Bank’s 
targeted procurement policy surprisingly lacked substance and any operational detail 
(The Land Bank 2001b). The procurement policy lacked significant operational 
detail despite recognition of its broad based potential and strategic importance to the 
Bank and its mandate (Interviewee 49, African, male, DFI; Interviewee 50, white, 
male, DFI; Interviewee 54, coloured, male, business).
The Land Bank’s transformation and leadership controversy received significant 
media coverage. What was less well covered, however, was the Bank’s ground­
breaking social accounting report (The Land Bank 1999). Measuring our Mandate 
was a brave and progressive move to measure and report on the impact of the Land 
Bank on its stakeholders. It joined a small number cf private sector companies in 
providing social reports which suggest good governance, along with a high level of 
accountability and transparency. The Bank’s social account occurred at a time of 
great flux and great possibility: unfortunately, the exercise was never repeated. The 
social report exercise, however, underscored the importance of stakeholder 
management as well as the issues of good governance, accountability and reporting 
which are gaining momentum globally and which are strongly associated with 
investor confidence.
The Industrial Development Corporation
Of the DFIs, the IDC has been most robustly geared to deliver around BEE. Like the 
Land Bank, prior to transformation the IDG’s clientele was largely drawn from the 
white Afrikaans-speaking community. Established in 1940, the IDC was established 
to remedy the ‘poor white’ problem and to provide financing to white entrepreneurs 
(Morathi 2003), as well as spur industrialisation. War shortages led to an 
amendment by Parliament to allow the IDC to establish as well as operate industries. 
Afrikaans businesses were established or equity was taken in a number of large 
corporations including Sasol, Foskor, South African Industrial Cellulose 
Corporation, Sappi, Synthetic Rubber company, Sapekoe, Palaborwa Mining, Iscor 
and the forerunner to Richard’s Bay Minerals (Ngqula 2003). In the 1980s, the IDC 
transferred its assets to the Small Business Development Corporation, launching a 
venture capital scheme to assist entrepreneurs in high-technology manufacturing. As
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well as identifying and exploiting new industrial opportunities, as a DFI the IDC had 
to address the transformation of its existing business in line with the new 
constitutional dispensation in which it operated. In the 1990s, the IDC was given the 
mandate of advancing BEE and developing SMEs by providing development 
finance for emerging industrialists and entrepreneurs (Morathi 2003). The IDC 
began to prioritise BEE with significant funding commitments to BEE in the tourism 
industry, the warehousing of shares for BEE groups and loan finance to black 
consortia to finance equity stakes in the first two of South Africa’s cellular 
communications operations. The IDC also embraced a broader African role in line 
with NEPAD, establishing partnerships and projects in 21 African countries, such as 
funding for the Mozambique Aluminium Smelter. In addition, its own internal 
human resource transformation is reflected in 78% of its top management and 80% 
of its professional staff being drawn from designated groups, namely, blacks, 
women and disabled people (Industrial Development Corporation 2003a).
BEE is a strategic business sector within the IDC and its priority is reflected in a 
new management structure which has the oversight of empowerment as the chief 
role of one of three top executives (Singh 2003). The IDC’s empowerment agenda is 
embedded in its financing criteria. Empowerment financing alone accounts for 32% 
- or R6 billion - of all financing projects (Ngqula 2003; Industrial Development 
Corporation 2003). The IDC claims a broad-based knock-on effect with 13,000 jobs 
created as a result of BEE development financing in 2002 (Industrial Development 
Corporation 2003a). The IDC has positioned itself as the key financer of BEE, 
financing equity, quasi-equity and loan finance across all industrial and some service 
sectors. BEE is a growth area and the need to finance empowerment activity has 
been accelerated by increasing pressure for public and private sector affirmative 
procurement, as well as new legislation and sectoral empowerment charters. 
However, a strong politically-driven BEE agenda has embroiled the IDC in some 
controversy: the selection of empowerment partners over established business with 
strong BEE credentials has revealed some selection inconsistencies (Shone 2003; 
Thole 2003).
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Like the DBSA and the Land Bank, the IDC’s transformation and empowerment 
imperatives have to operate in the context of a business imperative to maintain 
financial independence and profitability. Indeed, achieving the requisite balance of 
business sustainability and transformation are issues that also affect the private 
sector. With the state as sole shareholder in each, these DFIs generally appear to be 
managing the tension successfully. Moreover, as public investors in BEE, DFIs are 
obligated to advance BEE whilst ensuring sustainable development in South Africa 
and the region.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the articulation of the state and market relationship in one 
key sector, investment companies. It examined BEE companies in general, as well 
as TUICs and public sector DFIs. In exploring how policies are driven in the 
investment sector, I have focussed on the political and economic imperatives of BEE 
in a SCSD framework.
The SCSD framework advanced in this thesis argues that the state and market are 
co-partners in social and economic development. Applying the framework to the 
investment sector raises a number of pertinent issues. At the most abstract level it 
presents a sectoral case study which establishes BEE as a social development 
imperative. It also established a directive and underwriting state, and corporate 
social engagement in response to the particularities of the market environment. BEE 
policies are principally concerned with the allocation of investment capital and the 
concomitant redistribution of opportunity. BE policies are social and economic, as 
well as strongly political and ideological in nature. Thus, the framework can be 
usefully applied to BEE since the state and market operate in concert to transform 
the socio-economic patterns.
Unlike welfare-type social policies which redistribute wealth directly, BEE relies on 
the market mechanisms to redistribute opportunity. Employment equity and
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affirmative procurement are crucial to broadening the benefits of BEE."'^ The 
creation, facilitation and exploitation of empowerment opportunities are crucial 
elements since BEE policies focus on market-driven social development. The state 
and market act in concert to shift patterns of wealth, access to business opportunities 
and market benefits as has been demonstrated empirically at least for a narrow band 
of beneficiaries. Thus, the SCSD fi-amework can be usefully applied to BEE and its 
expression in the investment sector, in both public and private arenas.
The majority of BEE activity occurs in the investment sector, making it highly 
illustrative of the tensions that exist around BEE. BEE companies require definition 
given the potential rewards and opportunities they might exploit. This raises the 
tension between ownership and control of entities and the apparent a disjuncture 
between BEE policy and implementation, notably in the private sector. While 
actively seeking to redress economic imbalances, early narrowly interpreted BEE 
failed because it stressed the acquisition of equity at the expense of other 
empowerment. The most obvious and apparent transfer of wealth has benefited a 
small number of people, usually the black professional and corporate classes and a 
politically positioned black elite. This disjuncture and the development of black elite 
interests are particularly evident in the investment sector. BEE has altered the racial 
complexion of privilege but deep economic inequalities still obtain. Broad based 
policy attempts to promote more inclusive strategy aimed at the social and economic 
development of the whole of black society.
BEE is a highly contested policy which seeks to appease a number of different 
stakeholders. Government argues BEE is a mechanism for delivering growth, 
development and enterprise formation. Racial minorities and investors are 
ambivalent about BEE policies, the latter quick to interpret these policies as 
redistributionist and to demonstrate their discontentment with sanction. Most black 
people lack the necessary capital to exploit BEE opportunities which ostensibly 
meets the criteria of social justice but which relatively few enjoy. Local and global 
investors constitute another stakeholder groups who are especially concerned with
With reliance on market forces, there is, of course, no guarantee that BEE will necessarily result in 
the broad redistribution of wealth.
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return on investment. BEE companies must to meet this same obligation while 
sustaining their empowerment profile, particularly where these credentials have 
resulted in the award of contracts and licences, and where further business is sought 
from the state.
Government is a robust and committed driver of BEE. BEE is generally seen as a 
non-negotiable policy with which all stakeholders must comply although the state 
seeks to develop consensus between stakeholders. At the time of field research, 
many prominent white business people were still uncomfortable with the political 
and legislative processes underway. One privately called the non-negotiable nature 
of BEE policies ‘coercive redistribution’ and evidence of a ‘failed social contract’ 
although ironically the same businessman was seen to support BEE (Interviewee 20, 
white, male, business). A BEE commentator explained that ‘companies don’t like 
prescription’ (Interviewee 133, white, male, business). Another saw BEE as ‘state 
failure to protect the competition imperative of markets’ (Interviewee 38, white, 
male, business organisation). However, despite resistance, the state has been able to 
pursue BEE regardless. Government is the major consumer of goods and services 
and thus can leverage social and economic transformation through targeted 
procurement. Procurement opportunities offered by the state, SOEs, DFIs and 
voluntarily by the private sector are likely to develop a larger cadre of black 
businesses for the supply of goods and services. Through extensive policy and 
legislative instruments, the state has created strong incentive for the development of 
SMEs.
It is clear that industries will continue to pursue sector-specific targets for the 
transfer of the economy to black hands. One might argue that the government’s 
strategy to encourage private sector partnerships in the development of sector 
charters is likely to build a movement for economic transformation driven by a wide 
range of stakeholders (Gqubule 2003). Moreover, visible success in certain sectors 
creates a political and even normative pressure on other sectors to lend unequivocal 
support to economic transformation as it is defined in the discourse of BEE. The 
state’s role in supporting empowerment is a critical lever for BEE.
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Whilst there is a long-standing and well developed CSR/CSI culture, BEE is not a 
CSR capacity. As far as business engagement is concerned, CSR/CSI is unevenly 
embraced by South African business depending on their size, market position and 
public profile. Generally, CSR remains a corporate add-on based on normative 
principles practiced by large corporations, and increasingly by those seeking BEE 
credentials linked to the award of state contracts. Sectoral charters also emphasise 
social engagement in the form of CSR programmes alongside equity transfer. BEE, 
however, is the key strategic issue, far surpassing the perceived relevance and 
impact of CSR. This has implications for the SCSD framework: corporate social 
engagement as CSR is limited whereas social and economic engagement which lies 
at the heart of business concerns has far greater capacity to alter economic patterns, 
a stated aim of BEE.
Smaller black-owned and black controlled businesses have wider opportunities to 
exploited empowerment. Access to credit and to skills development would 
potentially deliver empowerment further down the value chain, and accrue 
significant legitimacy for the government’s BEE policies among the poor and the 
sceptical. More especially, whilst BEE has benefited the small but growing black 
middle class through employment equity legislation, skills development, enterprise 
charters, and access to credit, among other mechanisms, the chief challenge remains 
to make BEE broad-based and more equitable.
Finally, investment companies are geared towards the accumulation and allocation 
of capital. Investment companies illustrate the chief challenges facing South Africa: 
to deliver post-apartheid redress, ensure growth and stability, and become globally 
competitive. The state has laid a premium on business activity, which was for the 
most part accepted by most stakeholders as part of the reality of doing business in 
South Africa. BEE as redistribution of opportunity accords with market principles, 
and such strategies are congruent with imperatives for global competitiveness. As 
one interviewee stated: ‘In the long term, ‘business is business’ whether you are 
black or white. Global forces do not distinguish. The determining economic factor is 
supply and demand’ (Interviewee 23, African, male, business). Investment
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companies offer, in a single sector, many of the key issues and challenges facing 
SCSD in South Africa.
The following chapter looks at the second sectoral case study, tourism. Many issues 
explored in this chapter - particularly regarding BEE - are further developed with 
reference to the tourism sector in South Africa.
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CHAPTER SIX: TOURISM
Introduction
The second empirical chapter of the thesis analyses the tourism sector. Like the 
previous chapter, which examined investment companies and BEE, this chapter 
scrutinises the sector with reference to the state-corporate social development 
(SCSD) framework. This case study examines state-underwritten forms of market 
transfer within the tourism sector and the response of the private sector in terms of 
corporate social engagement. I continue to explore the development and 
implementation of BEE policy and corporate responses in light of the particular 
business drivers of the sector.
I wish to rehearse my reasons for selecting tourism as a case study. First, tourism is 
perceived as an economic and social ‘fix all’, and is given primacy in the state’s 
national agenda for its perceived potential to deliver social and economic 
development. Second, in response the sector has in recent years begun to co-ordinate 
its activities to better exploit its potential and begin to address broad issues of 
transformation. Third, the tourism industry is a highly complex and diversified 
industry. It encompasses other aligned sectors such as transport and catering and 
hospitality, and can further be differentiated into business size and tourism type. The 
social responses of large corporations may differ from smaller ones but in concert 
are likely to have impact. Fourth, tourism is highly dependent on strong stakeholder 
relationships for its viability, requiring a working social contract that ensures a safe 
and stable environment. Finally, the state has recognised its own leverage in the 
tourism industry given the opportunities it has to award concessions and licences. 
The state contends that tourism might be a powerful lever to advance the 
government’s empowerment agenda.
The first section of the chapter presents an overview of tourism as a diverse sector, 
examining its importance to the economy and its potential as an instrument of 
development. South African tourism is located within the global industry, examining 
some of the key issues and trends including the challenges of transformation. I
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explore the role of the state, and responses of corporations to BEE with reference to 
tourism. The second particularly presents three case studies of unequal length, 
drawn from the field research: (a) the government’s Lubombo Spatial Development 
Initiative (SDI) in the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park in northern KwaZulu-Natal, a 
government-initiated ecotourism tourism development node; (b) CCAfrica, a 
private-sector ecotourism enterprise; and, (c) three of the largest hotel businesses in 
South Africa, namely. Southern Sun, Sun International and Protea Hotels. Each of 
these traditionally white-owned businesses has engaged with the imperative to 
transform in different ways. The chapter concludes with a discussion on 
stakeholding and the social contract in tourism.
PART ONE: An Overview of Tourism in South Africa 
Global Tourism as development catalyst
It is important to locate South African tourism within the international tourism 
arena. Globally tourism is considered on the key drivers for economic and social 
development, particularly in the developing world (WTTC 1998). Travel and 
tourism are the largest earners of foreign currency, involving the free cross-border 
flows of both capital and people. Worldwide, tourism’s contribution to GDP is 12% 
(DEAT 2000, p. 13), accounting for more than 200 million jobs worldwide (WTTC 
2003a). Tourism is one of the world’s largest and fastest growing industries (WTTC 
2003a) and the principal export for one third of developing countries. The growth in 
tourism can be attributed to rising standards of living in developed countries, 
declining travel costs, changing demographics, globalisation, and the increased 
demand for exotic travel experiences (Goodwin 2000).
Within the extensive literature on tourism, critiques of tourism in developing 
countries and as a strategy for development and poverty alleviation are particularly 
relevant. Harrison notes that most tourism scholarship operates - implicitly or 
explicitly - from a position derived broadly from modernisation theory, which 
contends that:
Tourism is seen as a valuable aid to national, regional and local
development, with capital investment and the transfer of skills specific
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to tourism leading to increased employment and general prosperity 
through changes in the infrastructure and through the operation of the 
various kinds of Keynesian multipliers. According to this perspective, 
there is no doubt that capitalism, and capitalist-run tourism, brings 
development (Harrison 1994, p.249).
As a number of authors caution, the automatic positive correlation between a 
burgeoning tourism industry and economic growth needs to be viewed critically 
(Harrison 1992, p. 15-17; Mowforth and Munt 1998; Sautter and Leisen 1999; 
Scheyvens 1999; WTTC 2002e). Some critics argue that failure to place tourism and 
its impact within a development framework ‘also perpetuates class and regional 
inequalities, economic problems and social tension’ (Britton 1982, p.332). However, 
for many countries, particularly developing countries, tourism retains its promise of 
generating foreign exchange, increasing employment opportunities and attracting 
investment capital (Aylward and Lutz 2003; Business Day 200Id; Letsema 
Consulting 2002; Sinclair 1998).
Tourism is commonly characterised as an ‘instrument’ of development because 
consumption occurs at the place of production. In mature economies, the tourism 
sector is an important source of employment and revenue. In developing economies, 
it is often seen as a ‘panacea for economic malaise’ (Opperman and Chon 1997, 
p. 16, citing Cater 1987; Also in Hay 2000, p. 153). The most positive outcomes 
occur when there are business linkages between tourism and other economic sectors, 
and also when tourism is successfully integrated into the local economy to advance 
developmental goals (Freitag 1994; The Cluster Consortium 1999). Linkages with 
other sectors have a potentially high impact on the local economy; both formal and 
informal (DEAT 2002; Moosa 2001 (circa); Opperman 1993, p.536, p.538-9; South 
Africa 1996; South Africa Foundation 1999). These development goals are enabled 
most effectively when there is minimal cost to the environment and culture (Sautter 
and Leisen 1999, p.313; Ashley, Boyd, and Goodwin 2000). However, as Opperman 
observes, there are macro-economic and structural limitations to what tourism can 
realistically achieve, with the diffusion or trickle-down of benefits often exaggerated 
(Opperman 1993, p.539-541). This research confirms this view, with one informant 
cautioning: ‘Tourism has been blown out of all proportion in terms of what it is 
expected to deliver’ (Interviewee 57, white, female, DFI).
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Nonetheless, multiple benefits from tourism are likely with economic 
diversification. This diversification occurs as local economies meet tourists’ 
demands entailing investment, the production of capital, as well as for consumer 
goods and services (Harrison 1994, p.236; Ashley, Boyd, and Goodwin 2000). For 
instance, in the case of ecotourism, Oldham et al. indicate that the supply of 
ecotourism facilities requires capital input in land and infrastructural investment, as 
well as labour. Various other ancillary provision is necessary such as food and 
beverages, power, water and transport. The downstream supply of these goods and 
services has important employment implications, while expenditure on wages (as 
well as on goods and services) generates a multiplier effect which creates 
employment indirectly (Oldham, Creemers, and Reback 2000, p. 176-177; WTTC
1998).
Social policy has increasingly been concerned with pro-poor and integrated social 
development, a critical trend that extends into debates around tourism. Pro-poor 
tourism (PPT) attempts to place poverty at the centre of the tourism agenda; an 
agenda that aims at generating net benefits for the poor (Ashley, Boyd, and 
Goodwin 2000; Goodwin 2000, p.2). These benefits are chiefly in the form of 
employment and business opportunities, although the majority of opportunities for 
the poor are located in the informal sector (Department for International 
Development (DFID) 1999; Roe, Goodwin, and Ashley 2002). Advocates of PPT 
criticise national governments and donors for failing to take the specific needs and 
opportunities of the poor into account (Ashley, Boyd, and Goodwin 2000).^^^ Whilst 
not appropriate for all tourism environments, PPT is successful at ‘tilting’ the 
economic margins; it is most effective in multi-stakeholder partnerships, in remote 
areas where the impact of tourism is significant and where opportunities exist ‘for 
reducing vulnerability for many and providing exits from poverty for some’ (Ashley, 
Goodwin, and Roe 2001; Pro-Poor Tourism 2002; Roe and Urquhart 2001). PPT 
attempts to involve communities as stakeholders in securing tangible economic
115 ppY gigQ underscores the negative Impact and distribution of the social, environmental and 
economic costs and benefits of tourism. For instance, women are more likely than men to suffer from 
natural resource scarcity, as well as cultural and sexual exploitation. They also benefit most from the 
provision of infrastructure such as piped water and electricity which are often consequences of 
tourism development (Goodwin 2000, p.3).
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benefits. The PPT model is congruent with the SCSD framework developed in this 
thesis, particularly since it emphasises the role of the market, in concert with the 
state in delivering social and economic development.
Tourism in South Africa
The strategic importance of tourism in South Africa must be seen as part of the 
fundamental restructuring of the economy, away from primary production (namely 
mining and agriculture) towards a more diverse economy with a greater emphasis on 
the service sector, including tourism (DEAT 1997, 2001; South Africa 1996). 
Indeed, by 2002, tourism had surpassed mineral production in terms of export value 
(Abedian 2004).
Tourism is an important sector in terms of its revenue-earning potential. In 2002, 
tourism’s (direct and indirect) contribution to the GDP was R72.5 billion, 7.1% of 
the total national GDP (South African Tourism 2003; WTTC 2002e). The 
importance of the tourism sector to the South African economy is outlined below:
Economic impact of travel and tourism in 2002
491,741 Direct tourism jobs representing 2.9% of total employment
R32.8 billion Direct contribution of travel and tourism to GDP (2.9%)
1,118,530 Direct and indirect tourism jobs (7.3%)
R82.7 billion Direct and indirect contribution of travel and tourism to GDP (7.3%)
R43.4 billion Travel and tourism exports, services and merchandise (12.1%)
R25.6 billion Travel and tourism capital investment (14.1%)
Rl.O billion Government travel expenditures (0.6%)
Table 6.1: Direct and indirect economic impact of travel and tourism in 
South Africa, 2003
Source: Adapted from South Afncan Travel and Tourism Satellite Account, WTTC, 2003
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South Africa has also been marketed with ‘evangelical zeal’ promoting, its climate, 
scenic beauty, cultural diversity, political history and eco-tourism attractions, all 
underpinned by highly developed transport and telecommunications infrastructure. 
South Africa markets its product as ‘an African experience’ of high quality (Letsema 
Consulting 2002, p.7).
In recent years the South African tourism industry has enjoyed substantial growth, 
which has been both steady and sustained (Business Day 200 li; Fraser 2002; South 
African Tourism 2001; 2002, p.7; Thiel 2004). Statistics indicate that there were 6.4 
million foreign tourists in 2002, compared to 5.9 million in 2000 (South African 
Tourism 2003; Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein 2001),'*^ the world’s greatest 
growth of 11.1%. Regional tourism from Africa accounts for 72% of arrivals in 
South Africa; land-based travel from neighbouring Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries represents 92% of these (South African Tourism 
2002, p.l4).
Tourism growth coincided with the end of apartheid which saw increased 
international travel from prime markets in the UK and Europe (especially former 
cultural boycott supporters). Overseas tourist arrivals increased by 52% from 1994 
to 1995 alone (National Investment Promotions Agency and DEAT 1999 circa). 
South Africa has a vibrant and well-established domestic tourism industry (WTTC 
2002e, p. 18). Domestic tourism remains the mainstay of the industry (South African 
Tourism 2003, p .ll;  Haffajee and Goodenough 2001; Business Day 2001i).'*^ 
Democratic transition saw an expanding black middle class and the removal of 
travel restrictions imposed on black people domestically (Allen and Brennan 2002). 
The domestic tourism market is expected to grow as ‘historically disadvantaged 
people become tourists and travellers’ (DEAT 2002, p.2).
The 2002 boom can partly be attributed to increased travel to conferences such as the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), and the African Union Summit (South African 
Tourism 2003).
The viability and growth of international tourism to a country is directly linked to the strength of 
the domestic tourism industry. Domestic tourism’s share of the market is 66% which augurs well for 
future international tourism (Unnamed informant, personal communication, May 2004).
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Trends in South African tourism
Some key trends are critical to the sustained ability of the tourism industry to meet 
the high expectations as a ‘strategic industry’ enabling socio-economic development 
goals (Mafisa Planning and Research 2002; Koch 1998).*** These drivers include the 
competitive advantage of diversity, global industry dynamics, state capacity and 
harmonisation, as well as leadership and coordination of the sector. A further factor 
is strong social contracts required to promote a stable, crime-free and tourist-friendly 
environment. The final driver is a strong institutional base with government-driven 
market incentives advancing a BEE agenda which broaden the benefits for social 
and economic development (Segel 2001).
Industry diversity
The South African tourism industry is a complex and diverse industry and has been 
described as an ‘anarchic sector’ (Addison 2001). Tourism occurs within a complex 
nexus of stakeholders and interest groups, encompassing multiple government 
departments (primarily DEAT but also Trade and Industry, Arts and Culture and 
Foreign Affairs), provincial and local government, tribal authorities, municipalities, 
provincial tourism authorities, large JSE-listed corporations, industry associations, a 
wide range of accommodation and transport providers, leisure business, adventure 
and cultural tours operators, lodge owners, ecotourism operators, game farmers, 
national parks interests, township operators, conference operations, casinos, heritage 
operators, trade unions, secondary service providers and suppliers, banks and DFIs. 
It is clearly a challenge to coordinate such a complex groups of stakeholders, and 
harder still to co-ordinate these efforts to maximise and harmonise tourism to ensure 
broader development gains.
Global dynamics
Like elsewhere, the South Africa tourism market is ‘prone to rapid and erratic 
changes in performance’ (Hay 2000, p. 152). The greatest threat to the global - and
The environmental affects of tourism, closely linked with sustainability issues raises a set of 
debates with which I will not engage further.
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South African - tourist economy is global economic recession (South African 
Tourism 2003, p. 18). Many of the problems of the South Africa tourism industry are 
also those experienced by emerging industries globally. These include the hck of 
institutional control, stakeholder co-operation, and professionalism, as well as short- 
termism and the challenges of balancing regulation and entrepreneurialism. In 
addition. South Africa’s specific social and economic milieu, characterised by high 
unemployment and a racially skewed distribution of wealth, creates unique 
challenges for transforming the economy, not least of all, the tourism sector. Where 
opportunities exist for smaller enterprises to become established, weak business 
linkages within the private sector, and between the public and private sectors limit 
growth (The Cluster Consortium 1999).
Government capacity
In line with liberal economic policies, the state has restructured (or is in the process 
of restructuring) its assets. At the highest level, government has shown a strong 
commitment to the sector. Tourism is both a national and provincial concern - with 
relatively limited capacity in the latter - and it appears that provinces formulate their 
own tourism policies, often in competition with each other (Addison 2001). Tourism 
development strategy and the roles of national, provincial and local government are 
outlined in a slew of government policy documents.**^ The White Paper also goes so 
far as to adumbrate the roles of all stakeholders involved in the industry (South 
Africa 1996, p.47-59). However, the low rate of investment, ‘the insufficient focus 
on implementation and limited return in investment’ have hampered tourism’s 
projected development (WTTC 2002e, p.4).
During interviews, some business informants criticised government for over­
regulating the business environment, stifling the emergence of enterprise and 
reducing price competition among larger players. A number also criticised the state 
for high levels of corporate tax and unsustainable labour legislation. The tourism
Key policy documents informing South African tourism strategy, include ‘Institutional Guidelines 
for Public Sector Tourism Development and Promotion in South Afnca'(South Africa 1999), ‘White 
Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism in South Africa’ (South Africa 1996), 
‘National responsible tourism development guidelines for South Africa’ (DEAT 2002) and ‘A 
Transformation Strategy for the South African Tourism Industry’ (DEAT 2001).
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industry has spawned over 70 sector specific pieces of tourism legislation and policy 
protocols (Interviewee 5, white, male, government).*^® Regulation was a common 
point of concern among informants across sectors reflecting a key challenge for 
government in balancing over-regulation and adequate control of a disparate sector. 
The tension also operates at a macro-economic level where the overarching concern 
for government is social and economic transformation whilst competing in the 
global investment marketplace.
Aviation policy
Given the nature of the industry, airlines cannot easily adjust their capacity 
seasonally. This inflexibility results in increased ticket prices and compromises 
profitability (South African Tourism 2003, p.23). South African aviation policy has 
been criticised as needing liberalisation particularly to attract long-haul services and 
develop regional networks (Finance Week 1999; WTTC 2002f). Aviation policy can 
be a ‘tool for the broader development of travel and tourism and job creation’ 
(WTTC 2002e, p.9). In attempting to liberalise South Africa aviation. South Africa 
is privatising its national carrier South African Airways (SAA) as well as engaging 
in some ‘hard ball’ bilateral negotiations regarding ‘open skies’ policies (Cole 
2001a; WTTC 2002e, p.42-45.). For a developing country to own its own airline is 
more than a political statement since it reduces the country’s dependency on other 
countries and foreign airlines (Interviewee 21, African, male, business/parastatals). 
One informant in the tourism industry remarked: ‘It is in our best interest to have as 
many flights as possible coming into South Africa. After all, if our job is to create 
demand for the destination, we must ensure we have the capacity to meet it. But it is 
not that simple.’ (Unnamed informant, personal e-mail communication, January 
2004).
Liberalising aviation policy is a complex problem. However, despite these 
difficulties. South African tourism appears to maximising opportunities. Whilst a 
long-haul destination. South Africa markets itself as an ‘overnight destination’
In relation to the plethora of legislation in South Africa, the same interviewee pointed out that 
tourism companies in Mozambique enjoy 100% tax-break.
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stressing its competitive advantage as a no-jetlag destination: a convenient branding 
of ‘aperitif, nice dinner, sound nap and voila\ You’re in sunny South Africa!’ 
(Interviewee 12, African, male, government). In addition. South Africa has proved 
itself capable of exploiting other opportunities in niche markets, such as sports 
events, conferencing, the gay and lesbian market, and the culture and cultural history 
market (Finance Week 1999; Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein 1997, p.7; Joseph 
2001; Sekeleni 2001; Streek 2001; WTTC 2002e).
Leadership and co-ordination
The tourism sector has historically lacked leadership. One informant called it a 
‘fractured, fragmented and diverse industry’ (Interviewee 111, African, female, 
business organisation). There are a number of industry associations but their 
relationships have often been characterised by narrow self-interest and rivalry. 
Tourism business leaders led an important initiative comprising a wide range of over 
650 tourism stakeholders - from tourism businesses, government, unions, industry 
associations, consultants, NGOs - called the Cluster Consortium. A significant 
output of the Consortium’s Strategy in Action was the development of the Charter o f  
Empowerment and Transformation in the Tourism Industry (the Tourism Charter) 
(Tourism Business Council of South Africa 2001a). This process secured the co­
involvement of business as partners in South Africa’s tourism policy, its strategic 
direction and implementation (South Africa 1996, p.35).
The effect of crime on tourism and the social contract
This final sub-section on trends in South Africa tourism takes a detailed and sector- 
specific look at the issue of crime. Crime, the world over, is a considerable obstacle 
to tourism. South Africa is not unique in facing this problem (Interviewee 5, white, 
male, government initiative). Public insecurity is generated by perception of the risk 
o f ‘random’ crime (Marais 2001, p. 196-7; South African Tourism 2003a). Poor 
rule of law and inadequate policing contribute to these perceptions (Leeman 2001).
Crime disproportionately affects the poor and women, and largely occurs in the home where the 
victim knows the attacker.
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Indeed, perceptions of South Africa as a violent destination, well publicised in the 
media, are likely to be signalled to both investors and tourists (Chait 2000; DEAT 
2000c; Hay 2000, p,153; Hood 2000; Mackay 2000; Thiel 2000). High levels of 
crime, both real and perceived, are obstacles to tourism numbers, entrepreneurship 
and investment (Aylward and Lutz 2003, p.417; Business Day 200If; Kathrada, 
Burger, and Dohnal 1999).
Both the state and the private sector acknowledge crime as a threat to tourism 
sustainability. Whilst the reasons for crime are various and complex, the incidence 
of both endemic poverty and raised expectations following démocratisation are 
certainly contributory factors (Interviewee 117, white, male, NGO). While tourism 
crime has been concentrated around centres like Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
Durban, tourists are increasingly targeted in rural areas and at popular outlying 
attractions (Hlatshwayo 2002). Current public-private initiatives between 
government and business attempt to tackle crime gven its potential to undermine 
tourism sustainability (Graham 2000).^^^
Crime, of course, has an injurious impact beyond the tourist economy. Managing the 
problem is hardly simple. Business organisations such as the Business Trust and 
BAC have identified crime as a key barrier to tourism growth, and more broadly, 
investment in South Africa. These policies are premised on the relatively ‘crude’ 
assumption that economic growth and investment (foreign and local) will directly 
lead to job creation and socio-economic development (Interviewee 117, white, male, 
NGO). The rise of global terrorism also threatens the stability of the global tourism 
economy in which South Africa is embedded (WTTC 2001, 2002c, 2002a, 2003b; 
WTO 2002c).'“
In 2001, partnering government, a business-funded NGO, Business Against Crime (BAC) 
installed CCTV systems to protect businesses and tourists in high profile areas in the Cape Town 
(piloted) and Johannesburg central business districts (CBDs) with a reported decline of street crime 
by 80% and 50% respectively (Business Against Crime 2004; Business Trust 2002), Following this 
success, other cities and towns in South Africa are using the strategy and expanding the 
implementation of CCTV cameras. (Personal e-mail communication with Nomfundo Mqadi, 
Programme Manager, Business Trust, January 2004),
The effects of the World Centre attacks on tourism were estimated by the WTTC to have resulted 
in a decline of 7,4% in world travel and tourism in 2001 and 2002, and worldwide loss of 
employment of over 10 million jobs (WTTC 2002c),
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A government informant pointed out that crime was more detrimental to smaller 
businesses than big business, the later having greater means to protect themselves 
(Interviewee 70, white, male, government). Crime may hold tourism hostage given 
tourism’s reliance on a safe environment. One interviewee in the tourism sector 
explained that:
You need to protect the tourist from the threat of crime. The 
involvement of tiie community is required from the start to deal with the 
threat to the business and the guests, from crime, hijacking and [wildlife] 
poaching (Interviewee 35, white, female, business/foundation).
Within the tourism sector, stakeholder relations are more patent than in most other 
sectors, including for example, the investment sector. Crime is a threat to the nature 
and sustainability of tourism, and a direct threat to the creation or maintenance of 
social contracts between stakeholders. At a macro-level, the existence of high crime 
levels undermines trust in the government, its institutions and capacity to impose 
rule of law. One informant lamented that:
I think there is strain on the social contract between the populace and the 
government in terms of law and order, safety and security. Many people, 
black and white, feel that the government is reneging on its 
responsibility in providing a safe environment (Interviewee 125, white, 
male, organised business).
Another confirmed that the ‘failure by government to get on top of the crime 
situation and the lack of perceived prioritisation of the problem is probably one of 
the major sources of distrust’ (Interviewee 117, white, male, NGO). Again, popular 
perceptions of the problem fuel the failure of trust between stakeholders with 
potentially devastating consequences. What one might call the secondary effects of 
crime - the flight of skills through emigration, the resistance of foreign investors, 
sensational media representations and the fear of crime - may be as harmful to South 
African development as crime itself. The sustained growth of South Africa’s tourism 
industry depends on a workable social contract to ensure a safe tourist environment 
and stable environment for investment through an urgent amelioration of the causes 
of crime and through socio-economic development.
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The State in South African tourism: tourism transformation
South Africa’s global economic position and recent political history have resulted in 
an imperative to transform its tourism industry. Although business represented by 
the Tourism Business Council has developed an empowerment and transformation 
charter, the state is the primary driver of tourism transformation. Transformation has 
necessarily involved the state-directed repositioning of the sector in multiple ways:
Global repositioning
The state has recognised the imperatives of market forces in globalisation, and their 
impact on tourism in South Africa. There is local and international competition for 
customers, employees, tourism products and investment. Countervailing trends exist 
wherein some of South Africa’s competitive advantage lies. South Africa can satisfy 
a demand for predictable services and standards and unique location-driven 
experiences. For the tourism sector to be globally competitive, stakeholders 
acknowledge that the state and market have to work in concert. Indeed, the state has 
demonstrated necessary political will to ensure that tourism performs as a global 
industry. Tourism is identified as a key engine for growth, and the state’s 
macroeconomic policy, GEAR, has positioned the state and market strategically for 
global competitiveness.
Macroeconomic repositioning
In line with GEAR, the state has privatised tourism assets. As one informant 
explained:
[Tourism] is basically undergoing a form of privatisation. There is a 
restructuring of the [conservation] industry under neo-liberal economic 
pressure, whatever you want to call it. It is obviously a state-driven 
process. This includes the South African National Parks (SANP), the 
renamed National Parks Board (NPB). [The State] is concessioning out 
the development of the National Parks system (Interviewee 9, white, 
male, business).
Like elsewhere, the debates around privatising state assets and running them along 
market lines raise issues beyond those of transfer. This takes place against the
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backdrop of trade union protest and private sector approbation. Privatisation is often 
justified in terms of BEE and the transformation of ownership particularly given the 
warehousing of privatised assets for BEE investment, and the BEE obligations 
attached to government contracts. BEE in tourism is discussed in greater detail 
below. For some, privatisation is also more socially and environmentally 
responsible, given higher levels of accountability and the need to meet competitive 
tender criteria (Interviewee 32, black, Afi-ican, business/parastatal; Interviewee 119, 
white, male, business) (Letsema Consulting 1999).*^ "^  Mahoney and Zyl view the 
commercialisation through privatisation of state assets as a strategy to ensure the 
fulfilment of government’s environmental obligations. They argue that since 
government budget cuts invariably damage the environmental management function, 
it is valid to employ privatisation and strategic investment as mechanisms ensure 
environmental management compliance (Mahoney and Zyl 2001). Linked to 
privatisation, a number of joint ventures between the state and the private sector, 
particularly in conservation areas aim to direct benefits to adjacent rural 
communities (Ashley and Jones 2001).
Industry repositioning
The state has sought to transform tourism, a strategy exhibiting a number of 
characters. One, globalisation has meant greater outward focus with regards to 
tourism. Two, the industry has shifted from serving a white middle-class tourism 
market to developing a black domestic tourism culture (Letsema Consulting 2002, 
p.4; Marx 2003). Three, a more commercial attitude has been developed. Under 
apartheid, SANP saw its mandate as biodiversity conservation, with a secondary 
mandate to provide subsidised recreation for middle-class whites. There was no cost 
recovery imperative. Now, such organisations, whether managing conservation, 
heritage sites or state-owned and run recreation areas have to adapt to a new political 
and business environment, becoming self-sustainable and more business-like. Four, 
tourism is perceived explicitly as a vehicle for redress and broader state transfer. As
As in other sectors, privatisation is less likely to affect smaller tourism enterprises. Tourism SMEs 
are less likely to have designated social and environmental responsibility programmes, and there is 
typically less demand for such accountability although this may change as they compete for 
procurement contracts.
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in other industries, there is pressure by the state for the transfer of equity and control 
of privately owned businesses. The state’s commitment to redress has meant special 
attention in the tourism industry to policy and regulatory actions to promote job 
creation and higher growth rates (Mbeki 2001).
Repositioning human capacity
The state’s focus on tourism as a development vehicle has emphasised transforming 
and deracialising the required skills base.*^  ^ Capacity building in the industry is 
perceived as key to both BEE and to professionalising tourism. The Skills 
Development Act of 1999 created a Sector Education and Training Authorities 
(SETAs) for key sectors. The Tourism and Hospitality Education and Training 
Authority (THETA) comprises multiple stakeholder groups, including employers, 
trade unions and the government. As well as identifying areas of employment in 
both the formal and informal sectors, the THETA also aims to address the lack of 
tourism skills in the industry, as well as advance youth employment though 
leamership schemes (Business Day 200If, 200le, 2001k; Jackson 2001; Khan and 
Hemson 2002, p.299; The Star 2001).
Investment
Investment remains an economic priority generally and in the tourism sector 
specifically. Both local and international investment capital, however, is limited. 
International investment capital is attracted by high returns in the sector and sound 
financial performance. Companies seeking investment from international or 
domestic sources seek to demonstrate their viability in the marketplace and their 
potential to add-value. The bilateral public-private partnership between the 
government and businesses (such as the Business Trust and Tourism Business 
Council of South Africa) has invested in tourism marketing, capacity building, 
training, and support for tourism enterprises (The Cluster Consortium 1999; Jackson 
2001; Business Day 2001e; Finance Week 1999; Thomas 2000). It is commonly 
held that adequate domestic private sector investment necessarily prefigures foreign
The private sector has also affirmed the importance of tourism skills development primarily 
funded through the Business Trust (Business Trust 2000a; DEAT 2000f).
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direct investment in the sector. Additionally, there has been significant government 
investment in tourism, including high-profile marketing aimed at increasing 
international tourism through South African Tour i sm, t r a in ing  and capacity 
building, infrastructure development, malaria eradication and crime prevention.
State focus on tourism has been sustained since it is seen as a vehicle for delivering 
market-driven redistribution which is consistent with the SCSD framework. 
However, despite apparent political will and institutional and legislative 
arrangements already in place, redistributive delivery requires sustained investment 
and market performance, and cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the BEE process has 
been largely to the benefit of few individuals rather than a broad-based 
redistribution. There are concerns that the optimism about what tourism can and will 
deliver is overstated (Mafisa Planning and Research 2002, p.6).
Tourism and Black Economic Empowerment
In preceding chapters, I have explored the state’s prioritisation of BEE as a 
redistributive mechanism. As with other economic sectors, the ownership and 
control of tourism remains largely white (Letsema Consulting 2002, p.7; Business 
Report 2000; Streek 2000; Graham 2000; Cole 2001a). The TBCSA acknowledged 
that the industry was white dominated in all respects and that it ‘needs to reflect the 
demographics of South Africa’ (Tourism Business Council of South Africa 2001b).
What then does BEE mean specifically for the travel and tourism industry? If BEE 
seeks meaningful restructuring of the South African economy to advance black 
participation in the economic mainstream, then transformation of the industry 
requires an increase in black ownership and control, as well as increased 
participation in the benefits of tourism including as consumers (DEAT 2000d; 
Graham 2000). In the tourism sector, the move from pure equity ownership deals, 
which is a cruder indicator of BEE than those involving broader participation, is 
especially apparent. Perhaps even more than other sectors, the evolution of BEE is
South African Tourism is a parastatal mandated with marketing South African tourism: ‘to 
contribute to an increase in Gross National Product, create jobs and improve the redistribution and 
transformation of our economy and society’ (South African Tourism 2002, p.3).
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apparent. In 2000, in an internal discussion paper, the government was reported to 
have set ambitious goals of 60% black-ownership of the tourism industry within five 
years (Mvoko 2000; Business Day 2001c). No such benchmarks were set and this 
proposal was never advanced publicly. The notion of high levels of black ownership 
is congruent with first wave empowerment agendas, replaced now by broader-based 
strategies which anticipate the BB-BEE legislation and are clearly outlined in the 
Tourism Transformation Strategy (DEAT 2001; South Africa Government 
Communications 2001). Whilst shareholding remains an important indicator, it is, in 
itself, too narrow a measure. BEE in tourism is better measured in terms of advances 
made in capacity development (management and staff), affirmative procurement and 
supply chains, CSR/CSI and corporate governance (Business Day 200 Ij). In more 
mature areas of industry such as large hotel corporations, broader-based 
empowerment is more developed, business linkages are established and there is 
greater evidence of the knock-on multiplier effects on the industry. This is 
particularly apparent in the case of procurement.
There have been multi-stakeholder initiatives to address the issue of black 
participation in the sector. As mentioned earlier, the private sector has been seen to 
spearhead transformation. A highly significant process, the TBCSA led to the 
development of the Charter o f Empowerment and Transformation in the Tourism 
Industry (TBCSA 2001a). Along with business’ commitment to develop initiatives 
to achieve broad-based empowerment is a self-monitoring commitment to report and 
account progress (Letsema Consulting 2002, p.7; DEAT 2001). Significantly, the 
Tourism Charter pre-empts the newer conception of BEE as outlined in the BB-BEE 
Strategy and Bill by envisioning a broader, more inclusive and more diversified 
notion of black empowerment. The Charter is an explicit commitment on the part of 
business to further BEE in the industry. Whilst groundbreaking, the Tourism Charter 
received relatively little attention compared with other more formal charter 
processes that resulted in legislative obligations. This precursive multi-stakeholder 
process advanced a social contract between interest groups, particularly around the 
need for sector transformation and BEE. The charter adumbrated issues of 
ownership, business development, management opportunities and community 
development. Tourism business leaders stated:
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Far from being a government-imposed cost on reluctant businesses,
[BEE] offers clear benefits to those who are able to develop and 
implement a clear, business-driven empowerment vision (Letsema 
Consulting 2002, p.5).
As the Cluster Consortium contended, the most sustainable empowerment outcomes 
are those which balance social and market imperatives (The Cluster Consortium
1999). BEE was seen by business as central to the sustainability of the sector 
(Bramdaw 2000).
The government has made significant specific investments in advancing BEE in 
tourism. Like other sectors, significant barriers such as access to credit and markets 
hamper emerging black entrepreneurs. To this end, in October 2001, the Minister 
Valli Moosa announced that R66 million had been set aside for black tourism 
enterprises (Business Day 2001c). The development of a Tourism Enterprise 
Programme (TEP) in a PPP has levered over R585 million in deals assisting black 
entrepreneurs (Marx 2003). As a result of explicit government intervention and 
promotion, 200 black-owned enterprises were given international marketing 
exposure at the 2002 Tourism Indaba (Moosa 2002a). DFIs, in particular the DBSA, 
IDC, Ntsika and Khula have created sectoral focal points to fund the development of 
tourism, largely by the leveraging of finance to develop SMMEs. Outsourcing and 
procurement (mostly by statutory bodies) in tourism present opportunities that 
favour emerging entrepreneurs in generating local economic growth, as well as 
broad-based growth with concomitant financial gains for the economy as a whole 
(BusinessMap 2001; Rogerson 2000).
The procurement leverage has substantial benefits for both government and 
corporations in their supply relationships. The opportunities and potential benefits 
are significant given the size and diversity of the sector. In addition, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the potential to procure goods and services from black-owned businesses 
along a complex supply-chain can effect empowerment in a broad and substantial 
way. As illustrated later in this chapter, some large businesses have mirrored some 
of the state’s empowerment tender criteria in their own supply relationships. In 
effect, this is a ‘second-tier’ affirmative procurement process. Others have created
238
partnerships with black entrepreneurs where no appropriate established supplier 
existed. As in other sectors, affirmative procurement policies tend to be initiated by 
government and state-ovmed enterprises but these filter into the private sector, albeit 
unevenly. Corporate policy, like that of the state, is driven by the significant buying 
power of large enterprises. In turn, the stronger a given companies’ empowerment 
profile, the stronger their position in terms of winning contracts from the state. 
However, as demonstrated by the case-study research, affirmative procurement does 
carry increased transactional costs for the business. This appears to be a cost most 
large businesses are willing to incur in the short term in anticipation of the benefits 
and value of future business from the state and other private sector partners.
PART TWO: Three Case Studies
The second part of this chapter presents three case studies which serve to illustrate 
the operation of a SCSD framework in the tourism sector. The cases illustrate state- 
directed policies that seek to ensure socio-economic development through market 
redistribution, and the responses of corporations. The first, an examination of the 
Lubombo SDI’s Greater St Lucia Wetland Park (GSLWP) forms the major part. It 
looks at a state-driven process which focuses on infrastructural development, 
tourism investment and the impact on local communities. The second looks at a 
private ecotourism company, CCAfrica whose empowerment focus lies primarily in 
social responsibility and rural development. The final case study looks at the diverse 
empowerment strategies of three large, established hotel companies.
Case Study: Lubombo SDI s Greater St Lucia Wetland Park
The Lubombo SDI through its anchor project the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park 
(GSLWP) is illustrative of the SCSD framework as a state-led social and economic 
development initiative. Moreover, the strong focus on BEE and local economic 
development represent two state objectives in the empowerment process.
The Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) include nine government-identified 
investment promotion areas. Originally, the SDIs form part of South Africa’s 
industrial reorganisation, creating spines of infrastructural development to ensure
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long-term economic gains and international competitiveness (Interviewee 12, 
African, male, government). In line with GEAR, government identified these areas 
since they were economically undeveloped but had potential for significant growth. 
Thus, the SDIs explicitly aimed to seek new ways to develop sustainable local 
economies in targeted areas (Ashley and Jones 2001), and in the case of the 
Lubombo SDI agriculture and especially tourism and were identified as the only 
viable environmentally sustainable sectors for economic growth (Koch 1998).
Some SDIs are considered outright failures. All have been criticised as having 
‘clumsy’ beginnings and slow delivery (Interviewee 57, white, female, DFI). 
Resource-based SDIs were described as ‘spectacular failures’ and ‘a terrible flop’ 
(Interviewees 8 and 9 respectively, both white, male, business). However, the 
Lubombo SDI, through the GSLWP, is a notable exception. Initial progress was 
concrete and visible with positive achievements in infrastructure development, 
malaria management and the establishment of a regulatory framework. Delivery 
around tourism investment was significantly slower.
Focussing on infrastructure development such as the roads, the Lubombo SDI both 
provided a tourism route and local people with a tar road (called the Spine Road). 
This is important as perception of the GSLWP as tourism development 
infrastructure has generally elided the issue of local development.*^^
If the objective was only to provide tourism infrastructure, then tar roads which connect important 
regional centres like Mbazwana and Manguzi would have been rerouted.
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Figure 6.1: Map of the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park
Source: GSLWP Authority, 2003
The SDI facilitated statutory legislation in 1999'^^ that created the G SLW P, a 
sm aller area o f  250 000 hectares within the SDI. The Park w hich now has W orld 
Heritage s t a t u s , a l i g n e d  national conservation and developm ent interests to create 
an important biosphere consolidating 16 ‘parcels’ o f  land and a patchw ork o f  
existing reserve areas under one authority (Office o f  the Deputy President 1999; 
Marx 2003, p. 18). The Act established the G SLW P A uthority as a ‘business-friendly 
institution’ to develop the Park, and m anage it on an ‘on-going basis through a 
negotiated, contractual arrangem ent with the provincial conservation agency who 
[acts] as state m anager’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, b u s i n e s s ) . T h e  G SL W P’s
The World Heritage Convention Act 49 of 1999.
World Bank research suggests that World Heritage status has a positive impact on tourists’ 
destination preferences (Lindberg and Dellaert 2003).
KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife is responsible for conservation management.
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mandate required the balancing of three different imperatives, namely, conserving 
the Park’s World Heritage status, ensuring commercial development, and ensuring 
local communities benefit from both conservation and tourism.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships
The Lubombo SDI is a complex multi-stakeholder partnership, described as a 
tourism initiative that was ‘led by government, driven by the private sector and 
community based’ (Interviewee 12, African, male, government) (DEAT 1999). As 
indicated, significant regional co-operation has resulted in strategic partnerships 
with the governments of Mozambique and Swaziland (DEAT 2000a). Tourism has 
offered opportunities for regional cooperation (Hay 2000, p. 145). The SDI has 
enjoyed significant sustained support from govemment.^^' It also achieved 
something of notorious difficulty; intergovernmental and interdepartmental co­
ordination and government departments, including DEAT, DTI and Public Works 
(Interviewee 8, white, male, business). Co-operation was secured between national 
government departments and between three tiers of government, including 14 tribal 
authorities. Community representation in rural areas is largely through tribal 
authorities, themselves politically complex structures (Ashley and Jones 2001). 
These multi-stakeholder relationships are significant in terms of the sustainability of 
the Park’s infrastructure (Interviewee 12, African, male, government). There have 
been extensive cross-sector tourism partnerships between the private and public 
sectors. One informant ascribed the SDI’s achievement to its high level of successful 
coordination, particularly inter- and intra-govemmentally (Interviewee 8, white, 
male, business). The SDI’s management of a plurality of institutional players, and 
most especially the public and private sectors, is congruent with a SCSD framework. 
Figure 6.2 represents the GSLWP within a nexus of relationships acting in response 
to multiple environmental pressures.
The Lubombo SDI was also championed by former DEAT Minister, Valli Moosa.
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Figure 6.2: Stakeholder relationships in the GSLWP 
Strategic components
The Lubom bo SDI has four key com ponents. The first is infrastructure. 
G overnm ents in developing countries com m only influence tourism  developm ent. 
They m ost often do this through fiscal and investm ent policy (O pperm an and Chon 
1997, p.20). The Lubom bo SDI tourism  node exhibits all o f  these developm ent 
strategies. Investm ent in costly infrastructure - m ainly road construction, the 
provision o f  electricity, w ater and sew erage treatm ent - also benefits the local
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communities (Opperman and Chon 1997, p.20-21; Bramdaw 2000; Mbeki 2001), 
whereas fencing and game-stocking relate to conservation infrastructure. Second, is 
malaria eradication, previously a major threat in the area. The SDI, in partnership 
with the Business Trust and Medical Research Institute (MRI) are in the process of 
eradicating malaria by systematic spraying (Business Trust 2003b; GSLWP 
Authority 2002; Graham 2000). As part of the trans-frontier protocol, malaria has 
also been eradicated in the Mozambican areas of the Lubombo SDI (DEAT 2000e).
The third component is institutional development, which saw the creation of the 
GSLWP managed by the GSLWP Authority (as described above). In principle and 
policy, the GSLWP reserved a ‘limited role for the state’ in a regulatory role, 
facilitator of private sector development and as primary land manager (Interviewee 
12, African, male, government; Interviewee 9, white, male, business) (Mills 1999). 
The GSLWP operates along business rather than bureaucratic lines (GSLWP 
Authority 2003). In reality, government has to date remained the primary driver in 
the Park (with private sector and community roles less pronounced). Explicitly, the 
SDI’s function was to mobilise investment (DEAT 2000e; GSLWP Authority 
2000a; Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative 2001 circa). It also set up a 
financially sustainable management arrangement to cover both its running costs and 
eventually its capital input costs. This difficult balance arguably frames the 
partnerships established around tourism development in the Park.
The final component relates to the development of mechanisms to ensure that 
benefits accrue to local communities. The GSLWP’s pro-poor tourism model values 
tourist contact with local communities, community participation as a means of 
delivering development and, most importantly, the exploitation of economic 
opportunities through employment and building local business capacity. Community 
development occurs in four ways:
One, as a tourism node, strategies emphasise tourist contact with local communities. 
Local communities have traditionally enjoyed few benefits from protected tourism 
areas like the GSLWP despite often being displaced by them (Koch 2001c). The 
Authority has self-consciously avoided the weakness of enclave tourism which
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typically fails as a form of rural development since tourism managers seek to 
minimise economic exchanges between tourists and local communities (Freitag 
1994, p.538; Opperman 1993, p.537). Since GSLWP tourism development was 
delayed by the investment process and has now only recently begun, it is premature 
to comment on whether local communities are benefiting from direct contact with 
tourists (DEAT 2003).
Two, consistent with GSLWP strategy which links development and local 
democracy. Walker argues that the increased ‘emphasis on participation by local 
communities in resource management and decision-making provides important 
opportunities for improving the effectiveness and equity of conservation programs 
[sic]’ (Walker 1999, p.259). Despite clear policies and evidence that local 
community participation is a priority, this has been a thornier issue for the Park 
Authority, particularly with land claims and complicated local politics (Interviewee 
57, white, female, DPI).
Three, creating local employment opportunities has a significant multiplier impact 
on effect on local economies. The area is poor and undeveloped with few formal 
employment opportunities largely with poorly-paid unskilled l a b o u r . T o  ensure 
that higher levels of local employment are provided for local people, the tender 
process took into account not only the number of jobs but also the human resource 
development plan (Interviewee 91, white, female, government initiative). The 
strategy has been to link better-paid job creation with skills development and 
through investment strategies. In reality, although at least 900 permanent jobs for 
local people are anticipated, the employment capacity of the Park is unclear (DEAT 
2003).'”
Lastly and significantly, SMEs are regarded as potentially delivering broader 
economic benefits more broadly. Local businesses have developed in response to 
opportunities presented by increased investment in the Park, and BEE opportunities
For example, proposals by Richards Bay Minerals, a subsidiary of multinational Rio Tinto, to 
dredge-mine the GSLWP’s dunes for titanium were supported by many local people who saw it as an 
immediate source of employment (Preston-Whyte 1996; Walker 1999, p,271).
Regulations stipulate limits on the development of the Park and the number of possible jobs.
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more broadly. A paucity of local SMEs existed prior to the advent of the SDI which 
saw an increase in such enterprises, initially in road construction. One informant 
claimed that there were now a significant number of SMEs tendering for state 
contracts in the Park and in adjacent areas (Interviewee 5, white, male, government 
initiative). Moreover, every piece of infrastructural development has been built by 
companies with significant black ownership, although these may not be locally 
based. Local SMMEs constructed 30% of the first phase of the ‘Spine Road’, rising 
to 60% of the fourth phase (Kupka 2004). Moreover, a key strategy is creating 
equity partnerships with local communities around accommodation developments, 
activities (guiding, horse riding, boating etc), procurement (outsourcing of services), 
as well as employment. Land claimants are mandatory partners such as Bhangazi 
Trust in Cape Vidal (GSLWP Authority 2003d). Local communities have a stake in 
the GSLWP through restitution agreements and the mandate of the Authority 
(GSLWP Authority 2002a). This appears to reflect a significant departure from other 
conservation-led approaches apparent elsewhere.
Conservation, land issues and investment: a development ‘balancing act’
From the outset, the state’s role has been to facilitate the allocation of scarce 
resources in the GSLWP balancing among other things, utility, efficiency, 
environmental issues, ethical issues, and equity. Certainly, decisions of this nature 
often benefit special interest groups, and high levels of trust must obtain between 
interest groups for effective resolution (Allen and Brennan 2002). Preston-Whyte 
cautions for the potential of rent-seeking by interest groups in the GSLWP given 
resource scarcity and potential economic rewards (Preston-Whyte 1996). In its role 
of development facilitator, the state negotiates with multiple stakeholders in order to 
discourage rent-seeking and resolve claims on scarce resources in line with its 
development objectives.
Conservation
Conservation in South Africa has a gnarled history (See accounts in Allen and 
Brennan 2002; Draper 1998; Ellis 1994). Deeply embedded in the apartheid political 
economy, conservation contributed to land dispossession, to overcrowding in
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apartheid-era Bantustans and, among black South Africans, ‘feelings of deep 
hostility towards environmentalism, viewing it as a white middle-class concern’ 
(Bonner 1994, p.24; Mafisa Planning and Research 2002; Walker 1999, p.270, citing 
Cock 1991). These dynamics are present in the GSLWP. Whilst I do not explore 
further the complex politics of conservation and development, I wish to indicate the 
importance of the debate, not only in South Africa but also in the rest of Africa. 
Importantly, South Africa has consciously developed new conservation models that 
are more developmentally appropriate, and more inclusive in character. To this end, 
the Park’s social development funding is largely levered through land rentals which 
could eventually generate surpluses to fund bio-diversity programmes and the cross­
subsidisation of surrounding social and community development. In the GSLWP, 
this leveraging towards social development is known as the SEED (Social, 
Economic and Environmental Development) programme.
Land issues
Land issues pose a significant obstacle to the GSLWP since ecotourism and tourism 
investment often rest on the successful resolution of land c l a i m s . T h e  majority of 
South African land restitution claims have yet to be resolved (Koch, Massyn, and 
Niekerk 2001, p. 142; McLaughlin 2003, p. 130). Many of those interviewed, 
particularly businesspeople, expressed fears about the threat of Zimbabwe-style 
land. Koch et a l described the land issues as ‘not only one of the most defining 
political and development issues, but also perhaps one of the most intractable’ 
(Koch, Massyn, and Niekerk 2001, p. 131). Indeed, the land issue remains a pressing 
concern with a highly racially skewed pattern of land ownership (James, Ngonini, 
and Nkadimeng 2004 (forthcoming); Walker 2004 (forthcoming)). Despite extensive 
institutional arrangements like a Land Claims Courts and a Regional Land Claims 
Commission to progress claims, land reform - comprising restitution as well as 
redistribution - is an area of apparent under-delivery by government. This lag in
After 1994, the South African government (Department of Land Affairs) committed itself to 
redistributing 30% of arable land by 2015 on a willing-buyer willing-seller basis, or expropriation 
with compensation after a lengthy court process. The land reform programme also importantly 
covered tenure reform,
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delivery is due to the complexity of claims, and the application of liberal market 
principles which can inflate land prices.
Within the Park’s communities, land ownership comes with ‘risks and advantages’ 
and ‘land represents an enduring tension between tribal elite and peasant interests’ 
(Interviewee 5, white, male, government initiative). In the absence of land 
ownership, ecotourism can promote a set of local interests which involves the 
control of land and related resources as a way of effecting BEE (Interviewee 9, 
white, male, business). Within the GSLWP, 25% of land is under claim with a 
resultant tension between the ownership and use of land, as well as a tension 
between land claims and conservation (Interviewee 5, white, male, government 
initiative). Just 10% of the reserve is privately owned. Progress in advancing 
ecotourism in the area has been slowed by land restitution programmes which reflect 
the state’s broader commitment to social equity (Koch 1995; Radebe 2003; Walker 
1999, p.278). Diverse stakeholder positions’ have had to be managed sensitively in 
light of these diverse political c u r r e n t s .F o r  example, land claim settlements in 
Mabaso and Mbila have provided a precedent: land ownership was transferred to the 
claimants subject to the land not being reoccupied by claimants and its use being 
restricted to conservation, in return for a portion of concession fees (GSLWP 
Authority 2002). Moreover, as mentioned, land claimants receive a percentage of 
turnover generated by commercial activities, as well as being privileged as 
mandatory partners in concessions and procurement activity (GSLWP Authority 
2002a).
The importance of being sensitive to diverse stakeholder claims was underlined by a 
senior government official in the case of the GSLWP:
There were land claims involved in the GSLWP. Consultation became 
imperative. Government has been accountable to those communities and 
has to manage the stakeholder expectations and its given mandate 
(Interviewee 12, African, male, government).
Another stakeholder group whose interests have had to be managed were 4x4 leisure vehicle 
beach drivers. A ban was imposed on beach driving, ostensibly to the detriment of vehicle sales 
(Jenkins and Sewsunker 2004).
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The land issue has a direct bearing on the capacity of communities to exploit the 
benefits of tourism, particularly where these are significant tourism and conservation 
assets (Mahoney and Zyl 2001, p.44; Preston-Whyte 1996). However, it is important 
to note the difference between the ownership and the use of land which has been 
highlighted as an issue in the Park. As illustrated above, where land claims have 
been resolved, for the land claimants, these have meant ‘a financial package and 
weak symbolic rights to the land’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business). The state 
has expressed interest in transferring title to the land under claim because local 
communities have a stake^ which creates economic incentives to promote better 
resource stewardship. This entrenches conservation as land use. Land owners (or 
those with title claim) accrue a proportion of commercial revenues generated from 
the land. One commentator argued that this is likely to throw the GSLWP financial 
modelling into crisis and it is unclear how this problem might ultimately be resolved 
(Interviewee 9, white, male, business).
Investment
Investment bids for hotel developments were only secured in late 2003. Failure to 
attract adequate investment would have put the GSLWP development and the 
initiative’s tri-national development goals at risk (Marais 1998; DEAT 2000b). An 
interviewee argued that associated BEE conditions made the exercise more 
challenging:
In a climate where it is particularly different to procure investment,
[BEE] tends to be diluted as it tends to be seen as an extra business cost
(Interviewee 9, white, male, business).
However, a senior government official conceded that this cost was worthwhile since, 
given the injection of government public infi-astructure and skills training, among 
other benefits ‘[some development] success will have been achieved’ (Interviewee 
12, African, male, government). Significantly, as a public sector initiative, with 
greater political scrutiny and accountability, the Park’s capacity to ‘simply cut a 
deal’ without fulfilling its BEE mandate was constrained (Interviewee 5, white, 
male, government initiative).
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Indeed, it is the combination of government and private investment that makes the 
GSLWP empowerment vision possible. However, more broadly, empowerment in 
the GSLWP has been difficult to tackle, in part because of fraught local politics 
between traditional authorities, local government, political parties and local 
communities in defining ‘local’ and ‘community’ in terms of target empowerment 
beneficiaries (Interviewee 5, white, male, government initiative).
Empowerment has largely been defined within the GSLWP process in those terms 
laid out by government tender: ownership, jobs, procurement and training. 
Investment criteria stress BEE and the given business model ‘promotes business 
linkages and equity partnerships’ (Interviewee 8, white, male, business). Investment 
criteria were BEE driven given the ‘major lever that the state has’ and the lever of 
procurement, which ‘holds a lot of promise’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business). 
The Authority set up institutional linkages to provide financial incentives (mostly 
from DFIs), support and training for SMEs and black businesses (DEAT 2001a; 
GSLWP Authority 2003b; Wildnet Africa 2001). Empowerment criteria also 
considered broader-empowerment benchmarks alongside equity ownership 
including jobs, training and procurement (GSLWP Authority 2003c).
The World Heritage Convention Act places a public access duty on the Authority 
creating a tension with the Park’s requirement to maximise revenues. As it stands, 
one interviewee offered, the ‘prices of [national] parks excludes most people’ 
(Interviewee 57, white, female, DPI). The difficulty lies in making Heritage sites 
affordable and accessible but commercially viable. GSLWP planning suggests it will 
cater to a range of tourism needs from high end to affordable, aimed at both the 
domestic and international market (DEAT 2003; GSLWP Authority 2000; Office of 
the Deputy President 1999). Moreover, ensuring compliance in keeping with the 
Park’s Heritage Site status requires on-going regulation and oversight by the state of 
other stakeholders.
Investment was difficult to procure partly because the GSLWP is largely state- 
owned land. However, in 2003, when eight concessions were awarded investment 
was boosted by R432 million (DEAT 2003). The empowerment requirements
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secured investment from companies with more than 70% black ownership. 
Moreover, the Minister confirmed that 50% of resort construction would be awarded 
to small local businesses (DEAT 2003). The Authority has, in addition, added a 
remarkable document to the swathe of concession agreements presented to 
successful investors. A Social Compact Agreement (Annexure 8) outlines the 
principles under which the concessionaire, the Authority and representatives from 
the community come together to achieve the success of the development sites. The 
Compact is a formal - though not litigable -  social contract constituting an 
agreement which outlines the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in a spirit 
of cooperation (GSLWP Authority 2003a).
Critiques of the Lubombo SDI
The GSLWP is too young to have yet realised its planned vision. It cannot, 
therefore, be evaluated in terms of its delivery as a state-driven tourism initiative. 
However, what can be critiqued is the vision at its centre, its institutional 
development and sustainability, and its track record to date.
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the GSLWP, not least by the 
Authority’s own representatives. A key member of the GSLWP Authority admitted 
that the Lubombo SDI was criticised for not having ‘a strong enough social compact 
with local communities’ (Interviewee 5, white, male, government initiative). 
Another informant repeated criticism that the SDI was ‘top-down’ and lacking 
grassroots ‘participatory process’, and even ‘bulldozing the community’ 
(Interviewee 57, white, female, DPI). This criticism was reflected in a report on the 
Lubombo SDI (Altman 2001, p. 13). Nonetheless, extensive consultations did take 
place and were built into the process from the outset (GSLWP Authority 2000). 
Moreover, multiple formal and justiciable agreements exist which established the 
rights and responsibilities of key stakeholders.
Government recognised that with different objectives, constraints and leadership, 
each SDI would evolve differently. Under the direction of Zaloumis, the process was 
considered dynamic; a synergy of consultation and leadership (Interviewee 57, 
white, female, DPI). Por another informant, the ‘charismatic leadership has been
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instrumental’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business). Another assented that ‘success 
can be attributed to a dynamic champion’ (Interviewee 8, white, male, business). 
Indeed, the Lubombo SDI has outperformed any other SDI in terms of delivery. 
However, dependence on an individual’s leadership does not make for a sustainable 
institution.
The Park has also been highly constrained by lack of capacity. Whilst the Board 
boasts high profile members, the Authority has admitted to ‘being thin on the 
ground’ (Interviewee 5, white, male, government initiative). Another informant was 
concerned that each of the strategic positions in the executive was held by whites 
(Interviewee 57, white, female, DFI),'^^ and a current shortage of skilled blacks. 
There was also reluctance among skilled black people to live and work in rural areas 
(Interviewee 91, white, female, government initiative). Nonetheless, the 
management team has thus far been characterised by specialised professionalism, 
efficiency and a flat structure which is conducive to ‘quick and responsive 
management and rapid decision-making’ (GSLWP Authority 2003).
To date, the state has borne all major infrastructural costs. The pace of securing 
private sector investment was slow. As one interviewee mused: ‘Looking at positive 
economic return on state investment as a benchmark, I am not at all sure that those 
figures eventually stack up’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business).
The Park’s development is set against the context of market forces with ‘business 
models orientated to an international market’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business). 
The model ‘twins commercialisation of state assets with a procurement method that 
favours black South Africans’ (Mafisa Planning and Research 2002). However, the 
investment process was slow and difficult. Moreover, with a commercial business 
model, cost structures are geared towards affluent foreign consumers while local 
demand is flat (Mafisa Planning and Research 2002).
The racial composition of senior staff in the Authority has been problematised since government- 
aligned institutions are expected to take a lead on Employment Equity.
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GSLWP and BEE
The GSLWP appears almost to have two BEE strategies working simultaneously. At 
a critical primary level, enormous resources and capacity have been engaged in 
procuring investment that has significant black equity and ownership. Indeed, the 
GSLWP has determinedly driven a BEE agenda, going so far as delaying the roll-out 
of tourism development until it secured appropriate black investment. Investment 
tenders have also been linked to skills development and human resource 
development. At another level, black SMEs have been involved at each stage of 
infrastructural development. Policies are in place for the engagement of black 
enterprises in different capacities in the Park. These have, and ostensibly will result 
in further development of local enterprises in response to affirmative business 
opportunities. These new enterprises, economic benefits generated on claimants’ 
land, newly developed employment opportunities as well as significant black equity 
ownership and control of large-scale private investment number among key BEE 
gains for the GSLWP.
It is worth noting that the two ends of the empowerment continuum - equity control 
and ownership on the one hand and local development on the other - are both 
evident in the GSLWP BEE policy and implementation. The state has in the first 
instance set and advanced the BEE and development agenda in the GSLWP. With 
investment secure, the Authority has oversight to ensure on-going delivery of 
empowerment aims. However, the Park cannot cure all the areas economic ills. The 
majority of the local population are unlikely to become direct beneficiaries in the 
short term. However, despite shortcomings the GSLWP is illustrative of the SCSD 
fi’amework as a state-led social and economic development initiative.
Case Study: CCAfrica and private sector ecotourism
Conservation Corporation Africa (CCAfi*ica) developed fi-om a family business into 
one of Afi-ica’s largest ecotourism companies. It is now a South Afi-ican-owned 
multinational enterprise which runs 22 high-end lodges in six Afi-ican countries. Its 
flagship lodges are the Londolozi and Phinda Lodges, both located in the GSLWP 
(Varty and Buchanan 1999). Operating in the same space as the GSLWP Authority,
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CCAfrica provides a different tourism development model. CCAfnca’s 
‘empowerment strategies’ have largely focused on (obligatory) Employment Equity 
policies and voluntary CSR strategies through rural development. The case study 
illustrates that it too accommodates a SCSD framework which seeks social and 
economic development.
CCAfrica’s stated commitment to ecotourism, sustainability and rural development 
ensured on-going foreign investment despite an effective international boycott 
(Allen and Brennan 2002). In theory, ecotourism ensures the sustainability of 
businesses and resources in the conservation area through co-stewardship (Segel and 
Sprague 2001). Set against a global trend to include indigenous people in 
stewardship and management, these ideas have almost become common wisdom. 
One informant explained that although ecotourism was ‘still under government 
guidance’, ecotourism has required significant private sector investment 
(Interviewee 111, African, woman, business organisation). The importance of 
private sector investment is highlighted in Oldham et o/.’s study into game lodges in 
the area. They concluded that the ‘expansion of ecotourism in the direction of large, 
exclusive, self-sufficient luxury lodges requires investment on a significant scale’ 
(Oldham, Creemers, and Reback 2000, p.l78).^^^ To this end, CCAfrica has made 
considerable investment in setting up, game restocking and sustaining its reserve 
(Segel and Sprague 2001). It has also invested in infrastructure and social 
development programmes ordinarily undertaken by the state:
It is necessary for the private sector to act as development facilitators 
especially in remote areas where the government’s programmes cannot 
reach because of lack of infrastructure and services (Interviewee 53, 
white, female, foundation).
For example, CCAfrica acts as a delivery intermediary in the provision of rural 
clinics and schools. Communities benefit directly from CSR and the social 
engagement of the private sector. At the time of research, CSR was not yet linked to 
the awards of concessions and licences. However, the sustainability of these social
Different categories of accommodation require different levels of investment. The investment in 
land and infrastructure is revealed by the capital cost per bed. CCAfrica required overall investment 
four times higher than less well-appointed lodges, requiring more than R l,000,000 to support a 
luxury double room (Oldham, Creemers, and Reback 2000, p.177-178).
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benefits is linked to the sustainability of the business. This is discussed in greater 
detail below.
Rural employment
As outlined in the first part of this chapter, tourism is a chief employer in under­
developed rural areas.’ *^ For example, ecotourism already accounts for 27% of 
formal employment in the trade and catering sector o f the sub-region (Oldham, 
Creemers, and Reback 2000, p. 179). CCAfrica raises certain household income in 
the area but opportunities are limited with only 135 local people employed at lodge 
camps (The Cluster Consortium 1999, p.406). Over 90% of all staff employed by the 
lodges are drawn from local areas (Interviewee 18, white, female, business) given 
the remoteness of the lodges (Interviewee 104, white, female, DPI). Nonetheless, 
whilst direct employment is constrained, a multiplier effect creates indirect 
employment (new incomes further create a demand for other good and services) 
(Koch 1998, p,7). Benefits flowing from the lodges are experienced in the 
immediate hinterland of the reserves (Mafisa Planning and Research 2002, p. 14). 
This trend is borne out by a recent World Bank study of nature tourism in the area 
which suggests a positive economic impact locally in terms of employment and 
capital (though neutral to positive in enterprises and households) (Aylward and Lutz 
2003, p.21). It estimates that 21% of KwaZulu-Natal’s GDP originated from 
ecotourism (Aylward and Lutz 2003). Another study of the regional employment 
multiplier in KwaZulu-Natal suggests that for every two formal tourism jobs created 
in the region, another is created indirectly (Oldham, Creemers, and Reback 2000, 
p. 179). The same study also found that only a small percentage of the multiplier 
expenditure leaked from the target area suggesting a direct benefit to the local 
economy. However, the multiplier effect is limited and the positive economic impact 
of tourism concerns like CCAfrica are somewhat mitigated by the fact that many of 
the local suppliers import goods from urban centres or overseas (Oldham, Creemers, 
and Reback 2000, p. 181).
Another parallel debate surrounding employment and land use argues that agriculture is a 
preferred land use option to high-end ecotourism. If argued purely in terms of employment, 
agriculture employs more people. However, tourism pays those are employed much higher wages. 
Tourism generates other benefits to the local and surrounding regional economies which agriculture 
can not (Oldham, Creemers, and Reback 2000, p. 185).
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Management of lodges tends to be by non-local whites (Interviewee 24, white, 
female, b u s i n e s s ) W i t h  over 300 employees company-wide, CCAfrica is subject 
to Employment Equity and skills training legislation (Workplace Equity 2001). One 
interviewee acknowledged that the implementation of legislation was an important 
catalyst for compelling the company to prioritise black advancement (Interviewee 
24, white, female, business). Whilst staff training to develop black and local 
capacity is apparently in place, the growing incidence of HIV/AIDS hampers staff 
advancement (Interviewee 18, white, female, business; Interviewee 24, white, 
female, business). One informant lamented that many employment equity gains were 
undermined by HIV/AIDS. She stated: ‘HIV/AIDS is coming down on us like a 
freight train’ (Interviewee 24, white, female, business). A Community Development 
Budget was established at the time of interviews to treat staff with disclosed positive 
status with antibiotics and provide care packages for those no longer able to work 
(Segel and Sprague 2001).
Rural development, stakeholding and CSR
Like the GSLWP, CCAfrica has had to manage land claims and the tension between 
land ownership and land use. Elsewhere in the company’s African ecotourism 
operations, they have employed a community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) approach where the proximity of conservation land to community land 
ensures extensive economic incentives for land and wildlife stewardship 
(Interviewee 9, white, male, business) (Leach, Meams, and Scoones 1999). Whilst 
land-use agreements do not resolve these tensions, they do create a ‘workable and 
mutually beneficial’ compact between the company and its community stakeholders 
(Interviewee 35, white, female, business/foundation). For example, there are 
reciprocal bush clearing schemes with local communities where hard woods used in 
production of charcoal (now a self-sufficient business owned by individuals in the 
community) are harvested, as are reeds for building, and iLala palms for crafting, 
basketry and emergency food for livestock. These negotiated agreements with 
subsistence communities in the immediate hinterland - both formal and informal -
Conservation is also well-known for being male dominated (Draper 1998).
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form social compacts which ensure (some) balance of interests between the 
company and the community (Segel and Sprague 2001).
CCAfrica established CSR programmes which address socio-economic rural 
development in adjacent communities (The Cluster Consortium 1999, p.406). The 
company itself identified CSR as its primary BEE capacity (Interviewee 18, white, 
female, business). Since 1992, a separate and independent foundation aligned to 
CCAfrica, the Africa Fund: the Rural Investment Fund (RIF) has channelled money 
for rural works programmes, road construction, water reticulation, clinic services, 
schools, training centres, environmental education, bursaries targeted at the 
hospitality industry and ecotourism, and small businesses such as charcoal 
manufacturing, sewing and brick production (Africa Foundation 2000; Mafisa 
Planning and Research 2000).*"*° The RIF is separated from the core business and 
relies on donor funds.
Strong stakeholder relationships are important in effecting socio-economic 
development in adjacent communities, and the communities that serve as a labour 
pool. One informant external to the company acknowledged:
CCAfrica has a strong social responsibility ethic. It is strong due to the 
need to create good relationships [with adjacent communities] and 
promote rural development (Interviewee 8, white, male, business).
Here, rural development has a clear commercial imperative. CSR is driven by 
normative as well as strategic factors; the latter holding value for CCAfrica’s 
reputation and legitimacy, as well as its conservation interests. As a consequence of 
the Fund’s CSR programmes, CCAfrica enjoys increased acceptability among 
surrounding communities:
There has been a change of the perceived value of the company [by the 
community] because of community liaison and the value of conservation 
to community organisations’ (Interviewee 24, white, female, business).
The foundation was originally the Phinda Community Development Trust Fund which started as a 
bush clearing project (Interviewee 35, white, female, business/foundation).
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Moreover, company and community fortunes appear mutually dependent, albeit 
unevenly. The business is embedded in the local environment whilst the 
sustainability of the business means continued company supported rural 
development and employment. Improved stakeholder relationship has also met the 
important objective of stabilising the area with regard to crime and poaching 
(Interviewee 35, white, female, business/foundation).
Critiquing the CCAfrica business and development model
CCAfrica has been criticised for a number of reasons, ranging from its status as a 
private sector, commercial enterprise to its development model. Surprisingly, a 
senior employee acknowledged a number of perceived problems and volunteered 
some reasons. In the first instance, among other things, there was a deep and 
enduring suspicion of the private sector in the conservation sector, in government 
and within local communities (Interviewee 53, white, female, foundation). CCAfrica 
has also been criticised for having ‘arrogant directorship with regard to financial 
management and the control of the development spend’. The informant also offered 
that the lodges were not yet profitable or were newly profitable, because they were 
‘top heavy’ making operational costs too high (Interviewee 53, white, female, 
foundation). At the time of fieldwork, CCAfrica were not yet making profits. 
According to another informant, CCAfrica has been unprofitable because of heavy 
investment in land management and restocking, given that ‘wildlife is a fugitive 
resource -  it runs away’ (Interviewee 9, white, male, business).
Most significant criticism relates to CCAfrica’s development model which does not 
transfer equity to local stakeholders. The CCAfrica employee justified this position 
in a number of ways. She stressed that given low profitability and high costs, 
community equity was unlikely to be considered in the short term. The ‘lodges are 
not sustainable’ and CCAfrica was in ‘competition with other companies for a small 
slice of business’. It was necessary to manage community expectations. In addition, 
shorter-term competencies in social development as education, skills and 
entrepreneurship needed to be addressed such before equity transfer would be 
considered (Interviewee 53, white, female, foundation). This strategy was confirmed 
by an external informant who argued it was ‘paternalistic’:
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There are problems with the [development] model used by CCAfrica.
First, the donor money is often used as a subsidy for the lodge to do stuff 
like bush clearing which would ordinarily come out of the operational 
costs. This touches on borderline ethics. The other weakness is that the 
foundation is donor driven. It does not reinvest in the community nor 
does it use tourism as a productive engine (Interviewee 8, white, male, 
business).*'^ *
CCAfrica does not share company equity with its community partners. Where 
CCAfrica land is privately owned, adjacent communities are effectively excluded 
from any decision-making associated with land-ownership. Communities are 
‘expected to enjoy the benefits of conservation and ecotourism, but largely as 
passive beneficiaries’ (Allen and Brennan 2002, p. 161). The company’s social 
responsibility programmes are impressive but viewed as corporate philanthropy, 
increasingly seen as limited in the South Africa context. The company’s use of CSR 
as a marketing strategy and leverage funding has also been criticised (Allen and 
Brennan 2002).
As a counterpoint to the GSLWP, CCAfrica is a privately owned white business that 
retains equity and control in its community engagement. Whereas the state has taken 
an active directive stance in the Park, CCAfrica’s social engagement has been 
voluntary, motivated both by normative and strategic business concerns. CCAfrica’s 
CSR programmes are notable examples of corporate philanthropy and corporate 
rural development. However, the case study sits somewhat uncomfortably with the 
SCSD model since the state is not proactive, the market itself is not a redistributive 
tool, and there are limited opportunities for development beyond employment. 
Moreover, whilst a major employer in the area and the instigator of rural 
development programmes in adjacent communities, the social and economic impact 
of the company is limited and localised.
Fungibility raises an important debate and is often posited as a reason on the part of those opposed 
to social development investment (that is, investment in social spending as part of general 
development rather than social sector investment).
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Case Study: Large Hotel Companies
In this final section, I consider three large hotel enterprises, Sun International, 
Southern Sun and Protea Hotels. I examine their different responses to pressures 
from the state and other stakeholders. Each has used their empowerment drivers to 
differentiate their operations as well as for competitive advantage.
Sun International
Sun International, which established a casino industry in the former Bantustans,***  ^is 
the leading enterprise in South Africa’s gaming and leisure industry. The linkage 
between gaming licences and BEE prompted the company to restructure its 
operations (Rogerson 2000, p.6-7; Kim, Crompton, and Botha 2000). The National 
Gambling Act (1996) stipulated that no single operator could operate more than 16 
casino licences countrywide (up to two per province). Importantly, the Act attached 
BEE criteria to the potentially lucrative award of gaming licences and CSR 
obligations (National Gaming Board of South Africa 2001).'"*  ^ Both Sun 
International and Southern Sun are key players in the gaming industry.
As a consequence of these licensing obligations, there have been significant 
numbers of large BEE deals in the gaming sector (BusinessMap 2001; National 
Gaming Board of South Africa 2001; Kyriakidis, Wright, and Wallace 1996; 
Rogerson 2000, p. 11). Provincial Licensing Boards stipulated the contractual 
fulfilment of BEE criteria. The licence criteria have resulted in significant black 
ownership and control in these enterprises. The strategic response by the private 
sector to gaming legislation was the formation of new corporate vehicles in which 
there was a substantial black equity ownership.***"* Gaming enterprises have shown
Sun International and Southern Sun have thrown off the notoriety of founder, Sol Kerzner who 
during apartheid exploited political contacts and contradictions inherent in the ‘independent 
homeland’ system.
At informant at Sun International claimed as part of its CSR programmes, that they were the first 
to institute counselling programmes for responsible gambling at each of their casinos. Other 
interviewees were critical about casinos, voicing ethical concerns that gaming was detrimental to the 
poor (Interviewee 79, white, female, DPI; Interviewee 92, white, male, business; Interviewee 46, 
Indian, male, NGO).
An informant explained that there were 3-5 applications for each gaming concession; each cost 
about R20 million on risk (Interviewee 94, white, male, business).
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themselves to be highly lucrative (Interviewee 57, white, female, DPI) 
(BusinessMap 2001; The Cluster Consortium 1999, p.405). An informant claimed 
gaming was, ‘a licence to print money!’ (Interviewee 95, white, male, business). All 
gaming companies were subject to the same legislative and licence requirements so 
that as an industry start-up, none was competitively disadvantaged by BEE or CSR 
obligations (Interviewee 11, white, male, business). The same informant explained 
that CSR obligations were wider than the gaming tax which benefited the local 
municipality. He explained: Tt is not just a community social issue, it is a business 
imperative’ (Interviewee 7, white, male, business). The same informant added that 
1.5% of taxed profits went into CSR (a typical CSR spend by large enterprises).
Alongside equity, Sun International’s empowerment strategy is driven by 
affirmative set-up and operational procurement (Interviewee 81, white, male, 
academic). Sun International has spearheaded affirmative procurement in the private 
sector. With a shortage of black supply firms, limited affirmative procurement 
opportunities were initially in construction, gardening services, guest transport, dry 
cleaning, cleaning services and even a coffee shop in Carnival City (Rogerson 2000, 
p.20). Sun International has initiated a broader affirmative procurement policy 
beyond it licence obligations although it imposed a premium on the business. A 
company representative admitted: ‘We did pay a premium of up to 10% on contract 
but we paid with our eyes open’ (Interviewee 7, white, male, business).
The restructuring of Sun International was reported to have refocused the group’s 
operations resulting in staff reduction from 12 000 to 8 800 employees between 
1994 and 1999. Restructuring has seen Sun International create out- and in-sourcing 
arrangements.'"*^ As a BEE strategy, affirmative procurement involving out- and in­
sourcing was first mooted in 1998. The strategy was purportedly developed in line 
with national growth goals, social policy objectives of the RDP and market-driven 
wealth transfer (Sun International 1998). Sun International has established former 
black employees and emerging SMME in specialist service providers. Rogerson 
argues that these employment arrangements bestow certain advantages on the
Both Sun International and Southern Sun employ outsourcing and in-sourcing of non-core 
operations as efficiency and cost-cutting measures (Rogerson 2000, p. 13).
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company in that its complement of paid employees (and attendant obligations) is 
reduced (Rogerson 2000, p. 10). Conversely, the company argues the arrangement 
better suits the seasonality of the tourism industry, and that opportunities are created 
for emerging empowerment companies in the sector. An informant explained: ‘We 
have to invest in them; they are the stakeholders’ (Interviewee 7, white, male, 
business). To this end, construction work (a minimum set at 30% of total value) is 
awarded to emerging black businesses, some of which Sun International assisted in 
creating (Rogerson 2000, p. 12).
An interviewee commenting on the Sun International’s BEE framework argued that 
the company embarked on an aggressive affirmative procurement strategy because it 
anticipated ‘legislation from government to increasingly drive [affirmative 
procurement]’ (Interviewee 104, white, female, DPI). Whilst Sun International has 
led on affirmative procurement, public and private views are not always in accord. 
An informant shared some scepticism regarding the philosophy:
If a black man comes to you and tenders, he must be given preference.
That in itself is anti-competitive. And more especially, it is anti­
democratic and it is anti-free market. It goes against all the principles of
a free-market economy (Interviewee 7, white, male, business).
Such perceptions were often shared during interviews; what is surprising is that the 
Sun International source was at the same time also arguing the business case for the 
vigorous promotion of affirmative procurement, by its own suppliers.
In addition, and anticipating the BB-BEE strategy, which underscores affirmative 
procurement. Sun International instituted an arrangement whereby company 
suppliers take responsibility for supporting the growth of emerging SMMEs. To this 
end, the company has created a formalised structure to support out-sourcing 
enterprises. In other words. Sun International’s (private sector) suppliers have to 
take extensive responsibility for developing capacity in emerging businesses within
Under trade union pressure, the company committed itself, where possible, to buying South 
African made products. For example, negotiations with the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers’ Union resulted in a social compact with Sun International regarding the provision of 
quality, delivery time and price to promote South African manufacturing (Interviewee 7, white, male, 
business).
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their sphere. Sun International monitors supply companies in terms of their 
empowerment profiles, compliance with contractual obligations and any failure to 
support emerging SMMEs. Failure to meet these requirements is likely to threaten 
further contracts with the company. Contracted companies in turn have to manage 
their own stakeholder relationships though public community meetings and multi­
stakeholder partnerships. Notably, the transactional costs in developing partnerships 
with SMMEs are borne by the suppliers and not by Sun International.
Although the motivation for Sun International’s progressive affirmative procurement 
policies appears in the preservation of ‘free’ markets, its business model is one 
which self-consciously uses the somewhat visible hand of the ‘free’ market to ensure 
company value, as well as transfer. The model’s strength lies in the fact that it 
genuinely results in broader-based BEE by developing and providing opportunities 
further along the value chain. This widens the pool of economic beneficiaries. 
Moreover, the impact of Sun International affirmative procurement strategy is 
deepened in its secondary affirmative procurement policy places BEE obligations on 
its suppliers.
Southern Sun
The Southern Sun Group (hereafter Southern Sun), along with City Lodge, 
dominates the domestic business tourism industry (Rogerson 2000, p.6). The Group 
is wholly owned by SABMiller which is quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Its 
gaming business is co-owned by Tsogo Sun Investments ‘making it the country’s 
largest black empowerment hotel and gaming group’ (Southern Sun Hotels 2004). In 
strategic partnerships with Six Continents Hotels and the Accor Group, Southern 
Sun operates, among others, the franchises of Intercontinental, Crowne Plaza, 
Holiday Inn and Formula One brands. Southern Sun is also the largest time-share 
operator in southern Africa. Southern Sun is a multinational presence with hotel 
franchises in seven other African count r ies .Like Sun International, Southern Sun 
has extensive gaming interests.
These are Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Corporate citizenship reporting was a notable transformation initiative by Southern 
Sun. Its initial report in 2000 made it the first company to engage in social 
accounting in the tourism industry. The social reporting standards for company 
accounts, are primarily from the Global Reporting Initiative, as well as 
Accountability 1000 (Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability) and ISO 14001 
(International Organisation for Standardisation). Corporate citizenship reports are 
concerned with sustainability issues and reflect a multi-stakeholder process. The 
Group reports on economic, social and environmental indicators, corporate 
governance, partnerships and investors. It also systematically reports on its key 
stakeholder relationships; employees, customers, suppliers, government, industry, 
the environment, as well as on its BEE performance (Southern Sun Hotels 2002). 
One interviewee described the context in which social reporting was initiated as a 
‘very difficult trading time when the hotel industry is suffering and its fortunes 
going up and down with the economy’ (Interviewee 11, white, male, business). The 
same informant admitted that many throughout the business saw the reporting 
process as ‘an extravagant programme’, ‘soft’ and ‘not core to business operations’. 
The difficulty in gaining acceptance of such processes is not unique to Southern 
Sun. Indeed, given the onerous task of including resistant stakeholders, it is all the 
more remarkable that the company has maintained its commitment to producing a 
subsequent report in 2002.
Like its competitor Sun International, Southern Sun’s efficiency drivers have 
resulted in in-sourcing of services such as housekeeping. The development of a 
model around in-sourcing services by Southern Sun identified candidates from 
existing staff. Selected staff were provided with business training and awarded a 
trial contract prior to a longer-term contract. In addition. Southern Sun provided 
seed capital and ongoing training and mentorship for newly established businesses 
(The Cluster Consortium 1999, p.400). The group claimed significant successes with 
the programme. However, the programme was suspended following a Labour Court
Social accounting is an important process but not one which forms the core concerns in this thesis. 
More information on the social accounting standards I have mentioned can be found at 
www.globalreporting.org.www.accountabilitv.org.uk and www.iso.ch.
Southern Sun has been attributed with evolving the in-sourcing arrangement (Rogerson 2000, 
p.l3).
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judgement which ruled that since it was linked to retrenchments, Southern Sun had a 
responsibility to maintain income levels for these staff.
Companies like Southern Sun and Sun International have to balance efficiency 
imperatives with affirmative procurement programmes, which might in themselves 
appear to be creative redistributive mechanisms. However, the judgement that led to 
the suspension of in-sourcing reduces the commitment to such programmes since 
they undermine company efficiency and involve the risk of litigation. It may be 
argued that the power of the labour movement is waning and certain interests 
already regard the development of black enterprise are a critical element in 
broadening the benefits of BEE.
Protea Hotels
The Protea Group is a leading hotel group which owns and/or manages almost 90 
hotels around South Africa, as well as in surrounding African countries (Rogerson 
2000, p.7). It claims to be the largest hotel group in Africa in terms of numbers of 
hotels (Protea Hotels 2004). Among Protea’s management contracts are the state- 
owned Aventura resorts. The contract was awarded when the resorts failed to be 
privatised in 1999.
Of the three largest hotel companies. Protea has embarked on the most conventional 
of empowerment strategies. In 2001, non-listed Protea Hospitality Corporation 
(PHC), the holding company for Protea hotels sold 18% of its shares to a BEE 
consortium. The deal focussed on equity as the ‘biggest critical factor in the 
industry’ (Protea Hotels 2001). This is lesonant of the first wave of BEE where 
equity-driven deals were most common. Given the problems of special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) and the failure of many empowerment deals in that first wave, the 
Protea deal used private compacts between existing and new owners. With problems 
of leveraging funding, the company’s existing executive directors, underwrote the
The consortium comprised two trade union investment companies, Basebenzi Investments, the 
investment company of the Federated Allied Worker’s Union (FAWU) and Popcru Investment 
Holdings, The consortium also included black business interests Hoyohoyo Hotels and Resorts, 
Siphumelele Investments and two private shareholders.
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deal themselves. Protea’s shares were warehoused whilst the consortium purchasers 
made payment of a substantial deposit (Hospitality Online 2002 circa). The deal was 
essentially facilitated by the commitment of existing directors to underwrite the deal 
and enter a compact with their new empowerment partners. The management core 
remained intact and new empowerment members were added (Protea Hotels 2001).
Protea’s unusual funding arrangements mitigated some of the problems associated 
with BEE deals and SPVs. Given that this arrangement is underwritten by 
individuals, this suggests the strategic importance of securing BEE partners. In this 
case, Protea has responded to the state-created environment by advancing equity to 
BEE partners. Again, this arrangement directly benefits a relatively small number of 
people, with a wider pool of beneficiaries involved through institutional investors.
Conclusion
Tourism is a crucial sector of the South African economy. Consequently, it has 
attracted significant political interest and investment by both the public and private 
sector. In accord with the SCSD framework, government seeks to transform existing 
economic patterns and ensure economic prosperity by transforming key industries 
like tourism. State strategy in the political economy of tourism has seen it establish a 
specific and non-negotiable business environment which seeks to use the market for 
redistribution. It has also used the market to expand the distribution of opportunity 
and create incentive for transformation through potential massive rewards. Indeed, 
as demonstrated by the cases, through the incentives of such lucrative instruments as 
concessions, gaming licenses, infrastructure contracts and the on-going supply of 
goods and services, the state has been able to use the market towards economic - as 
well as social and political - ends. Corporations, in turn, respond to this environment 
in ways that maximise their strategic benefits. For example, empowerment 
businesses have been established to win contracts and licenses with empowerment 
obligations.
A recurrent theme in this chapter has been the importance of stakeholding to the 
tourism industry. Trust is also imperative for broader South African social objectives 
of a social contract ‘based on trust, empowerment, co-operation and partnerships’
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(DEAT 2002, p.5). The existence of trust between stakeholders in a working social 
contract is vital for creating a safe and stable environment to sustain tourism. To 
keep a competitive advantage in tourism diversity, South African enterprises need 
the support of a wide range of stakeholders. But trust which is the glue for social 
contract is not an unlimited resource. The state has to manage stakeholder 
relationships and tourism resources, whether human, wildlife, cultural or 
environmental. In this role, the state has to facilitate the development of stakeholder 
trust to shore up any social contract. On one level, the tourism industry represents 
the broader South African project which seeks to negotiate the interest of diverse 
groups and which seeks economic transfer along market principles. Moreover, 
whilst stakeholding and the social contract are essential normative concepts, 
tourism’s dependence on their existence shifts their importance to an instrumental or 
strategic level.
The engagement of tourism business with the social transformation of the economy 
is multi-dimensional. In the first instance, tourism enterprises have to manage a 
unique relationship with the state to secure this environment and the necessary 
infrastructure for their operation. Moreover, since the state is the major consumer of 
goods and services throughout the economy, tourism businesses have responded to 
the commercial rewards that flow from a good relationship with the state. To access 
these rewards, tourism enterprises have had to attend to their institutional 
arrangements, corporate governance, patterns of ownership and the management of 
affirmative legislation regarding employment, and procurement in particular. The 
nature of the particular tourism enterprise will also determine the relative importance 
of different stakeholders, whether the state, local communities or overseas tourists.
In this and the preceding chapter, I have argued that BEE is a form of market-driven 
state transfer. In the tourism sector, there are significant differences in the nature of 
distribution between equity-ownership leveraged by government at one end of the 
spectrum, and the benefits of land clearing programmes at the other. The impact of 
these benefits on communities is very different. How these two ends of tourism BEE 
cohere, and how the social and economic benefits of the sector are spread more
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broadly are the challenges to SCSD, and to the state and businesses as tourism 
stakeholders.
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CHAPTER SEVEN; ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
This thesis examines the dynamic relationship between the state and the market in 
South Africa with particular regard to the redistribution of social and economic 
goods and opportunities. The twin challenges of ensuring global competitiveness, 
whilst redressing apartheid legacies through social development have created a 
political economy that seeks to meet the interests of divergent social groups. To 
better understand this tension, I developed a new framework, state-corporate social 
development (SCSD) to describe and analyse the state-market relationship in this 
contemporary developing country milieu. The framework theorises this relationship 
in the global context of shifting expectations regarding the role of the state in 
managing social well-being. SCSD comprises two concepts. First, the notion ‘state- 
corporate’ highlights the dynamic tension between the state and the market in a 
contemporary political economy. Second, ‘social development’ underlines the 
specific public and particularly, private institutional responses to social development 
goals. The thesis explores how the South African state as purposeful and proactive 
actor has created a set of specific market conditions through policies such as black 
economic empowerment (BEE). These policies seek to ensure economic and social 
transformation through market-driven mechanisms. The thesis also explores the 
responses of business to these legislative, institutional and environmental conditions. 
As a social policy framework, SCSD does not seek to deliver social goods directly. 
Rather, it leverages the market, and key institutional relationships (between the state 
and the private sector) to these ends.
The thesis demonstrates how the state has created an environment in which to 
advance a particular set of economic, social and political outcomes. The primary 
political driver is the imperative to redress the legacies of apartheid and accelerate 
the integration of black South Africans into the economic mainstream. The state has 
used multiple levers to ensure this, including, most notably, the market mechanism. 
As the major consumer of goods and services, the state employs market incentives 
or sanctions as the primary means of effecting economic transfer. The thesis
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analyses this redistributive strategy with reference to the investment and tourism 
sectors.
Social contract and stakeholder theory are used to frame SCSD. Located within a 
left liberal spectrum, these theories permit the accommodation of pluralism. This is 
relevant for governance both by the state and business sector. Moreover, the analysis 
is enhanced by the synergistic employment of these theories. Social contract theory 
operates at a highly abstracted level as a heuristic device informing policy, whilst 
stakeholder theory functions at an operational level in the practice and 
implementation of policy.
The research employed qualitative methods including 135 face-to-face stakeholder 
interviews and extensive analysis of both published, grey literature and electronic 
sources. The empirical case studies explored SCSD as it pertains to contemporary 
South Africa, especially with respect to the policies and implementation of BEE.
The research had a number of explicit aims:
The primary aim was to employ a social development perspective to better 
understand the state-market relationship, in general, and the social role of 
corporations, in particular.
Second, in theorising the state-market relationship, the thesis developed a new 
conceptual framework and interrogated its appropriateness to describe and analyse 
the state-market relationship and socio-economic development in South Africa.
Third, it described the economic and social drivers established by the South African 
state to transform the business environment, and the responses of corporations to a 
given social and economic milieu.
Fourth, in line with corporate responses, the thesis interrogated the capacity of 
traditional forms of corporate social engagement, namely CSR to ensure social well­
being or alter economic patterns.
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Fifth, since the purview of CSR was assumed (and later established) to be limited, 
the thesis interrogated whether state-directed policies aimed at market-driven 
economic transfer patterns are more apposite to advance corporate social 
responsibility.
Sixth, within a left liberal paradigm, the research established the relevance of social 
contract theory and stakeholder theory as important theoretical frameworks in the 
formulation of a SCSD framework. With reference to a social development 
framework and policy formulation, social contract theory informs why these 
questions are asked in the first place. Stakeholder theory informs what questions are 
asked and how given objectives might be achieved.
Finally, the thesis engaged more specific research questions using empirical data 
drawn from the research. The thesis examined the development and evolution of 
current South African policies such as BEE. Using case study data, it questioned 
whether BEE could deliver particular economic outcomes that are socially 
responsible and whether these can potentially deliver social Justice.
Critical Empirical Findings
The research findings provide a picture of the South African political economy at a 
particular time in the country’s history. The thesis generated a framework for the 
analysis of the state-market relationship and the social responses by corporations in 
contemporary South Africa. The empirical data highlighted a number of important 
issues. Chief among these is the role of the state in determining market 
environments. Indeed, the South African government’s political agenda - the 
redistribution of wealth into black hands through BEE policies - crucially 
determines this business environment. This environment is defined by a number of 
laws and institutional arrangements that have altered the distribution of economic 
opportunity, albeit largely for a middle class, elite, and the relatively privileged 
employed labour class. Opportunity is redistributed through employment equity 
policies and practice, while social investment is advanced through skills 
development and affirmative procurement legislation, under an overarching
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constitutional framework which guarantees equality. At one level, this environment 
is non-negotiable. The state’s role as an underwriter of BEE is one of a directive and 
‘visible hand’ in the ‘free’ market in the way to seeks to allocate opportunity. The 
market is influenced by the state’s political imperative, as well as the incentives 
created by the state to which business has responded strategically. The research 
identifies the general (although not universal) acceptance of capitalism and market 
forces as the primary mechanism for wealth creation and redistribution. Moreover, 
as described in Chapter Four, there are multiple stakeholder fora for the negotiation 
of these issues, seeking the reduction of risk and reinforcement of liberal pluralism.
The apparently non-negotiable nature of the market environment characterised by a 
high level of state intervention was an issue of concern for many business people. A 
number of informants were ambivalent about the directive role of the state and what 
they considered the highly regulated contour of South African business. 
Interestingly, some elite representatives who were largely (but not exclusively) 
white criticised the apparent over-regulation by government as inefficient, as rent- 
seeking and as undermining competition. It also became clear that there was often a 
distinction between the public discourse of companies and the private opinions df 
their representatives during interviews. These informants raised concerns that 
excessive legislation hampered the efficient operation of the market. Of BEE 
legislation, again mostly white business people expressed concern about the 
racialised quality of economic redress and concerns about the business skills of their 
black counterparts. There also appeared to be an enduring distrust of government 
policies among some white business elites. Finally, there are enduring concerns 
about the sustainability of BEE. Since the ‘cost’ of BEE is justified in terms of 
redress and equity, concerns regarding the sustainability of BEE policies remain 
particularly in light of the fact that there is no stated time-line or proposed 
termination date for policies which are essentially remedial, aimed at post-apartheid 
redress. Again, the on-going costs of BEE policies have to be set against South 
Africa’s need to compete in the global market-place.
The sectoral case studies presented in Chapters Five and Six are not intended for 
direct comparison although some common trends and differences are noteworthy.
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Relationships with the state as a primary stakeholder are crucial for both investment 
and tourism enterprises. In the case of investment companies, a stable economic 
environment is vital for the attraction and retention of on-going investment both 
domestically and internationally. Certain enterprises require greater state 
approbation than others such as those seeking the award of contracts in industries 
which are subject to greater regulation including the media, broadcasting and 
telecommunications. However, the primary mandate of these companies is the 
(responsible) return on shareholder investment. Moreover, many of these investment 
companies owe their existence to opportunities made available to empowerment 
investment companies and these companies’ further mandate involves investment in 
companies with credible BEE credentials.
In the case of tourism enterprises, the state is also a crucial stakeholder for a number 
of reasons. First, the industry depends on a stable and crime-free environment, the 
product of political commitment, practical implementation, on-going vigilance, and 
significantly, state management of the social and economic causes of crime. At the 
same time, tourism is also dependant on other tourism stakeholders such as local 
communities to ensure this environmental stability and the co-stewardship of certain 
tourism assets. Second, licenses to operate assets in conservation areas, for example, 
and those in tourism-aligned industries such as transport and gaming are awarded on 
the basis of empowerment profiles and behaviour. The case studies also illustrate 
sectoral differences which suggest alongside stakeholder interests, the nature of the 
business in question is important to its corporate social engagement responses.
BEE seeks to integrate black people into the economic mainstream through various 
legislative and institutional mechanisms. Chapter Five demonstrated that in the first 
wave of BEE, many of these strategies failed. First wave empowerment largely 
benefited a small number of politically-connected individuals who now constitute an 
entrenched black elite and growing middle class. However, despite earlier failures, 
recent developments in the BEE framework have resulted in a broader-based 
strategy which seeks to widen the mechanism for empowerment and its pool of 
potential beneficiaries. BEE is the redistribution of opportunities to black people 
rather than merely the transfer of equity ownership. The state has used its purchasing
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power and its relationship with the private sector to compel deracialisation in the 
workplace, and create incentive for the transformation of business. A key constituent 
of this strategy is affirmative procurement. Affirmative procurement is seen as a 
progressive, market-driven strategy that increasingly results in the exploitation of 
market opportunities by the formation of BEE entities. The ability of black 
entrepreneurs to exploit these opportunities is often restricted by lack of access to 
capital, a problem only partially resolved by the state through DFIs. Affirmative 
procurement is not, however, an appropriate transformation mechanism for all 
circumstances such as in the case of small businesses that do not seek state contracts 
or which operate in sectors where procurement represents a small portion of the 
business.
A consequence of emerging black wealth has been a significant shift in the racial 
demographics of the middle class and among economic elites. Wealth inequality 
remains a serious challenge to South Africa. Chapter Four establishes that whilst 
poverty is still largely black, the middle-class has become increasingly deracialised. 
Inequality is increasingly an intra-racial phenomenon. There has been significant 
criticism of the government’s prioritisation of black middle-class interests at the 
expense of the interest of the poor. A key question emerging from this research has 
been the problematisation of BEE and for whom it ultimately delivers 
empowerment.
The thesis also found that although a desirable corporate engagement strategy, CSR 
(or CSX) is in itself limited as a social development policy. CSR is ameliorative. Its 
impact is often local and uneven, and it does not seek to transform existing 
economic patterns. There has been little critical attention given to the 
appropriateness of importing what is essentially a construct of corporate social 
engagement from the global North to South Africa or other Southern countries. This 
thesis has argued repeatedly that many of South Africa’s challenges are 
developmental in nature and as such, CSR is not a panacea for local challenges. Like 
their Northern counterparts. South African companies have justified CSR on 
normative but also, more interestingly, on strategic grounds. Despite its limitations, 
CSR successfully leverages strategic benefit for business in two ways. First, the
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long-term sustainability of business is linked to the perceived legitimacy of its 
economic and social benefits to stakeholders beyond its shareholders. Business has 
to be seen to be investing in social development capacity. Second, there are direct, 
realisable strategic benefits to CSR for those companies seeking business from the 
state since tendering requirements adumbrate CSR among criteria for the award of 
contracts. However, as both empirical chapters demonstrated, CSR alone does not 
result in any significant transfer and has to be viewed in the context of other 
transformative policies like BEE. The notion of corporate citizenship is more 
appropriate than CSR to the SCSD framework.
Utility of existing theoretical and conceptual approaches
In developing and applying the SCSD framework, the thesis has made extensive 
links between existing theoretical approaches. In particular, the SCSD framework 
employs the concept of political economy, left liberalism, social development, social 
contract theory and stakeholding.
The thesis and SCSD are grounded in a political economy approach which is 
embedded in the left liberal and social democratic traditions. They in turn advance 
roles for both the state and the market and seek to accommodate a plurality of 
interests. Thus, SCSD is a normative framework rooted in an ideological position 
that holds that the redistribution of resources is a basic and necessary requirement of 
social development. The political economy approach when operationalised, seeks to 
manage the relationship between the state and market in promoting social and 
economic development.
The thesis drew on the operational concept of social development towards 
developing a framework which accommodates the extension of institutional 
responsibility for development and the promotion of social and economic well-being 
to non-state institutional actors, particularly, business. SCSD highlights the role of a 
directive state in creating the enabling conditions for socio-economic development 
by ensuring capacity (through social investment) and opportunity. Social 
development also underlines the importance of the market in ensuring redistribution 
through growth. Also relevant to the SCSD framework, a social development
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perspective uses contracts between social partners and institutions to accommodate 
diverse interests through managed pluralism. It also allows for targeted policies 
which are context-specific. In the case of South Africa, this means positive 
discrimination.
SCSD also employs stakeholder theory to understand the corporation’s position 
within a nexus of societal relationships, and social contract theory to explain the 
rights and obligations extant between stakeholders. Stakeholder theory explains and 
guides the operation of the corporation from the fundamental premise of its 
accountability to numerous stakeholders beyond its shareholders. Corporations 
engage with stakeholders for descriptive, normative as well as strategic reasons. As 
a mechanism for managing diverse interests, a stakeholder theory of the corporation 
links advantageously to the liberalism and managed pluralism inherent in the social 
development framework. A central and on-going challenge in stakeholder theory is 
defining the corporation’s stakeholders. Donaldson and Preston utilise social 
contract theory to define those who hold a stake: a social contract exists between 
stakeholders and the corporation, expressed or implied (Donaldson and Preston 
1995). This was the approach followed here.
SCSD employs the social contract as a heuristic device to define the rights and 
responsibilities of different stakeholders. It also employs the social contract at a 
macro-level to describe the political, economic and social arrangements explicitly 
negotiated in societies, such as South Africa’s new liberal social democracy. 
Through a system of rights and responsibilities, social contract theory explains the 
relationship between the state and the market; between institutions, as well as 
between these institutions and the society in which they operate. Social contracts 
themselves may operate at different levels of abstraction. The SCSD framework 
which employs stakeholder theory on a normative and strategic basis is congruent 
with social contractarian notions. In turn, both of these theoretical positions support 
SCSD arguments that seek to advance the social engagement of corporations. The 
social contract is also especially useful for understanding the state-market dyad, and 
for advancing an understanding of the redistribution of goods in society. Classical 
social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are concerned with the
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origins and working of the state, and the limits of political authority and obligation. 
Modem theory uses the social contract as metaphor (rather than a formal and 
litigable contract) and is concerned with relationships of obligation in a general 
conception of justice.
The thesis has explored the necessary conditions for the achievement of social 
justice. To this end, it invokes Rawlsian social contract and his Principles of Justice 
in particular, to justify and explain unequal social and economic arrangements such 
as the affirmative policies in South Africa which direct material benefit and 
opportunities to black people. The thesis finds theoretical justification for BEE in 
Rawls’ social contract, as well as the social development framework that permits the 
affirmative treatment of certain groups and individuals through targeted 
redistribution.
Contributions of the research
This thesis contributes to academic research in a number of ways:
This thesis has developed and advanced a SCSD framework to analyse and explain 
the state-market relationship, redistribution through social investment and 
affirmative opportunities through the market, the management of diverse stakeholder 
interests and the social engagement of corporations. SCSD is defined as a 
framework for planned and strategic change for social well-being in which economic 
and social development are integrated and mutually supportive in a context-specific 
environment, and where the state is the chief driver and the market its primary 
mechanism in achieving social goals.
A key contribution of the SCSD framework is that it theorises the state-market 
relationship and advances an explicit engagement by corporations in concert with 
the state in the promotion of social well-being. The thesis extends existing 
conceptions of social development by focussing on the role of the market as a social 
development vehicle whilst regarding the directive state as the primary policy driver. 
In developing the SCSD framework, the thesis harmonises in a single framework a 
number of constituent approaches, the conjunction of which extends both theoretical 
and empirical insights into the state-market relationship in a developing country
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context. Moreover, the SCSD is found to be an appropriate analytic framework 
when tested against empirical data.
The thesis incorporates perspectives from various disciplines such as sociology, 
politics, development studies and business management. It draws together insights 
from these disciplines and from areas of attendant interest, including law, political 
philosophy, political economics, ethics, and governance. The thesis’ 
multidisciplinary orientation is consistent with perspectives inherent in its home 
discipline of social policy. However, by drawing from such a wide range of 
perspectives, the thesis offers a unique and integrative view of the phenomena and 
situations under investigation. As a consequence, the thesis represents an important 
contribution to the discipline of social policy, and also to other multidisciplinary 
areas such as development studies, governance and even business management. The 
thesis demonstrates the interaction of two key institutions, the state and the market, 
in advancing social and economic development. It has offered an analysis that steps 
beyond mere presentation and description. It develops a critique of the state-market 
dyad, corporate social engagement and BEE policies which is coherent, rigorous and 
insightful. Thus, the thesis draws together in a single analysis such disparate ideas as 
political economy, liberalism, social development, CSR, corporate citizenship, and 
BEE represented through a multidisciplinary prism which builds a picture of SCSD 
in South Africa. In so doing, the thesis breaks new theoretical and empirical ground.
The thesis extends current conceptions of corporate social engagement which have 
largely been concerned with CSR. Corporate philanthropic activity is often an 
important funder of social development programmes in a developing country 
context. However, these interventions are limited contributors to overall social 
welfare. Drawing on the values of corporate citizenship, the thesis establishes a 
corporate social development perspective in which social concerns are embedded in 
the strategic and operational imperatives of business. SCSD advances CSR and 
corporate citizenship issues by moving them from the normative to the strategic 
level. The SCSD framework holds that corporate social engagement has a normative 
basis and that it is ethical and virtuous. However, SCSD acknowledges that 
businesses seek profit maximisation and value-creation. SCSD contributes to the
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impact of corporate social engagement beyond that of CSR and corporate citizenship 
by harmonising responsible business with the broader social and economic 
imperatives of extending benefits and opportunities. It is clear, as demonstrated by 
the empirical data in this thesis that SCSD potentially results in corporate social 
engagement that is beneficial to all stakeholders.
The thesis has tested the SCSD framework within two key sectors of the South 
Africa economy, taking account of contextual specificities, and found it to be 
appropriate. South African society is characterised by striking economic and social 
inequalities. The SCSD framework focuses attention on the contextual 
appropriateness of a purposeful, interventionist state operating in tandem with 
proactive market institutions. The thesis demonstrates that government policy has 
targeted the market as an intermediary to extend economic and social opportunities 
through empowerment policies. The thesis contributes to a small but growing critical 
analysis of BEE. The thesis substantiates the notion that the South Africa 
government creates the environment for business operating licences using sanctions 
and positive incentives. The thesis presents evidence that corporations respond to 
these incentives for normative and, particularly, strategic reasons. In scrutinising 
BEE policies in general, and within two sectors in particular, the thesis tracks the 
evolution of BEE from a narrow equity-driven strategy to a broad-based strategy 
aimed at managing the social and economic needs of a greater number of citizens. 
The thesis’ treatment of BEE represents a significant contribution to this body of 
literature. SCSD theorises BEE within a social development and left liberal 
theoretical framework utilising both stakeholder theory as well as the abstract 
heuristic device of the social contract.
The thesis has contributed new analysis and explored empirical terrain in the 
sectoral cases of investment and tourism by its application of the SCSD framework. 
Empirical data supports the assumption that the SCSD conceptual and operational 
framework is compatible with the theoretical rubrics of social contract theory and 
stakeholder management. Both theoretical frameworks offer important guidance and 
direction with regard to understanding the management of conflicting interests.
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Together these theoretical rubrics show that pluralism is guaranteed and social 
cohesion ensured despite the existence of political, economic and social division.
A further contribution by this thesis is a picture of the operation of SCSD in South 
Africa at a particular period in the country’s transition. The thesis reflects and 
benchmarks the perceptions of elite stakeholders from diverse spheres to a range of 
issues of concern to the SCSD framework. Thus, the research establishes a useful 
empirical baseline for further research in this area, in the case studies and other 
sectors.
Methodological issues and future research
The research findings presented in this thesis reflect the methodological sensitivities 
inherent in applying the same analytic framework to different sectors, registering 
common trends and also specific institutional and operational dynamics of each 
sector. The evolution of BEE as a SCSD outcome has been demonstrated in both 
sectors. In addition, the research was sensitive to the relative importance of various 
stakeholders for different sectors, and even within sectors according to given 
business models. A number of limitations to the research were outlined in the first 
chapter including methodological problems inherent in subjective interpretation (of 
researcher and informant), case study methods, research undertaken with limited 
time and resources, representing information given in confidence, accessing elite 
informants and critical sanction given the highly politicised subject matter. 
However, the research managed these in a forthright and conscientious manner to 
construct a coherent and rigorous picture of SCSD in contemporary South Africa.
As indicated above, the thesis provides a platform for further research by providing 
a rigorous framework for the analysis of state-market relationships and the social 
engagement of corporations. It also provides a platform for describing and analysing 
redistributive mechanisms through the market. This research was time-bound, and 
has usefully established a baseline for further similar research in these areas. Here, 
there is greater scope for longitudinal studies which would permit SCSD to be used 
over a period of time to evaluate the performance of sectors against social and 
economic goals. In addition, the SCSD framework can usefiilly be applied to
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investigate the dynamics of other sectors such as the mining, transport and finance 
industries. As the thesis excluded analysis of the role of NGOs, a different 
framework which might contain some elements of the SCSD may be usefully 
applied to accommodate instances of local NGO sector pressure on both the state 
and business as in the case of pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, the SCSD 
framework might also be tested in the case of multinational corporations. The 
application of the framework to other developing nations could also be pursued.
The issue of BEE is an under-researched area and little critical scholarship exists on 
the subject. Whilst it is widely agreed that the South African economy must become 
more effective and competitive, it is generally suspected that BEE distorts the 
market by imposing a premium on business’ licence to operate. Controversially, 
recognising the immediate and urgent need for transformation of the South Africa 
economy, friture research might interrogate the longer-term impact of other indirect 
costs of BEE such as the emigration of white skills, investment costs or increased 
transactional costs borne by both the state and the private sector. However, since the 
state has not proposed a discontinuance of BEE policies, the cost of this ongoing 
state intervention to business of BEE must be evaluated against the clear gains of 
BEE.
Implications for policy and practice
Increasingly, policy makers around the globe focus on the relationship between the 
state and the market to ensure in promoting overall social well-being through social 
and economic development. Social policy, particularly in developed countries, has 
traditionally assumed that the role of the state was to ensure redistribution through 
social goods and services. The retrenchment of the state in recent years, however, 
has challenged this assumption and policy makers have had to consider other ways 
of realising social goals. Other institutions, particularly the market, are seen as 
appropriate co-partners for the state in achieving these socio-economic objectives. 
This thesis has argued that key policy issues relate to the balance of market 
intervention in market transactions in order to achieve a dynamic and responsive 
political economy acceptable to all stakeholders. The state, in concert with the
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private sector is forcefully accelerating BEE for the purposes o f  socio-econom ic 
transform ation.
State-Corporate I  Social Development
Corporate Social EngagementState-Market
Government Business Society
Social Contract 
Theory
Stakeholding
Practice & 
Implem entationPolicy
Figure 7.1: Diagrammatic representation of SCSD as a policy framework
Figure 7.1 offers a diagram m atic representation o f  SCSD as a discursive, analytic, 
policy and practical fram ew ork. It deconstructs SCSD into its two prim ary 
constituents; the state-m arket relationship which establishes the business 
environm ent, and the social engagem ent o f  business in response. It shows the key 
institutional stakeholders in the fram ework. It also points to the theoretical rubric 
inform ing SCSD. Social contract theory is reflected in the political econom y at a 
m acroeconom ic level. In other words, the social contract is the product o f  a 
negotiated agreem ent between state and m arket actors which in turn inform s the 
overarching policy environm ent. S takeholding explains and guides operational and 
practical concerns that inform the im plem entation o f  policies.
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South Africa’s liberal social democracy exhibits both Keynesian and neo-liberal 
characteristics in its macroeconomic policy, GEAR. GEAR emphasises 
macroeconomic stabilisation through fiscal restraint by the state and conservative 
economic policies which seek to create an enabling environment for market directed 
growth. Whilst GEAR is seen as a self-imposed structural adjustment policy, it also 
retains a link with RDP objectives which emphasise social redistribution through the 
provision of health care, education, housing, water and so on, as well as the 
alleviation of poverty through employment creation, including extensive public 
works programmes. Thus, GEAR establishes a macroeconomic environment which 
is greater than the sum of its parts since it privileges both liberal economic values in 
the market, and social democratic values in its social redistribution. Moreover, 
GEAR has been described as social contract (May et a l 1998, p.64; Mokate 2000; 
Friedman 1992). It advocates a social compact primarily between the state, business 
and labour to facilitate wage moderation, accelerate investment and employment and 
improve service delivery (Friedman 1992). Each of these elements of GEAR is 
congruent with social policy formulation in a left liberal framework. Here, SCSD 
provides a useful discursive, analytic and policy framework. However, both the 
market and redistributionist elements of South African social and economic policy 
have to be strengthened and sustained to ensure continued social transformation. 
This requires greater efforts by the state and the market to eradicate poverty and 
address the hugely divisive social and economic inequality that exists. The success 
of coordinated state-market strategies will depend on a number of factors. These 
include progressive and flexible policies underpinned by sustained political will to 
alleviate the plight of the poor, efficiency in the delivery of social goods, the 
proactive broadening of empowerment to a wider pool of beneficiaries, and 
institutional stability to manage the risks and opportunities of globalisation in the 
interest of human development.
Institutional co-operation described by SCSD requires a reified social agreement 
which mitigates conflict and the increased risk associated with political and 
economic instability. A culture of dialogue presupposes such a social contract. 
Social contracting is a democracy-consolidating exercise which ensures greater
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stability, stresses mutual obligation and promotes pluralism. Indeed, the act of 
articulating the purview of such a social contract among stakeholders can provide an 
important means of fostering agreement on shared goals and visions. South Africa’s 
tradition of dialogue serves the notion cf the social contract well, as it does the 
multiple formal and informal social contracts that obtain. At the core of the South 
African social contract is a set of rules and obligations that establish the manner in 
which different stakeholders engage, and how their interests are advanced. However, 
enduring stakeholder compacts based on trust require continuous revisiting and 
ongoing commitment by all contractors whether these are abstract or grounded, 
litigable contacts. The SCSD framework establishes the policy framework to 
promote and strengthen social contracts among stakeholders; between business and 
the state, and business and its various stakeholders. By using the social contract as 
the fairest and most just mechanism for the distribution of goods, SCSD ensures the 
state meets basic needs, and in concert with other institutions, promotes social 
investment and opportunity creation.
An important policy insight relates to the shift from normative to strategic business 
responses. CSR, as corporate philanthropy and corporate citizenship has largely 
been regarded as normative social engagement by business. The SCSD framework 
argues that whilst these responses are desirable, their impact may be maximised if 
embedded with a policy framework which recognises their strategic importance. 
Stated differently, the power of economic self-interest is harnessed for broader 
social development and restorative social justice. Here, the state as a major 
consumer encourages a range of corporate behaviours through material incentives 
which operate in the mutual interest of the state and business. By providing 
incentives, the state ensures that businesses are ‘socially responsible’, that they 
assent to a range of transformation policies which they might otherwise resist, and 
even reproduce these incentives along their own supply chain. Whilst CSR remains 
voluntary and non-mandatory, state licensing and procurement policies have ensured 
that in order for businesses to win contracts they have to look and behave in state- 
sanctioned ways. The implication is that companies have repositioned themselves in 
line with this socially responsible vision that advances BEE to commercial self- 
interest. Companies demonstrating greater demographic representation are
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commercially better placed to exploit market opportunities. A further implication is 
that where CSR and philanthropy ends, the market extends social and economic 
development. Policy must address transformation in innovative and creative ways 
which importantly also address business imperatives. Most companies, especially 
large business, see the process of adopting BEE as critical to their business 
sustainability in the long term. Thus, state policies as well as corporate social 
policies recognise the power of commercially-driven incentives and extend the 
potential of both state and market institutions to deliver social and economic benefit.
At a corporate level, it is clearly important for the sustainability of businesses that 
they adopt policies that are both commercially viable and politically strategic. 
Corporate social policies must be seen to be adding value. But beyond reputation 
management and legislative compliance, there is a strategic benefit in value-based 
empowerment policies and practice which are infused throughout the organisation 
from board level, through management to staff. Stakeholder management within the 
business enterprise is more likely to result in a shared culture, as well as a common 
strategic and operational vision. Race is a dominant issue in contemporary South 
Africa, and BEE is the critical facet in corporate social engagement. However, it is 
important that other forms of diversity including gender and disability remain 
priorities, both in policy or practice.
It is imperative that BEE policies deliver broad-based economic empowerment. In 
order to be effective as a mechanism for redistribution, and to remain a legitimate 
policy option, BEE must in relatively short order provide broader benefits to larger 
numbers of people. It is imperative that the state continues sensitively to manage the 
inevitable divergent interests that obtain. To this end and given the significant 
economic stakes, the state must ensure that policies are consultative building on an 
established social contract, and that implementation is fully transparent and 
accountable. The trend of ‘empowering’ politically well-placed individuals rather 
than on the basis of commercial capability weakens the government’s claims 
regarding fairness, market process and transparency. Accountability and 
transparency with regard to both the state and business are critical to continued 
economic stability and to attract sustained foreign direct investment. Indeed,
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broader-based BEE attempts to redress the contradiction inherent in narrowly 
conceived empowerment strategies by further inclusion and by focussing on social 
investment and the creation of market opportunities.
Government policies are driving corporate behaviour with respect to employment, 
equity investment and now recently, CSR. It is clear that sectoral charters are 
providing effective vehicles for this agenda although they by no means cover the 
whole economy. Whilst each charter is industry specific, they arguably significantly 
and appropriately widen the concept and beneficiaries of BEE. A notion of BEE 
which pivots on equity alone as was characteristic of the largely failed first wave of 
empowerment is bound to fail for structural reasons and thus a broader and more 
inclusive notion must prevail.
Indeed, South Africa competes for investment, goods and services with other 
developing economies in global markets. South Africa shares many of the same 
social and economic challenges as other middle income developing economies. 
However, South Africa’s particular history of apartheid creates significant political 
pressure on the state to ensure social and economic redress. South African 
competitiveness may be compromised in the long-term although the market appears 
willing to accept significant state intervention to address the question of equity. 
What would otherwise be regarded as market inefficiencies in this current phase of 
transition are tolerated in redressing exceptional circumstances and in the interest of 
social justice. Elements of BEE are widely considered by the business community as 
‘anti-market’ trade-offs. It is also clear that BEE will have to be unwound in due 
course although no such policy termination has been mooted and acute race and 
wealth differentials are likely to persist in the future.
As an operational framework SCSD does not seek to deliver social goods alone. 
Rather, it leverages relationships to this end. SCSD seeks to ensure that capacity is 
in place and opportunities are created for market-driven redistribution to occur. 
SCSD provides appropriate ways of managing need and opportunity through 
offering concerted policy frameworks and promoting implementation by multiple 
institutions, particularly the state and the market.
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APPENDIX ONE: Interview Schedule
Introduction to parameters of research, including:
• Reiteration ofpurpose o f research
• Assurance o f  confidentiality
• Anticipated time interview will take
• Seek permission to record interview and permission to quote 
anonymously
Interview
Ask for short description of company, organisation or project.
Probe areas of personal responsibility in company 
Connect to disaggregated research areas.
Corporate Social Engagement
How would you define corporate social engagement? Or CSR/CSI?
What term do you prefer to use to refer to corporate social engagement, and why? 
What are the debates as you see them?
How responsible are South Africa companies? Explain.
Probe company specific CSR programmes or corporate citizenship commitments. 
What are the benefits or vulnerabilities associated with this position?
To what extent does your company disclose its non-financial performance? Why? 
With what perceived results?
Role of Business
What do you perceive to be the role of business? Explain.
To whom is business accountable? (To whom is your company accountable?)
Do you see stakeholding as an acceptable business practice? Why?
Who are your (company’s) stakeholders? What stakeholders are specific to your 
sector?
How are these relationships managed and to what end?
What are the major challenges faced by (your) business in this climate?
Role of the State
What is the role of government? Explain.
What is the relationship between government and the business sector? (Other 
stakeholders?)
How do you perceive government’s management of social and economic 
challenges?
How would you describe the level of trust between government and business?
How do you see a social contract operating in South Africa?
What is your general assessment of government’s approach to the private sector and 
investors?
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Legislative and Policy Framework
What is your view on the legislative framework in which you operate?
What are your views on government policies towards business since 1994?
Probe specific legislation: employment equity; skills development 
How have labour regulations/legislation impacted on your business?
How has your company responded to recent empowerment legislation?
What are the challenges you face in compliance? With what benefits?
What are the biggest problems facing business? (Your business?)
Black Economic Empowerment
How would you define BEE and its purpose?
What is your general assessment of BEE as an economic and social policy?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of BEE?
How has BEE changed?
What are your BEE policies? Why do you engage in these? What are the key 
challenges?
South Africa and Globalisation
What do you perceive to be the key debates?
How would you define globalisation?
What are the key challenges facing South Africa in terms of global economic 
competition?
How important an issue is this to South Africa's development?
To what extent are the state and business responding to the challenges? (Probe: your 
company?)
Stakeholder relationships
In general, how do various stakeholder constituencies view each other in South 
Africa?
What is your view on NEDLAC? And on other multi- and bilateral organisations? 
What are the challenges associated with managing different interests? (For your 
company?)
In what ways do you communicate your values?
How important are these values to the way in which you do business?
Does your company consult with any societal groups (environmentalists, community 
groups, political groups, government)?
Other (if appropriate)
What are the challenges and opportunities facing your sector?
What are the key sectoral policy/legislative frameworks affecting your business? 
Have these assisted or prohibited growth or operations of your business?
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Probe general points raised in discussion for further detail (where necessary).
Is there anything else you would like to add to this discussion? 
Ask for additional contacts (if appropriate).
Ask for details of people or institutions mentioned in interview.
Thank interviewee
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APPENDIX TWO: List of Interviewees and Organisational
Affiliations
NAME POSITION INSTITUTION
Adele Thomas Director: South Africa Management Project
Adrian Bird Chief Director: Employment and Skills
Development Services 
Aggrey Klaaste Editor-in-Chief
Andre Bester Corporate Clinical HIV/AIDS Manager
Andre Lambrecht Executive Director
Andrew Donaldson Chief Director Financial Planning
Andrew Zaloumis Chief Operating Officer
Andy Maclaurin 
Ann Bernstein
Anthony Reznick 
Asghar Adelzadeh
Bemie Fanaroff
Bheki Sibiya 
Bonang Mohale 
Brendan Pearce
Busi Pilane
Charles Nupen
Group Human Resources Director 
Executive Director
Group Purchasing Manager
Research Director and Senior Economic
Modeller
Managing Director
Executive Director: Human Resources 
Executive Vice President 
Director
Brian Whittaker Chief Operating Officer
Bronwyn James Manager
Public Relations Officer
Chief Technical Advisor
Chris Heymans Consultant
Graduate School of 
Business Adm, Wits 
University
Department of Labour 
Sowetan
Gold Fields Limited 
Barloworld Limited 
Department of Finance/ 
Treasury 
Lubombo Spatial 
Development Initiative 
Southern Sun 
Centre for Enterprise and 
Development 
Sun International 
National Institute for 
Economic Policy 
Resolve Crime and 
Security Solutions 
Transnet Limited 
South African Airways 
Umhlaba Development 
Services 
Business Trust 
Lubombo Spatial 
Development Initiative 
Johnnie Communications 
Limited
International Labour
Organisation/Swiss
Project
McIntosh Xaba and 
Associates
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Christian Rogerson Professor
Clifford Elk Executive Director
Courtney Sprague Senior Researcher and Lecturer
Daniel Malan
David Barnard
David Story
Deborah Fox 
Deon Basson
"Manager 
Executive Director 
Director 
Director
Journalist and researcher
Dirk Geldenhuys Procurement
Douglas Ramaphosa Group Executive 
Eddie Koch Director
Eric Molobi Executive Chairman
Eric Ngubane Executive Director: Human Resources
Eric Ratschikhopha General Manager: Corporate Affairs 
Eugene Saldanha Director
Eugene Van As Chairman and Chief Executive
Francis Antonie Senior Economist
Gail Campbell Head: Absa Foundation
Gavin Anderson Chief Executive Officer
Gavin Pieterse Chief Executive
George Oricho General Manager: Development Markets
Gillian Hutchings Director: Membership and Communications
Geography and 
Environmental Studies, 
Wits University 
Mineworkers Investment 
Company
Graduate School of 
Business Administration, 
Wits University 
Business Ethics 
Consulting"
Southern African NGO 
Network
The Resolve Group 
(PTY) LTD 
CCAfrica 
Financial Times, 
Finansies and Tegniek 
and Moneyweb 
Land Bank 
ABSA 
Mafisa
Kagiso Trust Investment 
Company 
Anglo American 
Platinum Corporation 
Limited
Gensec Bank Limited
The Non-Profit
Partnership
Sappi Limited
Standard Bank of South
Africa
ABSA
Leadership Regional 
Network for Southern 
Africa
African Renaissance 
Holdings Limited 
Land Bank 
National Business
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Grace Rapholo Policy Analyst Social Development
Graeme Simpson Chief Executive Officer
Hilton Appelbaum Executive Director
Ian Russell Managing Director
Ingrid Miot Financial Director
Isaac Shongwe Director
Jan Harrison Human Resources
Jan Mahlangu Provident and Pension Fund Co-ordinator
Jayendra Naidoo Chief Operating Officer
Jeff Molobela Chairman
Jimmy Manyi Head: Business Development and Marketing
Johan Muller Manager
Jonathan Director
Yudelowitz
Joseph Claassen Corporate Affairs Manager
Karen Hesse Director
Karin Mahoney Spatial Development Initiatives
Kedibone Letlaka- Director
Rennert
Keneiloe Mohafa Social Investment Manager
Kevin Dunne Senior Manager
Kevin Handelsman Corporate Finance
Kevin Wakeford Chief Executive Officer
Khetla Shobane Chief Executive Officer
Leonie Van 
Lelyveld 
Les Kettledas
Chief Internal Officer (acting)
Deputy Dir-General: Labour Policy
Initiative
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Centre for the Study of 
Violence and 
Reconciliation 
Liberty Foundation 
Transformation Africa 
Ashira Legal Consultants 
(PTY) LTD 
Letsema 
CCAfnca 
Congress of South 
African Trade Unions 
Jay and Jayendra (PTY) 
LTD
Black Top Holdings 
Peoples Bank 
Land Bank 
Gemini Consulting
Sentech
BusinessMap South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Phambili Strategies and 
Solutions
Gold Fields Limited 
Nedcor
Dimension Data 
South African Chamber 
of Business 
Nelson Mandela 
Foundation 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Labour Market 
Programmes, Department 
of Labour
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Leslie Boyd 
Lewis Rosen
Lisa Klein
Executive Vice Chairman 
Managing Director and Director
Chief Operating Officer
Livhu Ramabulana Chief Operations Officer
Lot Ndlovu 
Louisa Mojela 
Lucy Kaplan 
Makaziwe 
Magwentchu 
Malcolm Gray
Mamathe 
Kgarimetse-Phiri 
Margie Keeton
Marie Kirsten 
Mary Cole 
Merle Favis 
Mervyn King
Michael Boyns 
Michael Rea 
Michael Spicer
Moketsi Masola
Executive Director 
Executive Director 
Researcher
Office Bearer/Consultant 
Asset Management
Senior Analyst: Affirmation Action and Gender 
Unit
Executive Director/Trustee
Policy Analyst
Operations Evaluations Specialist
Board Member
Chairman
Company Secretary
Senior Manager: Global Risk Management 
Solutions
Executive Director: Corporate Affairs
Chief Director: Tourism Development
Anglo American Pic
Global Edge Consulting
(PTY)LTD/KPMG
Jay and Jayendra (PTY)
LTD/ ex-Executive
Director Nedlac
African Legend
Investment Company
Nedcor
Wiphold
Mafisa
Afi’ican
Renaissance/Eskom 
Investec Asset 
Management 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Tshikululu Social 
Investments/Anglo 
American Chairman's 
Fund
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
South African 
Grantmakers Association 
Brait South Africa 
Limited/King 
Commission 
Johnnie Holdings 
Limited
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
Inc
Anglo American 
Corporation of South 
Africa Limited 
Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism
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Mome Havenga 
Neil van Heerden 
Nick Binedell
Nick Segal
Nick Smythe 
Nicky Young
Nonie Makose
Oupa Bodipe
Social Accounting 
Executive Director 
Director and Professor
Dean and Professor
Group Industrial Relations Manager 
Consultant and Trustee
Executive
Co-ordinator of the Secretariat Office
Oupa Mokuena Manager: Strategic and Business Planning Unit
Patrick Bond Associate Professor
Paul Edwards Group Chief Executive
Paul Graham Executive Director
Peter John Massyn Director
Phillip Armstrong Managing Director
Phillip Dexter Executive Director
Pieter Cox Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive
Priscilla De Gasparis Social Impact Specialist
Raymond Parsons Overall Business Convenor
Reg Rummney Director
Richard Wilkinson Executive Director
Rick Menell Chief Executive Officer
Land Bank
South Africa Foundation 
Gordon Institute of 
Business
The Graduate School of 
Business, University of 
Cape Town 
Gold Fields Limited 
Africa Foundation/Getty 
Foundation
New Africa Investments 
Limited
Congress of South 
African Trade Unions 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Graduate School of 
Public and Development 
Management, Wits 
University 
Johnnie Holdings 
Limited 
IDASA 
Mafisa
ENF Corporate 
Governance 
National Economic 
Development and Labour 
Council 
Sasol Limited 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
National Economic 
Development and Labour 
Council
BusinessMap South 
Africa (PTY) LTD 
Institute of Directors of 
Southern Afnca 
Anglovaal Mining
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Robin Lee 
Ross Kriel
Director
Chairman
Roy Silver Director
Sabello Macingwane Chief Executive Officer
Saliem Fakir Country Programme Coordinator
Sam Tsima Constructive Employment and Development
Samantha Terblanch Foundation Manager
Sandile Zungu
Saro Persaud
Sean de Cleene
Sean Mackay 
Steve Fitzgerald 
Steven Friedman 
Steven Gelb
Stiaan Van der 
Merwe 
Susan Hyde
Executive Director: Group Strategy and 
Empowerment
Office Bearer/Consultant
Director
Manager
Group Managing Director
Director
Policy Analyst
Chief Executive Officer
Proprietor
Teboho Mahuma Executive Director (acting)
Teuns Eloff Chief Executive
Thomas Qhena Group Director: Human Development and
Social Investment 
Tinka Wiswe Head: Corporate Secretariat
Tiyani Mongwe Board Secretary
Tumelo Motsisi Executive Chairman
Limited
Robin Lee Associates 
Ashira Legal Consultants 
(PTY) LTD 
Business for Good 
National African 
Federated Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
The World Conservation 
Union 
ABSA
CCAfnca/Afncan
Foundation
New Africa Investments 
Limited/Ex-Union 
Alliance Holdings 
Accountability Institute 
South Africa 
African Institute for 
Corporate Citizenship 
Centre for Policy Studies 
CCAfrica
Centre for Policy Studies 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Transparency South 
Africa
Susan Hyde and 
Associates Workplace 
AIDS Programmes 
South African 
Grantmakers Association 
National Business 
Initiative
Johnnie Communications 
Limited
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
Land Bank 
Prosperity Holdings
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Veronica Motsepe Assistant Director
Victoria Clarke
Vincent Maphai 
Wayne Visser
Zoe Budnick-Lees 
Zwelake Sisulu
Specialist: Tourism Planning and Development
Corporate Affairs Director 
Senior Manager: Environmental Health and 
Safety Unit 
Executive Director
Chief Executive Officer
(PTY) LTD/Ex-Kopano 
Tourism Business 
Council of South Africa 
Development Bank of 
Southern Africa 
South African Breweries 
KPMG
Industrial Environmental 
Forum of Southern 
Africa
New Africa Media
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